A/HRC/WGAD/2025/65

GE.26-01880 (E) 020326 020326 Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its 104th session, 10–14 November 2025 Opinion No. 65/2025 concerning Tahar Larbi (Algeria)* 1. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of the Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution 1997/50, the Commission extended and clarified the mandate of the Working Group. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251 and Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a three-year period in its resolution 60/8. 2. In accordance with its methods of work, 1 on 10 July 2025 the Working Group transmitted to the Government of Algeria a communication concerning Tahar Larbi. The Government did not reply to the communication within the established time frame. The State is a Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 3. The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases: (a) When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or her sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I); (b) When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, insofar as States Parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II); (c) When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity as to give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III); (d) When asylum-seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy (category IV); (e) When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on the grounds of discrimination, based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language, religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings (category V).

* Mumba Malila did not participate in the discussion of the case. 1 A/HRC/36/38. United Nations A/HRC/WGAD/2025/65 General Assembly Distr.: General 19 February 2026 English Original: French A/HRC/WGAD/2025/65 2 GE.26-01880 1. Submissions (a) Communication from the source 4. Tahar Larbi, born in 1968, is a cattle farmer, trade unionist and defender of human rights and the environment. (i) Context 5. According to the source, Mr. Larbi is an activist operating in southern Algeria. He has been a member of the Ligue algérienne pour la défense des droits de l’homme (Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights) since 2001 and formerly served as the local president of the Ligue in the municipality of El Abiodh Sidi Cheikh. 6. Mr. Larbi was first prosecuted in 2002 and sentenced to 7 months in prison for his participation in peaceful demonstrations the previous year. He was arrested again in 2003 after taking part in a peaceful rally in support of trade unionists and was subjected to torture and cruel, inhuman treatment while in detention. 7. From 2019 onward, Mr. Larbi became one of the leading figures of the Hirak popular movement in the wilayah of El Bayadh. In May 2020, he was sentenced to 6 months in prison and fined 100,000 dinars for displaying in public view publications deemed harmful to national interests and insulting the President of the Republic, offences defined under articles 96 and 144 bis of the Criminal Code, respectively. He was released on 5 July 2020 following a presidential pardon. 8. On 18 January 2022, Mr. Larbi was briefly detained at the Algerian-Mauritanian border and informed that he was subject to a ban on leaving the national territory. (ii) Arrest and detention 9. According to the source, on 18 September 2024, Mr. Larbi travelled to the premises of the Directorate General of National Security in El Abiodh Sidi Cheikh after receiving a summons without stated grounds from the criminal investigation police. Upon arrival, he was taken to El Abiodh Sidi Cheikh Court and brought before the prosecutor in connection with two separate cases. a. First case 10. The source indicates that, in the first case brought against Mr. Larbi, he was charged with insulting the President of the Republic, an offence under article 144 bis of the Criminal Code, and with displaying, for propaganda purposes, leaflets, bulletins, handbills, videos or audio recordings deemed harmful to national interests, an offence under article 96 of the Criminal Code. 11. The charges were based on several posts that Mr. Larbi made to social media between January and April 2023, specifically: (a) A post he shared marking the anniversary of the Hirak movement uprising; (b) A post criticizing large-scale hunting expeditions organized by Qatari nationals in the wilayah of El Bayadh and equating the agricultural investments of the Qatari royal family to a form of colonization; (c) A post in which he shared a publication from an online newspaper about Algerian independence and the Front de libération nationale (National Liberation Front); (d) A post he shared featuring a caricature of an Algerian general; (e) A post to which he attached an official notification report he had received from the criminal investigation police, with the comment that it was a “gift for Eid”. 12. Mr. Larbi confirmed to the prosecutor that he had published the statements attributed to him and explained that his intention was to share them with the general public in order to contribute to public debate on the issues concerned. He clarified that it was not his intention to offend anyone and that his posts reflected his personal opinions only. A/HRC/WGAD/2025/65 GE.26-01880 3 b. Second case 13. According to the source, in the second case, Mr. Larbi was accused of tarnishing the image of the security services or their affiliates through writings, drawings or any other audio or visual medium, or by any other means, an offence under article 149 bis (21) of the Criminal Code. He was again charged with insulting the President of the Republic and with displaying, for propaganda purposes, leaflets, bulletins, handbills, videos or audio recordings deemed harmful to national interests, offences defined under articles 96 and 144 bis of the Criminal Code, respectively. 14. These charges concerned three posts that Mr. Larbi made to social media: (a) A post consisting of an image of a torn voter’s card, with the comment “no elections with gangsters”, uploaded during the 2024 presidential election campaign; (b) A post consisting of a photograph of a herd of animals, with the comment “the donkey on the day of his uncle Hamroun’s election”;2 (c) A post consisting of a video of a herd of cattle, with the comment “we’ll take you, some guy’s uncle, just so we’re not stuck without a president”. 15. A request by Mr. Larbi’s lawyers for his release pending trial was denied. The prosecutor decided to refer both cases to the criminal court for immediate summary proceedings; however, as the defence requested a postponement, the hearings in both cases were postponed until 26 September 2024. A detention order was issued. (iii) Trial proceedings and sentencing 16. According to the source, during the hearing on 26 September 2024, the prosecution requested 7 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 dinars in each case. 17. Mr. Larbi’s lawyers argued that the purpose of the posts was to express personal opinions, that there was no criminal intent since Mr. Larbi did not seek to insult or harm any specific organization and that the posts were primarily intended as humour. The defence pointed out that Mr. Larbi was being prosecuted for sharing a post made by a journalist, yet the journalist himself had not been pursued by the justice system, and that the constituent elements of the alleged offences were absent. 18. In its ruling, the Court underscored that freedom of expression is guaranteed by the Constitution but is subject to legal restrictions to prevent infringement on the rights of private persons and State officials. It described the posts that Mr. Larbi published in the context of the presidential election as insulting and concluded that he had intended to mock the President. 19. Mr. Larbi was sentenced on the day of his trial hearing to 8 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 dinars in the first case and to 7 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 dinars in the second. As Mr. Larbi had previously been convicted under articles 96 and 144 bis of the Criminal Code in 2020, his sentence was doubled in accordance with article 54 bis (3) of the Criminal Code concerning repeat offences. 20. On appeal, Mr. Larbi’s sentence was reduced to 2 years’ imprisonment in each case, without any explanation being provided for this reduction. 21. According to the source, Mr. Larbi’s lawyers have lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. (iv) Detention 22. Mr. Larbi is currently being held at Abadla Prison in the wilayah of Béchar, approximately 500 kilometres from his home in El Abiodh Sidi Cheikh, a situation that increases his isolation and effectively deprives him of the support of his family and lawyers, as well as any direct communication with them. 2 A reference, according to the source, to “Lazy Hamroun”, a comical fictional character portrayed as being clueless. A/HRC/WGAD/2025/65 4 GE.26-01880 23. Mr. Larbi went on hunger strike to demand better medical care, leading to severe weight loss and a serious deterioration in his health. The source notes that, in violation of the rules applicable to hunger strikes in Algeria, the authorities did not place Mr. Larbi in isolation or under medical supervision. 24. In addition, according to the source, reprisals have been directed against a member of Mr. Larbi’s family, who was summoned by the criminal investigation police for questioning about social media posts, in particular, posts concerning Mr. Larbi’s health and expressions of solidarity with other political prisoners. (v) Legal analysis 25. The source argues that Mr. Larbi’s detention is arbitrary under categories I, II, III and V as set forth in the Working Group’s methods of work. a. Category I 26. The source points out that one of the fundamental guarantees of due process is the principle of legality, which encompasses the principle of non-retroactivity of the law enshrined in article 15 of the Covenant, the prohibition of analogy, the principle of legal certainty and the prohibition of uncodified criminal proceedings.3 It follows that an act may be punished only if, at the time of its commission, it was the object of a sufficiently precise written criminal law to which a sufficiently certain sanction was attached.4 27. The source adds that, in order to comply with the requirements of article 19 (3) of the Covenant, a norm must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly and it may not confer unfettered discretion for the restriction of freedom of expression on those charged with its execution.5 28. The source notes that article 96 of the Criminal Code, which formed the basis for the charges brought against Mr. Larbi in both cases, was amended6 after the commission of the alleged acts in the first case but before those in the second, and that it is unclear which version was applied in each case. 29. The source notes that the previous version of article 96 of the Criminal Code was the subject of concerns raised by the Human Rights Committee, which found that it criminalized and rendered punishable by fines activities relating to the exercise of freedom of expression.7 The source argues, however, that if the current version of article 96 was applied in the first case, this would constitute a violation of the principle of non-retroactivity of the law enshrined in article 15 of the Covenant, since the acts for which Mr. Larbi was prosecuted were allegedly committed in 2023, before the amendment entered into force. 30. Moreover, the source points out that the current version of article 96 is still not sufficiently clear or precise as to allow individuals to understand what conduct is prohibited or to enable the authorities to apply the law in a predictable and fair manner. According to the source, the changes made to article 96 not only broadened the scope of the offences defined therein, thereby increasing the authorities’ discretionary powers in that regard, but also increased the penalties for those offences. 31. Furthermore, the source indicates that the current version of article 96 refers to article 87 bis (5), which is based on a definition of terrorism that the Human Rights Committee considers to be overly broad and imprecise and to allow for the prosecution of conduct that may fall within the scope of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.8 The 3 Opinion No. 10/2018, para. 50. 4 Ibid. 5 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011) on the freedoms of opinion and expression, para. 25. 6 Act No. 20-06 of 28 April 2024 amending and supplementing Ordinance No. 66-156 of 8 June 1966 on the Criminal Code. 7 Human Rights Committee, concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Algeria (CCPR/C/DZA/CO/4), para. 43. 8 Ibid., para. 17. A/HRC/WGAD/2025/65 GE.26-01880 5 former Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism has previously expressed concerns regarding this definition.9 32. Regarding the charge of insulting the President of the Republic under article 144 bis of the Criminal Code, the source notes that the Human Rights Committee has also expressed concern about this article, on the basis that it criminalizes and renders punishable by fines activities relating to the exercise of freedom of expression.10 The source recalls that the mere fact that forms of expression are considered to be insulting to a public figure is not sufficient to justify the imposition of penalties.11 The source also emphasizes that the current version of article 149 bis (21) of the Criminal Code, on the offence of tarnishing the image of the security services or their affiliates, does not satisfy the principle of lex certa and does not allow the alleged harm to the person concerned to be balanced against the existence of an overriding public interest. 33. Regarding pretrial detention, the source refers to article 9 (3) of the Covenant to underscore that the use of pretrial detention should not be the rule and that it is for the State to demonstrate that it is reasonable and necessary.12 The source argues that Mr. Larbi was unlikely to flee, pose a risk to third parties or interfere with the evidence or the course of the investigation, as he had voluntarily complied with the criminal investigation police’s summons, the acts of which he had been accused were non-violent in nature and he was already subject to a ban on leaving the national territory. Alternatives to detention should therefore have been considered. Although limited in duration, Mr. Larbi’s pretrial detention illustrates the widespread use of this measure in Algeria.13 34. Lastly, the source asserts that the arbitrary nature of the detention is compounded by the cumulative sentences imposed in the two cases, which amounted to 15 years’ imprisonment at first instance and were later reduced to 4 years on appeal. The imposition of cumulative sentences at first instance is contrary to article 35 of the Criminal Code, which provides that, where multiple custodial sentences are imposed, only the most severe sentence is to be enforced unless a reasoned judicial decision orders their accumulation, which did not occur in this case. 35. The source recalls that the principle of ne bis in idem, as reflected in article 14 (7) of the Covenant, prohibits a person from being prosecuted or convicted more than once for the same offence. In the present case, the charges against Mr. Larbi concerned a series of Facebook posts which, although numerous, formed part of the same course of conduct and were published within the same time frame, and which should therefore have been addressed in a single set of proceedings. According to the source, the fragmentation of prosecutions by the public prosecutor’s office effectively amounts to circumventing the principle of ne bis in idem. 36. Consequently, the source claims that Mr. Larbi’s arrest lacks any legal basis and thus constitutes arbitrary detention under category I. b. Category II 37. The source asserts that Mr. Larbi’s arbitrary detention is a direct consequence of his exercise of the right to freedom of expression and the right of peaceful assembly, which are 9 OL DZA 12/2021. 10 Human Rights Committee, concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Algeria (CCPR/C/DZA/CO/4), para. 43. 11 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011), paras. 15 and 38; concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6), para. 25. 12 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person, para. 38; Marinich v. Belarus (CCPR/C/99/D/1502/2006), para. 10.4. 13 Human Rights Committee, concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Algeria (CCPR/C/DZA/CO/4), para. 35. A/HRC/WGAD/2025/65 6 GE.26-01880 protected under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant. The source emphasizes that, given Mr. Larbi’s status as a human rights defender, the circumstances surrounding his detention warrant heightened scrutiny.14 38. The source is of the view that Mr. Larbi has been persecuted for several years for exercising his rights, as he was previously prosecuted and imprisoned on three occasions between 2002 and 2020 for participating in peaceful demonstrations and for his publications. 39. In the two most recent cases brought against Mr. Larbi, the charges were based directly on a series of social media posts in which he expressed his personal views on Algerian politics. In the source’s view, the causal link between Mr. Larbi’s exercise of his right to freedom of opinion and expression and his criminal conviction in these two cases is indisputable. 40. The source affirms that a vague and general reference to the interests of national security or public order, without proper explanation and documentation, is not sufficient to establish that restrictions on the freedom of expression by way of deprivation of liberty are necessary.15 Moreover, the source maintains that article 19 (3) of the Covenant may never be invoked as a justification for the muzzling of any advocacy of multiparty democracy, democratic tenets and human rights.16 41. The source concludes that the deprivation of liberty of Mr. Larbi is not proportionate, reasonable or necessary. In both cases brought against Mr. Larbi, the Government failed to demonstrate, in a specific and individualized manner, the precise nature of the threat he allegedly posed or the necessity and proportionality of his imprisonment. Moreover, the prosecution did not produce convincing evidence that the dissemination of the publications concerned could have compromised national security or public order. Lastly, the excessive length of the prison sentences imposed on Mr. Larbi, particularly at first instance (a total of 15 years’ imprisonment), cannot reasonably be regarded as a proportionate measure to protect public order. 42. The source concludes that Mr. Larbi’s detention is therefore arbitrary and falls under category II. c. Category III 43. The source refers to article 14 of the Covenant to underscore that the right to a fair trial also extends to any penalties that may be imposed in that context. The source asserts that such penalties should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and respect the legitimate objectives of criminal punishment. 44. The source argues that, in the present case, the first-instance sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment for social media posts constitutes an excessive and unjustified criminal-law response. The posts in question fell within the scope of the exercise by Mr. Larbi of his right to freedom of expression, were non-violent in nature and posed no direct threat to public order or national security. 45. Furthermore, the source claims that Mr. Larbi did not receive a fair trial owing to the lack of judicial independence in Algeria. This issue was raised by the Human Rights Committee in its concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Algeria, in which it expressed concern about insufficient guarantees of judicial independence, the predominant role of the executive branch in the organization of the judicial branch and allegations of external interference in the decisions of judges and prosecutors.17 According to the source, the Algerian Government has not yet taken the measures necessary to address the Committee’s concerns. The source notes, in particular, that the Constitution grants the President the power to appoint all judges and prosecutors. Such appointments are subject to 14 Opinion No. 62/2012, para. 39. 15 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (E/CN.4/2006/7), para. 43. 16 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011), para. 23. 17 Human Rights Committee, concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Algeria (CCPR/C/DZA/CO/4), para. 39. A/HRC/WGAD/2025/65 GE.26-01880 7 review by the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, of which the President is a member. In addition to pressure from the Government, the judiciary is also subjected to pressure from the military. 46. For these reasons, the source is of the view that Mr. Larbi did not receive a fair trial and contends that his detention is arbitrary under category III. d. Category V 47. The source recalls that, according to the Working Group, when it is established that deprivation of liberty resulted from the active exercise of civil and political rights, there is a strong presumption that the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on the grounds of discrimination based on political or other views.18 The source emphasizes that the targeting of human rights defenders may be arbitrary and fall within category V where those concerned are deprived of their liberty on discriminatory grounds, that is, on the basis of their political or other opinions.19 48. The source asserts that, in the present case, Mr. Larbi’s detention resulted directly from his political opinions and his activism in support of social justice, environmental protection, political transparency and workers’ rights. 20 It considers that Mr. Larbi’s detention is intended to prevent him from continuing to exercise his fundamental rights and is the result of his active exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. 49. Accordingly, the source is of the view that Mr. Larbi was deprived of his liberty on discriminatory grounds and that his deprivation of liberty thus falls under category V. (b) Response from the Government 50. On 10 July 2025, the Working Group transmitted a communication concerning Mr. Larbi to the Government, requesting it to provide detailed information about him by 8 September 2025 at the latest. Specifically, the Working Group requested the Government to clarify the legal provisions justifying Mr. Larbi’s continued detention and their compatibility with the obligations of Algeria under international human rights law, in particular, with the treaties that the State has ratified. Moreover, the Working Group called upon the Government to ensure the physical and mental integrity of Mr. Larbi. 51. The Government submitted its reply on 11 September 2025, after the deadline. The Government did not request an extension of the deadline for its reply, as provided for in the Working Group’s methods of work. Therefore, the Working Group cannot accept the reply as if it had been submitted within the time limit. 2. Discussion 52. The Working Group regrets that it did not receive a timely response from the Government. In the absence of a timely response from the Government, and on the basis of all the information available to it, the Working Group has decided to render the present opinion in conformity with paragraph 16 of its methods of work. 53. In determining whether the deprivation of liberty of Mr. Larbi is arbitrary, the Working Group has regard to the principles established in its jurisprudence to deal with evidentiary issues. If the source has established a prima facie case for breach of international human rights law constituting arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be understood to rest upon the Government if it wishes to refute the allegations.21 Mere assertions by the Government that lawful procedures have been followed are not sufficient to rebut the source’s allegations. 18 Opinion No. 88/2017, para. 43. 19 Opinion No. 7/2021, para. 91. 20 Opinion No. 10/2018, paras. 81 and 82. 21 A/HRC/19/57, para. 68. A/HRC/WGAD/2025/65 8 GE.26-01880 (a) Category I 54. The Working Group will first consider whether there have been violations under category I, which concerns deprivation of liberty without a legal basis. 55. The source underscores that article 96 of the Criminal Code, which formed the basis of the charges brought against Mr. Larbi in both cases, was amended after the alleged acts in the first case but before those in the second, and that it remains unclear which version was applied in each case. According to the source, this situation violates the principle of non-retroactivity of the law enshrined in article 15 of the Covenant. As article 96, as well as articles 144 bis and 149 bis (21), relate to Mr. Larbi’s right to freedom of expression, the Working Group will examine the source’s arguments in that regard under category II. 56. The source maintains that Mr. Larbi’s detention pending trial did not meet the requirements of reasonableness and necessity and that alternatives to detention should have been considered. 57. The Working Group recalls that, under article 9 (3) of the Covenant, recourse to pretrial detention should not be the general rule. In addition, the Human Rights Committee has stated that pretrial detention should be an exception, should be as short as possible and must be based on an individualized determination, taking into account all the circumstances, that it is reasonable and necessary for such purposes as to prevent flight, interference with evidence or the recurrence of crime.22 Courts must examine whether alternatives to pretrial detention, such as bail or other conditions, would render detention unnecessary in the particular case.23 58. After examining the source’s observations and the Government’s belated reply, the Working Group notes that Mr. Larbi voluntarily travelled to the premises of the Directorate General of National Security when summoned and was already subject to a ban on leaving the national territory. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, he thus did not present a flight risk. In addition, there was nothing to indicate that he might have harmed a third party or interfered with evidence or the investigation. Moreover, the acts of which he was accused were non-violent in nature. The Working Group is therefore of the view that alternatives to detention should have been considered. In the absence of evidence that an individualized assessment was carried out, including consideration of alternatives to detention, the Working Group concludes that Mr. Larbi’s rights under article 9 (3) of the Covenant and article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were violated. 59. In addition, the source invokes the principle of ne bis in idem. It argues that the two sets of charges against Mr. Larbi were based exclusively on online posts of the same nature, published over the same time period, and should therefore have been joined in a single set of proceedings. However, the Working Group notes that it has not been informed of the exact date of publication of the posts and has not received any other relevant contextual information. Furthermore, in the present circumstances, the manner in which multiple acts are prosecuted is a matter of domestic law, which the source has not described in sufficient detail to enable the Working Group to reach a conclusion. 60. Nevertheless, given the above, the Working Group concludes that Mr. Larbi’s detention is arbitrary under category I. (b) Category II 61. The source maintains that the deprivation of liberty of Mr. Larbi is arbitrary as it results from his exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to peaceful assembly. In its belated response, the Government argues that Mr. Larbi was prosecuted as a repeat offender for insulting the President of the Republic and for disseminating propaganda likely to harm national interests. 62. The Working Group recalls that article 19 (2) of the Covenant provides that everyone has the right to freedom of expression and that this right is to include freedom to seek, receive 22 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 38; Marinich v. Belarus, para. 10.4. 23 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 38. A/HRC/WGAD/2025/65 GE.26-01880 9 and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his or her choice.24 According to the Human Rights Committee, all public figures, including those exercising the highest political authority, such as Heads of State and Government, are legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition. 25 Thus, the mere fact that forms of expression are considered to be insulting to a public figure is not sufficient to justify the imposition of penalties.26 63. Moreover, in its resolution 12/16, the Human Rights Council called on States to refrain from imposing restrictions that were not consistent with article 19 (3) of the Covenant, including on: discussion of government policies and political debate; reporting on human rights, government activities and corruption in government; engaging in election campaigns, peaceful demonstrations or political activities, including for peace or democracy; and expression of opinion and dissent.27 64. The Working Group examined the social media posts for which Mr. Larbi was prosecuted. It notes that the Government, in its belated response, did not provide any information demonstrating that the posts in question fell within the exceptions set out in article 19 (3) of the Covenant, failing, in particular, to demonstrate that they contained statements that jeopardized the protection of national security, public order or public health or morals. Furthermore, the Government’s admission that it monitored Mr. Larbi’s online activity also points to restrictions on freedom of expression. The Working Group concludes that, by being detained for posting and reposting on social media the messages referred to in the indictment, Mr. Larbi was subjected to reprisals for exercising his right to freedom of expression, in violation of article 19 of the Covenant and article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 65. The Working Group notes the similarities between Mr. Larbi’s case and that of another Algerian national with regard to whom it issued an opinion in 2025. In that case, the Working Group found that the rights of the person concerned had been violated and that a comparable situation involving the sharing and posting on social media of messages critical of the Government fell within category II.28 66. Furthermore, article 96 of the Criminal Code, which criminalizes the distribution, offering for sale and display, for propaganda purposes, of leaflets, bulletins and handbills deemed likely to harm national interests, has already been examined by both the Working Group and the Human Rights Committee. Both bodies have expressed concern regarding the provision’s vague wording, under which activities relating to the exercise of the right to freedom of expression are criminalized and rendered punishable by fines, including, for example, where such activities are characterized as defamation of or as insults directed at civil servants or State institutions.29 67. The Working Group has also examined the concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the fourth periodic report of Algeria. Regarding articles 96 and 144 bis of the Criminal Code, the Committee expressed its concern regarding the fact that, under these provisions and several others in the Criminal Code, activities relating to the exercise of the right to freedom of expression are criminalized and rendered punishable by fines, including, for example, where such activities are characterized as defamation of or as insults directed at civil servants or State institutions.30 Moreover, the Human Rights Committee and several United Nations special procedure mandate holders have stated that article 87 bis (5) of the Criminal Code defines the offence of terrorism in overly broad and vague terms that allow for the prosecution of activities that might fall within the scope of the exercise of the 24 See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011), paras. 9–12. 25 Ibid., para. 38. See also opinions No. 83/2018, para. 53, and No. 8/2020, paras. 61 and 62. 26 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011), para. 38. 27 Human Rights Council resolution 12/16, para. 5 (p). 28 Opinion No. 3/2025. 29 Opinion No. 29/2024, para. 84; Human Rights Committee, concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Algeria (CCPR/C/DZA/CO/4), para. 43. 30 Ibid., para. 43. A/HRC/WGAD/2025/65 10 GE.26-01880 right to freedom of expression or peaceful assembly.31 The Working Group considers that the use of these provisions of the Algerian Criminal Code against human rights defenders and individuals peacefully expressing opinions perceived as critical of the political regime in power raises serious concerns. Furthermore, the Working Group is concerned about the lack of precision, as alleged by the source, in both the previous and current versions of article 96 and about the reference in the current version to article 87 bis (5). 68. The Working Group also takes note of the arguments made by the source concerning the possible application of the amended article 96, which entered into force after the first case brought against Mr. Larbi but before the second. In its belated response, the Government did not clarify which version of the article was applied in each of the two cases. The risk of the retroactive application of the law as raised by the source, which would aggravate the violations falling within category II, has therefore not been refuted. 69. The Working Group also notes that Mr. Larbi was detained and prosecuted on three occasions between 2002 and 2020 for participating in peaceful protests and for his social media posts. The repeated proceedings brought against Mr. Larbi for exercising rights under the Covenant raise serious concerns for the Working Group. 70. The source further alleges a violation of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly falling within category II. However, as it has not presented any arguments or facts in support of this allegation, the Working Group is unable to conclude that a violation of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly has occurred. 71. Nevertheless, given the above, the Working Group finds that Mr. Larbi’s detention resulted from his exercise of the right to freedom of expression, in violation of article 19 of the Covenant and article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and that it thus falls within category II. (c) Category III 72. Given its finding that the deprivation of liberty of Mr. Larbi is arbitrary under category II, the Working Group wishes to emphasize that no trial should have taken place. However, according to the information provided by the source, Mr. Larbi was tried and convicted. 73. The source argues that the severity of the penalties imposed on Mr. Larbi is disproportionate to the circumstances and precludes a finding that he received a fair trial as guaranteed by article 14 of the Covenant. It underscores that the imposition of cumulative sentences at first instance is contrary to article 35 of the Criminal Code, which provides that where multiple sentences are imposed, only the most severe sentence is to be enforced unless a reasoned judicial decision orders their accumulation, which did not occur in this case. 74. The Working Group notes that, in total, Mr. Larbi was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 1 million dinars in the two cases combined. The sentence was subsequently reduced to a total of 4 years (2 years in each case), without the Court providing any reasons for this reduction. 75. In its belated response, the Government notes that the sentence was reduced on appeal but does not address the issue of cumulative sentencing. 76. The Working Group notes that, regardless of the severity of the 15-year sentence imposed at first instance and of the veracity of the criminal allegations, its role is not to act as a sentence-review body. Only where a penalty is so disproportionate as to demonstrate a disregard for fair trial guarantees can the Working Group conclude that a violation falling within category III has occurred. In the present case, the initial sentence of 15 years was reduced to 4 years on appeal. Recalling that its role is neither to serve as an appellate court nor to assess the details of domestic law or the penalties imposed in individual cases, the Working Group makes no finding on this particular issue. 77. The source indicates that Mr. Larbi was tried and sentenced approximately one week after his detention began. In its belated response, the Government argues that the authorities 31 Ibid., para. 17; AL DZA 7/2025; AL DZA 12/2021. A/HRC/WGAD/2025/65 GE.26-01880 11 complied with the principle of resolving cases within a reasonable time. As the Working Group has previously noted, an exceptionally brief trial for serious criminal offences may suggest that the accused was presumed guilty before trial, in violation of the right to the presumption of innocence protected under article 14 (2) of the Covenant.32 However, the Working Group does not consider that the duration of pretrial detention in the present case is, in itself, arbitrary. In this regard, it notes the nature of the charges and the information provided by the source, in particular that Mr. Larbi confirmed to the prosecutor that he had published the statements attributed to him and therefore did not contest at least part of the factual basis of the charges. Nevertheless, the Working Group remains concerned about the extremely limited time allowed for trial preparation and reaffirms that an accused person has the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare his or her defence. 78. The source also claims that Mr. Larbi did not receive a fair trial owing to the lack of judicial independence in Algeria. It makes reference to the observations of the Human Rights Committee, in which the Committee raised its concerns that the independence of the judiciary is not sufficiently guaranteed and that the executive plays a significant role in the organization of the judicial branch, as well as its concerns about allegations of external interference in the decisions of judges and prosecutors.33 79. The Working Group recalls that it has previously highlighted the lack of independence of certain courts in Algeria in earlier opinions.34 It notes, however, that in the present case the source raised this issue in general terms with respect to the Algerian judicial system, without specifying how the judges involved in the case lacked independence. While reiterating its concerns regarding the importance of fair trials and judicial independence in Algeria, the Working Group observes that it has not been demonstrated in the present case how any lack of independence rendered the trial unfair. 80. With regard to the specific allegations raised by the source under category III, the Working Group acknowledges the concerns expressed. However, as no specific violation has been established, the Working Group cannot conclude that a separate violation falling within category III has occurred. (d) Category V 81. According to the source, Mr. Larbi’s detention is discriminatory and falls within category V, as it results directly from his activism and political opinions in support of workers’ rights, social justice, environmental protection and political transparency. The source also notes that, from 2019 onward, Mr. Larbi became one of the leading figures of the Hirak popular movement in the wilayah of El Bayadh. In its belated response, the Government did not address the allegations of discrimination raised by the source. 82. Based on the information provided by the source and the Government, the Working Group considers that Mr. Larbi has been subjected to discriminatory targeting on several occasions since 2002 because of his political opinions and his criticism of the Government and political elites. It also notes a broader pattern of the Government targeting members of the Hirak movement.35 83. The Working Group is therefore of the view that Mr. Larbi’s detention constitutes a violation of international law on the ground of discrimination based on political opinion, in violation of articles 2 and 26 of the Covenant and articles 2 and 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and that it is arbitrary under category V. The Working Group is also of the view that there has been a pattern of conduct targeting Mr. Larbi and intended to deprive him of his freedoms. 32 Opinion No. 83/2018, para. 61. 33 Human Rights Committee, concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Algeria (CCPR/C/DZA/CO/4), para. 39. 34 Opinions No. 24/2024, para. 124, and No. 49/2024, para. 63. 35 Opinions No. 29/2024, No. 58/2023 and No. 45/2022. A/HRC/WGAD/2025/65 12 GE.26-01880 (e) Concluding observations 84. The Working Group expresses concern over information provided by the source and the Government indicating that Mr. Larbi went on a hunger strike between 15 May 2025 and 8 June 2025. The Working Group reiterates that the Government must ensure that Mr. Larbi’s conditions of detention are humane, in accordance with the right to health. It requests the Government to confirm that Mr. Larbi’s health condition is stable, in accordance with the instructions set out in the follow-up procedure for this opinion. 3. Disposition 85. In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion: The deprivation of liberty of Tahar Larbi, being in contravention of articles 2, 3, 7, 9 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 2, 9, 19 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is arbitrary and falls within categories I, II and V. 86. The Working Group requests the Government of Algeria to take the steps necessary to remedy the situation of Mr. Larbi without delay and bring it into conformity with the relevant international norms, including those set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant. 87. The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, the appropriate remedy would be to release Mr. Larbi immediately and accord him an enforceable right to compensation and other reparations, in accordance with international law. 88. The Working Group urges the Government to ensure a full and independent investigation of the circumstances surrounding the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of Mr. Larbi and to take appropriate measures against those responsible for the violation of his rights. 89. The Working Group requests the Government to disseminate the present opinion through all available means and as widely as possible. 4. Follow-up procedure 90. In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in follow-up to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including: (a) Whether Mr. Larbi has been released and, if so, on what date; (b) Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to Mr. Larbi; (c) Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of Mr. Larbi’s rights and, if so, the outcome of the investigation; (d) Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made to harmonize the laws and practices of Algeria with its international obligations in line with the present opinion; (e) Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion. 91. The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and whether further technical assistance is required, for example through a visit by the Working Group. 92. The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the above-mentioned information within six months of the date of transmission of the present opinion. However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up to the opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action would enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in implementing its recommendations, as well as of any failure to take action. A/HRC/WGAD/2025/65 GE.26-01880 13 93. The Working Group recalls that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all States to cooperate with the Working Group and has requested them to take account of its views and, where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken.36 [Adopted on 11 November 2025] 36 Human Rights Council resolution 60/8, paras. 6 and 9.