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A/HRC/WGAD/2025/47

Opinion No. 47/2025 concerning Gui Minhai (China and Thailand)

UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung (WGAD) · 2025-08-29 · en UN

Opinion; Subjects: CHINA, THAILAND, ARBITRARY DETENTION; [WGAD: UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung, willkürliche Haft; Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire; Gruppo di lavoro sulla detenzione arbitraria]

Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)

GE.25-16365 (E) 291025 301025

Human Rights Council

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention

Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary

Detention at its 103rd session, 25–29 August 2025

Opinion No. 47/2025 concerning Gui Minhai (China and Thailand)

1.

The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of

the Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution 1997/50, the Commission extended and

clarified the mandate of the Working Group. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251

and Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the

Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a

three-year period in its resolution 51/8.

2.

In accordance with its methods of work,1 on 25 February 2025 the Working Group

transmitted to the Governments of China and of Thailand a communication concerning Gui

Minhai. The Government of Thailand has not replied to the communication. Thailand is a

Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Government of China

replied to the communication on 17 April 2025. China is not a Party to the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

3.

The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases:

(a)

When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the

deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or her

sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);

(b)

When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or

freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and, insofar as States Parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25,

26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);

(c)

When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to

the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the

relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity as to

give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);

(d)

When asylum-seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged

administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy

(category IV);

(e)

When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on

the grounds of discrimination, based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,

religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability

or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings

(category V).

1 A/HRC/36/38.

United Nations

A/HRC/WGAD/2025/47

General Assembly

Distr.: General

30 October 2025

Original: English

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1.

Submissions

(a)

Communication from the source

4.

Gui Minhai is a naturalized citizen of Sweden. He was born on 5 May 1964 in Ningbo

City, Zhejiang Province, China.

5.

Mr. Gui is a writer, publisher, bookseller and co-owner of the Mighty Current

publishing house, based in Hong Kong, China. He wrote and published books under the pen

name Ah Hai. In his writings, he explored the alleged corruption, private lives and power

struggles of prominent officials. Mr. Gui is a member of International PEN, the international

writers’ association. He is currently detained in China.

(i)

Background

6.

The source submits that Mr. Gui appears to have been arrested at least three times. On

17 October 2015, he was apprehended by a plain-clothed man outside his holiday home in

Muang Pattaya, Bang Lamung District, Thailand. The closed-circuit television footage from

the building shows a man waiting outside the gates, Mr. Gui returning to the building in his

car, stepping out of the car, engaging in a brief conversation with the man and the two leaving

together in Mr. Gui’s car. A member of staff at the building stated that the man had been

heard speaking Chinese on the phone.

7.

In November and December 2015, Mr. Gui contacted his family to reassure them of

his safety but he was unable to say where he was or when he would be able to return home.

8.

In January 2016, Chinese State television aired footage of Mr. Gui claiming to have

travelled voluntarily to China to turn himself over to the police for having committed a crime

over a decade earlier. The source submits that Mr. Gui was forced to confess to having

committed a crime relating to a car accident, the sentence for which had been suspended.

9.

The source submits that it is plausible that Mr. Gui entered China within days of

leaving his condominium in Thailand, despite the fact that the Thai authorities have

reportedly found no official evidence of Mr. Gui leaving the country.

10.

It is unclear whether another arrest took place, as Mr. Gui was taken to China and

placed in custody there. For the purposes of the present submission, the source considers any

further arrest around 17 October 2015 as part of one instance.

11.

On 17 October 2017, Mr. Gui was arrested again. The specific location of that arrest

is not known. The source submits that Chinese officials had informed Swedish diplomats that

Mr. Gui was to be released on 17 October 2017 and the Ambassador of Sweden had travelled

to Cixi detention centre outside Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, to assist Mr. Gui upon his

release.

12.

The source notes that the Swedish authorities were told that Mr. Gui was held at Cixi

detention centre in Zhejiang Province between 17 October 2015 and 17 October 2017.

Consular officials saw him there four times, by appointment, but were allowed to speak to

him on only two occasions. It is not clear whether Mr. Gui was held at the Cixi detention

centre or if he was transferred there for those meetings.

13.

On 17 October 2017, the staff at the detention centre, upon being asked by the

Ambassador of Sweden, claimed that Mr. Gui had already left and that his whereabouts were

unknown. Mr. Gui’s family did not hear from him until six days later, at which point it

became clear that he had been placed under a form of residential surveillance and had

obtained an official release certificate.

(ii)

Current arrest and detention

14.

On 20 January 2018, at around 3 p.m. local time, Mr. Gui was apprehended again

while travelling on a train from Shanghai to Beijing with two Swedish diplomats. The arrest

took place when the train stopped at Jinan West Train Station, Shandong Province, and was

carried out by a group of 10 plain-clothed individuals who identified themselves as police

officers. They did not show their identity documents, a warrant or any other decision taken

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by a public authority. They physically lifted Mr. Gui from his seat and led him out onto the

platform.

15.

It is likely that Mr. Gui was subsequently taken to the detention centre at Ningbo City,

Zhejiang Province, and that he was held in custody by officials of the Ningbo City Public

Security Bureau. Two weeks after that incident, the Chinese authorities notified Swedish

consular officials of Mr. Gui’s arrest.

16.

According to the source, on 9 February 2018, Mr. Gui was forced to take part in

another televised confession. In a twenty-minute interview, he reportedly confessed to having

been influenced by the Swedish authorities.

17.

The source submits that several elements of the events outlined above, and

circumstances surrounding them, strongly indicate the involvement of Chinese officials,

including:

(a)

The nature of Mr. Gui’s work made him a plausible target, and four of his

colleagues also disappeared under mysterious circumstances between October and December

2015. Mr. Gui and his colleagues specialized in the publishing, distribution and sale of

politically sensitive literature in Hong Kong, China. All five disappeared individuals were

connected to Causeway Bay Books, which sold many titles that had been banned in mainland

China;

(b)

The pattern of involvement of government institutions in China, including

State-controlled media outlets, in the communication of Mr. Gui’s whereabouts and legal

status establishes at minimum collusion with the forces carrying out the arrests;

(c)

In the arrest carried out on 20 January 2018, the individuals identified

themselves as police officers but did not disclose the police branch or department to which

they belonged;

(d)

The case of one of Mr. Gui’s colleagues who was also disappeared in October

2015 was handled by a government task force called a central investigation team.

18.

The source submits that the reasons imputed by the authorities for Mr. Gui’s arrest are

as follows:

(a)

For the arrest on 17 October 2015, the authorities claim that Mr. Gui turned

himself over to the police voluntarily for having killed a person while driving intoxicated in

2003, for which he received a suspended prison sentence that was revoked, as he returned to

China. The source submits that Mr. Gui claimed under duress that he had travelled to China

and surrendered himself to the police voluntarily, out of remorse over the alleged incident in

2003. According to the national criminal law, Mr. Gui’s alleged voluntary surrender ought to

have been investigated by a public security organ – the People’s Procuratorate or the People’s

Court, and a case ought to have been filed. No evidence of such a case has been submitted

by the authorities;

(b)

For the arrest on 17 October 2017, the authorities claimed in bilateral

communications with Swedish officials on several occasions that Mr. Gui was free and could

thus do as he wished. However, Mr. Gui was placed under residential surveillance in Ningbo,

Zhejiang Province, where he had to seek permission from police minders in order to leave

the residence, and he was told that he would not be allowed to leave China;

(c)

For the arrest on 20 January 2018, the authorities notified Swedish consular

officials that Mr. Gui had been arrested for trafficking in State secrets and participating in

unauthorized meetings with foreign diplomats. The source notes that participating in

unauthorized meetings with foreign diplomats is not a crime under domestic criminal law.

Article 111 of the Criminal Law of China provides that gathering, purchasing or illegally

providing State secrets is punishable by up to 10 years in prison, and more than 10 years if

the circumstances are particularly serious. No further details or evidence have been provided

as to the nature of the crime or the alleged State secrets;

(d)

On 25 February 2020, a press release published on the website of Ningbo

Intermediate People’s Court stated that Mr. Gui had been sentenced to 10 years in prison for

illegally providing intelligence to foreign parties. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China

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has reportedly refused to share a copy of the judgment with the Swedish authorities, claiming

that Mr. Gui is no longer a Swedish citizen and that Sweden therefore has no right to interfere.

The authorities have failed to explain how Mr. Gui could have obtained and provided secret

information while in State custody.

19.

The source submits that, following Mr. Gui’s conviction, the Swedish authorities

demanded his release, as a Swedish citizen, but the Chinese authorities insisted that Mr. Gui

had chosen not to appeal the sentence and that he had asked to have his Chinese citizenship

reinstated. Mr. Gui has been denied access to his family and to consular support from the

Swedish embassy. His family has not been informed of his whereabouts for five years, since

the date of the verdict in 2020.

20.

The source further submits that Mr. Gui’s work as a publisher has continued to gather

international praise, while his case has sparked concern among press freedom advocates

worldwide. On 15 November 2019, Mr. Gui was awarded the Tucholsky Prize by Swedish

PEN, an association defending freedom of speech. The presence of the Minister of Culture

of Sweden at the award ceremony reportedly resulted in strong opposition from the Chinese

authorities, who opposed the awarding of the prize by Swedish PEN to Mr. Gui and the

attendance of any government officials of Sweden at the ceremony.

(iii)

Legal analysis

21.

The source submits that the authorities claim that between 17 October 2015 and

17 October 2017, Mr. Gui was serving a two-year prison sentence, which had previously

been suspended. No explanation has been given as to why Mr. Gui was allegedly serving a

prison sentence in a detention centre. Article 77 of the Criminal Law of China provides that

a suspended sentence is to be revoked if a criminal whose sentence is suspended commits

another crime during the probation period for suspension or if it is discovered that, before the

judgment was pronounced, the sentenced criminal committed another crime for which he or

she has not been sentenced. It also provides that if, during the probation period for

suspension, a criminal whose sentence is suspended violates laws, administrative statutes or

regulations governing the supervision and control of suspension of sentence stipulated by

public security departments of the State Council and if the circumstances are serious, the

suspension shall be revoked and the original punishment shall be executed.

22.

According to the source, the Chinese authorities have alleged that Mr. Gui violated

the terms of the suspension by fleeing the country. It is unclear what evidence exists to show

this. According to the Criminal Procedure Law of China, a suspended sentence may only be

revoked through a court order. No such court order has been presented.

23.

The authorities have not clarified Mr. Gui’s legal status during the period from

17 October 2017 to 20 January 2018. He was issued with an official release certificate on

17 October 2017. However, the source submits that his movements remained restricted and

that he was forced to live under police surveillance.

24.

Between 20 January 2018 and 25 February 2020, the source submits that Mr. Gui

appeared in an interview published in several Chinese media outlets, including the South

China Morning Post, on 9 February 2018, just over a week after he was apprehended. In the

interview, which the source submits has widely been regarded by experts as another forced

confession, Mr. Gui stated that he was in police custody and insinuated that Swedish

diplomats had attempted to take him back to Sweden against his will. He did not elaborate

further on why he was in police custody, but coverage of the interview by the Oriental Daily

News, a pro-Government newspaper in Hong Kong, China, also cited a note from the

authorities claiming that Mr. Gui had been criminally detained for illegally providing

intelligence and State secrets to foreign entities. No further details have been provided or

shared with the Swedish authorities.

25.

From 25 February 2020 until the present date, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China

has repeatedly claimed in bilateral communications with Swedish officials that Mr. Gui’s

case was handled in accordance with Chinese law but has presented no documentation to

support that claim. The authorities have not shared the judgment or any further information

on the trial. Since Swedish officials were not notified of the trial, they were unable to send

representatives to observe it.

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26.

The source submits that the information on Mr. Gui’s case provided by the Chinese

authorities was either insufficient to prove that the deprivation of Mr. Gui’s liberty was legal,

or it was deliberately worded so as to bypass obligations under the domestic laws of China

and the international treaties to which it is a Party.

27.

The source submits that Mr. Gui’s line of work, the circumstances of his initial

disappearance and the reportedly escalating restriction on political dissent in Hong Kong,

China, at the time suggest that the true reason Mr. Gui was arrested, detained and imprisoned

was his politically sensitive work.

28.

The source further submits that Mr. Gui has been denied the right to a fair trial. The

authorities reportedly indicated that Mr. Gui spent the period from 17 October 2015 to

17 October 2017 serving a revoked suspended sentence from 2003. The Criminal Procedure

Law of China permits the reinstatement of a suspended prison sentence if, for instance, the

terms of suspension were violated. However, the source notes that neither domestic nor

international law permit extraterritorial arrest and abduction to revoke a suspension.

29.

The source notes that if, as the Chinese authorities claim, Mr. Gui travelled to China

voluntarily to turn himself in, he must have entered the country illegally as he left his passport

in the apartment in Muang Pattaya, Thailand, and had to apply for a new one at the Swedish

consulate in Shanghai in 2017. If he did indeed enter China illegally, the source argues that,

in receiving Mr. Gui, the officials dealing with his alleged surrender would have assisted in

the illegal crossing of borders, which under the law of China is a criminal offence. The source

also notes that, at the time of his disappearance in October 2015, Mr. Gui was in the process

of renovating his property in Hong Kong, China, and had also made plans to see friends and

family in November and December of that year.

30.

The source argues that it seems implausible that Mr. Gui would have suddenly

decided, without telling anybody, to enter China illegally in order to turn himself in for a

crime that would have been committed over a decade earlier. It seems particularly

implausible because he could simply have purchased a plane ticket.

31.

Rather, the source submits that the Chinese authorities’ claims seem to have been

designed to conceal the fact that Mr. Gui was illegally rendered against his will from Thailand

to China. To the best of the source’s knowledge, no evidence (including arrest warrants) has

been produced to show that the multiple instances of deprivation of Mr. Gui’s liberty were

authorized by the law of China. The source notes that the law of China does not authorize

State organs to revoke a suspended sentence without a court decision. No court order

revoking Mr. Gui’s alleged suspended sentence appears to have been produced.

32.

The source further submits that the law of China does not authorize the residential

surveillance and deprivation of the right to freedom of movement of individuals who have

not been arrested or detained. Yet, Mr. Gui was placed under surveillance in a police-

managed apartment in Ningbo after he was purportedly released from prison (or detention)

and issued with a release certificate on 17 October 2017. There, he was monitored and,

although he wanted to go home, he was told that he would not be allowed to leave the country.

33.

The source submits that neither Mr. Gui nor his family were officially notified on that

occasion or on the two other occasions that he had been arrested. The individuals carrying

out or authorizing Mr. Gui’s arrests have not been identified. The authorities appear not to

have produced any judgment or documentation from the 2020 trial in which Mr. Gui was

sentenced to 10 years in prison. Such a document would have clarified the legal basis, if any,

of Mr. Gui’s continued deprivation of liberty, but the authorities have refused to engage with

the Swedish consular officials’ requests to see them. The source argues that this further

suggests that the authorities have acted arbitrarily and indicates the authorities’ knowledge

of that fact.

34.

The source submits that the authorities of China have also violated Mr. Gui’s consular

rights as a citizen of Sweden. It recalls in this context that the Vienna Convention on Consular

Relations, to which both China and Sweden are Parties, provides for the prompt notification

of the detention of a citizen of one State Party by another State Party and for regular consular

access. It is reported that between 17 October 2015 and 17 October 2017, consular officials

from Sweden were allowed to meet with Mr. Gui only four times. Two of those meetings

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reportedly lasted less than five minutes, since Mr. Gui had been instructed to tell the Swedish

consular staff that he did not wish to speak with them and to leave the room.

35.

The source submits that, during the period Mr. Gui was under residential surveillance,

from 17 October 2017 to 20 January 2018, he did not express his genuine wishes and had

been coerced into pretending that he did not want any consular assistance.

36.

The source submits that the Swedish authorities were not notified of Mr. Gui’s first

or second arrest; nor were they notified of his trial in 2020.

37.

Since Mr. Gui’s third arrest in 2018, the Chinese authorities have reportedly claimed

that he has renounced his Swedish citizenship and had his former Chinese citizenship

reinstated. The Swedish Migration Agency has received an incomplete form for the

renunciation of Swedish citizenship on Mr. Gui’s behalf but has not processed the

application. Although Sweden does not accept the claim that Mr. Gui is no longer a citizen

of Sweden, the officials of China are citing Mr. Gui’s purported Chinese nationality as a

reason not to share information on his case and welfare with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

of Sweden.

38.

The source submits that, from the failure of the Chinese authorities to substantiate

their claims with regard to their treatment of Mr. Gui and their reasons for depriving him of

his liberty, it is clear that the true reason for detaining and depriving Mr. Gui of his liberty is

his exercise of his right to freedom of expression, as protected by article 19 of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights.

39.

The source submits that, to prevent Mr. Gui from exercising that right in his home

country of Sweden, the authorities sought to keep him from leaving China by placing him

under residential surveillance. To that end, they arbitrarily charged him with trafficking in

State secrets and unilaterally stripped him of his Swedish citizenship, thus violating his rights

protected under the articles 13 and 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

40.

The source further submits that the fact that the Chinese authorities were seeking to

prevent Mr. Gui from exercising his right to freedom of expression is further corroborated

by the fact that China has and had at the time of Mr. Gui’s first arrest an extradition agreement

with Thailand. Had Mr. Gui been wanted for any perceived wrongdoing that was not

protected by his human rights, the Chinese authorities could have used that channel to have

him taken into custody. Instead, they chose to abduct him.

41.

The source submits that the period between Mr. Gui’s third arrest and his trial,

between 20 January 2018 and 25 February 2020, may be considered a period of arbitrary

detention, since the authorities refused to share details of the charges against him and why it

was necessary to hold him in incommunicado detention, as well as basic information such as

his whereabouts and his health.

42.

In addition, the source submits that Mr. Gui was not allowed any contact with his

family members or any Swedish officials, which made it impossible to help him appoint legal

representation. Mr. Gui’s trial cannot therefore be considered to have been either fair or

public, in accordance with article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

43.

The source submits that the sentencing of Mr. Gui to 10 years in prison for illegally

providing intelligence to foreign parties was announced on the website of the Ningbo

Intermediate People’s Court on 25 February 2020. The trial had not been preceded by any

public notice. Neither family members nor Swedish consular officials had been notified.

There was no way for anyone whose presence would have contributed to ensuring fairer

treatment of Mr. Gui to know that the trial was even taking place.

44.

The source further submits that the criminal justice system of China is known for its

high conviction rates, which were recorded in 2021 by some international observers to have

reached over 99.9 per cent. That fact alone establishes that a fair trial under the criminal

justice system in the country is highly unlikely.

45.

The source argues that in Mr. Gui’s case, there were specific circumstances that made

a fair trial impossible. Mr. Gui was denied legal representation throughout his time in Chinese

State custody or surveillance. He was only rarely allowed contact with his family members

and Swedish consular officials and on those occasions, the conversations were monitored.

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46.

The source submits that there is also evidence suggesting that, while in detention,

Mr. Gui lost a tooth as a result of torture. The gap in Mr. Gui’s teeth is visible in a photograph

published by the South China Morning Post, accompanying the interview with him in

February 2018.

47.

The source submits that Mr. Gui’s family cannot safely pursue any remedies within

the domestic legal and administrative systems. In 2016, when the family tried to appoint a

Chinese human rights lawyer on Mr. Gui’s behalf, the authorities did not accept that. Swedish

officials have repeatedly attempted to appoint such a lawyer, while also demanding regular

consular access, since Mr. Gui’s initial arrest in 2015. Those attempts have all been

unsuccessful.

(b)

Responses from the Governments

48.

On 25 February 2025, the Working Group transmitted the source’s allegations to the

Governments of China and of Thailand and, under its regular communications procedure,

requested responses by 28 April 2025.

49.

On 27 March 2025, the Government of Thailand requested an extension of the time

limit, in accordance with paragraph 16 of the Working Group’s methods of work. The

Working Group granted an extension until 28 May 2025. The Working Group regrets that,

despite the extension, it has received no response from the Government of Thailand.

50.

The Government of China submitted its response on 17 April 2025. It submits that

Mr. Gui is from Ningbo City, Zhejiang Province. After lawful court proceedings, the Ningbo

Intermediate People’s Court publicly pronounced its judgment on 24 February 2020, finding

Mr. Gui guilty of illegally providing intelligence to foreign entities, and sentenced him to 10

years’ imprisonment and 5 years’ deprivation of political rights. Pursuant to the first-instance

judgment, Mr. Gui is currently serving his sentence. During the trial, the court established

that, in November 2017, Mr. Gui had provided information containing intelligence to

personnel from a foreign consulate general in Shanghai. During the proceedings, the Chinese

judicial authorities fully guaranteed all the litigation rights that Mr. Gui enjoyed by law.

Selected members of the public attended the hearing.

51.

Concerning Mr. Gui’s nationality, according to the Government, he was originally

from Ningbo, China, and acquired Swedish nationality in 1996. In 2018, he voluntarily and

actively applied to the Chinese public security authorities to restore his Chinese nationality

and the public security authorities lawfully approved the restoration of his Chinese

nationality. Pursuant to the Nationality Law of China, China does not recognize dual

nationality for citizens of China. Therefore, when approval to restore a person’s Chinese

nationality is granted, that person may not retain foreign nationality. After Mr. Gui restored

his Chinese nationality, China lawfully recognized him as a citizen of China only.

(c)

Additional comments from the source

52.

On 9 June 2025, the source submitted its comments on the response from the

Government of China. It provided additional details emphasizing that Mr. Gui’s current

whereabouts remain unknown, despite requests from his family and the Government of

Sweden, and confirmed that he had been travelling to seek medical treatment at the Swedish

embassy when he was arrested. The source contextualized Mr. Gui’s case within a broader

pattern of transnational repression against journalists and publishers by the Chinese

authorities, citing the fact that in 2025, China was ranked 178th out of 180 countries in the

World Press Freedom Index.

2.

Discussion

53.

The Working Group thanks the source and the Government of China for their

submissions. In the absence of a response from the Government of Thailand, the Working

Group has decided to render the present opinion, in conformity with paragraph 16 of its

methods of work.

54.

The present case involves two States. The Working Group will discuss the issues

relating to each State separately. In determining whether Mr. Gui’s detention is arbitrary, the

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Working Group has regard to the principles established in its jurisprudence to deal with

evidentiary issues. If the source has established a prima facie case for breach of international

law constituting arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be understood to rest upon

the Government if it wishes to refute the allegations. Mere assertions by the Government that

lawful procedures have been followed are not sufficient to rebut the source’s allegations.2

(a)

Allegations against Thailand

55.

The source alleges that Thailand violated its obligations under the Covenant by failing

to prevent what was apparently the extraterritorial abduction of Mr. Gui from Thai territory

on 17 October 2015. According to the submissions, closed-circuit television footage shows

Mr. Minhai being approached by a plain-clothed individual who had been waiting outside his

holiday home in Muang Pattaya, Bang Lamung District, and subsequently leaving with that

person in his own vehicle. The individual was reportedly heard speaking Chinese while

waiting, suggesting foreign involvement in what appears to have been a coordinated

operation. The source contends that the Thai authorities failed to conduct an adequate

investigation into Mr. Gui’s disappearance and were unable to provide official evidence of

his departure from the country, despite the source’s assertion that he is likely to have entered

China within days of the incident.

56.

The source argues that the failure of Thailand to protect Mr. Gui from what constitutes

enforced disappearance and arbitrary detention violates the obligations of Thailand under

international law. By allowing foreign agents to operate on its territory to abduct an

individual and failing to take adequate measures to investigate or prevent such actions,

Thailand effectively enabled the subsequent arbitrary detention of Mr. Gui.

57.

The Working Group notes that the source has not presented any allegations that

Thailand directly arrested, detained or charged Mr. Gui, nor that the Thai authorities were

complicit in his apparent abduction from Thai territory on 17 October 2015. The source’s

submissions indicate that Mr. Gui was approached by an unidentified individual outside his

holiday home in Muang Pattaya and subsequently left the premises voluntarily in his own

vehicle. While the source suggests that this constituted an abduction, the closed-circuit

television footage described shows what appears to have been a conversation between two

individuals followed by their departure together, without evidence of force or coercion by

the Thai authorities or agents acting on their behalf.

58.

The Working Group observes that the source has not demonstrated that the Thai

authorities had knowledge of any planned operation against Mr. Gui or that they failed to

take reasonable measures to protect him once they became aware of his disappearance. The

absence of official records of Mr. Gui’s departure from Thailand, while noted by the source,

does not establish that Thailand violated its international obligations, as border control

systems may have gaps that do not necessarily constitute breaches of the Covenant.

59.

Accordingly, the Working Group finds no basis to conclude that the actions or

omissions of Thailand regarding Mr. Gui constituted arbitrary detention under any category

of its mandate.

(b)

Allegations against China

(i)

Category I

60.

The source alleges that China has arbitrarily detained Mr. Gui without any legal basis,

in violation of article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Between 17 October

2015 and 17 October 2017, the source submits that Mr. Gui was subjected to enforced

disappearance following his alleged abduction from Thailand, with the Chinese authorities

claiming that he voluntarily surrendered to serve a revoked suspended sentence from 2003,

but failing to present any court order revoking the suspended sentence, as required under the

Criminal Procedure Law of China. The source further alleges that, if Mr. Gui had genuinely

surrendered voluntarily, he would have entered China illegally without proper

documentation, making Chinese officials complicit in his illegal border crossing. Concerning

2 A/HRC/19/57, para. 68.

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his arrest on 20 January 2018, the source alleges that 10 plain-clothed individuals identifying

themselves as police officers failed to present identification, an arrest warrant or any legal

authorization, subsequently claiming that Mr. Gui had been arrested for trafficking in State

secrets and participating in unauthorized meetings with foreign diplomats, despite the latter

not constituting a crime under Chinese law. The source submits that no evidence regarding

alleged State secrets was provided and that the authorities failed to explain how Mr. Gui

could have obtained such information while in State custody.

61.

The Government responds that Mr. Gui was lawfully convicted by the Ningbo

Intermediate People’s Court of Zhejiang Province on 24 February 2020 for the crime of

illegally providing intelligence to foreign entities, following proper judicial proceedings that

fully guaranteed all the litigation rights he enjoyed by law. The Government submits that the

court established during the trial that, in November 2017, Mr. Gui had provided information

containing intelligence to personnel from a foreign consulate general in Shanghai, and that

select members of the public attended the hearing. The Government further states that

Mr. Gui accepted the sentence without appeal and is currently serving his 10-year prison term

with 5 years’ deprivation of political rights, in accordance with Chinese law. Regarding his

nationality, the Government clarifies that Mr. Gui voluntarily applied to the Chinese public

security authorities in 2018 to restore his Chinese nationality, which was lawfully approved,

and pursuant to the Nationality Law of China – under which dual nationality is not recognized

– China recognizes him as a citizen of China only following the restoration of his nationality.

62.

The Working Group recalls that article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights provides that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. The

Working Group has previously stated that, for a deprivation of liberty to have a legal basis,

it is not sufficient that there is a law which may authorize the arrest. The authorities must

invoke that legal basis and apply it to the circumstances of the case.3 This is typically done

through an arrest warrant or arrest order (or equivalent document).4 The right to be presented

with an arrest warrant is inherent to the right to liberty and security of person and to the

prohibition of arbitrary detention, under articles 3 and 9 of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and principles 2, 4 and 10 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All

Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.5

63.

The Working Group notes that, according to the source’s submissions, Mr. Gui’s

initial disappearance from Thailand on 17 October 2015 resulted in what appears to have

been an enforced disappearance, as he was taken from Thai territory by unidentified

individuals and his whereabouts remained unknown for extended periods. The Working

Group observes that in its response, the Government claims that Mr. Gui voluntarily

surrendered to the Chinese authorities, but it provides no documentation of any legal process

that would have authorized his detention. The authorities have failed to present any court

order revoking Mr. Gui’s allegedly suspended sentence from 2003, which under the national

Criminal Procedure Law is required for such revocation. Without such judicial authorization,

Mr. Gui’s detention from 17 October 2015 to 17 October 2017 lacked any legal basis under

domestic law.

64.

Regarding his arrest on 20 January 2018, the Working Group notes that according to

the source’s unrebutted submissions, 10 plain-clothed individuals who identified themselves

as police officers apprehended Mr. Gui on a train without presenting any identification, arrest

warrant or equivalent legal document. The individuals provided no legal justification for the

arrest and failed to inform Mr. Gui of the specific reasons for his detention at the time of

arrest, in violation of article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While the

3 Opinions No. 9/2019, para. 29; No. 46/2019, para. 51; and No. 59/2019, para. 46.

4 Opinions No. 88/2017, para. 27; No. 3/2018, para. 43; and No. 30/2018, para. 39.

5 The Working Group has maintained from its early years that the practice of arresting persons without

a warrant renders their detention arbitrary in, for example, decisions No. 1/1993, paras. 6 and 7;

No. 3/1993, paras. 6 and 7; No. 4/1993, para. 6; No. 5/1993, paras. 6, 8 and 9; No. 27/1993, para. 6;

No. 30/1993, paras. 14 and 17 (a); No. 36/1993, para. 8; No. 43/1993, para. 6; and No. 44/1993,

paras. 6 and 7. More recent jurisprudence is available in opinions No. 66/2019, para. 61; No. 6/2020,

para. 40; No. 11/2020, para. 38; No. 13/2020, para. 47; No. 14/2020, para. 50; and No. 89/2020,

para. 53.

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Government states that Mr. Gui was subsequently convicted for illegally providing

intelligence to foreign entities based on actions in November 2017, that post-hoc justification

cannot remedy the absence of legal authorization at the time of his arrest in January 2018.

The authorities’ claim that he was arrested for trafficking in State secrets and participating in

unauthorized meetings with foreign diplomats is undermined by the fact that the latter

conduct does not constitute a criminal offence under Chinese domestic law.

65.

Furthermore, the Working Group notes that the source submits that, following his

arrest on 20 January 2018, Mr. Gui was held incommunicado for over two years without

being brought before a judicial authority in a timely manner, effectively bypassing judicial

oversight of the lawfulness of the detention. As the Working Group has consistently argued,

holding persons incommunicado violates their right to challenge the lawfulness of detention

before a court under article 9 (4) of the Covenant.6 The Working Group stresses that judicial

oversight of detention is a fundamental safeguard of personal liberty7 and is essential in

ensuring that detention has a legal basis. Furthermore, according to the source, Mr. Gui’s

whereabouts have remained unknown since his trial. In the absence of any information to the

contrary from the Government, the Working Group considers that Mr. Gui’s detention

amounts to incommunicado detention, as he is denied any meaningful contact with the

outside world, including his family and Swedish consular officials. This is also a violation of

his right to an effective remedy under article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

66.

The Working Group notes that giving prompt and regular access to family members,

independent medical personnel and lawyers is an essential and necessary protection against

arbitrary detention, which is a violation of article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, as well as a safeguard for the prevention of torture. Moreover, prohibiting contact

with the outside world may violate rule 58 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules

for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) and principles 15 and 16 (1) and

19 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention

or Imprisonment.

67.

The Working Group recalls that enforced disappearances are prohibited by

international law and constitute a particularly aggravated form of arbitrary detention. 8

Enforced disappearance is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form

of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with

the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge

the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared

person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.9 By depriving the person

of any recognition before the law and any recourse to legal procedures, enforced

disappearance violates the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention before a court under

article 9 of the Covenant. On the basis of the undisputed facts, the Working Group considers

that Mr. Gui’s disappearance across multiple periods, particularly from October 2015 to

October 2017 and from January 2018 to February 2020, placed him outside the protection of

the law, in violation of his rights under articles 6 and 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights.

68.

Consequently, the Chinese authorities failed to establish the legal basis of Mr. Gui’s

detention in accordance with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

and applicable international standards.

69.

The Working Group thus concludes that Mr. Gui’s detention by the Chinese

authorities across all periods is arbitrary under category I.

6 Opinions No. 45/2017, No. 46/2017, No. 35/2018, No. 9/2019, No. 44/2019, No. 45/2019,

No. 15/2020, No. 16/2020 and No. 36/2020.

7 United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right of Anyone

Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court (A/HRC/30/37), para. 3; and

CAT/C/VNM/CO/1, para. 24.

8 See opinions No. 5/2020, No. 6/2020, No. 11/2020 and No. 13/2020. See also Human Rights

Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 17.

9 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, art. 2.

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(ii)

Category II

70.

The source alleges that Mr. Gui was detained as a result of his exercise of the right to

freedom of expression under article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The

source submits that Mr. Gui was targeted for his work as a writer, publisher and bookseller

who explored politically sensitive subjects through his Mighty Current publishing house and

the Causeway Bay Books store in Hong Kong, China, which sold literature banned in

mainland China. The source further alleges that four of Mr. Gui’s colleagues, all connected

to the bookstore, also disappeared under mysterious circumstances during the same period.

The source argues that the true reason for Mr. Gui’s detention was to prevent him from

exercising his right to freedom of expression by keeping him from returning to Sweden,

where he could continue that work.

71.

The Working Group notes that the Government’s response does not address the

particular allegations regarding the connection between Mr. Gui’s detention and his

publishing activities. The Government merely states that Mr. Gui was convicted for illegally

providing intelligence to foreign entities based on his actions in November 2017, without

addressing the source’s submission that his detention was motivated by his politically

sensitive publishing work or explaining why his colleagues faced similar circumstances. The

Working Group observes that the Government has provided no information to rebut the

source’s allegations that Mr. Gui’s detention was connected to his exercise of freedom of

expression, particularly given the pattern of disappearances affecting individuals associated

with the same bookstore and the nature of the materials they published.

72.

The Working Group considers that the circumstances of Mr. Gui’s case, including the

targeting of multiple individuals connected to the same publishing enterprise specializing in

politically sensitive literature, strongly suggest that his detention was motivated by his

exercise of the right to freedom of expression guaranteed under article 19 of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights. The Working Group notes that the source’s additional

submissions contextualize Mr. Gui’s case within a broader pattern of systematic repression

of journalists and publishers in China, particularly those born in China, with the Chinese

authorities using national security charges as a pretext to prosecute critical voices. The

Working Group therefore concludes that Mr. Gui’s detention is also arbitrary under

category II.

(iii)

Category III

73.

Given its finding that Mr. Gui’s deprivation of liberty is arbitrary under category II,

the Working Group wishes to emphasize that no trial should have taken place. Nevertheless,

as the trial took place and Mr. Gui was convicted, the Working Group will proceed with the

examination of the source’s submissions concerning the denial of Mr. Gui’s right to a fair

trial.

74.

The source alleges that Mr. Gui was denied his right to a fair trial in violation of

article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The source submits that Mr. Gui’s

trial on 24 February 2020 was conducted in secret without any public notice, with neither

family members nor Swedish consular officials being notified in advance. The source further

alleges that Mr. Gui was denied legal representation throughout his time in custody, was held

incommunicado for over two years prior to trial, and was only rarely allowed contact with

his family members and Swedish officials under monitored conditions. The source argues

that those circumstances made a fair trial impossible and notes that in the Chinese criminal

justice system, the conviction rate is over 99.9 per cent, which indicates that fair trials are

very rare. In addition, the source alleges that there is evidence suggesting that Mr. Gui was

subjected to torture while in detention, as he appears in a photograph accompanying his

February 2018 interview to have lost a tooth, and that he was forced to participate in televised

confessions in January 2016 and February 2018, which were widely regarded as coerced. The

source also submits that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China has refused to share a copy

of the judgment or any further information on the trial with anyone, including Mr. Gui’s

family.

75.

The Working Group notes that the Government’s response does not address the

specific allegations regarding fair trial violations. The Government merely states that the

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Chinese judicial authorities fully guaranteed all the litigation rights that Mr. Gui enjoyed by

law and that select members of the public attended the hearing. It provides no details about

notification procedures, legal representation or the circumstances of the trial proceedings.

The Government’s general assertion that litigation rights were guaranteed is insufficient to

rebut the source’s detailed allegations regarding the specific violations of fair trial standards.

The Government’s response does not address the allegations concerning the withholding of

the judgment and provides no explanation for the refusal to share trial documentation.

76.

Regarding the right to a public hearing, article 10 of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights guarantees that everyone is entitled to a public hearing in the determination

of any criminal charge. The public nature of hearings ensures the transparency of proceedings

and thus provides an important safeguard for the interest of the individual and of society at

large. Although the right to a public hearing is not absolute, it may only be restricted for

reasons of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, or when the

interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in

special circumstances where publicity would be prejudicial to the interest of justice.10 In the

absence of such exceptional circumstances, a hearing must be open to the general public,

including members of the media, and must not be limited to a select group of people. The

Working Group finds that the source’s unrebutted allegations that Mr. Gui’s trial was

conducted without public notice and with only select members of the public attending

violated his rights under article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

77.

Furthermore, the Working Group is concerned by the complete concealment of the

judgment in Mr. Gui’s case. The Working Group recalls that the right to a public hearing

under article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes the right to public

pronouncement of a judgment. Complete concealment from the public of the entirety of a

judicial decision cannot be justified under international law. Even where legitimate security

concerns may exist – and in the present case, the Government did not refer to any such

concerns – they can be accommodated through certain techniques, such as classification of

only those parts of judicial decisions whose disclosure would genuinely compromise national

security or the safety of others, rather than withholding the entire judgment. The Government

has provided no justification for completely concealing the judgment and has failed to

demonstrate that any security considerations would require such total non-disclosure. The

Working Group finds that the authorities’ refusal to make the judgment available, even to

Mr. Gui’s representatives or family members, constitutes a serious violation of the right to

public pronouncement of judgment under article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights and further undermines the fairness of the proceedings.

78.

Concerning access to legal counsel, the Working Group recalls that all persons

deprived of their liberty have the right to legal assistance by counsel of their choice at any

time during their detention, including immediately after their apprehension, and that such

access must be provided without delay.11 The right to prompt legal assistance is essential to

the right to a fair trial as it serves to ensure that the principle of equality of arms is duly

observed. The source’s allegation that Mr. Gui was denied legal representation throughout

his custody remain unrebutted by the Government. The Working Group finds that this denial

of access to counsel violated article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

79.

The Working Group is also concerned by the source’s allegations that Mr. Gui was

subjected to torture and forced to make self-incriminating statements under duress through

televised confessions. The Working Group notes that the admission into evidence of a

statement allegedly obtained through torture or ill-treatment is a breach of fair trial guarantees

and renders the entire proceedings unfair, regardless of whether other evidence was available

to support the verdict.12 Furthermore, principle 21 of the Body of Principles for the Protection

of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment specifically prohibits taking

10 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007), para. 29.

11 A/HRC/45/16, paras. 51–53. See also the United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on

Remedies and Procedures on the Right of Anyone Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings

Before a Court, principle 9 and guideline 8.

12 Opinions No. 43/2012, para. 51; No. 34/2015, para. 28; No. 52/2018, para. 79 (i); No. 32/2019,

para. 43; No. 59/2019, para. 70; and No. 73/2019, para. 91.

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undue advantage of the situation of detention to compel an individual to make a confession

or incriminating statements. The Government has provided no information to address those

serious allegations. In the absence of any refutation by the Government, the Working Group

finds that the use of torture and of statements obtained under duress violated articles 5 and

10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

80.

The Working Group concludes that the detention of Mr. Gui involved serious

violations of his right to a fair trial and is therefore arbitrary under category III.

(c)

Concluding remarks

81.

The present case is one of a number of cases brought before the Working Group in

recent years concerning arbitrary deprivation of liberty in China.13 The Working Group is

concerned that this indicates a widespread or systemic practice of arbitrary detention in the

country. The source’s submissions highlight that in 2025, China was ranked 178th out of 180

countries in World Press Freedom Index, with 123 journalists currently imprisoned or held

under the system of Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location, demonstrating the

systematic nature of repression of freedom of expression and press freedom. The Working

Group reminds China of its duties to comply with international human rights obligations not

to detain persons arbitrarily, to release persons who are arbitrarily detained and to provide

them with compensation. The duty to comply with international human rights rests not only

on the Government but on all officials, including judges, police and security officers, and

prison officers with relevant responsibilities. No person has the right to contribute to human

rights violations. The Working Group underlines that States have the obligation not to engage

in acts that could constitute crimes against humanity and to prevent and punish them if they

are committed. It reminds the Government that meaningful cooperation with international

human rights mechanisms remains the cornerstone of advancing justice in such cases.

3.

Disposition

82.

In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:

Regarding Thailand:

Pursuant to paragraph 17 (b) of the methods of work the Working Group, the case is

not one of arbitrary detention.

Regarding China:

The deprivation of liberty of Gui Minhai, being in contravention of articles 3, 5, 8, 9,

10 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is arbitrary and falls within

categories I, II and III.

83.

The Working Group requests the Government of China to take the steps necessary to

remedy the situation of Mr. Gui without delay and bring it into conformity with the relevant

international norms, including those set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

84.

The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the

case, the appropriate remedy would be to release Mr. Gui immediately and accord him an

enforceable right to compensation and other reparations, in accordance with international

law.

85.

The Working Group urges the Government to ensure a full and independent

investigation of the circumstances surrounding the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of Mr. Gui

and to take appropriate measures against those responsible for the violation of his rights.

13 See, for example, opinions No. 11/2016, No. 12/2016, No. 30/2016, No. 43/2016, No. 46/2016,

No. 4/2017, No. 5/2017, No. 59/2017, No. 69/2017, No. 81/2017, No. 22/2018, No. 54/2018,

No. 62/2018, No. 15/2019, No. 36/2019, No. 72/2019, No. 76/2019, No. 11/2020, No. 32/2020,

No. 78/2020, No. 82/2020, No. 25/2021, No. 30/2021, No. 9/2022, No. 41/2022, No. 64/2022,

No. 88/2022, No. 6/2023, No. 30/2023, No. 38/2023, No. 77/2023, No. 2/2024, No. 4/2024 and

No. 34/2024.

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86.

The Working Group requests the Government to disseminate the present opinion

through all available means and as widely as possible.

4.

Follow-up procedure

87.

In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group requests

the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in follow-up

to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including:

(a)

Whether Mr. Gui has been released and, if so, on what date;

(b)

Whether compensations or other reparations have been made to Mr. Gui;

(c)

Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of Mr. Gui’s

rights and, if so, the outcome of the investigation;

(d)

Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made to

harmonize the laws and practices of China with its international obligations in line with the

present opinion;

(e)

Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.

88.

The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may

have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and

whether further technical assistance is required, for example through a visit by the Working

Group.

89.

The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the

above-mentioned information within six months of the date of transmission of the present

opinion. However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up

to the opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action

would enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in

implementing its recommendations, as well as any failure to take action.

90.

The Working Group recalls that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all States

to cooperate with the Working Group and has requested them to take account of its views

and, where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily

deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken.14

[Adopted on 26 August 2025]

14 Human Rights Council resolution 51/8, paras. 6 and 9.