Opinion; Subjects: EGYPT, ARBITRARY DETENTION; [WGAD: UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung, willkürliche Haft; Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire; Gruppo di lavoro sulla detenzione arbitraria]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.26-05443 (E) 270426 270426
Human Rights Council
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention at its 105th session, 23 March–1 April 2026
Opinion No. 19/2026 concerning Abdel Khaleq Farouq (Egypt)*
1.
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of
the Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution 1997/50, the Commission extended and
clarified the mandate of the Working Group. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251
and Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the
Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a
three-year period in its resolution 51/8.
2.
In accordance with its working methods,1 on 2 December 2025 the Working Group
transmitted to the Government of Egypt a communication concerning Abdel Khaleq Farouq.
The Government replied to the communication on 27 February 2026. The State is a Party to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
3.
The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases:
(a)
When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the
deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or her
sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);
(b)
When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or
freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and, insofar as States Parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25,
26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);
(c)
When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to
the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the
relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity as to
give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);
(d)
When asylum-seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged
administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy
(category IV);
(e)
When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on
the grounds of discrimination, based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,
religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability
or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings
(category V).
* Miriam Estrada Castillo did not participate in the discussion of the case.
1 A/HRC/36/38.
United Nations
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/19
General Assembly
Distr.: General
27 April 2026
Original: English
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/19
2
GE.26-05443
1.
Submissions
(a)
Communication from the source
4.
Abdel Khaleq Farouq is an Egyptian political economist and researcher born on
26 January 1957, who resides in El-Shorouk City, Cairo. Prior to the 2011 Egyptian
revolution, he held senior positions at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic
Studies, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Egyptian Insurance Supervisory Authority and the
Central Agency for Organization and Administration. He has authored more than twenty
books on economic governance, corruption and public policy.
5.
The source reports that Mr. Farouq was previously arrested in 2018 following the
publication of his book entitled Is Egypt Really a Poor Country?, and was accused of
possessing and publishing materials containing false information. Although he was released
after eight days, the criminal case against him remained open and the book was subsequently
banned.
6.
At the time of his most recent arrest, Mr. Farouq was working as an independent
researcher and writer, and had recently published articles on social media criticizing the
Government’s economic policies, the New Administrative Capital project, and certain
businesspersons close to the authorities. The articles in question included ones entitled
“General Sisi and the theft of the century: the Administrative Capital as a model”, “Did
General Sisi receive payment for his stance on the Gaza holocaust?” and a series entitled
“The theft of the century”, published two days before his arrest.
(i)
Arrest and initial detention
7.
According to the source, on 20 October 2024 at approximately 11 p.m., approximately
10 officers of the National Security Agency in civilian clothing raided Mr. Farouq’s home.
The officers did not present an arrest warrant, nor did they inform Mr. Farouq of the reasons
for his arrest. They conducted a search of the premises, including Mr. Farouq’s office, and
seized draft publications, two flash drives, mobile telephones and laptops without producing
a search warrant or a property seizure warrant. Mr. Farouq was then taken to an undisclosed
location, which he later identified to the prosecutor in his lawyer’s presence as an Agency
facility.
8.
On 21 October 2024, officers of the National Security Agency brought him before the
Supreme State Security Prosecution in Cairo, in case No. 4937 of 2024. Mr. Farouq was
interrogated for six hours in the presence of his lawyer, with questioning centred on his
publications and research work, in particular articles critical of the President of Egypt.
Neither Mr. Farouq nor his lawyer was granted access to the case file at any stage of the
interrogation.
9.
Following the interrogation, the Supreme State Security Prosecution charged
Mr. Farouq with “joining a terrorist organization”, pursuant to article 86 bis of the Criminal
Code and article 12 of the Anti-Terrorism Act (Act No. 94 of 2015), and “spreading fake
news”, pursuant to article 102 bis of the Criminal Code. The Supreme State Security
Prosecution remanded him in pretrial detention at the Tenth of Ramadan Prison, providing
only the generic justification that detention was necessary to “complete the investigations
and ensure national security”.
(ii)
Pretrial detention
10.
Between 28 October 2024 and 18 February 2025, the Supreme State Security
Prosecution conducted eight hearings for the renewal of Mr. Farouq’s pretrial detention via
videoconference, on 28 October, 11 November, 25 November, 9 December and 23 December
2024 and 6 January, 20 January, 3 February and 18 February 2025. Mr. Farouq attended each
hearing remotely from prison while his lawyer was physically present in court. At each
hearing, the Supreme State Security Prosecution extended detention by 15 days, using the
same generic formula for justification. At no point was Mr. Farouq’s lawyer granted access
to the case file, nor were individualized reasons provided for any renewal.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/19
GE.26-05443
3
11.
On 12 and 18 March 2025, the Third Circuit of the Felony Court extended
Mr. Farouq’s pretrial detention by an additional 45 days on each occasion.
(iii)
Conditions of detention
12.
Since the beginning of his detention, Mr. Farouq’s health has deteriorated markedly
as a result of the impact of detention on his pre-existing conditions of diabetes, high blood
pressure, kidney disease and prostate problems. The prison authorities initially refused his
family’s requests to deliver medication, relenting only on 18 November 2024, almost one
month after his arrest. Mr. Farouq was reportedly transferred to a wing of the prison without
washing facilities and in which no other prisoners were held, meaning that he was subjected
to effective solitary confinement for approximately 23 hours per day.
13.
On 6 January 2025, during a renewal hearing, Mr. Farouq complained about denial of
access to sunlight, denial of exercise and inadequate medical care, and announced that he
would begin a hunger strike. On 13 January 2025, he suffered a heart attack and was
transferred to the prison hospital. Requests by his family to the Public Prosecutor for his
transfer to a private hospital at his own expense received no response. On 20 January 2025,
the Supreme State Security Prosecution renewed his detention while requesting that he
produce evidence of his earlier complaint regarding the conditions of his detention. At the
hearing on 3 February 2025, Mr. Farouq again complained about the conditions of his
detention and identified a specific officer of the National Security Agency as responsible for
his ill-treatment.
(iv)
Trial and conviction
14.
On 25 September 2025, Mr. Farouq was brought without prior notice before
El-Shorouk Misdemeanour Court to stand trial. The authorities had also failed to notify his
lawyers, who learned of the hearing only by chance, as they happened to be at the courthouse
on an unrelated matter. Mr. Farouq’s case was reregistered as No. 4527 of 2025. At this
hearing, Mr. Farouq raised the harsh conditions of his detention, including being denied
medical treatment following two heart attacks in detention and being locked in his cell for
the approximately 23 hours per day. The court ignored these complaints.
15.
On 2 October 2025, a second hearing took place before the same court. The defence
again requested access to the case file, but the judge ignored the request and proceeded to
hear the prosecution’s arguments over the defence’s objections, and refused to permit defence
submissions. After the hearing, the judge left the courthouse without publicly pronouncing
judgment, in violation of article 303 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On 4 October 2025,
Mr. Farouq’s lawyers attended the courthouse and learned that Mr. Farouq had been
convicted of “spreading false news inside and outside of Egypt”, pursuant to article 102 bis
of the Criminal Code, and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment.
(v)
Legal analysis
16.
The source submits that Mr. Farouq’s detention is arbitrary under categories I, II, III
and V.
17.
Under category I, the source alleges that Mr. Farouq’s arrest was conducted without
an arrest warrant being presented and without reasons being given, and that he was
questioned only after detention overnight at an undisclosed facility of the National Security
Agency. The source submits that the charges of “joining a terrorist organization” and
“spreading fake news” are defined with insufficient clarity and foreseeability to meet the
requirements of article 9 (1) of the Covenant, noting paragraph 22 of general comment No. 35
(2014) of the Human Rights Committee. It further contends that the repeated renewal by the
Supreme State Security Prosecution of pretrial detention with generic justifications lacks the
individualized necessity assessment required under article 9 (3) of the Covenant, and that the
Supreme State Security Prosecution does not constitute an independent judicial authority in
the context of article 9 (3), as the Working Group has previously determined. Pretrial
detention was thus not subject to genuine independent judicial authorization or review, in
violation of article 9 (3) and (4) of the Covenant.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/19
4
GE.26-05443
18.
Under category II, the source submits that Mr. Farouq’s arrest and detention were a
direct response to his exercise of freedom of expression on matters of public interest. The
source points to the close temporal proximity between the publication of his critical articles
and his arrest two days later, the focus of the interrogation exclusively on his publications,
and the seizure of his manuscripts and digital devices. It notes that the categories of speech
at issue – commentary on economic policy, governance and the conduct of public officials –
attract the highest level of protection under article 19 of the Covenant. The source submits
that the vague provisions invoked to restrict Mr. Farouq’s freedom expression fail the
requirements of legality, necessity and proportionality pursuant to article 19 (3) of the
Covenant.
19.
Under category III, the source alleges the following: the failure to inform Mr. Farouq
in detail of the charges against him, in violation of article 14 (3) (a) of the Covenant; the
systematic denial of access to the case file during hearings for the renewal of pretrial
detention, at trial and on appeal, in violation of article 14 (3) (b) and (5) of the Covenant; the
absence of any meaningful opportunity to make defence submissions at trial; the failure to
publicly pronounce judgment, in violation of article 14 (1) of the Covenant and domestic
procedural law; and conditions of detention that severely impaired Mr. Farouq’s ability to
participate in his own defence, compounding violations of the principle of equality of arms.
The source submits that these violations, in aggregate, are of sufficient gravity to render his
detention arbitrary under category III.
20.
Under category V, the source submits that Mr. Farouq’s arrest and detention are part
of a broader documented pattern of targeting academics, journalists, writers, lawyers and
political opponents of the Government, as established by the Working Group in previous
opinions. It argues that detention for the exercise of civil and political rights raises a strong
presumption of discriminatory treatment on the basis of political opinion, in violation of
articles 2 (1) and 26 of the Covenant.
(b)
Response from the Government
21.
On 2 December 2025, the Working Group transmitted the allegations by the source to
the Government under its regular communications procedure. The Working Group requested
the Government to provide, by 2 February 2026, detailed information about Mr. Farouq and
to clarify the legal provisions justifying his detention, as well as its compatibility with the
Government’s obligations under international human rights law, in particular with regard to
the treaties ratified by the State. Moreover, the Working Group called upon the Government
to ensure Mr. Farouq’s physical and mental integrity.
22.
The Government requested an extension of the deadline for its reply, which was
granted. The Government replied to the Working Group’s communication on 27 February
2026.
23.
Concerning the lawfulness of the arrest, the Government states that Mr. Farouq was
apprehended pursuant to a judicial warrant duly issued by the Public Prosecution in
connection with case No. 4527 of 2025, and that all procedures for entering and searching
the residence were carried out in accordance with article 54 of the Constitution. It states that
there was no enforced disappearance or unlawful detention at an undisclosed location.
24.
On judicial safeguards, the Government contends that the Public Prosecution, as an
integral part of the judiciary under article 189 of the Constitution, provides judicial protection
over detention, and that Mr. Farouq was brought before the Public Prosecutor immediately
following his apprehension on 20 October 2024. It states that he was questioned in the
presence of his private lawyer and presented with the evidence against him, including
technical reports and electronic publications.
25.
Concerning the trial, the Government states that at the hearing on 2 October 2025, the
court granted the defence’s request for a postponement to review the case files. The
Government therefore completely refutes the allegation that the court ignored the request to
access the file. It states that Mr. Farouq exercised his right of appeal, that his lawyers filed a
motion for recusal at the appeal stage and that the appeal was dismissed on 25 December
2025 after fair and impartial proceedings. The Government states that the judiciary is
independent and that all conditions of fairness were met.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/19
GE.26-05443
5
26.
On conditions of detention and healthcare, the Government states that Mr. Farouq
receives full medical care in accordance with Act No. 14 of 2022, on correctional and
rehabilitation centres, that his vital signs are within normal ranges and that his general
condition is stable. It states that placement in a specific location within a correctional facility
is subject to classification criteria and is not a form of punishment, and that any isolation may
be for medical or security reasons to protect the detainee. It states that Mr. Farouq receives
regular family visits, daily exercise, meals and access to washing and hygiene facilities
appropriate to human dignity.
27.
Replying to the source’s arguments on violation of the right to freedom of expression,
the Government acknowledges that article 19 (3) of the Covenant permits restrictions
necessary to protect national security or public order, and asserts that Mr. Farouq was
prosecuted not for writing economic articles but for specific criminal offences, namely the
publication and broadcasting of false news, statements and rumours through his social media
account that were liable to harm the national interest and disturb public security. It states that
technical reports proved that what he had published contained false information with no basis
in reality, aimed at causing chaos and undermining confidence in the national economy, and
that such conduct falls within the scope of incitement and the spreading of falsehoods, which
it notes are punishable in most democratic legal systems.
28.
The Government requests that the Working Group dismiss the communication as
unfounded.
(c)
Additional comments from the source
29.
The Government’s observations were submitted to the source, which provided further
observations on 17 March 2026.
30.
The source notes that the Government does not contest the allegation that officers of
the National Security Agency failed to provide Mr. Farouq with the arrest warrant and to
inform him of the reasons for his arrest at the time. It further notes that Mr. Farouq’s lawyer
did not see a copy of the warrant until 6 November 2025, during the appeal proceedings. The
failure to present the warrant at the relevant time rendered the arrest arbitrary under
article 9 (1) of the Covenant regardless of whether the warrant had been issued.
31.
The source dismisses the Government’s contention that the involvement of the
Supreme State Security Prosecution provided judicial protection as inconsistent with the
requirements of article 9 (3) of the Covenant. It notes that, on the Government’s own account,
Mr. Farouq was brought before no authority other than the Supreme State Security
Prosecution following his arrest. The Supreme State Security Prosecution does not possess
the characteristics of independence necessary to satisfy article 9 (3), as detailed in the
source’s previous submissions.
32.
Concerning overnight detention, the source claims that the Government admits that,
following Mr. Farouq’s arrest on 20 October 2024, he was brought before the Supreme State
Security Prosecution for the initial interrogation on 21 October 2024. In its response, the
Government states that Mr. Farouq was arrested on 20 October 2024 pursuant to a judicial
warrant, and brought before the Public Prosecutor immediately after his arrest, without
indicating the date. The Government provides no explanation as to his whereabouts during
the intervening hours, which the source submits were spent at an undisclosed facility of the
National Security Agency.
33.
With regard to access to the case file at trial, the source clarifies that while the
Misdemeanour Court, at the hearing on 2 October 2025, granted a postponement to enable
access to the file, the court clerk subsequently refused to provide it. The court proceeded with
the prosecution’s arguments over the defence’s objections, and the judge left without publicly
pronouncing the verdict. Mr. Farouq’s lawyer therefore had no access to the case file during
any stage of the first-instance proceedings.
34.
The source also notes that access to the case file was denied throughout the appeal
proceedings until partial access was provided on 6 November 2025, that missing documents
were never supplied despite a further request, and that the appeal was dismissed, meaning
Mr. Farouq was convicted and his conviction upheld without ever having had full access to
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/19
6
GE.26-05443
the evidence against him. A further appeal before the Court of Cassation is reported to be
pending.
35.
The source submits that the Government has failed to respond to the specific
allegations regarding the month-long denial of medication, the failure by the Public
Prosecutor to respond to requests by Mr. Farouq’s family, and Mr. Farouq’s transferral to a
wing of the prison without washing facilities and in which no other inmates were held. The
source notes that the Government’s general and unparticularized response calls into question
whether it is engaging with the Working Group in good faith.
36.
Lastly, the source submits that the Government’s invocation of article 19 (3) of the
Covenant fails to address the core submission that vague criminal provisions targeting
political commentary cannot constitute a lawful restriction on expression, and that the
prosecution was directly related to the political nature and critical content of Mr. Farouq’s
writings rather than to any specific false statement.
2.
Discussion
37.
The Working Group thanks the source and the Government for their submissions.
38.
In determining whether Mr. Farouq’s detention is arbitrary, the Working Group has
regard to the principles established in its jurisprudence to deal with evidentiary issues. If the
source has established a prima facie case for breach of international requirements constituting
arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be understood to rest upon the Government if
it wishes to refute the allegations. Mere assertions by the Government that lawful procedures
have been followed are not sufficient to rebut the source’s allegations.
(a)
Category I
39.
The source submits that Mr. Farouq’s deprivation of liberty violates category I by
reason of: (a) the failure to present an arrest warrant and to give reasons at the time of his
arrest; (b) his detention overnight at an undisclosed facility of the National Security Agency;
(c) the insufficiency of the legal basis for his pretrial detention, including the vagueness of
the charges and the lack of individualized reasons; and (d) the absence of independent judicial
authorization and review of his continued detention.
40.
The Working Group notes at the outset that the Government does not contest that
officers of the National Security Agency failed to show Mr. Farouq the arrest warrant at the
time of his arrest on the evening of 20 October 2024, nor that his lawyer did not obtain a copy
until 6 November 2025, more than a year later. Article 9 (2) of the Covenant requires that
anyone arrested be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for the arrest and promptly
informed of any charges. The Constitution equally requires, under article 54, that anyone
whose freedom is restricted be immediately informed of the reasons. The failure to
communicate the reasons for arrest, and to provide or show the warrant at the relevant time,
is uncontested and constitutes a violation of article 9 (2) of the Covenant, independently
rendering the initial deprivation of liberty without a lawful basis.
41.
Regarding the overnight detention at an undisclosed facility of the National Security
Agency, the Working Group notes the Government’s claim that Mr. Farouq was brought
before the prosecution immediately after his arrest on 20 October 2024. However, the
Government does not specify the date of Mr. Farouq’s first appearance before the Supreme
State Security Prosecution. No explanation is offered as to his whereabouts during the
intervening period, notwithstanding Mr. Farouq’s statement to the prosecutor that he had
been held at an Agency facility. Detention at an undisclosed location, even for a brief period,
places a detainee outside the protection of the law and is incompatible with articles 9 (1) and
(4) and 16 of the Covenant.2 The Working Group finds this allegation unrefuted and credible.
42.
In respect of the allegation of vagueness of the charges, the Working Group recalls
that vaguely and broadly worded provisions, which cannot qualify as lex certa, violate the
2 Opinion No. 17/2024, para. 62; Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form
of Detention or Imprisonment, principles 12 (1) (d) and 16 (1); and Code of Criminal Procedure,
art. 139.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/19
GE.26-05443
7
due process of law underpinned by the principle of legality in article 11 (2) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and that the Human Rights Committee has found that detention
pursuant to proceedings incompatible with article 15 (1) of the Covenant is necessarily
arbitrary within the meaning of article 9 (1).3 The Working Group has previously examined
articles 80 D, 86 bis and 102 bis of the Criminal Code and the Anti-Terrorism Act in the light
of the principle of legality, finding that these provisions cannot qualify as lex certa and may
be used to deprive individuals of their liberty without a specific legal basis.4 It has further
observed that the requirements of lex praevia, lex stricta, lex certa and lex scripta must be
construed more strictly in proportion to the severity of the prescribed punishment, and that
laws that are vaguely and broadly worded may have a deterrent effect on the exercise of the
rights and freedoms of individuals, as they have the potential to cause abuse, including the
arbitrary deprivation of liberty.5 The Working Group has therefore echoed the concerns
expressed in 2020 by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism about amendments to the 2015
Anti-Terrorism Act that could result in more, not less, abuse and a chilling effect.6
43.
Absent any significant comment from the Government in this respect, the Working
Group sees no reason to depart from those findings in the present case. The definition of
“terrorist crimes” under article 2 of the Anti-Terrorism Act encompasses any act that harms
“national unity”, “social peace”, “the interests or security of the community” or “freedoms
and rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the law”, sweeping formulations that remain
undefined in the text of the law and do not provide fair notice to a person whose conduct
consists of economic analysis and political commentary. Article 80 D of the Criminal Code,
which became the basis for Mr. Farouq’s conviction, likewise criminalizes the dissemination
of information that damages the “dignity and prestige” of the country, terms that are equally
undefined and susceptible to arbitrary application. Deprivation of liberty pursuant to such
charges does not rest on a legal basis that satisfies article 9 (1) of the Covenant.
44.
The Working Group further notes that the Supreme State Security Prosecution
repeatedly renewed Mr. Farouq’s pretrial detention over a period of approximately four
months, using at every instance an identical formula referring to the need to “complete the
investigations and ensure national security”. Article 9 (3) of the Covenant requires that
pretrial detention be justified on the basis of an individualized assessment of the necessity
and proportionality of continued custody, taking into account the specific circumstances of
the detainee.7 The invocation of national security in generic terms, without any analysis of
the specific risks posed by Mr. Farouq’s release, without any consideration of alternatives to
custody and with no reference to his individual circumstances, does not meet this standard.
The source’s allegation that no individualized reasoning was ever provided has not been
contested with specificity by the Government.
45.
Furthermore, article 9 (3) of the Covenant requires that anyone detained on a criminal
charge be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise
judicial power. The Working Group has previously found that the Supreme State Security
Prosecution does not qualify as an independent judicial authority in the context of this
provision.8 The Government’s argument that the Public Prosecution constitutes a part of the
judiciary under article 189 of the Constitution does not resolve this question, since the
functional independence of the reviewing authority – including its separation from the
prosecutorial function – is what article 9 (3) demands. In the present case, the Supreme State
Security Prosecution issued the arrest warrant, conducted the interrogation, preferred the
charges and authorized the majority of the renewals of pretrial detention. It cannot be
considered independent for the purposes of the judicial review of the detention that it has
ordered. Mr. Farouq was accordingly never brought before a genuinely independent judicial
3 General comment No. 35 (2014), para. 22.
4 Opinion No. 14/2020, paras. 57 and 58.
5 Opinion No. 14/2020, paras. 58 and 59.
6 Ibid., para. 59; and OHCHR, “Egypt’s updated terrorism law opens the door to more rights abuses,
says UN expert”, news release, 9 April 2020.
7 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 38; and Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, principle 39.
8 Opinion No. 45/2021, para. 80.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/19
8
GE.26-05443
authority during the entirety of his pretrial detention, extending from October 2024 to at least
March 2025.
46.
The absence of independent judicial review also frustrated Mr. Farouq’s right to bring
proceedings before a court to challenge the lawfulness of his detention, under article 9 (4) of
the Covenant. The consistent denial of access to the case file during renewal hearings – a
matter that the Government does not dispute with any particularity – meant that neither
Mr. Farouq nor his lawyer could effectively contest the stated grounds for detention,
rendering any review process illusory.
47.
In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group finds that Mr. Farouq’s deprivation
of liberty lacks sufficient legal basis and is arbitrary under category I, in violation of
article 9 (1)–(4) of the Covenant and articles 3 and 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
(b)
Category II
48.
The source submits that Mr. Farouq’s arrest and continued detention are a direct
consequence of his exercise of the right to freedom of expression through his writings on
economic and political affairs, including criticism of the President of Egypt and government
policy.
49.
The Working Group begins by observing the close temporal connection between
Mr. Farouq’s publication of critical articles and his arrest. He was arrested on the evening of
20 October 2024, two days after publishing a series of articles highly critical of the President
and of economic policies. The search of his home targeted his manuscripts and digital
devices. His six-hour interrogation before the Supreme State Security Prosecution centred
exclusively on his publications and research. The charges, though formally framed in
criminal law terms, relate entirely to the content of his writings.
50.
The Government does not engage with the substance of this argument. It asserts only
that Mr. Farouq was prosecuted for specific criminal offences under national law and that
technical reports proved that his publications contained false information. It does not identify
which publications were false, in what respect or what “technical reports” were relied upon.
The Working Group has before it no evidence that any of Mr. Farouq’s published analyses
were factually false, as opposed to being critical of or unwelcome to the Government.
51.
The Working Group recalls that the right to freedom of expression under article 19 of
the Covenant and article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights encompasses the
right to seek, receive and impart information on economic and political affairs, including
criticism of government policy and of public officials. The Human Rights Committee has
confirmed that this right extends to commentary of the kind that may disturb public officials
or those in power, and that it applies to written communication, including books and articles
published in traditional and online media.9 Academic and economic analysis on matters of
public concern – which is Mr. Farouq’s professional output – warrants the highest level of
protection as expression on matters of public interest.10
52.
Any restriction of freedom of expression must meet the three-part test under
article 19 (3) of the Covenant: it must be provided by law with sufficient precision, it must
pursue a legitimate aim and it must be necessary and proportionate. The Working Group has
already found above that the relevant provisions of Egyptian law are insufficiently precise to
constitute lawful restriction of expression. Even if they were sufficiently precise, the
Government has provided no demonstration that criminalizing political and economic
commentary – a form of expression falling at the very heart of the protection afforded by
article 19 – is necessary and proportionate for the protection of national security or public
order. The assertion that Mr. Farouq’s articles were designed to cause chaos and undermine
confidence in the national economy is a characterization that goes unsubstantiated; no court
evidence is cited, no specific factually false assertion identified and no harm to any
cognizable protected interest is shown.
9 General comment No. 34 (2011), paras. 11 and 20.
10 Ibid., paras. 20 and 38.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/19
GE.26-05443
9
53.
The Working Group notes that this case bears the hallmarks of what the Human Rights
Committee has described as detention as punishment for the legitimate exercise of rights
guaranteed by the Covenant, which is per se arbitrary under article 9 (1).11 Mr. Farouq was a
prolific critic of the authorities whose previous arrest in 2018 arose from similar
circumstances. The pattern of targeting, the timing of the arrest, the content of the
interrogation, the seizure of his manuscripts and the nature of the eventual conviction all
converge on the conclusion that his detention was the product of his expression and not of
any genuinely criminal conduct.
54.
The Working Group accordingly finds that the deprivation of liberty of Mr. Farouq
results from his exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, as protected by
article 19 of the Covenant and article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
is therefore arbitrary under category II.
(c)
Category III
55.
Given its finding that Mr. Farouq’s detention is arbitrary under category II, the
Working Group emphasizes that no trial should have taken place. Nevertheless, as the trial
did take place, the Working Group will proceed to examine the source’s submissions
concerning the denial of the right to a fair trial.
56.
The source submits that Mr. Farouq’s deprivation of liberty is rendered arbitrary under
category III by a series of violations of the right to a fair trial of the greatest gravity, which
persisted throughout the pretrial, trial and appellate stages of proceedings.
57.
Concerning the source’s complaint on the right to be informed in detail of the charges,
the Working Group notes that throughout the pretrial period, Mr. Farouq and his lawyer were
informed only of the bare statutory labels of the charges – “joining a terrorist organization”
and “spreading fake news” – without any factual particularization indicating which conduct
was alleged to constitute the offence, what organization he was alleged to have joined or
which specific publications were characterized as fake news. This failure was compounded
by consistent denial of access to the case file at every stage of the hearings for the renewal of
pretrial detention. The right under article 14 (3) (a) to be informed in detail of the charges
requires more than the generic recitation of an offence; it requires that the accused be in a
position to understand the nature and factual basis of the prosecution so as to mount an
effective defence.12 This minimum standard was never met.
58.
On the right to adequate facilities for the preparation of a defence, the Working Group
regards as among the most serious violations documented in this case the persistent denial of
access to the case file. This denial was not merely procedural; it was systematic and
maintained throughout the entirety of the criminal proceedings. During the pretrial period,
spanning from October 2024 to September 2025, the lawyer was denied access to the case
file at every renewal hearing. On the Government’s own account, a request for access was
addressed only when the trial court granted a postponement at the hearing on 2 October 2025.
However, as detailed in the source’s observations, the court clerk thereafter refused to
provide the file, at the next hearing the court proceeded despite the defence’s renewed
objections, and Mr. Farouq’s lawyer was not permitted to make any defence submissions.
The conviction was pronounced without defence counsel ever having read the charges, the
evidence or the case materials on which the prosecution relied.
59.
The Working Group observes that the Government’s claim that the court granted the
request to access the file is technically accurate but materially misleading. A court order
granting access has no effect if the court clerk, an officer under the court’s own supervision,
refuses to give effect to it. The source’s detailed account of the practical denial of file access
– corroborated by the fact that the appeal court was itself compelled to grant repeated
adjournments for the same purpose before eventually proceeding without full file disclosure
– has not been meaningfully refuted by the Government. The Working Group accepts the
source’s account.
11 General comment No. 35 (2014), para. 17.
12 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007), para. 31.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/19
10
GE.26-05443
60.
Access to the case file must in principle be provided from the outset of proceedings,
and every individual deprived of liberty has the right to have access to material related to his
or her detention.13 That right is not absolute: the disclosure of information may be restricted
if such a restriction is necessary and proportionate in pursuing a legitimate aim, such as the
protection of national security, and if the State has demonstrated that less restrictive measures
– such as providing redacted summaries that clearly point to the factual basis for the detention
– would be unable to achieve the same result.14 In the present case, the Government has not
provided any justification, at any stage of the proceedings, for the consistent refusal to grant
Mr. Farouq’s lawyer access to the case file. No claim of necessity, no invocation of national
security considerations and no offer of alternative disclosure was made either before the
domestic courts or to the Working Group. The systematic and unjustified denial of access for
Mr. Farouq’s defence counsel to the case file, from the moment of Mr. Farouq’s arrest
through to the conclusion of the appeal proceedings, constitutes a fundamental violation of
the principle of equality of arms and of his rights under articles 10 and 11 (1) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and article 14 (1) and (3) (b) and (e) of the Covenant.
61.
The Working Group notes the uncontested allegation that the trial judge left the
courthouse on 2 October 2025 without publicly pronouncing judgment, in violation of
article 14 (1) of the Covenant, which requires that any judgment be made public.
Mr. Farouq’s lawyers were only informed of the conviction two days later when they
attended the courthouse to inquire as to the verdict, since they had heard no announcement,
no reasons had been given in open court and they had had no opportunity to respond. The
Working Group has previously recalled that the right to a public hearing under article 10 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes the right to public pronouncement of a
judgment. Complete concealment from the public of the entirety of a judicial decision cannot
be justified under international law.15
62.
Concerning the right to an effective appeal, the Working Group finds that the same
pattern of denial of access to the case file that undermined first-instance proceedings was also
evident in the appeal. Partial access was provided only on 6 November 2025, after multiple
adjournments, and missing documents were never provided. Despite this, the court of appeal,
on 25 December 2025 proceeded to dismiss the appeal and upheld the conviction. An appeal
cannot be considered an effective remedy within the meaning of article 14 (5) of the Covenant
where the accused has never had access to the entirety of the evidence and case materials on
which the lower court based the conviction.
63.
Assessing the source’s submissions on conditions of detention and their impact on the
right to prepare a defence, the Working Group notes the uncontested and documented
deterioration of Mr. Farouq’s health: the initial denial of medication for nearly a month, the
effective solitary confinement in a wing without washing facilities, the heart attack on
13 January 2025, the hunger strike, and the reports of two heart attacks while in custody. The
source submits that these conditions severely compromised Mr. Farouq’s ability to
participate in proceedings. The Government asserts that he receives adequate care, but fails
to address the specific allegations with reference to any medical documentation and fails to
give any explanation as to why his family’s requests regarding medication were refused and
why there was no response to the family’s communications to the Public Prosecutor.
64.
The Working Group observes that the conditions of detention described – near-total
isolation, denial of medication, denial of sunlight and exercise, and the heart attacks – are of
such a nature as to raise concerns of treatment contrary to articles 7 and 10 (1) of the
Covenant. It finds that the conditions cumulatively impaired Mr. Farouq’s capacity to
participate meaningfully in his own defence, further contributing to the arbitrary character of
his continued detention.
65.
The violations identified – systemic denial of case file access, absence of any defence
submissions, the failure to publicly pronounce judgment and the failure to conduct a
13 Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right of Anyone Deprived of
Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court, principles 12 and 13; and opinion No. 83/2021,
para. 84.
14 Opinion No. 83/2021, para. 84.
15 Opinion No. 47/2025, para. 77.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/19
GE.26-05443
11
meaningful appeal – are serious and in combination constitute non-observance of the
international norms relating to the right to a fair trial, the gravity of which renders
Mr. Farouq’s deprivation of liberty arbitrary under category III. The Working Group
accordingly finds violations of articles 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and of article 14 (1), (3) (a), (b) and (e) and (5) of the Covenant.
(d)
Category V
66.
The source has submitted that Mr. Farouq was arrested, detained and convicted as a
direct consequence of his political opinions and his professional activity as an economist and
writer critical of the Government. It argues that his detention forms part of a broader pattern
of persecution of academics, journalists, lawyers and political opponents in Egypt through
the weaponization of provisions to combat terrorism and false news. The Working Group has
found under category II that Mr. Farouq’s detention resulted from his legitimate exercise of
the right to freedom of opinion and expression, creating a strong presumption that the
detention also constitutes a violation of international law on grounds of discrimination on the
basis of political or other views. Accordingly, the Working Group proceeds to examine the
allegations under category V.
67.
The source argues that several indicators establish the discriminatory nature of
Mr. Farouq’s detention on the basis of his political opinion. First, his deprivation of liberty
is part of a pattern of persecution directed against him personally, including his previous
arrest in 2018 following the publication of a book critical of economic governance, a case in
which the criminal proceedings were never formally closed and the book was banned.
Second, the manner of his arrest – a late-night raid by officers of the National Security
Agency, the seizure of his manuscripts and devices, and an interrogation focused exclusively
on the content of his publications – reflects the same modus operandi documented in prior
cases before this Working Group concerning Egypt. Third, other individuals with similar
distinguishing characteristics – namely, their public expression of views critical of the
Government – have been subjected to comparable treatment.
68.
The Government, in its response, asserts that the law applies to all equally without
discrimination on the basis of political opinion or professional background, and that
Mr. Farouq was prosecuted for specific criminal acts rather than for his identity as an
economist or his political views. The Working Group notes that this response does not engage
with the specific indicators of discriminatory targeting identified by the source, nor does it
address the pattern of prior persecution of Mr. Farouq or explain why, if the prosecution was
genuinely concerned about criminally false statements rather than with the political content
of his work, officers of the National Security Agency seized his manuscripts and interrogated
him exclusively about his critical publications.
69.
The Working Group considers that the presumption of discrimination is strongly
reinforced in Mr. Farouq’s case by the convergence of several factors: his previous arrest in
2018 on materially identical charges arising from the same type of critical writing; the
broader, well-documented pattern of the Egyptian authorities targeting academics,
researchers, journalists and political opponents on the basis of the same legal provisions
examined in this opinion; and the Working Group’s findings in multiple prior opinions that
such provisions have been systematically used in Egypt to suppress legitimate dissent.16 This
pattern has been documented not only by the Working Group but also by other special
procedures of the Human Rights Council.17
70.
Considering the pattern of discriminatory conduct displayed by the Egyptian
authorities towards Mr. Farouq on the basis of his political opinion, the Working Group finds
that his arrest and detention were based on discrimination resulting from his political opinion,
in violation of articles 2 (1) and 26 of the Covenant and articles 2 and 7 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. His deprivation of liberty is therefore arbitrary under
category V.
16 See opinions No. 14/2020, No. 42/2021, No. 45/2021 and No. 83/2021.
17 https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/12/un-experts-urge-release-rights-defenders-egypt-
condemn-misuse-counter.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/19
12
GE.26-05443
(e)
Concluding remarks
71.
The Working Group notes that the present opinion is one of several brought before
the Working Group in recent years concerning arbitrary detention in Egypt.18 The Working
Group remains concerned that this might indicate a widespread or systematic practice of
arbitrary detention in Egypt, including through the unlawful practice of rotation, whereby
release is ordered but never effected and new charges are brought against the person
concerned.19 The Working Group recalls that States have the obligation not to engage in acts
that could constitute crimes against humanity, and to prevent and punish them if they are
committed.
3.
Disposition
72.
In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:
The deprivation of liberty of Abdel Khaleq Farouq, being in contravention of
articles 3, 9, 10, 11 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles
2, 9, 14, 19 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is
arbitrary and falls within categories I, II, III and V.
73.
The Working Group requests the Government of Egypt to take the steps necessary to
remedy the situation of Mr. Farouq without delay and bring it into conformity with the
relevant international norms, including those set out in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
74.
The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the
case, the appropriate remedy would be to release Mr. Farouq immediately and accord him an
enforceable right to compensation and other reparations, in accordance with international
law.
75.
The Working Group urges the Government to ensure a full and independent
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of
Mr. Farouq and to take appropriate measures against those responsible for the violation of
his rights.
76.
The Working Group calls upon the Government of Egypt to urgently review and
amend the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2015 and the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code, to
bring them into conformity with the obligations of Egypt under articles 9, 15 and 19 of the
Covenant, so as to ensure that no person may be deprived of liberty on the basis of vague and
overbroad provisions. The Working Group also calls upon the Government to urgently
review and amend the legislative framework governing pretrial detention, including the
provisions conferring on the Supreme State Security Prosecution the power to authorize,
renew and supervise detention, so as to ensure that any person deprived of liberty is brought
promptly before a genuinely independent judicial authority – separate from and independent
of the prosecutorial function – in full conformity with article 9 (3) of the Covenant and the
requirement that independent judicial scrutiny of the action of the detaining authority be
exercised no later than 48 hours after arrest.
77.
The Working Group requests the Government to disseminate the present opinion
through all available means and as widely as possible.
4.
Follow-up procedure
78.
In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group requests
the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in follow-up
to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including:
(a)
Whether Mr. Farouq has been released and, if so, on what date;
18 See opinions No. 23/2022, No. 34/2022, No. 53/2022, No. 60/2022, No. 12/2023, No. 20/2023,
No. 31/2023, No. 36/2023, No. 40/2023, No. 70/2023, No. 8/2024, No. 17/2024, No. 20/2024,
No. 23/2025, No. 25/2025, No. 29/2025, No. 32/2025 and No. 56/2025.
19 See opinions No. 23/2025, No. 29/2025 and No. 32/2025.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/19
GE.26-05443
13
(b)
Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to Mr. Farouq;
(c)
Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of Mr. Farouq’s
rights and, if so, the outcome of the investigation;
(d)
Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made to
harmonize the laws and practices of Egypt with its international obligations in line with the
present opinion;
(e)
Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.
79.
The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may
have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and
whether additional technical assistance is required, for example through a visit by the
Working Group.
80.
The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the
above-mentioned information within six months of the date of transmission of the present
opinion. However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up
to the opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action
would enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in
implementing its recommendations, as well as of any failure to take action.
81.
The Working Group recalls that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all States
to cooperate with the Working Group and has requested them to take account of its views
and, where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken.20
[Adopted on 29 March 2026]
20 Human Rights Council resolution 60/8, paras. 6 and 9.