Opinion; Subjects: BURUNDI, ARBITRARY DETENTION; [WGAD: UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung, willkürliche Haft; Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire; Gruppo di lavoro sulla detenzione arbitraria]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.26-05886 (E) 150526 150526
Human Rights Council
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention at its 105th session, 23 March–1 April 2026
Opinion No. 1/2026 concerning Aline Sandra Muhoza (Burundi)
1.
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of
the Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution 1997/50, the Commission extended and
clarified the mandate of the Working Group. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251
and Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the
Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a
three-year period in its resolution 60/8.
2.
In accordance with its methods of work,1 on 15 January 2026 the Working Group
transmitted to the Government of Burundi a communication concerning Aline Sandra
Muhoza. The Government has not replied to the communication. The State is a Party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
3.
The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases:
(a)
When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the
deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or her
sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);
(b)
When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or
freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and, insofar as States Parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25,
26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);
(c)
When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to
the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the
relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity as to
give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);
(d)
When asylum-seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged
administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy
(category IV);
(e)
When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on
the grounds of discrimination, based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,
religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability
or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings
(category V).
1 A/HRC/36/38.
United Nations
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/1
General Assembly
Distr.: General
6 May 2026
English
Original: French
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/1
2
GE.26-05886
1.
Submissions
(a)
Communication from the source
(i)
Facts reported
4.
Aline Sandra Muhoza, born in 1982, is a journalist of Burundi for the online
newspaper La Nova Burundi. She lives in the commune of Ngozi, in Burundi.
5.
The source reports that Ms. Muhoza was arrested on 13 April 2024 in the Ngozi
region.
6.
Just before her arrest, she had reportedly received a phone call from a businessman
with ties to the ruling party, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces
pour la défense de la démocratie, regarding an article on agriculture. Ms. Muhoza reportedly
went to the meeting place in the Ngozi region to interview the person in question, but upon
her arrival, she was arrested by agents of the National Intelligence Service. They reportedly
did not inform her of the reason for her arrest and she was not shown an arrest warrant.
7.
According to the source, Ms. Muhoza was held overnight in Ngozi following her
arrest before being transferred to the headquarters of the National Intelligence Service in the
economic capital, Bujumbura, without being given access to her family or a lawyer.
8.
On 19 April 2024, six days after her arrest, and after being questioned for several days
by the National Intelligence Service, Ms. Muhoza was formally charged by the Attorney
General with incitement to racial or ethnic aversion or hatred, in violation of article 266 of
the Criminal Code, and with denigration of the country, or undermining the integrity of the
national territory, in violation of article 611 of the Criminal Code. According to the source,
it was not until this point that Ms. Muhoza was informed of the reasons for her arrest and
allowed to contact her lawyer and family.
9.
The source reports that Ms. Muhoza’s arrest appears to be based on messages that she
allegedly sent to a private group of journalists on a messaging application as part of a
discussion about the alleged distribution of machetes in certain regions of the country.
Ms. Muhoza reportedly claimed that weapons had recently been distributed “to wipe us all
out,” referring to certain segments of the Burundian population. When another member of
the group of journalists asked Ms. Muhoza if she could show them at least two or three
households that had received machetes, she replied that she could show them more.
10.
On 6 May 2024, Ms. Muhoza appeared before a judge at a preliminary hearing.
Ms. Muhoza’s lawyer argued that her case did not fall into the category of cases in which
provisional release could not be granted pending trial. However, the judge ordered that
Ms. Muhoza remain in pretrial detention, without providing any justification for his decision,
even though, according to the source, Burundian law allows detainees to be released subject
to an undertaking to appear for the duration of the trial. Ms. Muhoza’s lawyers appealed
against the refusal of their client’s request for provisional release, but the appeal was denied
on 8 May 2024.
11.
Ms. Muhoza’s trial took place at the Mukaza Tribunal de Grande Instance (court of
major jurisdiction) in Bujumbura Province in November 2024.
12.
On 16 December 2024, the Court found Ms. Muhoza guilty and sentenced her to
21 months in prison – 18 months for undermining national territorial integrity and 3 months
for racial aversion – for messages she had sent to a private group of journalists on a messaging
application. Ms. Muhoza and the public prosecutor’s office both appealed against the ruling.
13.
On 30 May 2025, the Bujumbura Mairie Court of Appeal ruled that neither it nor the
court of first instance (in this case, the Mukaza Tribunal de Grande Instance) had jurisdiction
to hear the case involving Ms. Muhoza. The Court cited a law on judicial procedures
establishing that defendants must be tried by a court in the region where they were arrested,
where they reside, or where the alleged offence was committed, and noted that Ms. Muhoza
resided in, and had been arrested in, Ngozi Province. On that basis, the court ordered the case
to be referred to the competent court.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/1
GE.26-05886
3
14.
The source maintains that the court of appeal’s ruling effectively overturned
Ms. Muhoza’s conviction, thereby depriving her ongoing detention beyond 30 May 2025 of
any legal basis. Despite this, Ms. Muhoza remained in detention in Mpimba Central Prison
in Bujumbura until she was transferred to Ngozi Prison on 26 September 2025. She was also
denied a court hearing on her ongoing detention until 7 October 2025. According to the
source, no effort was made to secure her release, despite the fact that her conviction had been
expressly overturned by the ruling of the Bujumbura Mairie Court of Appeal.
15.
The source argues that, even if the authorities intended to hold a new trial before a
different court, Ms. Muhoza’s continued detention at Mpimba Prison lacked any legal basis,
since the court of appeal’s ruling had overturned all previous interim orders and the initial
arrest warrant had expired without further judicial review.
16.
The source notes that it was only after she was transferred to Ngozi Prison, in late
September 2025, that Ms. Muhoza was able to appear in new proceedings before a court in
that region.
17.
On 7 October 2025, during a hearing before the Ngozi Tribunal de Grande Instance
(court of major jurisdiction), Ms. Muhoza’s lawyer requested that she be released pending
further legal proceedings.
18.
On 14 October 2025, the court refused this request for release and ordered that
Ms. Muhoza remain in detention pending the trial on the merits of the case.
19.
On 3 November 2025, Ms. Muhoza’s lawyers appealed against the rejection of the
request for provisional release, citing article 155 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which
provides for provisional release within 15 days of the issuance of an arrest warrant if the
person subject to the warrant is not brought before a competent judge, and article 159 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that orders for pretrial detention must be
reviewed and extended every 30 days. On the basis of this information, Ms. Muhoza’s
lawyers argued that she should have been released because the ruling issued on 30 May 2025
by the Bujumbura Mairie Court of Appeal, quashing her conviction, had overturned all
preliminary orders issued by lower courts, including those regarding her pretrial detention.
In view of the annulment of these legal proceedings, Ms. Muhoza’s lawyers also argued that
the initial arrest warrant issued by prosecutors following her detention in April 2024 was no
longer valid, as Ms. Muhoza was not brought before a competent court until 7 October 2025,
well after the 15-day period provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure for the judicial
review of arrest warrants. The source states that, as a result of the measures taken against
Ms. Muhoza, she has been held in detention, in difficult conditions, for 19 months now, with
no end in sight.
20.
With regard to Ms. Muhoza’s conditions of detention, the source notes that
international human rights observers have condemned the overcrowding in Mpimba Prison
and pointed out that, while prisons in Burundi generally lack adequate sanitation systems,
drinking water, ventilation and lighting, these conditions are particularly poor in Mpimba
Prison. As a result, illnesses, including malaria, are endemic there, and medical care is
rudimentary. Mpimba Prison is also short on medical supplies and staff, and persons with
serious health problems are forced to seek treatment at a local hospital. However, it is difficult
to obtain permission to receive medical treatment outside the prison, particularly for prisoners
held on political grounds, such as Ms. Muhoza. According to the source, even persons who
manage to receive treatment at the hospital are often sent back to prison before they have
fully recovered.
21.
According to the source, in April 2024, security staff blindfolded Ms. Muhoza during
her questioning, handcuffed her and struck her. In December 2024, after having been held at
Mpimba Prison for nearly eight months, she became extremely ill, suffering from painful
swelling and bloating. She was in fear of her life. The source notes that Ms. Muhoza’s family
had to provide her with medication to relieve her gastrointestinal disorders, as she was not
receiving the necessary medical care in prison. Ms. Muhoza is also suffering from diabetes,
a condition that is difficult to manage in prison without proper medical care. At Mpimba
Prison, she received only one meal a day consisting of beans and corn, which, given her state
of health, was dangerous and forced her family to supplement her diet at great expense.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/1
4
GE.26-05886
22.
The source states that, because of these conditions, Ms. Muhoza’s health has
deteriorated significantly in recent months. Since July 2025, she has been experiencing
extreme and worsening pains in her legs that prevent her from walking. In Mpimba Prison,
she was unable to walk for several weeks and was forced to crawl around her cell. She also
used the prison latrines, which, according to the source, were dirty, unsanitary and covered
in faeces.
23.
Owing to her state of health, Ms. Muhoza was transferred to a clinic in Mpimba in
August 2025.
24.
In September 2025, following examinations at an external hospital, Ms. Muhoza was
diagnosed with a herniated disc. The hospital recommended that she seek additional medical
advice and indicated that she might need surgery. However, prison officials refused to grant
Ms. Muhoza access to medical care outside the prison.
25.
The source states that, even after being transferred to Ngozi Prison in late
September 2025, Ms. Muhoza did not receive the recommended medical care. She is still
suffering from severe pain, and her mobility is still limited. The source states that, for every
day that passes without her receiving proper medical treatment, the risk to her health is
greater. In addition, Ngozi Central Prison, which has experienced food shortages, is just as
overcrowded as Mpimba Prison and does not provide any more medical care.
26.
Lastly, the source argues that Ms. Muhoza’s prolonged detention has had serious
repercussions for her family, including her children, particularly her youngest child, who has
found being separated from his mother deeply traumatic, causing him great distress.
(ii)
Legal analysis
27.
The source argues that Ms. Muhoza’s detention is arbitrary under categories I, II, III
and V of the methods of work of the Working Group.
a.
Category I
28.
The source recalls that deprivation of liberty is arbitrary under category I when it is
clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the deprivation of liberty.
29.
The source maintains that, contrary to article 9 (2) of the Covenant, Ms. Muhoza was
not informed, at the time of her arrest on 13 April 2024, of the reasons for her arrest or the
charges against her. She was not charged until 19 April 2024 – six days after her arrest – after
being detained and questioned by the National Intelligence Service. She was sentenced to
21 months in prison on 16 December 2024, following a trial before the Mukaza Tribunal de
Grande Instance in Bujumbura Province.
30.
The source points out that Ms. Muhoza’s conviction was effectively overturned by a
subsequent ruling issued by Bujumbura Mairie Court of Appeal, which held that neither it
nor the court of first instance had territorial jurisdiction to hear the case.
31.
The source believes that the court of appeal’s decision rendered Ms. Muhoza’s
original conviction null and void. The decision also invalidated the arrest warrant and the
previous rulings of the court of first instance regarding her request for provisional release.
Despite this, Ms. Muhoza remained in detention in the absence of any legal justification or
respect for due process, as required under article 9 (1) of the Covenant.
32.
According to the source, this flagrant violation of Ms. Muhoza’s rights is part of a
broader pattern of human rights violations in Burundi. There are hundreds of similar cases of
people who remain in detention even after they have been acquitted or served their sentences.
The source adds that political prisoners, in particular, are often held in pretrial detention.
33.
The source claims that Ms. Muhoza’s detention also violates article 9 (3) of the
Covenant, which the Human Rights Committee has interpreted as requiring any person
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/1
GE.26-05886
5
arrested or detained on a criminal charge to be brought before a judge or other officer
authorized by law to exercise judicial power within a few days of the time of arrest, generally
no more than 48 hours.2
34.
The source notes that Ms. Muhoza did not appear in court until a month after her
arrest, and even then, she was never brought before a competent judge or court, as the
Bujumbura Mairie Court of Appeal has confirmed.
35.
Furthermore, after her conviction was overturned on 30 May 2025, Ms. Muhoza
remained in detention for an additional four months before she appeared again before a court
in Ngozi charged with ruling on the lawfulness of her pretrial detention. This was contrary to
domestic law, which requires arrest warrants to be subjected to judicial review within
15 days. The court denied Ms. Muhoza’s request for provisional release pending further
proceedings, without providing any reasons.
36.
The source also claims a violation of article 9 (4) of the Covenant, which grants any
person who is arrested or detained the right to take proceedings before a court in order that
that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his or her detention, and which
enshrines the principle of habeas corpus.3 In this regard, the source points out that once a
court order for release becomes enforceable, it must be implemented immediately, and the
continuation of the detention would be arbitrary.4
37.
In the present case, the Bujumbura Mairie Court of Appeal explicitly found in its
decision that Ms. Muhoza’s conviction, and therefore her prolonged detention, were not
lawful under domestic law, as the court of first instance lacked jurisdiction. Despite this
decision, Ms. Muhoza was not released.
38.
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, Ms. Muhoza should have been released or
granted a judicial review of her ongoing detention within 15 days. She was not granted the
right to a speedy trial under article 9 (3) of the Covenant until October 2025, at which time
she was brought before a new court in Ngozi so that it could rule on her pretrial detention in
that jurisdiction. The court denied her request for provisional release through a decision for
which the grounds were not provided and the legal basis was not made public.
39.
Although she is currently facing another trial before the court in Ngozi, Ms. Muhoza
remains in detention, despite the overturning of her previous conviction and what the source
describes as an unjustifiable delay in transferring her case to a competent court following the
court of appeal’s decision.
b.
Category II
40.
The source recalls that deprivation of liberty is arbitrary under category II when it
results from the exercise of fundamental rights or freedoms protected under international law.
In the present case, Ms. Muhoza’s arrest and detention stem from the exercise of her right to
freedom of expression and freedom of association.
41.
The source notes that the right to freedom of expression is enshrined in article 19 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in article 19 (2) of the Covenant, and includes
a person’s freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds through any
media of his or her choice. The source further considers that any restriction on the right to
freedom of expression may be imposed only under conditions provided by law and only to
the extent necessary to achieve a legitimate State objective.5
42.
In this regard, the source maintains that the Working Group has considered that the
possession of documents on a given subject may be protected as a form of expression,
particularly when charges of possession of such documents involve vague allegations of harm
2 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 33.
3 Ibid., paras. 39 and 41.
4 Ibid., para. 41.
5 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011), para. 11.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/1
6
GE.26-05886
to the interests of the State, without sufficient specificity, thereby serving as blanket cover to
disapprove of any unacceptable activity and eliminate anyone who disagrees with the
authorities.6
43.
The source argues that the right to freedom of association is guaranteed by
article 20 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by article 22 of the
Covenant, which provides that everyone has the right to freedom of association with others
and that, in general, no restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right. The Working
Group also confirmed that association with journalists’ organizations is protected by the right
to freedom of association.7
44.
According to the source, the Human Rights Council has also recognized that the rights
to freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association are essential elements of
democracy, offering individuals invaluable opportunities, including the opportunity to
express their political views. The Human Rights Council called on States to fully respect and
protect the rights of all individuals to freedom of association, particularly those who hold
minority or dissenting views or beliefs.8
45.
The source considers that Ms. Muhoza’s arrest and detention stem from the exercise
of her rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. This is clearly evident from
the ruling of 16 December 2024, according to which Ms. Muhoza was guilty of undermining
national security by sending messages to a private group of journalists, allegedly stating that
machetes had been distributed to five families and insulting certain institutions. This is also
apparent from the notice of appeal issued by the public prosecutor’s office on 22 January
2025, which:
(a)
Described Ms. Muhoza as a reporter for Radio Intumbero FM and a writer for
La Nova newspaper;
(b)
Considered as relevant the fact that Ms. Muhoza served as a correspondent for
radio stations run by so-called coup plotters who had fled to Rwanda;
(c)
Stated that Ms. Muhoza had been arrested by the National Intelligence Service
for comments she had made in an audio message posted in a journalists’ group on a
messaging application;
(d)
Noted that the charges against Ms. Muhoza were based on the fact that she
“frequently provided information” to her fellow journalists, as “evidenced by messages found
on her mobile phone”.
46.
Lastly, the source notes that Ms. Muhoza’s arrest has been widely condemned by
several human rights organizations as arbitrary and stemming from her work as a journalist.
c.
Category III
47.
The source argues that Ms. Muhoza’s detention is arbitrary under category III as it
was marred by serious procedural irregularities affecting her right to a fair trial. In particular,
she was not informed of the reasons for her arrest at the time it took place, and was not
brought promptly before a judge. Nor was she tried without undue delay, either before or
after the decision handed down by the court of appeal on 30 May 2025.
48.
The source notes that article 14 (3) (a) of the Covenant provides that any individual
charged with a criminal offence must be informed promptly of the nature and cause of the
charge against him or her. This provision requires that information on the applicable law and
the alleged general facts on which the charge is based be given as soon as the person
concerned is formally charged or publicly named. 9 Furthermore, in examining the
requirement that a detained person be informed without delay of the reason for his or her
arrest, the Working Group found that even a five-hour delay in complying with this
6 Opinion No. 33/2007, para. 16.
7 Opinion No. 83/2017, para. 74.
8 Human Rights Council, resolution 15/21 of 30 September 2010.
9 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007), para. 31.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/1
GE.26-05886
7
requirement may constitute a violation of the Covenant.10 The source further states that,
except in certain limited circumstances, there must be an arrest warrant specifying the legal
grounds for the arrest.
49.
The source notes that, under article 9 (3) and (4) of the Covenant, a detained person
must be brought promptly before a court – generally within 48 hours – following his or her
arrest or detention. It recalls that pretrial detention should be the exception rather than the
rule and must be based on an individualized determination that it is reasonable and necessary
taking into account all the circumstances, for such purposes as to prevent flight, interference
with evidence or the recurrence of crime.11
50.
The source further argues that detained persons should generally not be held in
incommunicado detention in circumstances where their communication with other people is
very limited or non-existent. It states that, at a minimum, a prisoner must be able to
communicate with his or her family and lawyer. Failure to respect this right would constitute
a violation of articles 9 (4) and 14 (3) (b) of the Covenant, particularly in situations where
depriving the prisoner of the opportunity to communicate with his or her lawyer prevents him
or her from preparing and presenting a defence.12
51.
The source points out that protection against incommunicado detention also overlaps
with the rights of accused persons under article 7 of the Covenant and article 5 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which prohibit torture and cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. It recalls that the Human Rights Council, the General
Assembly and the Working Group have affirmed that prolonged incommunicado detention
can facilitate the commission of acts of torture and may in itself constitute a form of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment.13
52.
In this regard, the source notes that Ms. Muhoza was held in detention for several days
following her arrest without being able to contact her family or consult a lawyer. During the
rounds of questioning, the authorities allegedly subjected her to physical abuse, beating her,
blindfolding her and handcuffing her, in violation of article 7 of the Covenant and article 5
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On 19 April 2024, Ms. Muhoza was
transferred to Mpimba Prison in Bujumbura, where she remained until 26 September 2025,
when she was transferred to Ngozi Central Prison.
53.
It was not until 19 April 2024 – six days after her arrest – that Ms. Muhoza was
brought before a prosecutor for the first time and informed of the reasons for her arrest. This
time period is significantly longer than the five-hour period that the Working Group had
deemed to be unacceptable in other cases.14
54.
Ms. Muhoza was also unable to obtain legal assistance or communicate with her
family prior to that date. Even then, Ms. Muhoza was denied any form of court hearing until
6 May 2024, when she was brought before a judge for a preliminary hearing. The court
subsequently upheld Ms. Muhoza’s continued pretrial detention without providing any
justification, despite the law allowing suspects to be released on bail and the fact that her case
did not fall within the categories that preclude such release under article 161 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
55.
The source states that the authorities continued to violate Ms. Muhoza’s right to a fair
trial following the court of appeal’s decision of 30 May 2025. Although this decision
overturned her conviction, Ms. Muhoza remained in detention for four months, in difficult
conditions, before she appeared before a competent court for a new trial in October 2025. In
this instance, the court once again rejected her request for release pending a new trial without
providing any justification for keeping her in pretrial detention in the specific circumstances
of her case. Furthermore, the source points out that this decision was inconsistent with the
10 Opinion No. 57/2016, para. 108.
11 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 38.
12 Human Rights Committee, Nina Muteba and Tshitenge Muteva v. Zaire, communication
No. 124/1982, CCPR/C/22/D/124/1982, para. 12.
13 A/HRC/4/40, para. 48.
14 Opinion No. 57/2016, para. 108.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/1
8
GE.26-05886
procedures established in national criminal law, which provides for regular judicial review
of pretrial detention orders and judicial review of arrest warrants within 15 days.
56.
The source notes that Ms. Muhoza is suffering from several physical ailments for
which she is not receiving the necessary care, including diabetes and a herniated disc. The
prison officials have refused to grant Ms. Muhoza access to medical care outside the prison.
The source claims that these conditions violate accused persons’ right not to be subjected to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
d.
Category V
57.
The source notes that detention is considered arbitrary under category V when it
constitutes a violation of international law on the grounds of discrimination, based on birth,
national, ethnic, or social origin, language, religion, economic condition, political or other
opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or any other status.
58.
The source stresses that the Working Group considers there to be a correlation
between category II and category V in that there is a strong presumption that a deprivation
of liberty resulting from the exercise of fundamental political rights constitutes a violation of
international law on the grounds of discrimination based on political or other views, and that
it therefore also constitutes arbitrary detention under category V.15
59.
The source argues that Ms. Muhoza’s arrest and detention are a direct result of her
work as a journalist, her association with other journalists, and the communications that she
shared in the course of her journalistic work. Her detention is therefore arbitrary under
category V.
(b)
Response from the Government
60.
On 15 January 2026, the Working Group transmitted a communication concerning
Ms. Muhoza to the Government, requesting it to provide detailed information about her by
16 March 2026 and to ensure her physical and mental well-being.
61.
The Working Group regrets that it did not receive a response from the Government
and that the Government did not request an extension of the time limit for its reply, as
provided for in the Working Group’s methods of work.
(c)
Further information from the source
62.
On 13 March 2026, the source informed the Working Group that, on 14 January 2026,
Ms. Muhoza had been sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment for undermining the internal
security of the State and inciting ethnic division. She was provisionally released on 4 March
2026, following an order issued on 27 February 2026, by the public prosecutor at the Ngozi
Court of Appeal, pending the appeal ruling. However, her provisional release is subject to
several conditions, including that she must not leave the province where she lives without
authorization and must report to the investigating judge once a month.
2.
Discussion
63.
In the absence of a response from the Government, the Working Group has decided
to render the present opinion, on the basis of all the information submitted by the source, in
conformity with paragraph 15 of its methods of work.
64.
In determining whether the deprivation of liberty of Ms. Muhoza is arbitrary, the
Working Group has regard to the principles established in its jurisprudence to deal with
evidentiary issues. If the source has established a prima facie case for breach of international
law constituting arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be understood to rest upon
the Government if it wishes to refute the allegations.16 In the present case, the Government
has chosen not to challenge the prima facie credible allegations made by the source.
15 Opinion No. 88/2017, para. 43.
16 A/HRC/19/57, para. 68.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/1
GE.26-05886
9
65.
Although Ms. Muhoza has been released, the Working Group, in accordance with
paragraph 17 (a) of its methods of work, considers that the gravity of the allegations warrants
its issuing an opinion on whether the deprivation of liberty was arbitrary. In this regard, the
Working Group notes that Ms. Muhoza’s release was conditional and provisional.
(a)
Category I
66.
The Working Group will first consider whether there have been violations under
category I, which concerns deprivation of liberty without a legal basis.
67.
The source claims that Ms. Muhoza was arrested without being shown an arrest
warrant and was not informed of the reasons for her arrest. She was not informed of the
reasons for her arrest until 19 April 2024, when she first appeared before the prosecutor for
the filing of charges.
68.
The Working Group notes that, under article 9 (1) of the Covenant, no one may be
deprived of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure
as are established by law. In order for a deprivation of liberty to have a legal basis, it is not
sufficient that there is a law that may authorize the arrest. The authorities must invoke that
legal basis and apply it to the circumstances of the case. This is typically done through an
arrest warrant or arrest order (or equivalent document). In addition, article 9 (2) of the
Covenant provides that anyone who is arrested must be informed, at the time of the arrest, of
the reasons for the arrest and must be promptly informed of any charges against him or her.17
Respect for these rights is essential for the other rights set out in article 9 of the Covenant,
since all individuals must know the reasons for their arrest in order to challenge it effectively
and must be brought before a court or judge in order to lodge an appeal.
69.
In the present case, noting that the Government has not responded to the
communication, the Working Group concludes, on the basis of the information provided by
the source, that Ms. Muhoza was not informed of the reasons for her arrest and that no arrest
warrant was shown to her at the time of her arrest. This is particularly serious because she
was detained and questioned by the National Intelligence Service in the days following her
arrest and prior to the filing of charges against her. The Working Group therefore finds that
there has been a violation of article 9 (1) and (2) of the Covenant and article 9 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
70.
With regard to the source’s allegation that Ms. Muhoza was not brought before a judge
until one month after her arrest, the Working Group points out that, under article 9 (3) of the
Covenant, anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge must be brought promptly before
a judge. As the Human Rights Committee has stated, 48 hours is ordinarily sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of bringing a detained person “promptly” before a judge, and any
longer delay must remain absolutely exceptional and be justified under the circumstances.18
Longer detention in the custody of law enforcement officials without judicial control
unnecessarily increases the risk of ill-treatment.19
71.
In light of the evidence presented, the Working Group concludes that there has been
a violation of article 9 (3) of the Covenant and article 9 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights since considerably more than 48 hours elapsed between the arrest and the
appearance before a judicial authority. This time period also constitutes a violation of
article 9 (4) of the Covenant, which grants any person who is arrested or detained the right to
bring proceedings before a court in order that the court may promptly decide without delay
on the lawfulness of his or her detention.
72.
According to the source, Ms. Muhoza was not permitted to contact her lawyer or her
family for six days following her arrest. The Working Group recalls that holding persons
incommunicado violates their right to challenge the lawfulness of their detention before a
court under article 9 (4) of the Covenant.20 Certain conditions of detention, such as denial of
17 A/HRC/WGAD/2023/4, para. 64; and Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014),
para. 24.
18 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 33.
19 Ibid.
20 Opinion No. 58/2023, para. 49.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/1
10
GE.26-05886
access to counsel and family, may also result in procedural violations of article 9 (3) and (4)
of the Covenant. In this regard, the Working Group is concerned to note that Ms. Muhoza
was questioned by the National Intelligence Service while being held in incommunicado
detention, without having access to legal counsel. Her rights under article 9 (3) and (4) were
therefore violated.
73.
Furthermore, the source states that, following the court of appeal’s decision of 30 May
2025, in which it ruled that the court of first instance that had heard Ms. Muhoza’s case
lacked territorial jurisdiction, she remained in custody for an additional four months before
she appeared before a court tasked with ruling on her pretrial detention. The Working Group
considers that this constitutes an additional violation of article 9 (1) and (3) of the Covenant.
74.
Lastly, the Working Group notes that Ms. Muhoza’s prolonged detention has had
serious repercussions for her family, particularly her youngest child. The Working Group
stresses that, under article 9 (3) of the Covenant, pretrial detention must be the exception
rather than the rule. Courts must examine whether alternatives to pretrial detention would
render detention unnecessary in the particular case.21 Rules 57 and 58 of the United Nations
Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women
Offenders (the Bangkok Rules) require States to develop and implement alternative measures
tailored to the situation of women, taking into account their parental responsibilities and
family ties, and to ensure that women accused of offences are not separated from their
families or communities without due consideration being given to these factors.
Non-custodial sentences should be preferred, where possible and appropriate, for pregnant
women and women with dependent children.22 Even a short period in prison may have
harmful long-term consequences for the children concerned and should, if possible, be
avoided, in accordance with article 9 (3) of the Covenant.23 On the basis of the information
provided by the source, the Working Group is of the view that the competent authorities
failed to consider appropriate alternative measures to detention in the light of Ms. Muhoza’s
personal circumstances and the best interests of her children, in violation of article 9 (3),
especially given the non-violent nature of the offences with which she was charged.24
75.
In view of the above findings, the Working Group considers Ms. Muhoza’s detention
to have no legal basis, in violation of article 9 of the Covenant and articles 3 and 9 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and therefore to be arbitrary under category I.
(b)
Category II
76.
According to the source, Ms. Muhoza’s deprivation of liberty is arbitrary under
category II as she was detained for exercising her rights to freedom of expression and freedom
of association. In the absence of any response from the Government, the source’s claims in
this regard have not been refuted.
77.
The Working Group recalls that arrest or detention is arbitrary if it is intended to
punish a person for the legitimate exercise of rights protected by the Covenant. Under
article 19 of the Covenant and article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
everyone has the right to freedom of expression and opinion. This right includes the right to
hold opinions without interference and the right to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.25 Article 22 (1) of the Covenant and
article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for their part, enshrine the right to
freedom of association, including the right of all persons to form and join trade unions for
the protection of their interests.
21 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 38.
22 Bangkok Rules, rule 64. See also rule 52.
23 Opinion No. 41/2025, para. 101.
24 CRC/C/BHR/CO/4-6, para. 35; CRC/C/GBR/CO/5, para. 55; and CRC/C/MUS/CO/3-5, para. 48 (in
these different concluding observations, the Committee on the Rights of the Child stressed that
prioritizing the best interests of the child means avoiding, to the extent possible, prison sentences for
parents or primary caregivers that would result in their being separated from their children, in
particular by using alternative measures to detention whenever possible).
25 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011), paras. 11 and 12.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/1
GE.26-05886
11
78.
The Working Group notes that the appeal filed by the public prosecutor’s office on
22 January 2025 described Ms. Muhoza as a journalist for Radio Intumbero FM and a writer
for La Nova newspaper and alleged that the charges against her were based on the fact that
she frequently provided information to her fellow journalists. Despite the nature of the
charges brought against Ms. Muhoza, namely, that she undermined national security by
sending messages about the distribution of machetes and insulting certain institutions, the
Working Group has received no information demonstrating that her arrest was necessary in
the interests of national security, public safety or public order under article 22 (2) of the
Covenant. The same considerations apply to Ms. Muhoza’s right to freedom of association,
which was violated because she was targeted for communicating with other journalists.
79.
Under these circumstances, the Working Group finds that Ms. Muhoza’s arrest and
detention resulted from her activities as a journalist and that her deprivation of liberty
constitutes a violation of the rights guaranteed by articles 19 and 20 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and articles 19 and 22 of the Covenant. Her detention is
therefore arbitrary under category II.
(c)
Category III
80.
Given its finding that the detention of Ms. Muhoza is arbitrary under category II, the
Working Group emphasizes that no trial should have taken place. However, according to the
source’s uncontested allegations, Ms. Muhoza was tried and convicted not only following an
initial trial, which was overturned on appeal because the court concerned lacked territorial
jurisdiction, but also during a second trial, which resulted in her being sentenced to 4 years
in prison in January 2026.
81.
According to the source, Ms. Muhoza’s detention was arbitrary under category III as
it was marred by serious procedural irregularities affecting her right to a fair trial.
82.
Ms. Muhoza was reportedly held incommunicado for several days after her arrest,
without being able to consult a lawyer or contact her family. She was subjected to
ill-treatment during the rounds of questioning that took place during that period.
83.
The Working Group recalls that all persons deprived of their liberty have the right to
legal assistance by counsel of their choice, as guaranteed under article 10 and 11 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 14 (3) (b) and (d) of the Covenant. This
right applies at all times during their detention, including immediately after the moment of
apprehension, and access to counsel must be granted promptly.26
84.
Furthermore, allowing persons deprived of their liberty to communicate with their
families and lawyers is an essential and necessary safeguard to protect them against arbitrary
detention and violations of their individual freedoms, as well as to prevent torture. 27
Prohibiting contact with the outside world and with a lawyer contravenes rules 58 and 61 of
the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson
Mandela Rules) and principles 15, 16 (1) and 19 of the Body of Principles for the Protection
of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.28 Furthermore, the Committee
against Torture has made it clear that incommunicado detention creates conditions that lead
to violations of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.29 The Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment has also consistently reaffirmed that the use of
incommunicado detention is illegal.30
85.
Noting the lack of response from the Government, the Working Group considers that
the authorities have violated Ms. Muhoza’s right to be assisted by counsel of her own
26 United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right of Anyone
Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court (A/HRC/30/37, annex), principle 9
and guideline 8; A/HRC/45/16, para. 51; and Human Rights Committee, general comment
No. 35 (2014), para. 35.
27 Opinion No. 19/2022, para. 52.
28 Opinions No. 35/2018, para. 39; No. 44/2019, paras. 74 and 75; and No. 45/2019 para. 76.
29 A/54/44, para. 158 (a).
30 A/54/426, para. 42; and A/HRC/13/39/Add.5, para. 156.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/1
12
GE.26-05886
choosing, as guaranteed by article 14 (3) (b) and (d) of the Covenant and articles 10 and
11 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Working Group also considers that
the violence inflicted on Ms. Muhoza aggravated the violation of this right.
86.
The Working Group concludes that the violations of Ms. Muhoza’s right to a fair trial
are of such gravity as to render her deprivation of liberty arbitrary under category III.
(d)
Category V
87.
According to the source, Ms. Muhoza’s arrest and detention are a direct result of her
work as a journalist, her association with other journalists, and the communications that she
shared with them in her capacity as a journalist.
88.
The Working Group takes into account a number of non-cumulative factors in order
to determine whether a deprivation of liberty is discriminatory in nature. Among other things,
it examines whether other persons with similar characteristics have also been persecuted or
whether the circumstances suggest that the authorities detained a person on discriminatory
grounds or to prevent him or her from exercising his or her human rights.31
89.
The Working Group notes that, along with a number of special procedure mandate
holders, it has already brought to the attention of the Government of Burundi its concerns
about allegations submitted to it concerning Ms. Muhoza’s detention and the pattern of
increasing human rights violations against journalists and discriminatory practices in
Burundi.32 In this case, however, in the absence of any specific information indicating that
Ms. Muhoza’s detention was discriminatory on the grounds of a protected characteristic, the
Working Group is unable to conclude that it was arbitrary within the meaning of category V,
without this affecting its conclusions that the detention was arbitrary under categories I, II
and III.
90.
Nevertheless, the Working Group wishes to take this opportunity to remind the
Government of its obligations under articles 2 and 26 of the Covenant to respect and ensure
to all persons within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
Covenant without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
(e)
Concluding remarks
91.
The Working Group is concerned about the allegations relating to Ms. Muhoza’s
detention conditions. She is said to be suffering from a number of physical conditions,
including diabetes and a herniated disc, for which she has not received the necessary
treatment.
92.
The Working Group takes this opportunity to remind the Government of its obligation
under article 10 (1) of the Covenant to ensure that all persons deprived of their liberty are
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. It also
recalls that, under rules 24 and 118 of the Nelson Mandela Rules, any person deprived of
liberty must be allowed to receive the same standards of health care that are available in the
community, and to be visited and treated by his or her own doctor if there are reasonable
grounds for the application and he or she is able to pay any expenses incurred.
93.
The Working Group urges the Government to ensure that detention conditions in all
places of deprivation of liberty in Burundi are in line with international standards.
3.
Disposition
94.
In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:
The deprivation of liberty of Aline Sandra Muhoza, being in contravention of articles
3, 9, 10, 11, 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 9,
31 A/HRC/36/37, para. 48.
32 BDI 1/2025. See also A/HRC/60/60, paras. 19, 57 and 62.
A/HRC/WGAD/2026/1
GE.26-05886
13
14, 19 and 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is arbitrary
and falls within categories I, II and III.
95.
The Working Group requests the Government of Burundi to take the steps necessary
to remedy the situation of Ms. Muhoza without delay and bring it into conformity with the
relevant international norms, including those set out in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
96.
The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the
case, the appropriate remedy would be to release Ms. Muhoza immediately and
unconditionally and accord her an enforceable right to compensation and other reparations,
in accordance with international law.
97.
The Working Group urges the Government to ensure that a thorough and independent
investigation is carried out into the circumstances of Ms. Muhoza’s arbitrary deprivation of
liberty, and to take appropriate action against those responsible for the violation of her rights.
98.
The Working Group requests the Government to disseminate the present opinion
through all available means and as widely as possible.
4.
Follow-up procedure
99.
In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group requests
the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in follow-up
to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including:
(a)
Whether Ms. Muhoza has been unconditionally released and, if so, on what
date;
(b)
Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to Ms. Muhoza;
(c)
Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of
Ms. Muhoza’s rights and, if so, the outcome of the investigation;
(d)
Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made to
harmonize the laws and practices of Burundi with its international obligations in line with
the present opinion;
(e)
Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.
100.
The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may
have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and
whether further technical assistance is required, for example through a visit by the Working
Group.
101.
The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the
above-mentioned information within six months of the date of transmission of the present
opinion. However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up
to the opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action
would enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in
implementing its recommendations, as well as of any failure to take action.
102.
The Working Group recalls that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all States
to cooperate with the Working Group and has requested them to take account of its views
and, where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken.33
[Adopted on 23 March 2026]
33 Human Rights Council resolution 60/8, paras. 6 and 9.