A/HRC/WGAD/2025/60, Opinion No. 60/2025 concerning Mohammad Labbad and Mohammad...

Opinion; Subjects: SAUDI ARABIA, ARBITRARY DETENTION; [WGAD: UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung, willkürliche Haft; Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire; Gruppo di lavoro sulla detenzione arbitraria]

Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)

GE.25-19529 (E) 081225 091225

Human Rights Council

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention

Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary

Detention at its 104th session, 10–14 November 2025

Opinion No. 60/2025 concerning Mohammad Labbad and Mohammad

Abdulah al-Faraj (Saudi Arabia)*

The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of

the Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution 1997/50, the Commission extended and

clarified the mandate of the Working Group. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251

and Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the

Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a

three-year period in its resolution 51/8.

In accordance with its methods of work, 1 on 23 April 2025 the Working Group

transmitted to the Government of Saudi Arabia a communication concerning Mohammad

Labbad and Mohammad Abdullah al-Faraj. The Government replied to the communication

on 20 June 2025. The State is not a Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights.

The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases:

(a)

When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the

deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or her

sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);

(b)

When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or

freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and, insofar as States Parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25,

26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);

(c)

When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to

the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the

relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity as to

give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);

(d)

When asylum-seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged

administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy

(category IV);

(e)

When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on

the grounds of discrimination, based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,

religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability

* Miriam Estrada Castillo and Mumba Malila did not participate in the discussion of the case.

1 A/HRC/36/38.

United Nations

A/HRC/WGAD/2025/60

General Assembly

Distr.: General

9 December 2025

Original: English

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or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings

(category V).

Submissions

(a)

Communication from the source

Mohammad Labbad, born in 1988, is a Saudi citizen residing in Sharqiyah.

Mohammad Abdullah al-Faraj, born in 1992, is a Saudi citizen residing in Sharqiyah.

In 2011 and 2012, they took part in demonstrations in Qatif, protesting against

discriminatory policies by the authorities towards Shia Muslims. They were arrested on

charges relating to their participation in those demonstrations.

(i)

Background

Reportedly, Saudi Arabia has a history of discrimination against the Shia minority in

Sharqiyah, which intensified following the 2011 protest movement. Members of this

community are often tried in mass trials and sentenced to death on the basis of vague charges.2

The criminal court system is staffed mainly by Sunni religious scholars. Judges have

wide-ranging powers to determine what constitutes a criminal offence and what the

corresponding punishment should be.

The Counter-terrorism and Financing of Terrorism Act criminalizes a wide range of

non-violent acts. Any act of public dissent can be thus conflated with a terrorist act.

10.

The Public Prosecution Office and the State Security Presidency are under the direct

control of the King. The General Directorate of Investigation (Mabahith) is under the direct

authority of the State Security Presidency. The Mabahith runs several detention facilities,

including the general investigation prison in Dammam, where Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj

are currently being held.

(ii)

Arrest and detention of Mr. Labbad

11.

On 23 August 2017, a relative of Mr. Labbad received a call from the Mabahith in

Anak. Mr. Labbad was summoned to benefit from a pardon for anyone accused of a crime

who would surrender.3 Such persons would not be imprisoned for more than six months.

12.

Certain that he had not committed any crime, Mr. Labbad decided to comply with the

order. He called authorities and was told that he could wait until after the Eid holidays to

present himself.

13.

On 11 September 2017, Mr. Labbad went to the Mabahith centre in Anak. He was

told that the summons was in connection with procedural issues that would not take more

than six months. He would be asked a few questions and was advised to sign the relevant

documents. He was not informed of any charges and was not presented with an arrest warrant.

14.

From that date, Mr. Labbad was placed in detention in the Mabahith centre and was

not allowed to contact his family. He was allowed to make his first phone call on 2 October

2017. He was later transferred to the general investigation prison in Dammam and placed in

solitary confinement for five and a half months.

15.

Mr. Labbad was isolated from the outside word and was subjected to torture, such as

flogging with metal wires, suffocation, waterboarding, and cuffing of his hands and feet. He

was also subjected to severe psychological torture, being placed in a dark cold room and then

transferred to a room with bright lighting to prevent him from sleeping. He was threatened

with rape, and death threats against his family were made to him.

16.

On 16 September 2019, Mr. Labbad reportedly attended his first hearing before the

Specialized Criminal Court, where he was charged with belonging to an armed terrorist

2 Opinion No. 26/2019, para. 57.

3 See https://www.okaz.com.sa/local/na/1552826.

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organization that aims to rebel against the State and carry out terrorist acts to destabilize

security. These charges were based on Royal Decree No. A/44, Royal Order No. 16820,

article 1 (b) of the 2014 Counter-terrorism and Financing of Terrorism Act, articles 2 (d) and

16 of the Anti-Money Laundering Law issued in Royal Decree No. M/39, articles 34 and 48

of the Weapons and Ammunition Law issued in Royal Decree No. M/45, and the Explosives

and Fireworks Regulation issued in Royal Decree No. M/38.

17.

Mr. Labbad informed the judge that he had been forced to sign the confessions, under

duress, and denied all charges. His allegations of torture were not investigated and were

dismissed.

(iii)

Arrest, detention and sentencing of Mr. Al-Faraj

18.

On 28 February 2017, Mr. Al-Faraj was abducted from his workplace by plain-clothes

agents. He was not shown an arrest warrant and was taken to the general investigation prison

in Dammam.

19.

He was allowed to call his family one week after his arrest. He was then placed in

solitary confinement for four months, without any contact with the outside world.

20.

Mr. Al-Faraj was subjected to torture, for example by being handcuffed to the door,

being suspended in the air for prolonged periods, being beaten and being threatened with the

arrest of his family. He did not receive medical treatment. The interrogator forced him to sign

a confession without reading it.

21.

On 16 September 2019, Mr. Al-Faraj had his first hearing before the Specialized

Criminal Court and was presented with a list of terrorism-related charges, based on Royal

Decree No. A/44, Royal Order No. 16820, the Anti-Money Laundering Law issued in Royal

Decree No. M/39, articles 34 and 40 of the Weapons and Ammunition Law issued in Royal

Decree No. M/45, and article 6 of the Anti-Cybercrime Law issued in Royal Decree

No. M/18.

22.

Mr. Al-Faraj informed the judge that he had been forced to sign the confessions, under

duress, and denied all the charges against him. His allegations of torture were not investigated

and were dismissed by the judge.

(iv)

Trial of Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj

23.

Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj were tried jointly. On 2 October 2022, the Specialized

Criminal Court issued its first verdict and sentenced them to death under ta‘zir. The sentence

was upheld by the Specialized Criminal Court of Appeal on 9 March 2023.

24.

In August 2023, the Supreme Court sent the case back to the Specialized Criminal

Court of Appeal. The Specialized Criminal Court of Appeal upheld the sentence for the

second time on 30 March 2024.

25.

A few months later, the families of Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj were informed that

their case would be retried, and that the sentence would be suspended pending a new verdict.

26.

On 5 December 2024, a lengthy hearing took place. The Public Prosecutor presented

the same list of charges as in the previous trial.

27.

After several hearings, on 25 February 2025, the Specialized Criminal Court of

Appeal again sentenced Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj to death under ta‘zir.

28.

Mr. Labbad had no lawyer appointed for him until his first hearing, on 16 September

2019. No lawyer was appointed for Mr. Al-Faraj until four years into his detention, in

February 2023. Mr. Al-Faraj’s State-appointed lawyer did not cooperate with him, did not

inform the family of the date of the hearings and did not give them a copy of the judgment.

(v)

Legal analysis

29.

The source submits that the detention of Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj falls under

categories I, II, III and V of the Working Group.

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30.

In relation to category I, it recalls that they were neither presented with arrest warrants

at the time of the arrests nor informed of the reasons for such, contrary to articles 3 and 9 of

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and principle 10 of the Body of Principles for the

Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.

31.

Furthermore, since they were unable to challenge the lawfulness of their detention as

they were being held incommunicado, their detention violates articles 6 and 8 of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They were also unable to communicate with their

families, giving rise to an infringement of principles 15 and 19 of the Body of Principles for

the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment and rules 43 (3)

and 58 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the

Nelson Mandela Rules).

32.

There is no right to submit complaints directly to judicial authorities or to claim habeas

corpus under Saudi law. Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj were thus never allowed to challenge

the legality of their detention, contrary to articles 8 and 9 of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and principle 10 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons

under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.

33.

They appeared before a judge for the first time two years and two-and-a-half years

after their arrests, respectively. Their detention was therefore not based on an individualized

determination, in violation of articles 3, 9 and 11 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, and principles 11, 37 and 38 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All

Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.

34.

The Counter-terrorism and Financing of Terrorism Act, which served as a basis for

convicting Mr. Labbad, came into effect on 1 February 2014. It was not in force at the time

of the alleged acts, which took place in 2011 and 2012. The detention of Mr. Labbad thus

violates article 11 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

35.

Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj have been charged under the counter-terrorism and

anti-cybercrime laws, and under provisions that do not list specific acts. The law defines as

terrorist any act that is pursued with a terrorist aim, without defining what constitutes a

terrorist aim and what acts may fall under that aim. As these laws lack legal certainty, they

are contrary to articles 9 and 11 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

36.

In relation to category II, both men were arrested and charged for participating in

protests against the treatment of the Shia minority, and in funerals, and for chanting

anti-government slogans. These acts cannot qualify as posing threats to morality and public

order. There is no evidence of any violence or incitement to violence.

37.

The sentencing of Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj was unnecessary and

disproportionate, and added to the chilling effect among dissidents. Their detention is in

violation of articles 19, 20 (1) and 21 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

38.

In relation to category III, the source argues that following their arrests,

Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj did not have access to a lawyer and were not promptly informed

of their rights. Lawyers were only appointed for them at the beginning of the trial in the case

of Mr. Labbad and four years after the arrest in the case of Mr. Al-Faraj. There is no evidence

that they were granted access to a lawyer beforehand, and thus their access to legal counsel

was restricted, in violation of articles 3, 9, 10 and 11 (1) of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights.

39.

Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj were placed in solitary confinement for prolonged

periods and subjected to torture to extract confessions, which were later admitted in court as

the sole and highest form of evidence. Their detention thus violates article 5 of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, articles 2, 15 and 16 (1) of the Convention against Torture and

Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and rules 43 (1) (b) and 44 of

the Nelson Mandela Rules.

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40.

The Specialized Criminal Court cannot be considered an independent and impartial

tribunal.4 Its judges are appointed by the Supreme Judicial Council; they are comprised of

members appointed by the King and include the Director of the Public Prosecution Office.

41.

In relation to category V, the source recalls concerns of the Committee on the

Elimination of Racial Discrimination that ethno-religious minorities in Saudi Arabia face

obstacles in freely practising their right to freedom of religion or belief and that certain

ethno-religious minorities face discrimination in education, employment and the legal

system.5 The Committee also expressed concern at “the significant increase in the rate of

executions carried out since 2023, in particular among members of the Shia ethno-religious

minority group”.6 This discrimination has similarly been noted by the Committee on the

Rights of the Child.7

42.

The application of the death penalty is based on a legal framework that enables the

judiciary to pursue a repressive agenda on the basis of wide discretionary powers. There have

been similar cases involving Shia detainees sentenced to death.8

43.

Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj are from the Shia minority. The discrimination against

this group forms the backdrop to their deprivation of liberty, trial and subsequent death

sentences.

(b)

Response from the Government

44.

On 23 April 2025, the Working Group transmitted the allegations from the source to

the Government of Saudi Arabia under its regular communications procedure. The Working

Group requested the Government to provide detailed information by 23 June 2025 about the

current situation of Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj. The Working Group also requested the

Government to clarify the legal provisions justifying their detention, as well as their

compatibility with the State’s obligations under international human rights law.

45.

On 20 June 2025, the Government submitted its reply, in which it states that

Mr. Labbad was detained on 11 September 2017 after voluntarily surrendering. Mr. Al-Faraj

was arrested on 28 February 2017 pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by the competent

authority after evidence became available proving his involvement in terrorist crimes.

46.

The Government refutes the source’s conclusion that the detention of Messrs. Labbad

and Al-Faraj falls under categories I, II, III and V of the Working Group.

47.

Upon Mr. Labbad’s surrender, the competent authority issued a detention order, and

he was informed of the reasons for it on the same day. Mr. Al-Faraj was similarly informed

of the reasons for his arrest, on the same day he was detained. Both individuals were informed

of their legal rights and signed official acknowledgments. They were also informed of the

charges against them and of their right to notify any person of their arrest.

48.

Orders are based on solid evidence, are in strict compliance with the law, and must

come from a competent authority. Detention or imprisonment must only occur in designated

facilities and for the duration determined by the competent authority. The procedures are

consistent with international standards, including articles 3 and 9 of the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights and principle 10 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons

under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.

49.

Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj were not placed in solitary confinement and were not

denied contact with the outside world. Mr. Labbad received 55 visits, the most recent on

17 April 2025, and made 177 phone calls, the most recent on 4 June 2025. Mr. Al-Faraj

received 117 visits, the most recent on 25 May 2025, and made 204 phone calls, the most

recent on 4 June 2025.

4 CAT/C/SAU/CO/2, para. 17; and opinion No. 26/2019, para. 57.

5 CERD/C/SAU/CO/10-11, paras. 29, 35 and 56.

6 Ibid., para. 25 (b).

7 CRC/C/SAU/CO/3-4, para. 17.

8 Opinions No. 26/2019, No. 56/2019, No. 26/2024 and No. 71/2024.

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50.

Legislation grants the investigating authority the right to prevent the accused from

contacting others for a limited period when exceptional investigative needs so require. This

does not infringe upon the right of accused persons to contact their relatives or legal

representatives. This procedure aligns with international standards, including the Nelson

Mandela Rules and principle 16 (4) of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons

under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.

51.

The individuals in question were investigated on terrorism-related charges. The

duration of their detention during the investigation was lawful, and they were not denied the

right to challenge the legality of their detention. They have had access to this right since the

date that each one’s detention order was issued and until the present time.

52.

They are being held at the general investigation prison in Dammam. From the moment

of their arrest and detention, they have had the right to visits and communication. On the very

day of their arrest, they were allowed to contact individuals of their choice to inform them of

the arrest.

53.

They have also been granted access to legal assistance. Mr. Labbad was represented

by four legal representatives, one of whom was appointed at State expense, whom he

personally selected. Mr. Al-Faraj was represented by five legal representatives, one of whom

was also appointed at State expense at his request. Their lawyers were permitted access and

were afforded sufficient facilities and time to prepare their defence.

54.

Restrictions on communication for the accused are only applied under exceptional

circumstances defined by law, without infringing on the right of the relatives of the accused

to be informed of the arrest. The competent authority may order the prevention of

communication or visits for a period not exceeding 90 days if this is deemed necessary for

the investigation. If such restrictions occur, all detainees have the right to file a complaint

pursuant to article 39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

55.

Solitary confinement can only occur in exceptional cases and for the shortest time.

Specific conditions must be met, including with regard to the seriousness of the offence and

the existence of an investigative interest. Such decisions are subject to the discretion of the

Regional Chief Prosecutor or the Public Prosecutor and the solitary confinement must not

exceed the period specified under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The right of the accused

to contact his or her lawyer must not be compromised. Prosecution responsible for monitoring

prisons must ensure compliance and reporting to the Public Prosecutor if there is a need to

extend the detention beyond 15 days from the date of arrest.

56.

All prisons are subject to oversight. The public prosecution, which is independent,

supervises the work of criminal investigation officers, in accordance with article 25 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure. The Human Rights Commission and the National Society for

Human Rights also visit prisons at any time, without the need for prior permission.

57.

The procedures undertaken in the case of the aforementioned individuals are

consistent with articles 6, 8 and 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, principles

10, 15 and 19 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of

Detention or Imprisonment and rules 43 (3) and 58 of the Nelson Mandela Rules.

58.

Detention of an accused person is conducted in accordance with the law and is limited

to specific, non-extended periods. If an extension is necessary, a competent court issues a

judicial order to extend the detention for defined periods, while ensuring that the accused

retains the right to challenge the legality of the detention.

59.

With respect to the source’s allegation that Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj did not

appear before a judge until two-and-a-half years after their arrest, the Government explains

that they were tried within a reasonable time. Upon completion of the investigation, the

Public Prosecution Office found sufficient evidence to file charges and referred the case to

the Specialized Criminal Court in accordance with article 15 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure and article 3 (b) and (c) of the Law on the Public Prosecution. The case was

submitted along with an indictment outlining the alleged crimes, identifying the constituent

elements of each offence, citing the applicable legal provisions and detailing evidence

establishing crimes and attributing them to the defendants, in accordance with article 126 of

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the Code of Criminal Procedure. The defendants were summoned to appear in court pursuant

to article 135 of the same law.

60.

The aforementioned individuals were arrested, detained and investigated in

accordance with the Counter-terrorism and Financing of Terrorism Act of 2013, which was

in effect at the time; their punishment was not applied retroactively. Article 3 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure affirms that no criminal penalty may be imposed on anyone except after

they have been proven guilty of committing an act prohibited by sharia or law, and only after

a trial conducted according to legal procedures, consistent with article 11 (2) of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights.

61.

Legislation contains clearly defined provisions that outline the criminalized acts and

the penalties. Individuals are thus fully informed of the applicable laws, allowing them to

avoid inadvertently committing crimes due to ambiguity.

62.

Necessity and proportionality are fundamental criteria that ensure that the penalty is

appropriate in view of the nature of the crime and is necessary to protect the safety of society.

The 2013 and 2017 versions of the Counter-terrorism and Financing of Terrorism Act provide

clear definitions of terrorism and terrorist financing, in line with international standards. The

anti-cybercrime law also clearly defines cybercrimes.

63.

The Government denies the source’s allegation that Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj are

part of a systematic pattern of depriving the Shia minority of their right to freedom of

expression. They were not arrested or detained until credible evidence was obtained proving

their involvement in serious terrorist crimes. Their arrest was not due to participation in

peaceful assembly.

64.

The crimes that Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj were convicted of include serious

terrorist criminal acts threatening national and international security: repeated armed attacks

on security officers with the intent to kill, targeting their vehicles and government facilities,

throwing Molotov cocktails at security personnel, planning and executing ambushes, joining

an armed terrorist organization to carry out terrorist operations within Saudi Arabia, plotting

with other terrorists to kidnap and murder a judge from the Shia sect, receiving and providing

military training for terrorist purposes, supplying weapons and equipment to terrorist

operatives, delivering a firearm to a member of a terrorist organization for use against

security personnel, recruiting and training terrorist elements, providing logistical support to

terrorists, possessing and using weapons and ammunition for terrorist purposes to undermine

internal security and target law enforcement officers, and financing terrorism and terrorist

acts. These offences cannot be considered peaceful or justifiable.

65.

The punishment for committing these terrorist crimes is not only in accordance with

the country’s obligation under article 29 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

but also reflects the country’s commitment to the international instruments for combating

terrorism, as well as its adherence to the relevant Security Council resolutions that address

threats to international peace and security. Furthermore, the judgment is fully consistent with

the guarantees protecting the rights of persons facing the death penalty, as set out in

Economic and Social Council resolution No. 1984/50, as well as with article 6 (2) of the

Covenant.

66.

Neither individual was subjected to torture. They confessed freely and admitted the

charges before the court in accordance with article 101 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

They did not claim coercion during their confessions before the court. Although they later

raised allegations of torture during the trial proceedings, the court took the necessary

measures to verify and investigate these claims and concluded that the allegations were

unfounded. The judge does not base rulings solely on confessions, but rather on a

combination of verified evidence and corroborating facts.

67.

The Specialized Criminal Court is an independent judicial body established by a

decision of the High Judicial Council, which is granted authority under article 6 of the Law

of the Judiciary to establish courts and determine their subject matter and territorial

jurisdiction.

68.

The Government rejects the source’s allegation that the detention and sentences of

Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj resulted from discrimination based on their membership of the

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Shia minority. They were arrested and tried for committing terrorist crimes, which are

unrelated to their religion or affiliation, and which cannot be justified as the legitimate

exercise of freedom of opinion and expression.

69.

Both individuals are in good health and have received appropriate medical care since

the date of their arrest.

(c)

Further information from the source

70.

Generic claims made by the Government about its compliance with international legal

standards contrast with the findings of civil society and international organizations.

71.

The State’s response did not mention the specific authority that issued the arrest

warrants, the issuance date, who the arresting authorities were, and how the authorities

carried out the arrests of the two individuals.

72.

The source challenges the Government’s assertion of the impartiality of the Public

Prosecution Office and the Specialized Criminal Court, citing executive influence over both

institutions.

73.

The Government has not substantiated the type of evidence that served as the basis

for the Public Prosecution Office’s indictments.

74.

The source also raises concerns regarding the lack of independence and efficiency of

the Human Rights Commission.

75.

The Government’s response did not substantiate the length of time that each of the

detainees was held in solitary confinement and how long they were prevented from

communicating with the outside world.

76.

The source also disputes the Government’s claim that the two individuals were not

subjected to enforced disappearance upon arrest, arguing that no information was given about

the place of arrest and detention in respect of each individual.

77.

The Government did not provide satisfactory information about the dates of visits

received by the detainees, the locations thereof, and whether those visits took place while the

two were forcibly disappeared.

78.

The detainees were not brought promptly before a judge and were held for a time

grossly exceeding 48 hours before they were first heard by a judicial authority.

79.

The source recalls the Working Group’s previous opinions, which have found that the

anti-terrorism law in Saudi Arabia does not qualify as lex certa.

80.

The two individuals were arrested in relation to their participation in protests

regarding the treatment of the Shia minority. Mr. Labbad and Mr. Al-Faraj are among those

who have been subjected to systematic discriminatory targeting of members of the Shia

community.

Discussion

81.

The Working Group thanks the source and the Government for their submissions. In

determining whether the detention of Mr. Labbad and Mr. Al-Faraj is arbitrary, the Working

Group has regard to the principles established in its jurisprudence to deal with evidentiary

issues. If the source has established a prima facie case for breach of international

requirements constituting arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be understood to

rest upon the Government if it wishes to refute the allegations.9

(a)

Category I

82.

The source submits that when the two complainants were arrested, they were not

informed of the reasons for the arrests and did not find out the charges until their trial. Neither

individual was presented with an arrest warrant at the time of arrest.

9 A/HRC/19/57, para. 68.

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83.

The Government contends that a detention order was issued against Mr. Labbad after

he “voluntarily surrendered” to the security authorities, while Mr. Al-Faraj was arrested

pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by a competent authority after evidence became available

proving their involvement in terrorism-related offences. Both individuals were informed of

the reasons for their arrest on the same day as their detention. The source submits that the

State’s response does not mention which specific authority was responsible for issuing the

arrest warrants, nor the date of issuance, nor who carried out the arrests and how they were

carried out. The Government did not specify when the indictment was filed before the

Specialized Criminal Court and when the complainants were given copies of their

indictments.

84.

The Working Group notes that detained persons have the right to be promptly

informed of the charges against them, as is inherent in article 9 of the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights and in principles 2 and 10 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of

All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment. It has previously stated that in

order for a deprivation of liberty to have a legal basis, it is not sufficient that there is a law

that may authorize the arrest. The authorities must invoke that legal basis and apply it to the

case. 10 This is typically done through an arrest warrant or arrest order (or equivalent

document).11

85.

The Working Group notes that the submissions of the parties are contradictory on this

issue. In relation to Mr. Al-Faraj, it observes that while the source provided a detailed account

of the circumstances leading to his arrest and detention, the Government provided limited

information to confirm its version of events. Although the Government confirms the date of

the arrest, there is no indication as to which specific authorities conducted the arrest or how

the arrest was carried out. Moreover, the Government does not mention the specific authority

that issued the arrest warrant (in the case of Mr. Al-Faraj) or the date of its issuance. The

Government does not argue that this was a case of flagrante delicto, where the opportunity to

obtain an arrest warrant is typically not available. On this basis, the Working Group is not

satisfied that Mr. Al-Faraj was informed of the reason for his arrest at the time that it occurred,

irrespective of whether a warrant was duly issued.

86.

In the case of Mr. Labbad, the Working Group notes that he voluntarily turned himself

in after receiving a summons, by telephone, that did not detail any charges and instead

included a promise of amnesty. The source’s detailed account of how Mr. Labbad was

detained contrasts with the Government’s general assertion that he was informed of the

reasons for his detention on the day he turned himself in. Accordingly, the Working Group

is not satisfied that Mr. Labbad was properly and promptly informed of the reasons for his

arrest.

87.

The Working Group therefore finds that the arrests violated article 9 of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights and principles 2 and 10 of the Body of Principles for the

Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.

88.

The source submits that the detainees were denied the right to challenge the lawfulness

of their detention and to be brought promptly before a judge. It was only on 16 September

2019 that they appeared before a judge. The Government does not dispute this fact but

contends that Mr. Labbad and Mr. Al-Faraj were tried within a reasonable time. It states that

the Public Prosecution Office referred their case files to the Specialized Criminal Court upon

completion of the investigation. The source further disputes this claim by arguing that the

detainees were held for a time grossly exceeding 48 hours before they were brought before a

judicial authority.

89.

The source also argues that the detainees were held in solitary confinement, with

access to outside world denied to them. Mr. Labbad was held in solitary confinement for

five-and-a-half months, while Mr. Al-Faraj was held in incommunicado detention for four

months. In response, the Government asserts that the law grants its investigating authorities

10 Opinions No. 9/2019, para. 29; No. 46/2019, para. 51; No. 59/2019, para. 46; No. 71/2024, para. 106;

and No. 5/2025, para. 85.

11 Opinions No. 88/2017, para. 27; No. 3/2018, para. 43; and No. 30/2018, para. 39. In cases of arrests

made in flagrante delicto, the opportunity to obtain a warrant will typically not be available.

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GE.25-19529

the right to restrict detainees’ access to communication or visits for a limited period (i.e. not

exceeding 90 days) where this is necessary for the investigation. Likewise, it maintains that

the detainees were allowed to contact individuals of their choice on the day they were arrested

and were granted access to legal representation at the State’s expense. It enumerates visits

and calls received by each individual. The source replies that the State did not substantiate

the period of time for which each of the complainants was held in solitary confinement, and

for how long they were prevented from communicating with the outside world. The source

also points out that the State failed to specify the locations and dates of the alleged visits,

thereby challenging the veracity of the information provided by the State.

90.

Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines the right to be

promptly informed of charges and to have the opportunity to promptly take proceedings

before a court to challenge the legality of detention.12 The same right is also embodied in

principles 11, 32 and 37 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under

Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment. This judicial remedy is a fundamental safeguard of

personal liberty and is essential in ensuring the legality of the detention.13 The Human Rights

Committee has previously noted that 48 hours is generally sufficient time to bring an arrested

person promptly before a judge, and that any delay longer than 48 hours must be absolutely

exceptional and be justified under the circumstances.14

91.

The Working Group observes that Mr. Labbad and Mr. Al-Faraj were not brought

promptly before a judge – within 48 hours barring exceptional circumstances as per the

Working Group’s jurisprudence.15 They were first brought before a judge almost two-and-a-

half years after their arrests, which cannot be considered a reasonable time frame. The right

to challenge the legality of detention is a self-standing human right, critical to avoid and

mitigate any instances of arbitrary detention, the absence of which constitutes a human rights

violation.16 The rights of Mr. Labbad and Mr. Al-Faraj under article 9 of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights were violated in this respect.

92.

Turning to the source’s claims that the two detainees were subjected to enforced

disappearance, the Working Group first notes that Mr. Labbad went with a relative to the

Mabahith centre in Anak where he was detained. Consequently, the Working Group does not

consider that the source has shown that he was “disappeared”, notwithstanding subsequent

periods of incommunicado detention.

93.

By contrast, Mr. Al-Faraj was detained from his workplace. According to the source’s

submission, which has not been refuted in any detailed manner, he was prevented from

contacting his family for one week from the moment of his arrest. The Government refers to

the permissibility of retaining detainees without contact with the outside world but does not

specify what the exact limits are, nor why his family could not have been informed of his

location. This is sufficient to demonstrate enforced disappearance in which there was a

concealment of the fate of Mr. Al-Faraj. Preventing him from contacting his family or a

lawyer and withholding access to legal procedures for him placed him outside the protection

of the law. His detention constituted enforced disappearance in violation of the customary

international law prohibition of enforced disappearance, which accords with article 2 of the

International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.17

His detention was thus arbitrary, being in violation of article 9 of the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights.

94.

The Working Group notes the source’s submissions that Mr. Labbad and Mr. Al-Faraj

were held in solitary confinement, incommunicado, for periods of five-and-a-half months

and four months respectively. The Government has specified that the detainees received visits

12 Opinion No. 5/2025, para. 88.

13 A/HRC/30/37, para. 3.

14 See the Committee’s general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 33.

15 Opinions No. 57/2016, paras. 110 and 111; No. 2/2018, para. 49; No. 83/2018, para. 47; No. 11/2019,

para. 63; No. 20/2019, para. 66; No. 26/2019, para. 89; No. 30/2019, para. 30; No. 36/2019, para. 36;

No. 42/2019, para. 49; No. 51/2019, para. 59; No. 56/2019, para. 80; No. 76/2019, para. 38; and

No. 82/2019, para. 76.

16 A/HRC/30/37, para. 2.

17 See also the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

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and calls, but has not detailed when these occurred and has not specifically refuted the

arguments concerning periods of several months of solitary confinement.

95.

The Working Group has consistently held in its jurisprudence that holding a person

incommunicado can violate the right under article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights to challenge the lawfulness of his or her detention. 18 Prohibitions against

incommunicado detention are also included in principles 15 and 19 of the Body of Principles

for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment and in

rules 43 (3), 58 and 68 of the Nelson Mandela Rules. The Government’s argument that the

detainees were entitled to periodic visits and contact during their detention, by providing an

overview of the number of visits and calls, does not counter the source’s detailed

submissions. In the absence of specific information regarding the dates and locations of the

visits, as well as whether these visits took place during the time when the complainants were

in solitary confinement, the Working Group considers that the source has established that the

detainees were held incommunicado. It finds that this exacerbated the violations of their

rights under category I, as it further undermined their ability to challenge the basis for their

detention through contacts with their lawyers and potential habeas corpus procedures.

96.

The Working Group considers that the detention of Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj

violates articles 8 and 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and principles 11, 32

and 37 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of

Detention or Imprisonment.

97.

Furthermore, the source submits that Mr. Labbad was convicted under the

Counter-terrorism and Financing of Terrorism Act, which came into effect on 1 February

2014, for alleged acts committed in 2011 and 2012, thereby violating the principle of

non-retroactivity. The Government replies that the complainants were arrested, detained and

investigated in accordance with the law in force at the time.

98.

The source notes that articles 1, 4, 6 and 16 of the Counter-terrorism and Financing

of Terrorism Act lack legal certainty and are overly broad and vague, thus violating the

principle of legality enshrined in article 11 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Moreover, article 6 of the anti-cybercrime law, which was used in the case of Mr. Al-Faraj,

is formulated in vague and broad terms, in breach of the principle of lex certa. The

Government asserts that the 2014 Counter-terrorism and Financing of Terrorism Act, as well

as its 2017 version, define terrorism and terrorist financing in a manner consistent with

international standards. It states that the definition of cybercrimes in the anti-cybercrime law

was also formulated without ambiguity.

99.

Article 11 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that no one is

to be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not

constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was

committed.19

100.

The Working Group considers that the Government has not adequately addressed the

source’s contention concerning violation of the principle of legality. The Government did not

dispute the source’s argument that the alleged acts attributed to the complainants took place

prior to the effectivity of the statute penalizing these offences. The Working Group also

recalls its earlier findings concerning similar facts 20 and considers that a violation of

article 11 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been demonstrated.

101.

As to the vagueness of the anti-cybercrime and anti-terrorism laws, the Working

Group recalls its previous opinions in which it has stated that these cannot qualify as lex

certa, in violation of the principle of legality stipulated in article 11 (2) of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights.21 Special procedure mandate holders have expressed their

concerns about the definition of “terrorist crime” as contained in article 1 of the

18 See opinions No. 53/2016, No. 56/2016 and No. 10/2017.

19 Opinion No. 71/2024, para. 116.

20 See opinion No. 71/2024.

21 Opinions No. 10/2018, paras. 54–56; No. 71/2019, para. 73; No. 30/2022, para. 80; No. 26/2024,

para. 101; and No. 71/2024, para. 119.

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counter-terrorism law, as it does not restrict the acts that it criminalizes to violent acts.22 The

Working Group reiterates these findings with regard to Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj.

102.

The Working Group has also expressed its concern that anti-terrorism laws, “by using

an extremely vague and broad definition of terrorism, bring within their fold the innocent and

the suspect alike and thereby increase the risk of arbitrary detention”, with the consequence

that “legitimate democratic opposition … becomes a victim in the application of such laws”.23

103.

The Working Group considers that the deprivation of liberty of Mr. Labbad and

Mr. Al-Faraj lacks a valid legal basis and is thus arbitrary, falling under category I.

(b)

Category II

104.

The source submits that the two individuals were arrested and charged for protesting

against the treatment of the Shia minority, in breach of articles 19, 20 (1) and 21 (1) of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Government claims that they were arrested and

convicted on multiple terrorism-related charges, which cannot be considered peaceful as they

endanger civilian lives, and that it rejects discriminatory practices based on religion, belief

or affiliation. The source replies that the present cases provide another example of the

Government’s weaponization of its counter-terrorism framework to target individuals

expressing views critical of the Government’s policies.

105.

The Working Group notes that article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights protects the right to freedom of expression, which includes the freedom to seek,

receive and impart information and includes political discourse, commentary on public

affairs, discussion of human rights, and journalism.24 It protects the holding and expression

of opinions, including those that are critical of or not in line with government policy. 25

Article 20 provides the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, while

article 21 (1) ensures the people’s right to take part in their government, directly or through

freely chosen representatives.26 Article 29 (2) provides that limitations on the exercise of

these rights must be determined by law and be solely for the purpose of securing due

recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just

requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.27

106.

The Working Group has consistently held that restrictions placed on freedom of

expression by way of deprivation of liberty can only be justified when it is shown that the

deprivation of liberty has a legal basis in national law, does not violate international law, is

necessary to ensure respect for the rights or reputations of others, or for the protection of

national security, public order, public health or morals, and is proportionate to the legitimate

aims pursued.28

107.

The Working Group notes the source’s submission that the detentions of

Messrs. Labbad and Al-Faraj arose due to their participation in demonstrations protesting

against the treatment of Shia citizens. It observes that the Government’s response only

contains an enumeration of the alleged criminal offences but lacks a detailed account of the

factual and evidentiary basis for these allegations and of how specifically these crimes were

committed. Claims that the detainees were involved in terrorism-related activities, including

throwing Molotov cocktails at security personnel and collaborating with terrorists to plan the

kidnapping and murder of a judge from the Shia sect, were not sufficiently substantiated to

controvert the source’s detailed account of the complainants’ detention for peacefully

participating in protests. The Government does not explain the evidence on which the

convictions were based (apart from its reference to purported confessions, which are found

22 See communication SAU 12/2020, available at

https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25726.