Opinion; Subjects: THAILAND, ARBITRARY DETENTION; [WGAD: UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung, willkürliche Haft; Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire; Gruppo di lavoro sulla detenzione arbitraria]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.25-15864 (E) 161025 171025
Human Rights Council
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention at its 103rd session, 25–29 August 2025
Opinion No. 38/2025 concerning Sirapob Phumphengphut (Thailand)
1.
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of
the Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution 1997/50, the Commission extended and
clarified the mandate of the Working Group. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251
and Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the
Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a
three-year period in its resolution 51/8.
2.
In accordance with its working methods,1 on 8 November 2024 the Working Group
transmitted to the Government of Thailand a communication concerning Sirapob
Phumphengphut. The Government has not replied to the communication. The State is a Party
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
3.
The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases:
(a)
When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the
deprivation of liberty (category I);
(b)
When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or
freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and, insofar as States Parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25,
26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);
(c)
When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to
the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the
relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity as to
give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);
(d)
When asylum-seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged
administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy
(category IV);
(e)
When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on
the grounds of discrimination, based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,
religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability
or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings
(category V).
1 A/HRC/36/38.
United Nations
A/HRC/WGAD/2025/38
General Assembly
Distr.: General
17 October 2025
Original: English
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1.
Submissions
(a)
Communication from the source
4.
Sirapob Phumphengphut is a 24-year-old citizen of Thailand residing in Bangkok. He
has been a student activist and human rights defender since 2020. Prior to his detention, he
was pursuing a master’s degree in political science and working as a paralegal for a
non-governmental organization (NGO), Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, which assists with
cases involving freedom of political expression and the lèse-majesté law.
5.
As a college student, Mr. Phumphengphut led a peaceful demonstration with a student
activist group called Generation of Change to protest against the dissolution of the opposition
Future Forward Party. He continued to attend pro-democracy protests, publicly expressing
criticism of the Government.
6.
Mr. Phumphengphut was arrested on the basis of a speech he gave during a peaceful
pro-democracy protest in November 2020, in which he questioned the constitutionality of the
King’s involvement in the enactment of certain laws and constitutional amendments
concerning the monarchy. He was charged a month later with violating the lèse-majesté law
and convicted on 25 March 2024. He was sentenced to three years in prison, which the trial
court reduced to two years. Mr. Phumphengphut has submitted nine applications for bail
pending appeal, all of which have been summarily denied. He has thus remained in detention
since his conviction.
(i)
Arrest and detention under the lèse-majesté law
7.
The source submits that on 18 November 2020, Mr. Phumphengphut took part in a
peaceful rally that protested the use of violence by the authorities to disperse a pro-democracy
demonstration that had taken place in front of Parliament the day before.
Mr. Phumphengphut, along with several others, took turns speaking at the rally before the
demonstrators gathered in front of the headquarters of the Royal Thai Police.
8.
On 18 December 2020, a month after Mr. Phumphengphut gave his speech, he was
charged with violating section 112 of the Criminal Code, on the grounds that the speech had
“defame[d] the King in a manner which exposes him to scorn and hatred”. The source submits
that the authorities did not provide any further reasoning, merely quoting various excerpts
from the speech where Mr. Phumphengphut had appeared to question the constitutionality of
certain actions by the King.
9.
On 6 May 2021, Mr. Phumphengphut was indicted under section 112 of the Criminal
Code. As noted, Mr. Phumphengphut’s speech discussed the role of the King in the country’s
democracy as well as the status of the Thai people in relation to the monarchy. The indictment
did not explain how the speech could amount to a violation of the lèse-majesté law, noting
only that it was “false”, “insulting” and “defaming”, “resulting in damage” to the King’s
“dignity”, and that it demonstrated Mr. Phumphengphut’s “intent to destroy the monarchy”.
10.
The source further notes that after Mr. Phumphengphut was indicted under
section 112, he was placed in pretrial detention and applied for bail pending trial. However,
Bangkok South Criminal Court denied his application, which caused Mr. Phumphengphut to
miss an examination. In the denial order, the trial court vaguely referred to “the gravity of
the charges” and “the circumstances of the case”, finding that Mr. Phumphengphut had been
charged with an offence concerning national security and carrying a long prison sentence.
Without further explanation, and despite the prosecution’s lack of objection to bail, the trial
court considered it had “reason to believe” that the defendant might “commit the same crime”
if he were released.
11.
Mr. Phumphengphut submitted a second bail application several days later, which the
trial court granted on condition that he refrained from engaging in activities defaming the
monarchy as well as from leaving the country, and that he must not fail to appear in court.
12.
The source submits that at trial, the defence argued that the criticism expressed during
Mr. Phumphengphut’s speech had been made in good faith, with “respect and a good
intention toward the monarchy”, and had referred to the institutional role of the King and the
monarchy in a democracy. However, the trial court summarily dismissed these arguments,
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stating instead that the speech was “inappropriate” and “offensive” and “likely impair[ed] the
King’s reputation and exposed him to scorn and hatred”.
13.
The trial court also suggested that Mr. Phumphengphut’s speech was inconsistent with
the Constitution of Thailand, invoking section 6 which states that the King “shall not be
violated” nor exposed “to any sort of accusation or action”. Without explaining its reasoning
or the appropriate application of the constitutional provision to section 112 cases, the trial
court concluded that the speech had not been “an expression of comment in good faith” and
had instead wrongfully “accused” the King of “abusing” his constitutional authority.
14.
The source submits that the court has thus conflated two distinct concepts: “good
faith”, for instance, is typically a defence to a charge of defamation of public figures, whereas
the constitutional “inviolability” of the King relates to the institutional role of the monarch.
Relatedly, the trial court’s judgment was unclear as to whether the crime being prosecuted
was defamation of the monarch or criticism of the monarchy. For instance, the trial court
stated that “merely mentioning the name of the King invit[ed] the audience to hate him”, yet
at another point, the court stated that the speech had used “words that were regarded as
anti-monarchy”.
15.
The source notes that on 25 March 2024, Bangkok South Criminal Court convicted
Mr. Phumphengphut of violating section 112 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to a
three-year term of imprisonment, reduced to two years without probation due to his “useful
testimony” at trial.
16.
The source submits that Mr. Phumphengphut has been denied bail pending appeal,
with the Court of Appeal denying his nine applications in a series of nearly identical
one-paragraph orders, and making only cursory references to the “severity” of the case and
to the fact that previous applications for bail had been denied.
17.
The source notes that Mr. Phumphengphut has been in detention since his conviction.
(ii)
The lèse-majesté law of Thailand
18.
The source explains that the country’s lèse-majesté law is found in section 112 of the
Criminal Code, which provides for a 3- to 15-year sentence for any person who “defames,
insults or threatens the King, the Queen, the Heir Apparent or the Regent”.
19.
The source further notes that the authorities have repeatedly explained that this
provision protects the “rights or reputations” of the royal family in the same way that the libel
law does for “commoners”, although it imposes significantly higher penalties. The authorities
have, moreover, asserted that since members of the royal family are not able to file
defamation or libel complaints themselves, section 112 permits a “third party” (i.e.
government prosecutors) to lodge a formal complaint on their behalf.
20.
The source notes that following a period when there were no section 112 prosecutions,
the 2020 pro-democracy protests demanding reform of the monarchy have resulted in
renewed use of the law. Since 2020, the number of individuals deprived of their liberty
pending trial or following conviction on lèse-majesté charges has increased. The source
submits that there are currently 25 individuals in prison on lèse-majesté charges.
21.
The source submits that the authorities also routinely hold those accused of
lèse-majesté in pretrial detention for months, frequently denying bail due to the alleged
severity of the offence (on the logic that the significant potential penalties give rise to a risk
of flight) and to the alleged risk of “reoffending” by participating in rallies or making critical
speeches.
22.
The source notes that in instances where authorities have granted pretrial bail, they
often add restrictive conditions, such as bans on participating in protests or on speaking about
the monarchy, and courts have revoked bail due to alleged violations of such conditions.
(iii)
Legal analysis
23.
The source argues that Thailand has violated Mr. Phumphengphut’s rights under the
Covenant and his detention is arbitrary under categories I, II, III and V.
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24.
In relation to category I, the source submits that Mr. Phumphengphut’s detention is
arbitrary because it lacks legal basis. It was based upon alleged violations of the lèse-majesté
law, a law that is vague and overly broad. Furthermore, his detention is predicated upon an
unforeseeable interpretation of the law – namely that it can apply equally, and at the same
time, to criticism of the person of the King and to criticism of the institution of the monarchy.
25.
The denial of Mr. Phumphengphut’s nine applications for provisional release pending
appeal are insufficiently reasoned and thus reflect an arbitrary application of the standards
for release under domestic law.
26.
The source also argues that Mr. Phumphengphut’s detention is arbitrary because the
lèse-majesté law under which he was charged and sentenced is vague and excessively broad.
27.
Furthermore, under the principle of legality, an act can be punished only if, at the time
of its commission, the act was the object of a valid, sufficiently precise, written criminal law
to which a sufficiently certain sanction was attached. As a result, vaguely and broadly worded
provisions violate the due process of law undergirded by the principle of legality.2
28.
Such laws provide authorities with unfettered discretion, resulting in unjustified and
arbitrary criminalization of the legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression.3
29.
The Working Group has previously concluded that the lèse-majesté law of Thailand
fails to provide a legal basis for detention.4 Specifically, it has held that section 112 is vague
and overly broad because it fails to define what forms of expression constitute insults or
threats to the monarchy, leaving “the determination of whether an offence has been
committed entirely to the discretion of the authorities”.5
30.
Therefore, as in prior cases, Mr. Phumphengphut’s detention, based on alleged
violations of section 112, is without legal basis and arbitrary.
31.
The source further argues that Mr. Phumphengphut’s detention is arbitrary because it
is based on an overly broad and unforeseeable application of the lèse-majesté law and that
his detention also violates the foreseeability requirement of the principle of legality.
32.
In this context, firstly, the source submits that to the extent the trial court sought to
apply a defamation framework, it relied only on conclusory assertions that
Mr. Phumphengphut’s statements were not made in good faith to find that the speech
amounted to a violation of section 112. Secondly, the source notes that the trial court
repeatedly conflated alleged harm to the King’s reputation with alleged harm to the
monarchy, leaving uncertain the reach of an already broad lèse-majesté law.
33.
The prosecution asserted that Mr. Phumphengphut’s statements were “false and
considered an offence” against the King, and the trial court stated that they were “not an
expression of comment in good faith”, treating the alleged “falsity” and “lack of good faith”
respectively as predicates to their ultimate findings that Mr. Phumphengphut’s speech was
“an offence under section 112”.
34.
Specifically, the trial court held that because the speech was assertedly “not made in
good faith”, it amounted to “a defamation, an insult or a threat against the King”, while also
holding that because the defendant’s speech amounted to “a defamation, an insult or a threat”,
it was “not an expression of comment in good faith”, thus constituting “an offence under
section 112”. According to the source, the trial court thus appeared to be operating under a
framework similar to that recognized by international human rights bodies for defamation:
that is, defamation laws, and “in particular penal defamation laws” that target “comments
about public figures” must include truth and good faith as defences, and not penalize
statements made “without malice”, to avoid unduly restricting the exercise of freedom of
expression.6
2 Opinion No. 10/2018, para. 50.
3 Opinions No. 20/2017, No. 21/2014 and No. 27/2012; and Human Rights Committee, general
comment No. 34 (2011), para. 25.
4 See opinion No. 49/2023.
5 Ibid., para. 62.
6 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011), para. 47.
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35.
Thai courts have previously found that, unlike for the ordinary crime of defamation,
section 112 does not permit truth or good faith defences. Here, the trial court did not
sufficiently explain its conclusory rejection of the defence’s good faith argument and failed
to consider whether the speech had been made without malice.
36.
Along with the prosecution’s invocation of the speech’s alleged “falsity”, the
prosecution also confuses the applicable legal standard, thereby exacerbating the extent to
which the lèse-majesté law is unforeseeably broad.
37.
The judgment additionally fails to explain whether Mr. Phumphengphut was being
prosecuted for defaming the King or for defaming the monarchy. The trial court held that his
speech was “considered offensive and malignant in that manner that likely impair[ed] the
King’s reputation and exposed him to scorn and hatred”, and thus constitutes “a defamation,
an insult or a threat against the King”, while at the same time characterizing the speech as
“anti-monarchy”.
38.
In addition to the vagueness of this reasoning, the trial court at no point specified to
which category any of Mr. Phumphengphut’s statements pertained, nor did it offer any
evidence for the asserted connection between his statements and the “likely impair[ment]” to
the King’s reputation – the trial court conflated defamation of a person with criticism of an
institution. According to the Government itself, the lèse-majesté law “gives protection to the
rights or reputations of the King, the Queen and the Heir Apparent or Regent in a similar way
libel law does for commoners”.7
39.
The Government has affirmed this purpose on multiple occasions, at one time
explaining that since members of the royal family are not able to file complaints for
defamation or libel themselves, a third party was permitted to lodge a formal complaint on
their behalf.8 On the other hand, in a 2012 decision upholding the constitutionality of the
lèse-majesté law, the Constitutional Court held that section 112 of the Criminal Code was
necessary to give “practical effect” to section 6 of the Constitution, equating the protection
of the King’s person from defamation under the former to the protection of the “status of the
King as the Head of State and principal institution of the country” under the latter.9
40.
In some of its statements before human rights bodies regarding the lèse-majesté law,
the authorities have suggested that the law is meant to protect “key national institutions and
national security”.10 Referring at different times to both the monarchy and the monarch as a
“main pillar” of the nation that is “highly revered” by the majority of Thai people, Thai
authorities have claimed that section 112 protects both the monarch as the “symbol of the
existence of the nation” and Head of State, and the monarchy as one of the country’s
“principal institutions”.11
41.
Consistent with these differing interpretations, the trial court here effaced the
distinction between the person of the King and the institution of the monarchy. For example,
the trial court stated that Mr. Phumphengphut had made a speech “alluding to the monarchy
and mentioning the name of King Rama X, inviting the audience to hate him”, and that he
had used “words that were regarded as anti-monarchy … in that manner that likely impair[ed]
the King’s reputation”. Similarly, the trial court invoked section 6 of the Constitution, which
provides that the King “shall be enthroned in a position of revered worship and shall not be
violated” and prohibits exposing him to “any … accusation or action”. Asserting that
Mr. Phumphengphut’s speech had violated section 6 because in it Mr. Phumphengphut had
accused the King of “not being under the Constitution by centralizing the power around
himself and thereby abusing his power”, the trial court implied that section 112 should extend
7 See https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=32816. See also opinions
No. 3/2018, No. 56/2017 and No. 44/2016.
8 CCPR/C/SR.3350, para. 18.
9 “Summary of Constitutional Court Ruling No. 28–29/2555” (2012), Summaries of the Constitutional
Court Rulings for Year 2012, Government Gazette, vol. 129, part 122a, pp. 64 and 66 (2012),
available at https://constitutionalcourt.or.th/occ_en/download/article/article_20210914100655.pdf.
10 A/HRC/49/17, para. 20; A/HRC/WG.6/39/THA/1, para. 117; and opinion No. 35/2012, paras. 15 and
16. See also A/HRC/19/8/Add.1, para. 8.
11 CCPR/C/THA/2, para. 153; and A/HRC/WG.6/12/THA/2, para. 37.
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to legitimate questions about the scope of the monarchy’s constitutional authority. The trial
court’s conflation of criticism that may be directed against the person of the King and
criticism that may be directed against the institution of the monarchy is inconsistent with
international standards.
42.
The trial court’s judgment further illustrates the lack of foreseeability in the
application of section 112.
43.
Mr. Phumphengphut’s detention is arbitrary because the orders denying bail are not
sufficiently justified under domestic law.
44.
The Criminal Procedure Code incorporates the presumption under international
human rights law in favour of granting release from detention pending trial. In line with the
standards recognized by the Working Group for pretrial bail,12 section 108/1 specifically
provides that courts may only deny applications for provisional release if there is “reasonable
cause to believe” that: (a) the defendant will abscond; (b) the defendant will tamper with
evidence; (c) the defendant will cause “other dangers”; (d) the applicant for bail or the
security is not credible; or (e) the provisional release will “obstruct or cause damage” to
proceedings by a “competent official” or in a court. Under Thai law, however, these standards
apply regardless of whether the release sought is pretrial or post-conviction.
45.
The jurisprudence of the Working Group regarding the need for specific reasoning to
justify a denial of bail should therefore also apply as a matter of domestic law to applications
for post-conviction release in Thailand. Thus, any decision denying provisional release under
section 108/1, including post-conviction release, must set out sufficient reasoning.
46.
Mr. Phumphengphut has submitted nine applications for provisional release pending
appeal to the trial court, all of which were forwarded to the Court of Appeal and summarily
denied in a series of nearly identical one-paragraph orders consisting mainly of cursory
references to the “high penalty” for the offence and to “the serious circumstances of the case”,
which four of the orders noted had “caused damage to the monarchy and affected the people’s
feelings”.
47.
None of these “vague and expansive” reasons are sufficiently particularized as to
establish a permissible ground for denial of provisional release under section 108/1 of the
Criminal Procedure Code. In only four of the orders, the Court of Appeal also found that it
had reason to believe that Mr. Phumphengphut “may” flee if released. However, the Court
of Appeal did not provide any reasoning or evidence in support of a reasonable belief that
Mr. Phumphengphut would abscond, as is required under section 108/1. Instead, it only cited
the fact that a prison sentence had been imposed by the trial court. The source argues that the
severity or length of a potential sentence is not a proper basis for denying bail, as was
established in the pretrial context.
48.
Furthermore, since the standards used by Thailand regarding provisional release apply
equally to pretrial and post-conviction bail, it should follow, at least as a matter of domestic
law, that the mere fact that a defendant was sentenced to imprisonment cannot on its own
justify a finding that he is a flight risk.
49.
In addition, the source notes that, as the Working Group has found in several cases
brought under section 112 involving arbitrary detention, “the near blanket rejection of bail
applications by lèse-majesté offenders casts serious doubt about the individualized
determination of flight risk”. 13
50.
Doubts with regard to individualized determinations of bail applications are
exacerbated where, as here, the denial of bail has been partially justified by the existence of
prior denials (which themselves have lacked sufficient justification); under such a practice, a
defendant like Mr. Phumphengphut would be more likely to have his bail denied with each
12 Opinions No. 41/2014, para. 32; No. 56/2017, para. 67; No. 51/2017, para. 52; No. 3/2018, para. 61;
No. 4/2019, para. 65; and No. 64/2021, para. 78.
13 Opinions No. 4/2019, para. 66; No. 56/2017, para. 68; No. 51/2017, para. 53; and No. 3/2018,
para. 62.
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successive application, effectively resulting in punishment for a defendant’s exercise of his
legal right to apply for provisional release.
51.
It is submitted that in the present case, the Court of Appeal did not address any of the
substantive arguments raised in Mr. Phumphengphut’s nine applications, which included the
fact that he had been granted provisional release during trial and had complied with all the
conditions imposed on his bail, as well as the fact that the trial court had found
Mr. Phumphengphut to have cooperated during the proceedings, such that his sentence was
reduced by one third. The Court of Appeal similarly ignored the fact that he lives with his
parents and is responsible for his household as the eldest child, that he held a job as a paralegal
to support his family and to advance his professional career, and that he was pursuing a
master’s degree at a university.
52.
The orders denying Mr. Phumphengphut’s applications for provisional release
pending appeal are insufficiently reasoned, and therefore without legal basis.
53.
The source submits that Mr. Phumphengphut’s detention is also arbitrary under
category II of the Working Group, because it resulted from the exercise of his right to freedom
of expression, based on protected political speech expressed during a pro-democracy protest.
Thus, Mr. Phumphengphut’s detention violates article 19 of the Covenant.
54.
The source notes that defamation laws cannot be justified if their purpose or effect is
to prevent legitimate criticism of government officials and public figures. Speech amounting
to political opinion expressed as part of a public debate and which criticizes the Government
and political figures is afforded a “particularly high” level of protection under international
law.14
55.
With regard to category III, the source notes that international human rights standards
provide protection for statements made about public figures “without malice”, and permit the
defence of “good faith” in defamation cases. Similarly, many jurisdictions impose a
requirement of specific harmful intent, or “actual malice”, to prove defamation of a public
figure.15 The source argues that the trial court merely asserted that Mr. Phumphengphut’s
speech was “considered offensive and malignant in that manner that likely impair[ed] the
King’s reputation and exposed him to scorn and hatred”, and thus amounted to “a defamation,
an insult or a threat against the King, and not an expression of comment in good faith on any
person or thing subjected to public criticism”.
56.
The source submits that the trial court’s conclusory rejection of the defence’s “good
faith” arguments demonstrates its failure to provide sufficient reasoning in its judgment
against Mr. Phumphengphut. This violated Mr. Phumphengphut’s right to be presumed
innocent, rendering his detention arbitrary under category III.
57.
Finally, the source submits that Mr. Phumphengphut’s detention is another example
in a well-established pattern of persecution by Thai authorities of Mr. Phumphengphut and
similarly situated defendants based on their political opinion and pro-democracy activism
and that his detention therefore falls within category V.
58.
The source submits that these indicators demonstrate the discriminatory nature of
Mr. Phumphengphut’s detention. Firstly, Mr. Phumphengphut has been charged in five other
cases on the basis of his participation in peaceful, political protests that have called for
constitutional change and reform of the monarchy.
59.
Secondly, the source notes that the authorities have prosecuted and imprisoned
numerous other individuals like Mr. Phumphengphut who are perceived to have criticized
the monarchy, including in cases that have come before the Working Group.
60.
Thirdly, the context of the case indicates that Mr. Phumphengphut was detained to
prevent him from exercising his right to freedom of expression. Mr. Phumphengphut’s
14 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011), para. 38.
15 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression,
principle 10.
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detention amounts to discrimination on the grounds of political opinion, in violation of
international law.
61.
Mr. Phumphengphut has engaged in public criticism of prosecutions on the grounds
of lèse-majesté legislation, for the purpose of drawing public attention to human rights
violations, and has been charged in five other cases due to his participation in pro-democracy
protests which, among other issues, criticized the use of section 112 to restrict freedom of
speech.
62.
Prior to his detention, Mr. Phumphengphut also worked as a paralegal at the NGO that
monitors and provides legal aid for human rights violations, focusing on the right to political
expression.
63.
The authorities have therefore discriminated against Mr. Phumphengphut on the basis
of his actual or perceived political opinions as well as his activities as a human rights
defender, in violation of international law, rendering his detention arbitrary under category V
of the Working Group.
64.
In
conclusion,
the
source
submits
that
the
authorities
have detained
Mr. Phumphengphut pursuant to a vague and excessively broad law for making a speech
during a pro-democracy protest in which he expressed criticism of the monarchy and the
Government. The source further submits that the authorities have also unlawfully kept
Mr. Phumphengphut in detention while he exercises his right to appeal against his conviction.
65.
The source submits that Mr. Phumphengphut’s case serves as another example of the
application of the lèse-majesté law. Furthermore, this case reflects the insufficiently reasoned
and unforeseeable application of the Criminal Procedure Code in Thailand to deny bail in
lèse-majesté cases.
(b)
Response from the Government
66.
On 8 November 2024, the Working Group transmitted to the Government of Thailand
a communication concerning Mr. Phumphengphut under its regular communications
procedure, requesting a reply by 7 January 2025.
67.
On 6 January 2025, the Government of Thailand requested an extension in accordance
with paragraph 16 of the Working Group’s methods of work, which was granted with a new
deadline of 7 February 2025. The Working Group regrets that, despite the extension, it has
received no reply from the Government.
2.
Discussion
68.
In the absence of a timely response from the Government, the Working Group has
decided to render the present opinion, in conformity with paragraph 15 of its methods of
work.
69.
In determining whether Mr. Phumphengphut’s detention is arbitrary, the Working
Group has regard to the principles established in its jurisprudence to deal with evidentiary
issues. If the source has established a prima facie case for breach of international law
constituting arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be understood to rest upon the
Government if it wishes to refute the allegations.16
70.
In the present case, the Government has chosen not to challenge the prima facie
credible allegations made by the source.
(a)
Category I
71.
The source alleges that Mr. Phumphengphut’s detention is arbitrary because it lacks
legal basis – he is detained under legislation that expressly violates international human rights
law. The authorities have exclusively relied on section 112 of the Criminal Code to justify
his arrest and pretrial detention.
16 A/HRC/19/57, para. 68.
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72.
In considering whether that provision meets international standards, the Working
Group firstly recalls that the principle of legality requires that laws be formulated with
sufficient precision so that the individuals can access and understand the law and regulate
their conduct accordingly. 17 It has taken into account relevant analysis of lèse-majesté
offences in Thailand carried out in recent years by the Working Group and other international
human rights mechanisms.18
73.
In this regard, in its jurisprudence relating to Thailand, the Working Group has
consistently found the detention of individuals under section 112 of the Criminal Code and
section 14 of the Computer Crimes Act to be arbitrary under category II when it has resulted
from peaceful exercise of the right to freedom of expression.19
74.
Furthermore, in communications to the Government, special procedure mandate
holders have expressed concern about the lèse-majesté provisions of the Criminal Code,
including their use in restricting freedom of expression and their incompatibility with
article 19 of the Covenant.20 The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the
right to freedom of opinion and expression has stated that lèse-majesté provisions have no
place in a democratic country and are incompatible with the right to freedom of expression
under international human rights law.21 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights has expressed similar concerns.22
75.
In its concluding observations on the second periodic report of Thailand, the Human
Rights Committee expressed its concern that criticism and dissension regarding the royal
family were subject to punishment of 3 to 15 years’ imprisonment. The Human Rights
Committee also expressed concern about reports of a sharp increase in the number of persons
detained and prosecuted for the crime of lèse-majesté since the military coup, and about
extreme sentencing practices, which had resulted in extensive periods of imprisonment in
some cases.23
76.
During the most recent consideration of Thailand under the universal periodic review
mechanism of the Human Rights Council, in November 2021, the lèse-majesté laws and the
restrictions on the right to freedom of opinion and expression were frequently raised as
17 See, for example, opinion No. 41/2017, paras. 98–101. See also opinion No. 62/2018, paras. 57–59;
and Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 22. See also Human Rights
Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011), paras. 24–26 (in which the Committee noted that any
restriction on freedom of expression must be provided for by law with sufficient precision to enable
individuals to regulate their conduct, and that such law must not confer unfettered discretion for the
restriction of freedom of expression on those charged with its execution).
18 Relevant examples of this analysis are also given in opinions No. 51/2017, paras. 28–40; and
No. 56/2017, paras. 36 and 42–55. For more recent examples, see opinions No. 4/2019, paras. 48 and
49; and No. 64/2021, paras. 54–58.
19 See opinions No. 35/2012, No. 41/2014, No. 43/2015, No. 44/2016 and No. 51/2017. The Working
Group has also made similar findings in relation to lèse-majesté laws in other countries: see, for
example, opinions No. 28/2015, No. 48/2016 and No. 20/2017.
20 See communications THA 5/2011, THA 9/2011, THA 10/2011, THA 13/2012, THA 1/2014,
THA 3/2014, THA 13/2014, THA 9/2015, THA 1/2017, THA 7/2017, THA 3/2019, THA 8/2020,
THA 11/2020, THA 6/2021, THA 1/2023 and THA 2/2023. All communications mentioned in the
present document are available from https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/Tmsearch/TMDocuments.
21 See, for example, UN News, “UN rights expert urges Thailand to loosen restrictions around
monarchy defamation law”, 7 February 2017, available at
https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/02/550962-un-rights-expert-urges-thailand-loosen-restrictions-
around-monarchy-defamation. See also A/HRC/14/23/Add.1, paras. 2361–2409; and
A/HRC/29/25/Add.3, para. 366.
22 See, for example, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Press
briefing note on Thailand”, 13 June 2017. See also Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Regional Office for South-East Asia, press release dated 28 March 2017.
23 CCPR/C/THA/CO/2, paras. 37 and 38; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, submission for the thirty-ninth session of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review for the third cycle review of Thailand, para. 4; and United Nations country team submission
for the third cycle review of Thailand, “Implementation of international human rights obligations,
considering applicable international humanitarian law”, April 2021, paras. 58 and 59.
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matters of concern. Delegations urged the Government to bring its lèse-majesté laws into
conformity with its international commitments.24
77.
The Working Group recalls its jurisprudence in which it has found that section 112 of
the Criminal Code, pursuant to which Mr. Phumphengphut was prosecuted and convicted, is
vague and overly broad and as such prevents accused persons from being able to defend
themselves, contrary to article 14 (3) (b) of the Covenant.25 Section 112 of the Criminal Code
does not define what kinds of expression constitute defamation of or an insult or threat to the
monarchy, and leaves the determination of whether an offence has been committed entirely
to the discretion of the authorities.
78.
In the present case, the courts’ application of section 112 demonstrates an even more
troubling expansion of the law’s problematic scope. The source submits that the trial court
conflated two distinct legal concepts by simultaneously invoking the constitutional principle
of royal “inviolability” under section 6 of the Constitution – which relates to the institutional
role of the monarch – with the defamation-based “good faith” defence typically applicable to
criticism of public figures. The court stated that Mr. Phumphengphut’s speech was
inconsistent with the Constitution because the King “shall not be violated” nor exposed “to
any sort of accusation or action”, while also concluding that the speech had not been “an
expression of comment in good faith” but had instead wrongfully “accused” the King of
“abusing” his constitutional authority. Without explaining its reasoning or the appropriate
application of the constitutional provision to section 112 cases, the trial court merged these
conceptually distinct frameworks without legal justification.
79.
This judicial approach further undermines the principle of legality. The source notes
that the trial court’s judgment was unclear as to whether the crime being prosecuted was
defamation of the monarch as an individual or criticism of the monarchy as an institution.
The trial court stated at one point that merely mentioning the name of the King invited the
audience to hate him, while elsewhere characterizing the speech as using “words that were
regarded as anti-monarchy”. In the absence of any explanation from the Government, the
Working Group finds that such inconsistent application demonstrates that even the courts
themselves cannot coherently define the boundaries of the prohibited conduct, rendering the
law fundamentally incompatible with the requirement that criminal offences be defined with
sufficient precision.
80.
In view of that considerable body of findings in relation to the lèse-majesté provisions
in section 112 of the Criminal Code, the Working Group is convinced that
Mr. Phumphengphut is being detained pursuant to legislation that expressly violates
international human rights law. As a result, there is no legal basis for his detention. The
Working Group recalls its jurisprudence in which it has found that detention pursuant to a
law that is inconsistent with international human rights law lacks a legal basis and is therefore
arbitrary.26
81.
The Working Group reiterates that section 112 of the Criminal Code is so vague as to
be inconsistent with international human rights law. It is thus incompatible with article 11 (2)
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 15 (1) of the Covenant and cannot
be considered to be prescribed by law and defined with sufficient precision, due to its vague
and overly broad language.27 The present case demonstrates how this vagueness enables
judicial interpretations that further undermine legal certainty and expand the law’s repressive
scope even beyond its already problematic textual boundaries. Given the continuing
international concern regarding the country’s lèse-majesté laws, the Working Group calls on
the Government to work with international human rights mechanisms to bring these laws into
24 A/HRC/49/17, paras. 52.56–52.62. See also the recommendations made during the second cycle
review: A/HRC/33/16, paras. 158.130–158.138, 158.141, 158.142, 159.18 and
159.50 –159.63.
25 Opinions No. 51/2017, para. 32; No. 56/2017, para. 45; No. 4/2019, para. 55; and No. 64/2021,
paras. 55 and 56.
26 See, for example, opinions No. 43/2017, para. 34; No. 40/2018, para. 45; and No. 69/2018, para. 21.
In these cases, the Working Group found that the detention lacked a legal basis and was therefore
arbitrary under category I.
27 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011), para. 25.
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conformity with its international obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the Covenant.
82.
The Working Group notes the source’s submissions, unrefuted by the Government,
that Mr. Phumphengphut’s detention pending appeal has been extended through nine
successive bail denials without any individualized assessment. The Court of Appeal denied
all nine applications for provisional release in “nearly identical one-paragraph orders”,
making only cursory references to the “high penalty” for the offence and to “the serious
circumstances of the case”, with four orders noting that the case had “caused damage to the
monarchy and affected the people’s feelings”.
83.
The Working Group recalls that it is a well-established norm of international law that
detention is to be the exception and not the rule and that it should be ordered for as short a
time as possible.28 Article 9 (3) of the Covenant provides that it is not to be the general rule
that persons awaiting trial are detained, but that release may be subject to guarantees to appear
for trial and at any other stage of the judicial proceedings. It follows that liberty is recognized
as a principle and detention as an exception in the interests of justice.
84.
Moreover, although the severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in
assessing the risk of absconding or reoffending, the need to continue the deprivation of liberty
cannot be assessed from this purely abstract point of view – taking into consideration only
the gravity of the offence and using stereotyped formulae, without any individualized
assessment or considering alternative preventive measures.
85.
The Working Group has consistently found that the “near blanket rejection of bail
applications by lèse-majesté offenders casts serious doubt about the individualized
determination of flight risk”.29 The Court of Appeal ignored substantive arguments raised in
Mr. Phumphengphut’s applications, including that he had been granted provisional release
during trial and had complied with all conditions imposed, that the trial court had found him
to have cooperated during proceedings such that his sentence was reduced by one third, and
that he lives with his family, with strong community ties and employment.
86.
In the present case, the Working Group considers that by failing to address specific
facts and alleged risks, or to consider alternative less severe preventive measures, the
authorities failed to properly justify the post-conviction detention of Mr. Phumphengphut. In
the absence of any argument to the contrary from the Government, and given the systematic
failure to provide individualized assessments, the Working Group finds that
Mr. Phumphengphut’s continued detention pending appeal violates the principles underlying
article 9 (3) of the Covenant.
87.
In the light of the preceding considerations, the Working Group finds that the
deprivation of liberty of Mr. Phumphengphut is arbitrary under category I.
(b)
Category II
88.
The source submits that Mr. Phumphengphut’s detention is also arbitrary under
category II of the Working Group, because it resulted from the exercise of his right to freedom
of expression, based on protected political speech expressed during a pro-democracy protest.
Thus, Mr. Phumphengphut’s detention violates article 19 of the Covenant.
89.
The Working Group recalls that freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of
thought and conscience are fundamental human rights enshrined in articles 18 and 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant.
90.
Mr. Phumphengphut was arrested, detained, prosecuted and imprisoned under
section 112 of the Criminal Code for his speech at a pro-democracy protest, at which he
questioned whether the King’s recent involvement in the legislative process fell within his
constitutional authority as Head of State. The Working Group considers that
Mr. Phumphengphut’s speech falls within the boundaries of the exercise of the right to
28 Opinion No. 8/2020, para. 54; No. 1/2020, para. 53; No. 57/2014, para. 26; No. 49/2014, para. 23;
and No. 28/2014, para. 43; Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 38; and
A/HRC/19/57, paras. 48–58.
29 See, among others, opinion No. 3/2018, para. 62.
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freedom of expression protected by article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and article 19 of the Covenant. That right includes the expression of every form of idea and
opinion capable of transmission to others, including political discourse, commentary on
public affairs, and discussion of constitutional and governmental matters. The trial court
acknowledged that the event at which Mr. Phumphengphut had given his speech was a
“political public assembly concerning the administration of the Government and the
monarchy”. His speech specifically addressed the institutional role of the King and the
monarchy in a democracy, questioning constitutional boundaries of authority on the basis of
academic materials from his political science studies, and his defence counsel argued that the
speech had been made in good faith with respect and a good intention towards the monarchy.
91.
The Government did not submit a reply in the present case, although it has previously
claimed on numerous occasions that the lèse-majesté law has the objective of respecting the
rights and reputations of members of the royal family and of regents – purportedly a
legitimate restriction on freedom of expression under article 19 (3) (a) of the Covenant.
However, in the Working Group’s assessment, the purported objective of the lèse-majesté
law can hardly be considered as a valid ground for a necessary restriction of freedom of
expression, given that all public figures can legitimately be subject to criticism and political
opposition. The mere fact that forms of expression are considered to be insulting to a public
figure is not sufficient to justify the imposition of penalties. All public figures, including
those exercising the highest political authority, such as Heads of State and Government, are
legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition, and laws should not provide for
more severe penalties solely on the basis of the identity of the person who may have been
impugned. Moreover, the Human Rights Committee has specifically expressed concern
regarding lèse-majesté laws,30 noting that the application of criminal defamation laws should
only be allowed in the most serious cases and that imprisonment is never an appropriate
penalty.31
92.
Under article 19 (3) of the Covenant, any restriction imposed on the right to freedom
of expression must satisfy three requirements: namely, the restriction must be provided by
law, be designed to achieve a legitimate aim and be imposed in accordance with the
requirements of necessity and proportionality. Given its lack of a response, the Government
did not invoke any of these limitations, or demonstrate why arresting, detaining and
prosecuting Mr. Phumphengphut was a necessary and proportionate response to his peaceful
political speech. The trial court failed to establish “a direct and immediate connection
between the expression and [any] threat”, instead relying on vague determinations that the
speech was “inappropriate” and “offensive”, without concrete analysis of how it threatened
legitimate interests protected under international law.
93.
In this specific case, the Working Group cannot but also consider that the detrimental
effects of the lèse-majesté law and its application on Mr. Phumphengphut’s freedoms, and
the chilling effect for the public, far outweigh any potential benefits. The Working Group
does not consider it plausible that Mr. Phumphengphut’s academic-based questioning of
constitutional authority could threaten the rights or reputations of others, national security,
public order, or public health or morals. In this vein, the Working Group has been unable to
find Mr. Phumphengphut’s deprivation of liberty under section 112 of the Criminal Code
necessary or proportionate for the purposes set out in article 19 (3) of the Covenant.
94.
The Working Group therefore considers that Mr. Phumphengphut’s deprivation of
liberty is arbitrary under category II, as it resulted from his exercise of the rights or freedoms
guaranteed under articles 18 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant.
(c)
Category III
95.
Given its finding that Mr. Phumphengphut’s deprivation of liberty is arbitrary under
category II, the Working Group wishes to emphasize that no trial of Mr. Phumphengphut
should have taken place. However, with the trial having taken place, the Working Group will
30 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011), para. 38.
31 Ibid., para. 47.
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now consider whether the alleged violations of the right to a fair trial and due process were
grave enough to give his deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character, so that it falls within
category III.
96.
The Working Group notes that the trial court’s reasoning in Mr. Phumphengphut’s
case raises concerns regarding the adequacy of judicial reasoning. Judgments of courts and
tribunals should adequately state the reasons on which they are based, as reasoned decisions
serve the purpose of demonstrating to the parties that they have been heard, thereby
contributing to a more willing acceptance of the decision on their part. In addition, they oblige
judges to base their reasoning on objective arguments and to also preserve the rights of the
defence. Moreover, an issue from the perspective of the presumption of innocence may arise
if judgments finding guilt are not sufficiently reasoned. The source submits that despite the
defence arguing that the criticism expressed during Mr. Phumphengphut’s speech had been
made in good faith, with “respect and a good intention towards the monarchy”, and had
referred to the institutional role of the King and the monarchy in a democracy, the trial court
dismissed these arguments without adequate consideration.
97.
While courts are not obliged to give a detailed answer to every argument raised, it
must be clear from the decision that the essential issues of the case have been addressed, and
that a specific and explicit reply has been given to the arguments that are decisive for the
outcome of the case. Instead, the court asserted that Mr. Phumphengphut’s speech was
“considered offensive and malignant in that manner that likely impair[ed] the King’s
reputation and exposed him to scorn and hatred”, concluding that it amounted to “a
defamation, an insult or a threat against the King, and not an expression of comment in good
faith”. The Working Group considers that by not adequately addressing the specific
arguments made by the accused regarding the good-faith nature of his academic-based
commentary on constitutional matters, the domestic court’s reasoning was insufficient to
meet the standards required under article 14 of the Covenant. The Working Group finds that
this inadequate consideration of key defence arguments raises concerns about whether
Mr. Phumphengphut received a fair trial.
98.
The Working Group further notes that failure to provide a reasoned judgment
constitutes a breach of article 14 (5) of the Covenant, as it effectively prevents prospective
appellants from enjoying the effective exercise of the right to appeal.
99.
The Working Group recalls that the right to fair trial provides that key issues raised
by the defence are taken into account by the court; this right is violated where the court
provides only limited reasons for its conclusions. In the present case, the trial court’s failure
to engage meaningfully with the defence’s arguments regarding good-faith commentary on
matters of public interest, particularly in view of international human rights standards that
provide protection for statements made without malice about public figures, renders
Mr. Phumphengphut’s conviction and subsequent detention arbitrary under category III.
(d)
Category V
100.
The source submits that Mr. Phumphengphut’s detention is another example in a
well-established pattern of persecution by the authorities of Mr. Phumphengphut and
similarly situated defendants on the basis of their political opinion and pro-democracy
activism. The source also submits that the authorities have discriminated against
Mr. Phumphengphut on the basis of his actual or perceived political opinions as well as his
activities as a human rights defender, in violation of international law, rendering his detention
arbitrary under category V of the Working Group.
101.
The Working Group has already established that Mr. Phumphengphut’s detention
resulted from his exercise of the right to freedom of expression. When it is established that a
deprivation of liberty has resulted from the active exercise of civil and political rights, there
is a strong presumption that the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international
law on the grounds of discrimination based on political or other views.32
32 Opinions No. 88/2017, para. 43; No. 13/2018, para. 34; No. 59/2019, para. 79; and No. 91/2020,
para. 65.
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102.
The Working Group recalls several non-cumulative indicators that serve to establish
the discriminatory nature of detention. These include the following: (a) the deprivation of
liberty was part of a pattern of persecution against the detained person, including, for
example, through previous detention; (b) other persons with similarly distinguishing
characteristics have also been persecuted; or (c) the context suggests that the authorities have
detained a person on discriminatory grounds or to prevent them from exercising their human
rights.33
103.
With regard to these non-cumulative indicators, the Working Group notes that
Mr. Phumphengphut has been charged in five other cases on the basis of his participation in
peaceful political protests that have called for constitutional change and reform of the
monarchy. Moreover, the Working Group recalls that the authorities have prosecuted and
imprisoned numerous other individuals like Mr. Phumphengphut who are perceived to have
criticized the monarchy, including in cases that have previously come before the Working
Group.34 The Working Group further observes an overall pattern in Thailand of detaining
individuals who peacefully oppose the lèse-majesté laws, and the present case is another
example. The Working Group observes that Mr. Phumphengphut’s political views are at the
centre of the present case and that the authorities have displayed a discriminatory attitude
towards him.
104.
The Working Group notes that many of the cases involving Thailand, particularly
those concerning its lèse-majesté laws, relate to charges and prosecution under vaguely
worded criminal offences that typically attract heavy penalties, lack a legal basis and involve
due process violations.35
105.
The Working Group further notes that Mr. Phumphengphut has engaged in public
criticism of prosecutions under the country’s lèse-majesté legislation for the purpose of
“drawing public attention” to human rights violations, and has been charged in five other
cases due to his participation in pro-democracy protests that, among other issues, criticized
the use of section 112 to restrict freedom of speech. Prior to his detention,
Mr. Phumphengphut worked as a paralegal at an NGO that monitors and provides legal aid
for human rights violations, focusing on the right to political expression. The Working Group
has found category V violations in cases involving discrimination due to a defendant’s status
as a human rights defender.36
106.
Based on the foregoing, the Working Group finds that Mr. Phumphengphut was
deprived of his liberty on discriminatory grounds on the basis of his political opinions. For
these reasons, the Working Group considers that Mr. Phumphengphut’s deprivation of liberty
constitutes a violation of articles 2 and 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
articles 2 (1) and 26 of the Covenant on the grounds of discrimination based on political or
other opinion, as well as on his status as a human rights defender. His deprivation of liberty
is therefore arbitrary under category V of the Working Group.
(e)
Concluding remarks
107.
The present case is one of several cases brought before the Working Group in recent
years concerning the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of persons in Thailand. The Working
Group wishes to express its grave concern about the pattern of arbitrary detention in cases
involving the lèse-majesté laws of Thailand. It notes with concern the chilling effects of
judicial prosecutions on society, furthered by a climate of intimidation that appears to
surround the enforcement of lèse-majesté laws, particularly in the context of legitimate
academic and political discourse about constitutional governance. Given the continuing
international concern regarding the country’s lèse-majesté laws, the Government may
consider it to be an appropriate time to work with international human rights mechanisms to
33 A/HRC/36/37, para. 48.
34 See, for example, opinion No. 28/2024.
35 Opinions No. 44/2016, No. 51/2017, No. 56/2017, No. 3/2018, No. 4/2019, No. 42/2020 and
No. 49/2023.
36 See, for example, opinions No. 19/2018, No. 50/2017 and No. 48/2017, and A/HRC/36/37.
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bring those laws into conformity with its international obligations under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant.
108.
The Working Group notes that in Mr. Phumphengphut’s case, the judicial application
of section 112 has demonstrated even more troubling innovations – including the conflation
of distinct legal concepts such as constitutional “inviolability” and defamation law’s “good
faith” defence, and the systematic denial of bail through formulaic reasoning that fails to
meet basic standards of individualized assessment. In the view of the Working Group,
freedom of expression is a core tenet of a democratic society. There is a growing consensus
regarding the serious harm to society caused by existing lèse-majesté laws enforced in a
manner that may lead to individuals refraining from debates on matters of public interest in
order to avoid prosecution.
3.
Disposition
109.
In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:
The deprivation of liberty of Sirapob Phumphengphut, being in contravention of articles 2,
7, 9 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 2, 9, 14, 19 and 26 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is arbitrary and falls within
categories I, II, III and V.
110.
The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the
case, the appropriate remedy would be to release Mr. Phumphengphut immediately and
accord him an enforceable right to compensation and other reparations, in accordance with
international law.
111.
The Working Group urges the Government to ensure a full and independent
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of
Mr. Phumphengphut and to take appropriate measures against those responsible for the
violation of his rights.
112.
The Working Group requests the Government to disseminate the present opinion
through all available means and as widely as possible.
4.
Follow-up procedure
113.
In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group requests
the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in follow-up
to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including:
(a)
Whether Mr. Phumphengphut has been released and, if so, on what date;
(b)
Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to
Mr. Phumphengphut;
(c)
Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of
Mr. Phumphengphut’s rights and, if so, the outcome of the investigation;
(d)
Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made to
harmonize the laws and practices of Thailand with its international obligations in line with
the present opinion;
(e)
Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.
114.
The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may
have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and
whether further technical assistance is required, for example through a visit by the Working
Group.
115.
The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the
above-mentioned information within six months of the date of transmission of the present
opinion. However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up
to the opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action
would enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in
implementing its recommendations, as well as of any failure to take action.
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116.
The Working Group recalls that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all States
to cooperate with the Working Group and has requested them to take account of its views
and, where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken.37
[Adopted on 25 August 2025]
37 Human Rights Council resolution 51/8, paras. 6 and 9.