Opinion; Subjects: UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, ARBITRARY DETENTION; [WGAD: UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung, willkürliche Haft; Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire; Gruppo di lavoro sulla detenzione arbitraria]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.26-01871 (E) 200226 230226
Human Rights Council
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention at its 104th session, 10–14 November 2025
Opinion No. 74/2025 concerning Tundu Antiphas Mughwai Lissu
(United Republic of Tanzania)*
1.
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of
the Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution 1997/50, the Commission extended and
clarified the mandate of the Working Group. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251
and Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the
Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a
three-year period in its resolution 60/8.
2.
In accordance with its methods of work, 1 on 31 July 2025 the Working Group
transmitted to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania a communication
concerning Tundu Antiphas Mughwai Lissu. The Government submitted a late response on
30 September 2025. The State is a Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
3.
The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases:
(a)
When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the
deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or her
sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);
(b)
When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or
freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and, insofar as States Parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25,
26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);
(c)
When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to
the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the
relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity as to
give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);
(d)
When asylum-seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged
administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy
(category IV);
* Miriam Estrada Castillo and Mumba Malila did not participate in the discussion of the case.
1 A/HRC/36/38.
United Nations
A/HRC/WGAD/2025/74
General Assembly
Distr.: General
23 February 2026
Original: English
A/HRC/WGAD/2025/74
2
GE.26-01871
(e)
When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on
the grounds of discrimination, based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,
religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability
or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings
(category V).
1.
Submissions
(a)
Communication from the source
4.
Tundu Antiphas Mughwai Lissu is a Tanzanian politician born in 1968, usually
residing in Dar es Salaam.
(i)
Context
5.
According to the source, Mr. Lissu is a veteran anti-corruption campaigner and a
former president of the Tanganyika Law Society, and served as a Member of Parliament from
2010 to 2020. In January 2025, he became the leader of Chama cha Demokrasia na
Maendeleo (Chadema), the country’s main opposition party.
6.
The source reports that opposition parties in the United Republic of Tanzania currently
face significant legal and administrative hurdles, including restrictions on public assembly,
unusual electoral regulations, and selective enforcement of laws aimed at curbing political
activity. While the Government has made public gestures towards constitutional reform, in
practice it has allegedly intensified its control. Law enforcement agencies reportedly
frequently intervene in internal party affairs or disrupt opposition meetings. Journalists and
others critical of the Government allegedly encounter harassment, threats, and prosecution
under vague statutes. Despite initially lifting a long-standing ban on political rallies, the
authorities have reportedly resumed arbitrary arrests of opposition members during peaceful
rallies, disrupted legal political gatherings and blocked public access to State proceedings.
7.
The source submits that Mr. Lissu has been targeted by the authorities in the past for
his vocal opposition to corruption. In March 2017, he was detained for allegedly uttering
words intended to wound religious feelings and for raising discontent. He was arrested again
later that year on charges of sedition. In September 2017, Mr. Lissu survived an assassination
attempt, during which he was shot 16 times; the perpetrators have never been identified or
charged. The source notes that in 2020, evidence was heard in London-based employment
arbitration proceedings that a mobile telephone company had provided call detail records
concerning Mr. Lissu to Tanzanian authorities in the weeks leading up to the attempt on his
life.
(ii)
Arrest and detention
8.
The source reports that on 9 April 2025, while attending a political rally organized by
Chadema during which he delivered a speech, Mr. Lissu was surrounded by approximately
30 uniformed police officers and arrested, without being provided with the reasons for the
arrest or an arrest warrant. He was taken to the regional police station in Songea, and was
then driven more than 1,000 kilometres to Dar es Salaam, arriving the next morning.
9.
On the day of arraignment, 10 April 2025, Mr. Lissu allegedly appeared before a
magistrate in the court at Kisutu and was charged with one count of treason under
section 39 (2) (d) of the Penal Code and three counts of publishing false information under
section 16 of the Cyber Crimes Act.
10.
On the same day, Mr. Lissu’s lawyers reportedly applied for bail in relation to the
charges of publishing false information, which was granted. However, Mr. Lissu remains in
detention, as treason is a non-bailable offence under Tanzanian law. Moreover, the source
states that his lawyers were only informed of the charges against him at his arraignment,
despite having been told that they would be informed of them when they attended Songea
police station the previous day.
A/HRC/WGAD/2025/74
GE.26-01871
3
11.
The source notes that Mr. Lissu’s detention has gained global attention, with regional
and international human rights organizations, as well as the European Parliament, expressing
concern about the potential political motivation behind his arrest.
(iii)
Conditions of detention
12.
According to the source, after his arraignment, Mr. Lissu was transferred to Keko
Remand Prison, and on 17 April 2025 to Ukonga Maximum Security Prison, where he
remains detained.
13.
The source reports that, in the month following his arrest, Mr. Lissu’s lawyers saw
him only twice: at his first appearance, and on 22 April 2025. On the latter occasion, only
one lawyer from his legal team was allowed a 15-minute meeting with him, through an
intercom, with four prison guards present. Despite normal practice in the United Republic of
Tanzania regarding private lawyer-client meetings, lawyer-client confidentiality was
allegedly not respected.
14.
The source states that Mr. Lissu’s family have faced difficulties visiting him, and have
not been allowed to bring him food despite this normally being permitted. Mr. Lissu was
denied access to religious services during Easter, despite other prisoners being allowed to
attend.
(iv)
Judicial proceedings
15.
The source claims that for Mr. Lissu’s second court appearance, which was scheduled
for 24 April 2025, it was announced only 12 hours beforehand that Mr. Lissu would appear
via video link, rather than in person. Mr. Lissu reportedly refused to attend the hearing unless
he was allowed to do so in person; because of his physical absence, he was unable to confer
with his lawyers during the hearing. All points raised on his behalf were allegedly dismissed
by the judge.
16.
The source underlines that the hearing took place against a backdrop of violence and
intimidation. Police allegedly issued a warning that anyone attending the hearing would be
severely punished. Members of Chadema and the public were allegedly violently denied
access to the courthouse, with several arrested and severely beaten.
17.
On 6 May 2025, when lawyers raised concerns about access to counsel, the judge
ruled that the court had no jurisdiction to determine complaints against prison officers.
(v)
Legal analysis
18.
The source argues that Mr. Lissu’s detention is arbitrary under categories II and III of
the Working Group’s methods of work.2
a.
Category II
19.
The source argues that Mr. Lissu’s arrest and detention result directly from the
exercise of his rights to freedom of opinion and expression and his right to protection from
discrimination, as guaranteed by article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
article 26 of the Covenant.
20.
It points out that Mr. Lissu is accused of treason under section 39 (2) (d) of the Penal
Code, which provides, notably, that any person who forms an intention to effect or to cause
to be effected, or forms an intention to instigate, persuade, counsel or advise any person or
group of persons to effect or to cause to be effected, the intimidation of the executive, the
legislature or the judiciary, and manifests such intention by publishing any writing or printing
or by any overt act or deed whatsoever, shall be guilty of treason and liable on conviction to
be sentenced to death.
2 Ibid.
A/HRC/WGAD/2025/74
4
GE.26-01871
21.
The source submits that this provision should be interpreted in accordance with the
ordinary or literal meaning of its terms. On that basis, a statement would qualify as treasonous
only if it specifically called for the intimidation of one of the three branches of Government.
22.
The source points out that Mr. Lissu was charged with treason on the basis of a
statement he allegedly made, which has been translated into English as:
“They said this stance indicates rebellion, it’s true … because we say we will prevent
the election, we will incite rebellion, that’s the way to get change … so we are going
to sabotage it … this election is really going to be disrupted … we are going to
sabotage it very badly.”
23.
The source submits, however, that the Swahili word “uasi”, which in the text above
was translated as “rebellion”, is a highly contextual word with many meanings, and that in
the context of Mr. Lissu’s speech, it should instead be translated as “civil disobedience”.
24.
The source argues that, in any event, the statement attributed to Mr. Lissu on no
reasonable interpretation can be considered to contain statements to “instigate, persuade,
counsel or advise” the intimidation of the executive, the legislature or the judiciary. It
underlines that the statement contains no reference, explicitly or implicitly, to any of the
branches of government. Rather, according to the source, it refers to the process of the
election itself, and the engagement with that process by a select group of individuals within
the United Republic of Tanzania, which is a separate exercise of democratic choice, rather
than a function, designation or attribute of any branch of government.
25.
As such, the source considers that Mr. Lissu’s detention on the charge of treason,
which carries with it the death penalty in the case of conviction, cannot stand up to even the
most basic level of legal scrutiny. Therefore, the source argues that Mr. Lissu’s detention is
based purely upon his political opposition to the leadership of the United Republic of
Tanzania.
26.
The source emphasizes that the right to peaceful assembly forms the very foundation
of a system of participatory governance based on democracy, human rights, the rule of law
and pluralism, and that freedom of assembly would be hollow without robust protection of
the speech exercised within such forums.
27.
The source also posits that freedom of expression is critical in this instance, and that
any restrictions should be proportional and the least intrusive possible, as the value placed
by the Covenant on uninhibited expression is particularly high in the context of public debate
in a democratic society.
28.
The source submits that by charging Mr. Lissu with treason, the Government has
violated these core international legal obligations. Mr. Lissu was arrested and charged for a
statement amounting to “intimidation”, which the source considers to be a nebulous term. It
points out that the term is not defined in relation to section 39 of the Penal Code. As such,
the Government has broad discretion to deploy this charge against any individual who, like
Mr. Lissu, voices legitimate criticism of the Government, and in this case, of its electoral
policies, and who calls for change. The source further submits that such an ill-defined and
expansive concept of what constitutes a treasonous statement is clearly in contrast to
articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant, in relation to which the Human Rights Committee has
clearly stated that restrictions on freedom of speech in the context of public debate, and
peaceful yet contentious political assembly, should be interpreted narrowly.
b.
Category III
29.
The source submits that Mr. Lissu’s detention violates international norms on fair trial.
A/HRC/WGAD/2025/74
GE.26-01871
5
30.
According to the source, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has
previously rejected the argument of the United Republic of Tanzania that the right to a lawyer
is not an absolute right under Tanzanian domestic law,3 finding that the denial of access to
free legal assistance was contrary to article 7 (1) (c) of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights read together with article 14 (3) (d) of the Covenant.
31.
The source recalls that Mr. Lissu has been denied timely confidential access to his
legal team. When he was given access to his legal team, the circumstances under which access
was granted were insufficient in terms of time, and clearly contrary to international legal
norms with regard to his right to confidentially confer with counsel. While the source
acknowledges that Mr. Lissu was eventually, after 13 days in detention, given brief access to
a lawyer, it asserts that this was done solely to give a veneer of procedural regularity to his
continued detention. The source recalls that he was only allowed one 15-minute conversation
with one of his lawyers, which was monitored by four prison officers, and was carried out
through a prison intercom.
32.
The source specifies that the question of timely and sufficient access to counsel was
raised by Mr. Lissu’s lawyers during the hearing of 6 May 2025. However, the judge ruled
that Mr. Lissu’s rights and treatment in prison fell under the authority of prison officers, and
that the court had no jurisdiction to determine the complaints raised by the defence against
the prison officers.
33.
According to the source, in a further derogation from international norms, the
Government warned that anyone who attended the 24 April 2025 court hearing would be
punished. The source claims that to give effect to this warning, police officers were present
at the courthouse, and indiscriminately and violently arrested those individuals trying to
attend the proceedings. This means, according to the source, that the 24 April 2025 hearing
was, in effect, a closed hearing.
(b)
Response from the Government
34.
On 31 July 2025, the Working Group transmitted the allegations concerning Mr. Lissu
to the Government and requested it to provide, by 29 September 2025, detailed information
about his situation and to clarify the legal provisions justifying his detention.
35.
The Government submitted its response on 30 September 2025, after the deadline. It
did not request an extension of the time limit for its reply, as is provided for in the Working
Group’s methods of work. Consequently, the Working Group cannot accept the response as
if it had been submitted within the time limit.
2.
Discussion
36.
The Working Group regrets that it did not receive a timely response from the
Government to the communication. In the absence of such a response, and on the basis of all
the information the Working Group has received, it has decided to render the present opinion,
in conformity with paragraph 16 of its methods of work.
37.
To determine whether the deprivation of liberty of Mr. Lissu is arbitrary, the Working
Group has regard to the principles established in its jurisprudence to deal with evidentiary
issues. If the source has established a prima facie case for breach of international law
constituting arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be understood to rest upon the
Government if it wishes to refute the allegations. Mere assertions by the Government that
lawful procedures have been followed are not sufficient to rebut the source’s allegations.4
(a)
Preliminary observations
38.
As a preliminary matter, the Working Group notes at the outset that this is the second
case concerning a senior leader of Chadema that has come before the Working Group in
recent years. In opinion No. 3/2022, the Working Group found that the deprivation of liberty
3 African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Zuberi v. United Republic of Tanzania, Judgment,
26 February 2021.
4 A/HRC/19/57, para. 68.
A/HRC/WGAD/2025/74
6
GE.26-01871
of Freeman Mbowe, who was the leader of Chadema at the time of his arrest in July 2021,
was arbitrary under categories I, II, III and V. The pattern of arresting senior opposition
figures, particularly those associated with Chadema, raises serious concerns about the use of
the criminal justice system to suppress political opposition in the United Republic of
Tanzania.
39.
Here, the source has argued that the detention of Mr. Lissu is arbitrary and falls under
categories II and III. The Working Group will proceed to examine these in turn, as well as
whether the detention may fall under additional categories.
(b)
Category I
40.
Although the source did not specifically invoke category I, the Working Group
considers it appropriate to examine whether Mr. Lissu’s detention has a legal basis, given the
circumstances of the case.
41.
The source explains that Mr. Lissu was charged with treason under section 39 (2) (d)
of the Penal Code. In its late response, the Government confirms that treason is a non-bailable
offence under section 151 (5) (a) (i) of the Criminal Procedure Act, chapter 20, and moreover
that it is an offence punishable by death. As a result, Mr. Lissu remains in mandatory pretrial
detention, despite having been granted bail on the charges of publishing false information
under the Cyber Crimes Act.
42.
In its jurisprudence, the Working Group has repeatedly confirmed that mandatory
pretrial detention violates a State’s obligations under international human rights law.5 In
particular, non-bailable offences violate the requirement under article 9 (3) of the Covenant
that pretrial detention be an exceptional measure rather than the rule. Non-bailable offences
also violate the requirement that pretrial detention be based on an individualized
determination that it is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances, for such purposes as
to prevent flight, interference with evidence or the recurrence of crime.6 As the Human Rights
Committee has stated, pretrial detention should not be mandatory for all defendants charged
with a particular crime, without regard to individual circumstances.7
43.
Notably, in opinion No. 3/2022, the Working Group found that the automatic
detention of Mr. Mbowe on the basis of non-bailable offences under Tanzanian law, with no
individualized determination of the risk of flight, interference with the evidence or recurrence
of the crime, and with no consideration of less intrusive alternatives such as bail, electronic
bracelets or other conditions, in accordance with the principle of necessity and
proportionality, was devoid of legal basis.8 The Working Group finds that the same reasoning
applies to the present case.
44.
Mr. Lissu has been detained since 9 April 2025 with no possibility of release on bail
solely because the charge of treason is categorically non-bailable under Tanzanian law. In its
belated response, the Government has not demonstrated that any individualized assessment
of Mr. Lissu’s circumstances took place, notably based on whether he poses a flight risk,
would interfere with evidence or would commit further offences. The Government has
merely relied on the automatic nature of the non-bailable offence. The Working Group finds
that this mandatory pretrial detention without an individualized determination is devoid of
legal basis and violates article 9 (3) of the Covenant.
45.
The source alleges that Mr. Lissu was arrested without being presented with an arrest
warrant and without being informed of the reasons for his arrest at the time of the arrest. The
Government responds that section 15 of the Criminal Procedure Act, chapter 20, permits
police officers to carry out an arrest without a warrant where serious offences are involved,
5 Opinions No. 8/2020, para. 77; and No. 64/2019, No. 14/2019, No. 75/2018, No. 61/2018,
No. 53/2018, No. 16/2018, No. 24/2015 and No. 57/2014; A/HRC/42/39/Add.1, paras. 36–38; and
A/HRC/19/57, paras. 48–58. See also opinion No. 3/2022, para. 57.
6 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 38.
7 Ibid.
8 See para. 58.
A/HRC/WGAD/2025/74
GE.26-01871
7
including treason, and that Mr. Lissu was informed of the grounds for his arrest in accordance
with section 24 of the Criminal Procedure Act, chapter 20.
46.
The Working Group recalls that international law on detention includes the right to be
presented with an arrest warrant to ensure the exercise of effective control by a competent,
independent and impartial judicial authority, which is procedurally inherent in the right to
liberty and security of person and the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation under articles 3 and
9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 9 of the Covenant, as well as
principle 10 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment.9
47.
While the Working Group acknowledges that domestic law may permit warrantless
arrests in certain circumstances, the State must still demonstrate that such arrests comply with
international standards. In the present case, the Government has not demonstrated, in its
belated response, that Mr. Lissu was informed of the specific reasons for his arrest at the time
of arrest on 9 April 2025. The source states that his lawyers were only informed of the charges
when he was presented with a charge sheet during his arraignment on 10 April 2025.
Furthermore, the arrest took place on 9 April 2025, while the Government claims the
offending statements were made on 3 April 2025, suggesting that the authorities had ample
time to seek an arrest warrant but chose not to do so.
48.
The Working Group finds that the absence of an arrest warrant, combined with the
failure to promptly inform Mr. Lissu of the reasons for his arrest and the charges against him,
violated articles 3 and 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 9 of the
Covenant and principle 10 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under
Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.
49.
In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group finds that the deprivation of liberty
of Mr. Lissu is arbitrary under category I.
(c)
Category II
50.
The source submits that Mr. Lissu’s arrest and detention result directly from the
exercise of his right to freedom of opinion and expression, as guaranteed by article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 19 of the Covenant.
51.
According to the source, Mr. Lissu was charged with treason on the basis of a
statement he allegedly made at a political rally, which the Government characterizes as
declaring his intention to halt the electoral process and incite an insurrection. The source
argues that the Swahili word “uasi”, used by Mr. Lissu during the speech, should be translated
as “civil disobedience” rather than “rebellion” or “insurrection”, and that the statement
contains no reference to intimidating the executive, the legislature or the judiciary as would
be required by section 39 (2) (d) of the Penal Code.
52.
The Working Group notes that article 19 (2) of the Covenant provides that everyone
has the right to freedom of expression, and that this right includes the freedom to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing
or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his or her choice. This right
includes political discourse, commentary on public affairs, discussion of human rights, and
journalism.10 It protects the holding and expression of opinions, including those which are
critical of, or not in line with, government policy.11
53.
The Human Rights Committee has stated in its general comment No. 34 (2011) that
restrictions on freedom of expression must not be overbroad and should be the least intrusive
instrument among those which might achieve their protective function. The Committee has
emphasized that the value placed by the Covenant on uninhibited expression is particularly
high in the context of public debate in a democratic society. Critically, the Committee has
9 See, among many others, opinions No. 21/2017, para. 46; No. 68/2018, para. 39; No. 34/2020,
para. 46; and No. 59/2024, para. 90.
10 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011), paras. 11 and 12.
11 Opinions No. 79/2017, para. 55; No. 8/2019, para. 55; and No. 71/2021, para. 74.
A/HRC/WGAD/2025/74
8
GE.26-01871
stated that restrictions on freedom of expression may never be invoked as a justification for
the muzzling of any advocacy of multiparty democracy, democratic tenets and human
rights.12
54.
Furthermore, the Working Group notes that article 21 of the Covenant protects the
right to peaceful assembly and article 25 guarantees the right to take part in the conduct of
public affairs. As the Human Rights Committee has stated in its general comment No. 37
(2020), the right of peaceful assembly forms the very foundation of a system of participatory
governance based on democracy, human rights, the rule of law and pluralism. Assemblies
may be used to pursue contentious ideas or goals without diminishing the protections they
are owed.13
55.
The Working Group observes that Mr. Lissu made the impugned statements at a
political rally in the context of the upcoming general elections. As the Chairman of the main
opposition party, Mr. Lissu was engaging in core political speech about the electoral process.
Even if his statements were contentious or provocative, as the source acknowledges, they fall
within the protected sphere of political expression.
56.
The Government has charged Mr. Lissu with treason under section 39 (2) (d) of the
Penal Code, which requires that the accused form an intention to “instigate, persuade, counsel
or advise” the “intimidation of the executive, the legislature or the judiciary”. However, the
Government has not explained how Mr. Lissu’s statements, which referred to disrupting or
“sabotaging” an election, constitute intimidation of any branch of government. Elections are
a democratic process distinct from the branches of government themselves. The Government
has not demonstrated that Mr. Lissu’s statements called for violence, discrimination or
hostility, or posed a genuine threat to national security or public order.
57.
The Working Group considers that charging an opposition leader with treason – a
capital offence carrying the death penalty – for statements made at a political rally about
disrupting an election is a grossly disproportionate restriction on freedom of expression that
cannot be justified under article 19 (3) of the Covenant. The Government has not
demonstrated that such a severe measure was necessary to protect any legitimate interest.
58.
In this respect, the Working Group further recalls that the Human Rights Committee
has stated that the death penalty may only be imposed for the most serious crimes, which
pertain only to crimes of extreme gravity involving intentional killing. Crimes of a political
nature can never serve as the basis for the imposition of the death penalty.14 The charge of
treason against Mr. Lissu, based on political speech at a rally, clearly does not meet this
threshold.
59.
The Working Group also notes the pattern established in opinion No. 3/2022
concerning Mr. Mbowe, the previous Chadema leader, who was arrested and charged with
terrorism-related offences ahead of a planned meeting on constitutional reform. In that case,
the Working Group found that Mr. Mbowe’s arrest violated his rights to freedom of
expression, peaceful assembly, association, and participation in public affairs. The arrest of
Mr. Lissu follows the same pattern of using serious criminal charges to suppress opposition
political activity.
60.
Furthermore, the Working Group notes with concern that Chadema was banned from
participating in the October 2025 general elections just three days after Mr. Lissu’s arrest,
reinforcing the political nature of the charges against him.15 The timing of the arrest, coming
in the run-up to crucial national elections, and the subsequent banning of the opposition party,
strongly suggest that the prosecution is aimed at silencing political opposition rather than at
addressing genuine criminal conduct.
12 See paras. 23 and 34.
13 See paras. 1, 7, 17 and 32. See also opinion No. 55/2025, para. 89.
14 See the Committee’s general comment No. 36 (2019), para. 35; and opinions No. 32/2024, para. 54;
and No. 71/2025, paras. 75 and 76.
15 See communication TZA 4/2025, available at
https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=30158.
A/HRC/WGAD/2025/74
GE.26-01871
9
61.
The Working Group recalls that the present case has been the subject of
communications by several special procedure mandate holders. On 10 June 2025, a
communication was addressed to the Government concerning the disappearance and torture
of two human rights defenders from Kenya and Uganda who had travelled to the
United Republic of Tanzania to attend Mr. Lissu’s trial.16 A further communication was sent
on 14 July 2025, concerning the pattern of arrest and detention of Mr. Lissu and another
opposition leader, as well as the banning of Chadema from the elections.17
62.
The Working Group therefore finds that Mr. Lissu’s arrest and detention resulted from
the peaceful exercise of his rights to freedom of opinion and expression guaranteed by
article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 19 of the Covenant, his
right to peaceful assembly and association guaranteed by article 20 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and articles 21 and 22 of the Covenant, and his right to take
part in the conduct of public affairs guaranteed by article 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and article 25 of the Covenant. His detention is therefore arbitrary under
category II.
(d)
Category III
63.
Given its finding that the deprivation of liberty of Mr. Lissu is arbitrary under
category II, the Working Group emphasizes that no trial should take place. However, judicial
proceedings have been brought against Mr. Lissu and the source has made allegations
concerning violations of his fair trial rights, which the Working Group will examine.
64.
The source alleges that Mr. Lissu was denied timely access to legal counsel and that
when access was granted, it was inadequate. Specifically, it states that Mr. Lissu was only
able to see his lawyers twice in the first 13 days of detention: firstly at his arraignment on
10 April 2025, and secondly on 22 April 2025 when only one lawyer was allowed a
15-minute meeting through an intercom with four prison guards present. The source further
alleges that all documents passed between Mr. Lissu and his lawyers are read by prison
officers.
65.
In its belated response, the Government affirmed that Mr. Lissu had been afforded
access to legal representation in accordance with established procedures, that lawyer-client
privilege was respected and that any monitoring was strictly limited to safeguarding security.
The Government also notes that Mr. Lissu chose to exercise his right to self-representation
in the treason case.
66.
The Working Group recalls that all persons deprived of their liberty have the right to
legal assistance by counsel of their choice at any time during their detention, including
immediately after their apprehension, and that such access must be provided without delay.18
This right is essential to ensuring the principle of equality of arms in criminal proceedings.
67.
The Working Group is particularly concerned about the allegations that lawyer-client
communications have not been afforded the confidentiality required under international law.
The Human Rights Committee has stressed that counsel should be able to meet their clients
in private and to communicate with the accused in conditions that fully respect the
confidentiality of their communications, and furthermore that lawyers should be able to
advise persons charged with a criminal offence without restrictions, influence, pressure or
undue interference from any quarter.19 According to principle 8 of the Basic Principles on the
Role of Lawyers, all arrested, detained or imprisoned persons are to be provided with
adequate opportunities, time and facilities to be visited by and to communicate and consult
with a lawyer, without delay, interception or censorship and in full confidentiality.
68.
The Working Group also notes that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights has held, in line with principle 14 (c) of the Guidelines on the Conditions of Arrest,
16 See communication TZA 1/2025, available at
https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=30016.
17 See communication TZA 4/2025.
18 United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right of Anyone
Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court, principle 9 and guideline 8.
19 See the Committee’s general comment No. 32 (2007), para. 34.
A/HRC/WGAD/2025/74
10
GE.26-01871
Police Custody and Pre-Trial Detention in Africa, that pretrial detainees must have regular
and confidential access to lawyers, and that an accused person must be able to consult with a
lawyer in conditions that ensure confidentiality of their communications without any
restrictions, influences, pressures or undue interference from any quarter.20
69.
The source’s allegations that Mr. Lissu’s meetings with his lawyers take place in the
presence of multiple prison officials, through an intercom that can be assumed to be
monitored, and that all documents are read by prison officers, are serious violations of the
right to confidential communication with counsel. The Government’s general assertion that
monitoring is “strictly limited to safeguarding security” does not address the fundamental
requirement that lawyer-client communications be confidential. In further comments that it
submitted to the Working Group following the Government’s belated response, the source
has stated that prison officers have justified having to read documents passed between
Mr. Lissu and his lawyers because of a poisoning threat. The Working Group considers this
reason not to be credible and finds that it cannot justify the wholesale interception of
privileged communications.
70.
Finally, the Working Group notes with concern that in its further comments on the
Government’s belated response, the source has claimed that Mr. Lissu’s decision to
self-represent in the treason case was motivated at least in part by concern for the safety of
his legal team, given the human rights record of the United Republic of Tanzania and the
Government’s ongoing actions against the opposition. If true, this would indicate that
Mr. Lissu has effectively been denied meaningful access to legal representation through
intimidation, even if he nominally chose to self-represent.
71.
The Working Group finds that the violations of Mr. Lissu’s right to legal assistance,
including the denial of timely access to counsel and the failure to ensure confidential
lawyer-client communications, violated articles 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and article 14 (3) (b) and (d) of the Covenant.
72.
The source also alleges that the hearing of 24 April 2025 was in effect a closed hearing,
as the police issued warnings that anyone attempting to attend would be punished, and the
police violently arrested supporters of Mr. Lissu who attempted to attend.
73.
The Government responds that the court hearings have been generally open and have
even been livestreamed, and that the restrictions were lawfully and proportionately applied
due to the high-profile nature of the matter and potential risks of disruption. The Government
states that reports of police violence are inaccurate and that the police acted within its
mandate to maintain peace and order.
74.
Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that everyone is
entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.
Article 14 (1) of the Covenant similarly provides for a public hearing. The Human Rights
Committee has explained that the publicity of hearings ensures the transparency of
proceedings and provides an important safeguard for the interest of the individual and of
society at large.21 While the right to a public hearing is not absolute, it may only be restricted
for reasons of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, or when the
interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would be prejudicial to the
interests of justice.22
75.
The Working Group notes that a report from an international non-governmental
organization cited by the source corroborates the allegations that police arrested dozens of
supporters outside the court on 24 April 2025, with many subsequently reporting harassment,
beatings, and treatment that may amount to torture before being abandoned in remote areas.
The Government’s assertion that hearings have been accessible via livestream is wholly
insufficient to rebut these allegations. The public character of judicial proceedings serves a
20 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Civil Liberties Organisation, Legal Defence
Centre, Legal Defence and Assistance Project v. Nigeria (communication No. 218/98), decision of
7 May 2001.
21 See the Committee’s general comment No. 32 (2007), para. 28.
22 Ibid., para. 29; and opinion No. 50/2025, para. 81.
A/HRC/WGAD/2025/74
GE.26-01871
11
purpose that cannot be fulfilled by remote broadcast alone: it protects individuals against the
administration of justice in secret, without public scrutiny, and it is one of the principal means
by which confidence in the courts is maintained. By rendering the administration of justice
transparent and visible, the physical presence of the public contributes directly to the
guarantee of a fair trial – a fundamental principle of any democratic society. When the State
simultaneously broadcasts proceedings while deploying violence to exclude the public from
the courtroom, it undermines the very purpose of the right to a public hearing. A livestream
observed under conditions of State intimidation, where potential attendees face arrest and
torture, cannot substitute for genuine public access to justice. The Working Group finds that
the intimidation and violence used to prevent public attendance at Mr. Lissu’s court hearings,
as well as the detention and expulsion of foreign observers,23 violated his right to a public
hearing under article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 14 (1) of
the Covenant.
76.
The source reports that on 24 April 2025, Mr. Lissu was informed only 12 hours
before his hearing that he would appear via video link rather than in person. Mr. Lissu refused
to attend the virtual hearing, which meant he was unable to confer with his lawyers during
the proceedings.
77.
The Government states that the decision to hold the hearing virtually was lawful and
consistent with judicial practice rules, and that Mr. Lissu’s refusal to attend was voluntary.
78.
The Working Group recalls that article 14 (3) (d) of the Covenant guarantees the right
of the accused to be tried in his or her presence. While video-link appearances may be
permissible in certain circumstances, the Working Group is concerned that in the present case,
the last-minute notification and the use of video link prevented Mr. Lissu from meaningfully
participating in his defence and from conferring with counsel during the hearing.
79.
The Working Group finds that the manner in which Mr. Lissu’s virtual court
appearance was handled violated his right to be tried in his presence and to defend himself
under article 14 (3) (d) of the Covenant.
80.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Working Group concludes that the violations of
Mr. Lissu’s right to a fair trial are of such gravity as to give his deprivation of liberty an
arbitrary character, falling under category III.
(e)
Category V
81.
Although the source did not specifically invoke category V, the Working Group
considers it appropriate to examine whether Mr. Lissu’s detention constitutes discrimination
on the basis of political opinion.
82.
A deprivation of liberty is considered arbitrary under category V when it constitutes
a violation of international law on the grounds of discrimination, based on, inter alia, political
or other opinion, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings.
Articles 2 and 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 2 and 26 of the
Covenant prohibit discrimination on the basis of political opinion.24
83.
The Working Group considers that Mr. Lissu was targeted because of his peaceful
political activities, including his leadership of the main opposition party and his vocal
criticism of the Government. Mr. Lissu’s political views and convictions are at the centre of
the present case. In the discussion above concerning category II, the Working Group
established that Mr. Lissu’s detention had resulted from the peaceful exercise of his rights
under international law. When a detention results from the active exercise of civil and
political rights, there is a strong presumption that the detention also constitutes a violation of
international law on the grounds of discrimination based on political or other views.25
84.
The Working Group notes the broader pattern of targeting opposition figures in the
United Republic of Tanzania. As the Working Group noted in opinion No. 3/2022, the
23 See communication TZA 1/2025.
24 Opinion No. 60/2024, para. 71.
25 Opinions No. 55/2025, paras. 115 and 116; No. 58/2023, para. 73; No. 25/2024, paras. 125 and 126;
and No. 3/2022, para. 73. See also A/HRC/36/37, para. 46.
A/HRC/WGAD/2025/74
12
GE.26-01871
previous Chadema leader, Mr. Mbowe, was similarly detained on serious charges in relation
to his political activities. The source’s allegation that Chadema was banned from
participating in the October 2025 elections just three days after Mr. Lissu’s arrest, and reports
of arbitrary arrests and detentions of opposition figures including the deputy leader of
Chadema,26 paint a disturbing picture of systematic persecution of the political opposition.27
85.
Moreover, the Working Group has previously determined that provisions that permit
mandatory pretrial detention create two categories of defendant: those who are subject to
criminal proceedings that do not require automatic detention and can benefit from alternative
measures, such as bail; and those who, as in the case of Mr. Lissu, are alleged to have
committed criminal acts that do not allow for such alternatives. 28 Such a distinction is
discriminatory against certain categories of criminal defendants, in a manner which ignores
the equality of human beings, based on their “other” status, that is, being accused of a crime
that does not allow for alternative measures to detention.29
86.
For the above-mentioned reasons, the Working Group finds that Mr. Lissu was
deprived of his liberty on discriminatory grounds, that is, owing to his political opinion. His
deprivation of liberty violated articles 2 and 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and articles 2 (1) and 26 of the Covenant, and was therefore arbitrary under category V.
(f)
Concluding remarks
87.
The Working Group notes with deep concern the serious allegations of violence,
intimidation and ill-treatment surrounding this case. The source reports that supporters of
Mr. Lissu who attempted to attend his court hearing were violently arrested and beaten, and
that Mr. Lissu himself was forcefully shoved by security services. These allegations, which
the Government has not adequately addressed, suggest a pattern of serious human rights
violations.
88.
The Working Group recalls that on 11 November 2025, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights called for election-related killings to be investigated and
for the release of Mr. Lissu.30 In addition, special procedure mandate holders wrote to the
Government regarding allegations that foreign observers had been detained, allegedly
tortured and sexually assaulted, and expelled.31
89.
International human rights law requires that detainees be protected from any practice
that violates their right to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, as set forth in article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and article 7 of the Covenant. The Working Group recalls that the Committee against
Torture has stated that the right to freedom from torture and other ill-treatment or punishment
is absolute and non-derogable.32
90.
The Working Group is particularly concerned about the well-being of Mr. Lissu, given
that he is the survivor of an assassination attempt in which he was shot 16 times. The Working
Group reminds the Government that it is the duty of every State to treat those detained with
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, in accordance with
26 See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2025/10/tanzania-deaths-and-injuries-amid-
election-related-protests,
https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/10/1166243 and
https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/11/tanzania-election-related-killings-and-other-
violations-must-be-investigated.
27 See, in this regard, opinions No. 50/2024, para. 112; and No. 63/2025, paras. 70 and 71.
28 Opinion No. 8/2020, para. 81. See also opinions No. 1/2018, No. 75/2018, No. 14/2019 and
No. 64/2019; and No. 3/2022, para. 73.
29 Opinion No. 1/2018, para. 69.
30 See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/11/tanzania-election-related-killings-and-other-
violations-must-be-investigated.
31 See communication TZA 1/2025.
32 Committee against Torture, general comment No. 2 (2007), para. 5. See, most recently, opinion
No. 56/2025, para. 92.
A/HRC/WGAD/2025/74
GE.26-01871
13
article 10 of the Covenant. Every detainee has the right to the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health.33
3.
Disposition
91.
In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:
The deprivation of liberty of Tundu Antiphas Mughwai Lissu, being in contravention
of articles 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 11, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and articles 2, 9, 14, 19, 21, 22, 25 and 26 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, is arbitrary and falls within categories I, II, III and V.
92.
The Working Group requests the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania to
take the steps necessary to remedy the situation of Mr. Lissu without delay and bring it into
conformity with the relevant international norms, including those set out in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
93.
The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the
case, the appropriate remedy would be to release Mr. Lissu immediately and accord him an
enforceable right to compensation and other reparations, in accordance with international law.
94.
The Working Group urges the Government to ensure a full and independent
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of
Mr. Lissu and to take appropriate measures against those responsible for the violation of his
rights.
95.
The Working Group requests the Government to disseminate the present opinion
through all available means and as widely as possible.
4.
Follow-up procedure
96.
In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group requests
the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in follow-up
to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including:
(a)
Whether Mr. Lissu has been released and, if so, on what date;
(b)
Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to Mr. Lissu;
(c)
Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of Mr. Lissu’s
rights and, if so, the outcome of the investigation;
(d)
Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made to
harmonize the laws and practices of the United Republic of Tanzania with its international
obligations in line with the present opinion;
(e)
Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.
97.
The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may
have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and
whether further technical assistance is required, for example through a visit by the Working
Group.
98.
The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the
above-mentioned information within six months of the date of transmission of the present
opinion. However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up
to the opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action
would enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in
implementing its recommendations, as well as of any failure to take action.
33 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules),
rule 24; and opinion No. 42/2021, para. 78.
A/HRC/WGAD/2025/74
14
GE.26-01871
99.
The Working Group recalls that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all States
to cooperate with the Working Group and has requested them to take account of its views
and, where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken.34
[Adopted on 14 November 2025]
34 Human Rights Council resolution 60/8, paras. 6 and 9.