Opinion; Subjects: RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ARBITRARY DETENTION; [WGAD: UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung, willkürliche Haft; Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire; Gruppo di lavoro sulla detenzione arbitraria]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.25-06636 (E)
Human Rights Council
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention at its 102nd session, 1–10 April 2025
Opinion No. 34/2025 concerning Viktor Viktorovich Babaiev, Ruslan
Volodymyrovich Skrypnik, Mykita Andriyovich Rolya, Oleksii
Mykolaiovych Chinchoi, Dmitro Oleksandrovich Mocharny and
Danyyl Yvgenyovich Khlopetsky (Russian Federation)*
1.
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of
the Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution 1997/50, the Commission extended and
clarified the mandate of the Working Group. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251
and Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the
Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a
three-year period in its resolution 51/8.
2.
In accordance with its methods of work, 1 on 15 July 2024, the Working Group
transmitted to the Government of the Russian Federation a communication concerning Viktor
Viktorovich Babaiev, Ruslan Volodymyrovich Skrypnik, Mykita Andriyovich Rolya,
Oleksii Mykolaiovych Chinchoi, Dmitro Oleksandrovich Mocharny and Danyyl
Yvgenyovich Khlopetsky. The Government has not replied to the communication. The State
is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
3.
The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases:
(a)
When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the
deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or her
sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);
(b)
When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or
freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and, insofar as States Parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25,
26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);
(c)
When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to
the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the
relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity as to
give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);
(d)
When asylum-seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged
administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy
(category IV);
* In accordance with paragraph 5 of the Working Group’s methods of work, Ganna Yudkivska could
not participate in the discussion of the case.
1 A/HRC/36/38.
United Nations
A/HRC/WGAD/2025/34
General Assembly
Distr.: General
30 June 2025
Original: English
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(e)
When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on
the grounds of discrimination, based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,
religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability
or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings
(category V).
1.
Submissions
(a)
Communication from the source
4.
Viktor Viktorovich Babaiev, born on 23 November 1981, is a national of Ukraine. He
was convicted by the Kakhovskiy Interdistrict Court of Kherson Oblast, Ukraine, on 8 May
2020 and was serving a prison sentence in Hola Prystan correctional facility No. 7, Kherson
Oblast, until his arrest by the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation on 3 March
2022.
5.
Ruslan Volodymyrovich Skrypnik, born on 11 December 1984, is a national of
Ukraine. He was convicted by the domestic courts of Ukraine in 2018, sentenced to eight
years of imprisonment and was serving his sentence in Northern correctional facility No. 90,
Kherson Oblast, until his arrest by the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation on
11 May 2022.
6.
Mykita Andriyovich Rolya, born on 17 January 1998, is a national of Ukraine. He was
convicted by the Korabelny District Court o(Mykolaiv, Ukraine) on 2 March 2017 and was
serving a prison sentence in Darivka correctional facility No. 10 (Kherson Oblast) until his
arrest by the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation on 28 February 2022.
7.
Oleksii Mykolaiovych Chinchoi, born on 5 October 1987, is a national of Ukraine. He
was convicted by the domestic courts of Ukraine in 2020, sentenced to four years of
imprisonment and was serving his prison sentence in Darivka correctional facility No. 10
(Kherson Oblast), until his arrest by the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation on
28 February 2022.
8.
Dmitro Oleksandrovich Mocharny, born on 30 August 1996, is a national of Ukraine.
He was convicted by the Surovsky District Court of Odesa, Ukraine, on 22 December 2020
and was serving his prison sentence in Darivka correctional facility No. 10 (Kherson Oblast)
until his arrest by the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation on 28 February 2022.
9.
Danyyl Yvgenyovich Khlopetsky, born on 26 August 2001, is a national of Ukraine.
He was convicted by the domestic courts of Ukraine in 2021, sentenced to four years of
imprisonment and was serving his prison sentence in Darivka correctional facility No. 10
(Kherson Oblast) until his arrest by the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation on
28 February 2022.
(i)
Context
10.
The source submits that at the time of the occupation of Kherson by the Russian
forces, there were 2,225 prisoners detained in penitentiary facilities in the Kherson and
Mykolaiv Oblasts of Ukraine. All penitentiary facilities came under the control of the
occupying armed forces of the Russian Federation and affiliated armed groups.
11.
On 9 November 2022, the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation announced
their retreat from Kherson. Reportedly, in mid-November 2022, prisoners convicted by the
Ukrainian courts who had been serving their sentences in Kherson prisons (correctional
colonies and medical prison facilities) were transferred to penal facilities in the Russian
Federation. The transfer of convicts from Kherson followed a similar forcible transfer of
prisoners of war and civilians by the occupying Russian forces from other regions of Ukraine.
12.
The source affirms that before the transfer to the Russian Federation, over a period of
several months from March 2022, inmates from correctional colonies No. 10 (Darivka),
No. 90 (Kherson) and No. 5 (Snihurivka, Mykolaiv Oblast) were transferred to Hola Prystan
correctional colony No. 7 in Stara Zburivka, approximately 50 km from Kherson. In
November 2022, two weeks before the Russian retreat from Kherson, Russian armed forces
began the transfer of prisoners from Hola Prystan correctional colony No. 7 to the
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Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine, temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation.
From there, most of the inmates were taken to penal colonies in the Russian Federation,
including in Krasnodar Krai (colonies IK-2, IK-5, IK-11 and IK-14), Volgograd Oblast
(colonies IK-19, IK-26 and medical prison facility LIU-23), Vladimir Oblast, Rostov Oblast
(prison tuberculosis hospital No. 19 and LIU-20) and, allegedly, Sverdlovsk Oblast, as well
as the Republic of Mordovia (colony IK-6).
13.
The transfer was carried out with the involvement of the Russian Federal Penitentiary
Service. Most of the prisoners were subjected to ill-treatment and torture in the remand prison
in Simferopol, Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine, temporarily occupied by the
Russian Federation, en route for penitentiary facilities in the Russian Federation, and have
been held separately from Russian inmates (or foreigners convicted and serving their
sentences in the Russian Federation). The prisoners allocated to colony IK-19 in Volgograd
Oblast were severely beaten upon arrival.
14.
Prisoners transferred to the Russian Federation were not allowed to contact their
families or other inmates. Some were formally allowed to send letters, but were unable to
pay for postage. Relatives, on the other hand, were unable to get confirmation of the transfers
from the Federal Penitentiary Service. Prisoners allocated to the correctional colonies in
Krasnodar Krai and Volgograd Oblast were denied access to telephones or mobile devices.
15.
According to the source, the purpose of the transfer of prisoners from Kherson to the
Russian Federation remains unclear. Some of the prisoners had been persistently offered
Russian citizenship and even to join the ranks of the Wagner Group, an unincorporated
military formation that had been recruiting inmates from Russian (or Russian-controlled)
penitentiary facilities between February 2022 and February 2023.
16.
The source states that on 11 November 2022, the building of the Kherson pretrial
detention centre was set on fire by the occupying Russian forces in an attempt to destroy the
evidence of torture of civilians and prisoners that allegedly took place there.
17.
There have been attempts by the Russian authorities to legalize the transfers. On
31 July 2023, the Russian authorities adopted a federal law (No. 395-FZ), which proclaimed
a retrospective extension of Russian criminal jurisdiction over the occupied Ukrainian
Oblasts of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia, with respect to all crimes
committed there both before and after the occupation (sect. 2 (1)). In addition, under section
8, the new law provides that the Russian Federation acknowledges the legal force of all
judicial decisions delivered in the annexed territories that entered into force before
30 September 2022, including the part concerning the execution of sentences.
18.
The newly adopted law echoes a similar legislative exercise undertaken by the Russian
authorities in 2014, following the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
Ukraine, temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation. Thus, Federal Law No. 91-FZ of
5 May 2014 “On application of the provisions of the Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes
of the Russian Federation in the territory of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol”,
provided for the retroactive extension of Russian criminal jurisdiction to the territory of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine, temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation,
in respect of crimes committed there before 18 March 2014. With that legislation, the Russian
authorities also acknowledged the binding legal force of criminal judgments delivered by the
Ukrainian courts before 18 March 2014, including for the purpose of the execution of
sentences (section 8 of the Federal law) and subsequently launched numerous proceedings
for the “conversion” of sentences in respect of prisoners detained in the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea, Ukraine, temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation, pursuant to
criminal judgments handed down by the Ukrainian courts.
19.
According to the source, similar proceedings on the so-called conversion of sentences
were launched in respect of prisoners forcibly transferred from Kherson. It appears that this
procedure was applied mostly in respect of prisoners whose terms of imprisonment imposed
by the Ukrainian courts were soon to end. The so-called conversion proceedings were
opened, and the relevant decisions were delivered by the Kerch “Town Court” – a district
level “tribunal” operating in Kerch in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine,
temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation.
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20.
The source reports that to date it has identified around 120 so-called conversion cases
opened against prisoners transferred from Kherson. In most of them, the conversion was
made several weeks before the expiry of the sentences imposed by the Ukrainian courts (or
the sentence was slightly reduced). In some cases, however, inmates were left in detention
for considerable periods (several months or years) after the conversion of their sentences.
Some of these decisions (and presumably others, yet to be identified) were delivered before
the adoption of Federal Law No. 395-FZ and omitted any explanation as to the domestic legal
grounds for the exercise of Russian jurisdiction over the prisoners transferred from Ukraine.
The source notes that while Federal Law No. 395-FZ has not yet been enforced against the
six individuals that are the alleged victims of the present communication, it is highly probable
that it will be applied to them in the future.
(ii)
Arrests and detention
Mr. Babaiev
21.
Mr. Babaiev was convicted by the Kakhovskiy Interdistrict Court of Ukraine on
8 May 2020 and served his sentence in Hola Prystan correctional facility No. 7 (Stara
Zburivka, Kherson Oblast). On 3 March 2022 the correctional facility came under the control
of the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation. No later than 1 May 2022, the
remaining staff of the correctional facility was replaced by officers of the Russian Federal
Penitentiary Service. The occupying authorities of the Russian Federation began to transfer
inmates from other correctional institutions of the Kherson and Mykolaiv Oblasts to Hola
Prystan correctional facility No. 7, which led to severe overcrowding and shortages of food
and medicine. Prisoners with “open” forms of tuberculosis were kept together with healthy
inmates. On 14 June 2022, inmates were allegedly subjected to mass beatings by Russian
special forces.
22.
From 3 November 2022, the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation began
to transfer inmates from Hola Prystan correctional facility No. 7 to the Russian Federation.
The prisoners were transferred by vans in groups of 200–300 people. They were first taken
to the Simferopol pretrial detention centre No. 2 (a seven-hour journey), where they spent
the night, and in the morning were taken further, to pretrial detention and correctional
colonies in the Russian Federation. Mr. Babaiev was taken from Hola Prystan correctional
colony No. 7 between 3 and 7 November 2022, transferred to the Simferopol pretrial
detention centre and from there transferred to correctional colony IK-14 in Krasnodar (a
15-hour journey), where he is presently detained on no legal grounds.
Mr. Skrypnik
23.
Mr. Skrypnik was convicted by the domestic courts of Ukraine in 2018, sentenced to
eight years’ imprisonment and served his sentence in Northern correctional facility No. 90
(Kherson). On 11 May 2022, the facility came under the full control of the occupying
authorities of the Russian Federation. Inmates were used as labour in the construction of
fortifications. In October 2022, Mr. Skrypnik, along with other inmates from Northern
correctional facility No. 90, was transferred to Hola Prystan correctional facility No. 7 (Stara
Zburivka, Kherson Oblast).
24.
From 3 November 2022, the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation began
to transfer inmates from Hola Prystan correctional facility No. 7 to the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea, Ukraine, temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation, and from there to the
Russian Federation. Mr. Skrypnik was reportedly taken from Hola Prystan correctional
colony No. 7 between 3 and 7 November 2022, transferred to the Simferopol pretrial
detention centre and from there transferred to correctional colony IK-5 in Krasnodar Krai (a
15-hour journey), where he is presently detained on no legal grounds.
Mr. Rolya and Mr. Chinchoi
25.
Mr. Rolya was convicted by the Korabelny District Court of Mykolaiv, Ukraine, on
2 March 2017. Mr. Chinchoi was convicted by the domestic courts of Ukraine in 2020 and
sentenced to four years in prison. The two men served their prison sentences in Darivka
correctional facility No. 10 (Kherson Oblast). The facility came under the control of the
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occupying Russian forces on 28 February 2022. In mid-May 2022, the occupying authorities
of the Russian Federation began to use the colony to house their military personnel and
military vehicle repair depots, and transferred all the inmates, including Mr. Rolya and
Mr. Chinchoi, to Hola Prystan correctional facility No. 7 (Stara Zburivka, Kherson Oblast).
26.
From 3 November 2022, the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation began
to transfer inmates from Hola Prystan correctional facility No. 7 to the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea, Ukraine, temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation, and from there to the
Russian Federation. Mr. Rolya and Mr. Chinchoi were reportedly, taken from Hola Prystan
correctional colony No. 7 between 3 and 7 November 2022 and transferred to the Simferopol
pretrial detention centre. From there, they were transferred to correctional colonies in the
Russian Federation (a 15-hour journey): Mr. Rolya to IK-2 and Mr. Chinchoi to IK-11, both
in Krasnodar Krai, where they are presently detained on no legal grounds.
Mr. Mocharny and Mr. Khlopetsky
27.
Mr. Mocharny was convicted by the Surovsky District Court of Odesa, Ukraine, on
22 December 2020. Mr Khlopetsky was convicted by the domestic courts of Ukraine in 2021
and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. Both men served their prison sentences in
Darivka correctional facility No. 10 (Kherson Oblast). The facility came under the control of
the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation on 28 February 2022. In mid-May 2022,
the occupying Russian authorities started to use the colony to house their military personnel
and military vehicle repair depots, and transferred all the inmates, including Mr. Mocharny
and Mr. Khlopetsky, to Hola Prystan correctional facility No. 7 (Kherson Oblast).
28.
From 3 November 2022, the occupying forces of the Russian Federation began to
transfer inmates from Hola Prystan correctional facility No. 7 to the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea, Ukraine, temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation, and from there to the
Russian Federation. Mr. Mocharny and Mr. Khlopetsky were reportedly in a group of
prisoners taken first to a remand prison in Krasnodar (a 15-hour journey). They and other
prisoners were allegedly subjected to a mass strip search and put in overcrowded cells in the
Krasnodar remand prison. After five hours, they were taken to correctional colony IK-19 in
Surovikino, Volgograd Oblast. The prisoners transferred from Kherson were put in two large
dormitories, with windows covered with metal sheets. Mr. Mocharny is presently detained in
colony IK-19 on no legal grounds. Mr. Khlopetsky was later transferred to a medical
correctional facility, LIU-15, in Volgograd. He is presently detained, either in colony IK-19
or medical correctional facility LIU-15, on no legal grounds.
29.
On 4 November 2022, the Ukrainian authorities opened an investigation into the
forcible transfer of civilian prisoners from the Kherson and Mykolaiv Oblasts by the
occupying armed forces of the Russian Federation to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
Ukraine, temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation, and to the Russian Federation. On
4 July 2023, a former head of Northern correctional facility No. 90 was charged with a
number of criminal offences, including one of giving an order to commit violations of the
laws and customs of war, which consisted in the deportation and relocation without consent
and with the use of coercion of protected persons from Kherson Oblast to the Russian
Federation and to the territory of Ukraine temporarily occupied. On 19 October 2023, he was
convicted in absentia of defection and on 20 February 2024, he was additionally convicted
of State treason. A similar criminal notification of suspicion was brought against a former
head of correctional colony No. 7 in Hola Prystan. The investigation into the forcible transfer
is ongoing. Over 100 prisoners have been formally given victim status in those criminal
proceedings.
30.
The source notes that the situation of the forcible transfer of prisoners from Kherson
was highlighted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) in its report of 2023 on the detention of civilians in the context of the armed attack
by the Russian Federation against Ukraine2 and in its report on the human rights situation in
2 See OHCHR, Detention of Civilians in the Context of the Armed Attack by the Russian Federation
against Ukraine, 24 February 2022–23 May 2023 (June 2023), para. 80.
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Ukraine.3 Commenting on the forcible transfer of prisoners from Kherson, OHCHR recalled
that international humanitarian law prohibits forcible transfers and deportations, and only
permits evacuation in strict circumstances if the security of the population or imperative
military reasons so demand. 4 International humanitarian law also requires an occupying
power to return any evacuated persons back to their homes as soon as conditions permit
(article 49 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War (Fourth Geneva Convention)). OHCHR further noted the difficulties related to the
lack of valid travel documents for prisoners to return to Ukraine from the Russian Federation
after their release, as they fall under the category of people for whom the State Migration
Service of Ukraine does not issue certificates of return.5
(iii)
Legal analysis
31.
The source submits that the cases of the six individuals fall under category I and
category V.
32.
As a preliminary matter, the source asserts that the detention of convicted prisoners in
Kherson by the occupying forces and their subsequent transfer to and detention in the Russian
Federation occurred in the context of the armed conflict in Ukraine. Therefore, it entails the
applicability of international humanitarian law to the situation of their detention, in particular,
the Fourth Geneva Convention, which, by virtue of its article 2, shall apply “to all cases of
partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party”.
33.
The source asserts that all prisoners convicted by the Ukrainian courts who served
their sentences at the moment of occupation of the Kherson Oblast by Russian forces
(including the six alleged victims on whose behalf the present submission is made) fall under
the category of “protected persons” under article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as
persons “who at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of
a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which
they are not nationals”.
34.
According to the source, on the matter of geographical distribution and transfer of
convicted prisoners, article 76 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that protected
persons accused of offences shall be detained in the occupied country, and if convicted they
shall serve their sentences therein. While this provision refers to the convictions and
sentences delivered by the Occupying Power, as a general principle it appears to be a fortiori
applicable to prisoners sentenced and imprisoned by the authorities of the occupied country.
It is especially evident if article 76 is read in conjunction with article 49, on which, as
explained by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its commentary of
1958, it is based and which lays down “the fundamental principle forbidding deportations”.
35.
According to ICRC in its 1958 commentary on article 49, “the prohibition (contained
in article 49) is absolute and allows of no exceptions, apart from those stipulated in
paragraph 2”, namely, “evacuation of an area by the Occupying Power”. However, the
occupying authorities of the Russian Federation have never explained the forcible transfer of
prisoners from Kherson to the Russian Federation as necessitated by evacuation or for safety
and security reasons. The actions of the occupying Russian forces during their retreat from
Kherson, such as the release of pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners sentenced to life
imprisonment, as well as the burning of the remand prison in Kherson, further refute the idea
of evacuation as a potential motive behind the prisoners’ transfer.
36.
The source argues that the forcible transfer/deportation of the six individuals does not
meet the criteria for a legitimate “evacuation” under article 49 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention for several reasons: the transfer was not carried out in the face of an unexpected
and imperative military need; the transfer appears to have been planned in advance, rather
than being a response to an urgent situation; the implementation of the transfer occurred in
an atmosphere resembling “terror” and was not carried out in a manner conducive to the
3 OHCHR, “Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 February to 31 July 2023” (October
2023), paras. 95–97.
4 Ibid., para. 97.
5 Ibid., para. 95
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eventual return of the six individuals (as well as the entire group of civilian prisoners in
Kherson). 6 Moreover, it appears that the Russian authorities have never informed the
Protecting Power (and in its absence ICRC) of the transfer, as required under article 49 of the
Convention.
37.
Furthermore, the transfer of prisoners does not fall within the scope of subjecting the
population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying
Power to fulfil its obligations under the Convention envisaged in article 64 of the Convention;
thus, no justification has been put forward by the occupying authorities of the Russian
Federation, nor can any circumstances be identified which would indicate a need for them to
“subject the population … to provisions which are essential to fulfil their obligations under
the Convention”.
38.
The source asserts that according to article 64 of the Convention, the penal laws of
the occupied territory (in the present case, Ukraine) should remain in force and are still
applicable to the individuals who have been transferred. The continuing detention of the
prisoners by the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation has no legal grounds, in
view of the “severance” of the causal link between their conviction and their detention – first
under the Russian occupation in Ukraine and then in the Russian Federation – following their
transfer, due to the de facto enforcement of the sentence outside the Ukrainian legal
framework.
39.
The source adds that the detention of the six individuals in the Russian Federation
and, before that, in regions of Ukraine temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation could
not be further classified as internment from the standpoint of the Convention. Thus, under
article 42 of the Convention: “The internment of protected persons may be ordered only if
the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.”
40.
The source argues that no security-related grounds necessitating the detention exist or
have been ever invoked by the Russian authorities. Moreover, as demonstrated by the
conversion decisions of the so-called Kerch Town Court (see above), the domestic authorities
have never linked the continuing detention of Ukrainian prisoners with the military conflict
or any security considerations. As follows from the domestic judgments and from Federal
Law No. 395-FZ, the Russian authorities formally base the detention of the Ukrainian
detainees who were transferred either on them having committed crimes/being convicted in
Ukraine or on them having allegedly breached Russian immigration rules (in cases of
immigration detention taking place after the expiry of the sentences imposed by the Ukrainian
courts).
41.
The source notes that, apparently, none of the transferred prisoners requested
voluntary internment (see paragraph 2 of article 42 of the Fourth Geneva Convention).
Finally, no internment decisions were taken by the Russian authorities in accordance with
article 43 of the Convention and neither were the transferred detainees provided with habeas
corpus guarantees, as required under article 43.
42.
Given that there are no valid legal grounds for the continued detention of Ukrainian
civilians in the Russian Federation and in the absence of legitimate security concerns or
national interests that would justify their detention, the source submits that the six individuals
should be granted the unrestricted right to leave the Russian Federation in accordance with
article 35 of the Convention. The source asserts that the Government of the Russian
Federation is obligated to establish a formal process for handling applications to leave the
country, including an appeals mechanism for those whose requests are denied, to prevent
arbitrary decision-making.7
43.
It is further incumbent on the Russian authorities to ensure that, as stipulated under
article 36 of the Convention, such departures be carried out in satisfactory conditions as
regards safety, hygiene, sanitation and food. While detained in the Russian Federation, the
6 Trial Chamber I of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radislav
Krstić, Judgment, 2 August 2001, paras. 524–527; Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, Judgment,
17 January 2005, paras. 598 and 599; Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilic, aka “Tuta” and Vinko
Martinovic, aka “Stela”, Judgment, 31 March 2003, paras. 512–571.
7 See ICRC 1958 commentary on article 35 of the Convention.
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safety and security of the Ukrainian prisoners is additionally guaranteed under article 37 of
the Convention, which provides for their right to humane treatment during confinement.
Finally, if not immediately, then at least after being released from correctional facilities, the
Ukrainian detainees shall have the right to ask to freely leave the territory of the Russian
Federation.8
a.
Category I
44.
The source submits that, from the moment when the correctional facilities of the
Kherson Oblast came under Russian occupation, the detention of all the prisoners held in the
Kherson Oblast, including the six individuals, became arbitrary and unlawful under
international human rights law (article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
article 9 (1) and (2) of the Covenant). The situation was exacerbated by the inhuman
treatment of the detainees, including prolonged transfers, to which the prisoners were
subjected, a lack of judicial control over their detention after the occupation, denial of their
communication with the outside world and, in particular, with their families.9
45.
All prisoners transferred from Kherson, including the six individuals, were detained
solely on the basis of the criminal judgments delivered by the Ukrainian courts before the
armed conflict. Occupation of the correctional facilities of the Kherson Oblast on the
rendered their detention unlawful, as the occupying forces of the Russian Federation had no
grounds for the continued detention of convicted prisoners. Similarly, the forcible transfer of
the prisoners to the Russian Federation and their detention in penitentiary facilities there also
lacks any legal grounds and therefore amounts to arbitrary detention.
46.
The source recalls the Working Group’s position that deprivation of liberty must have
a legal basis consistent with international human rights standards – not merely national laws.
The authorities must invoke a legal basis consistent with international human rights standards
and apply it to the circumstances of the case.10 In its opinion No. 50/2014, the Working Group
affirmed that international humanitarian law and human rights law apply during armed
conflicts and situations of occupation, with limited derogations. It emphasized that the
prohibition of arbitrary detention is a jus cogens norm, allowing no derogation, and that
international humanitarian law must comply with this prohibition.11
47.
The source contends that none of the six individuals were formally arrested and
presented with arrest warrants by the occupying forces of the Russian Federation.
Furthermore, at no point were they brought before a judicial or other authority to authorize
their arrest or detention in accordance with Russian law. The only legal basis for the detention
of the six individuals were criminal judgments from Ukrainian courts issued before the start
of the armed conflict in February 2022. Following the occupation of the Kherson Oblast and
its correctional facilities, the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation had no legal
grounds for enforcing those judgments. The occupying authorities of the Russian Federation
did not invoke any legal grounds for the detention of the six individuals or the other 2,000
inmates from Kherson. Consequently, the detention of the six individuals violated articles 3
and 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 9 (1) and (3) of the Covenant.
48.
The six individuals were not at any time informed of the reasons for their arrest and
the criminal charges against them, in violation of article 9 (2) of the Covenant, and were not
granted an opportunity to challenge the legality of their detention (art. 9 (4) of the Covenant).
49.
The source recalls that the Working Group has consistently held that incommunicado
detention violates a person’s right to challenge the legality of their detention before a judicial
authority. 12 This principle applies to the case of the six individuals, who were denied
communication with family, friends and third-State representatives (given the lack of
8 Article 37, para. 2, of the Convention.
9 Principles 1, 2, 4, 15, 16 and 19 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any
Form of Detention or Imprisonment and rules 58 and 62 (3) of the United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules).
10 Opinion No. 6/2020, para. 39.
11 Paras. 62–67.
12 See opinion No. 35/2018.
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9
diplomatic ties between Ukraine and the Russian Federation). Such treatment contravenes
rules 58 and 62 (3) of the Nelson Mandela Rules, which guarantee detainees the right to
communicate with the outside world. The denial of such fundamental rights further supports
the conclusion that the detention of the six individuals was arbitrary.
50.
The source argues that the Human Rights Committee’s recently adopted Views on the
communication concerning three Ukrainian detainees, Roman Bratsylo, Valery Golovko and
Sergey Konyukhov are relevant and applicable to the situation of the Kherson prisoners.13
That case pertained to the forced naturalization (imposition of citizenship) and detention of
Ukrainian prisoners in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine, temporarily occupied
by the Russian Federation, and their transfer to the Russian Federation.
51.
The source argues that, as pointed out by the Human Rights Committee in the Views
mentioned above, there was no international agreement that would have allowed the Russian
Federation to prosecute the authors or to execute decisions of Ukrainian courts.14
52.
In view of these findings by the Human Rights Committee, the source reiterates its
position that the detention of the six individuals became and remained arbitrary (under
categories I and V) from the moment the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation
took control of the facilities where they were held and began the de facto execution of the
Ukrainian criminal judgments against them. That arbitrary detention continued throughout
their subsequent transfer to the Russian Federation.
53.
The source asserts that the Russian authorities have adopted Federal Law No. 395-FZ,
which retroactively extends Russian criminal jurisdiction over the Ukrainian oblasts of
Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia temporarily occupied by the Russian
Federation. This law applies to all crimes committed in the oblasts mentioned, both before
and after the occupation. The provisions of this law, specifically sections 2 and 8, are identical
to those in Federal Law No. 91-FZ, which was adopted in 2014 following the annexation of
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine, temporarily occupied by the Russian
Federation. The Human Rights Committee has previously ruled that the Law No. 91-FZ
contradicts the Russian Criminal Code and violates article 15 of the Covenant, leading to
arbitrary detention and conviction.
54.
In view of the identical nature of the provisions of the new Russian law governing
criminal jurisdiction in the territories of Ukraine occupied in 2022 (Law No. 395-FZ), the
source asserts that it paves the way for similar violations. While Federal Law No. 395-FZ has
not yet been applied to the six individuals concerned (namely, the sentences delivered against
them by the Ukrainian courts were not formally converted under Russian law), such
considerations are nevertheless relevant for the examination of their cases, as they
demonstrate that Federal Law No. 395-FZ cannot in any way “legalize” the detention of the
six individuals.
55.
The source further emphasizes that in its Views on the communication concerning
Messrs. Bratsylo, Golovko and Konyukhov, the Human Rights Committee recognized the
authors’ status of “protected persons” under the Fourth Geneva Convention.15 Given that the
factual and legal situation in which the six individuals who are the subject of the present
communication is similar to that of Messrs. Bratsylo, Golovko and Konyukhov, the source
reiterates that the six individuals concerned also enjoy the status of “protected persons” under
Convention and the guarantees associated with it.
56.
In the case mentioned above, the Human Rights Committee referred to articles 65 and
67 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as additional relevant legal provisions stipulating the
principle of non-retroactivity of the penal law (breached in that case).16 The source believes
that, in this context, the Working Group is not prevented from assessing the arbitrariness of
the detention of the six individuals from the standpoint of the Convention and, specifically,
its articles 35, 36, 42, 43, 49, 64 and 76. The source argues that the Russian authorities do
not and cannot justify or explain the continued detention and transfer of the six individuals
13 See CCPR/C/140/D/3022/2017.
14 Ibid., para. 8.4
15 Ibid., paras. 8.6 and 8.18.
16 Ibid., para. 8.6.
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from the standpoint of the Convention and that, moreover, their detention and transfer
directly contradict articles 49 and 76 of the Convention, contributing to its arbitrariness under
category I.
b.
Category V
57.
The source asserts that the detention of the six individuals is discriminatory based on
their national and ethnic origin as Ukrainians. The Russian authorities have not provided any
justification for the occupation of the correctional facilities in Kherson Oblast or the mass
transfer and continued detention of the Ukrainian prisoners. The lack of formal authorization
for their detention and transfer, incommunicado detention and lack of access to the courts
indicate that the six individuals, as part of a larger group of Ukrainian prisoners, have been
treated differently from prisoners convicted by the Russian courts and serving sentences in
Russian facilities. That differential treatment on the basis of national and ethnic origin
amounts to discriminatory detention under category V.
58.
The source recalls that in its Views on the communication concerning
Messrs. Bratsylo, Golovko and Konyukhov, the Human rights Committee found that the
forced imposition of Russian citizenship on the authors and their subsequent transfer from
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine, temporarily occupied by the Russian
Federation, to serve their sentences in the Russian Federation violated their rights under the
Covenant. 17 Specifically, the Committee determined that these actions disregarded the
authors’ ties to their homeland and their status as protected persons under the Fourth Geneva
Convention. The Committee concluded that the transfer was disproportionate and
discriminatory, in breach of article 26 of the Covenant. The source considers these findings
directly relevant and applicable to the situation of the six individuals who were similarly
discriminated against on the basis of their nationality and their protected status under the
Convention.
(b)
Additional information received from the source
59.
On 31 July 2024 and in March 2025, the source reported that the sentences of
Mr. Babaiev, Mr. Skrypnik and Mr. Rolya had been “converted” under Russian law in
September and October 2024 and that Mr. Skrypnik, Mr. Rolya and Mr. Chinchoi had been
released at around the same time.
(c)
Response from the Government
60.
On 15 July 2024, the Working Group transmitted the allegations from the source to
the Government of the Russian Federation under its regular communications procedure. The
Working Group requested the Government to provide by 16 September 2024 detailed
information on the situation of the six individuals, clarifying the legal and factual grounds
for their detention and explaining how they were compatible with the obligations of the
Russian Federation under international human rights law and, in particular, the treaties
ratified by the State.
61.
The Working Group regrets that the Government has not submitted a response or
requested an extension in accordance with paragraph 16 of the Working Group’s methods of
work.
2.
Discussion
62.
In the absence of a response from the Government, the Working Group has decided
to render the present opinion, in conformity with paragraph 15 of its methods of work.
63.
In determining whether the detention of Mr. Babaiev, Mr. Skrypnik, Mr. Rolya,
Mr. Chinchoi, Mr. Mocharny and Mr. Khlopetsky was arbitrary, the Working Group has
regard to the principles established in its jurisprudence to deal with evidentiary issues. If the
source has established a prima facie case for breach of international requirements constituting
arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be understood to rest upon the Government if
17 Ibid., para. 8.18.
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11
it wishes to refute the allegations. In the present case, the Government has chosen not to
challenge the prima facie credible allegations made by the source.
64.
At the outset, the Working Group notes that Mr. Skrypnik, Mr. Rolya and
Mr. Chinchoi were released in September and October 2024. Nonetheless, given the serious
nature of the allegations, the Working Group has determined that it will consider the case in
accordance with paragraph 17 (a) of its methods of work.
65.
As a further preliminary issue, the Working Group notes that international human
rights law, including the Covenant, continues to apply during times of armed conflict in
parallel to international humanitarian law. The only limitation on this is with the exception
of guarantees derogated from, provided such derogations have been declared in accordance
with article 4 of the Covenant by the State Party. The Human Rights Committee has held this
position on multiple occasions.18 The International Court of Justice has also taken the same
position.19 For its part, the Working Group has reiterated this position repeatedly, including
in its deliberation No. 8, in which it stated that as a matter of principle, the application of
international humanitarian law to an international or non-international armed conflict does
not exclude the application of human rights law. The two bodies of law are complementary
and not mutually exclusive.20
66.
The Working Group expanded on this in its 2011 thematic report on the application
of the international instruments on human rights to situations of armed conflict, stating that
norms of international human rights law protecting individuals against arbitrary detention
should be complied with by Governments even during periods of armed conflict and noting
the similar positions adopted by the General Assembly and ICRC.21
67.
In line with that legal position, the Working Group removed a provision from its
original methods of work that limited its ability to address allegations of arbitrary detention
that arose in the context of international armed conflicts. 22 Since then, it has addressed
allegations of arbitrary detention in armed conflict in numerous opinions.23
68.
On this basis, and noting that the Russian Federation has not explained to the Working
Group that it has derogated from its obligations under the Covenant in a manner that would
affect the present allegations, the Working Group will assess the alleged arbitrariness of the
detention of the six individuals.
a.
Category I
69.
The Working Group will first consider whether there have been violations under
category I, which concerns deprivation of liberty without legal basis.
70.
According to the source, although the detainees were convicted and sentenced at
various times prior to 2022, the detention of the six detainees became arbitrary from the
moment when the correctional facilities in the Kherson Oblast came under Russian
occupation in March 2022. The Working Group notes that the Government has elected not
to address this issue.
71.
Article 9 (1) of the Covenant requires, inter alia, that no one shall be deprived of his
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by
law. This means that procedures for carrying out legally authorized deprivation of liberty
should be established by law and States Parties should ensure compliance with them,
including by specifying when a warrant is required. Article 9 (2) of the Covenant states that
18 General comments No. 29 (2001), para. 3, No. 31 (2004), para. 11, and No. 35 (2014), para. 64.
19 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226; and
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136.
20 Deliberation No. 8 (E/CN.4/2006/7, sect. II).
21 A/HRC/16/47, paras. 37–51.
22 Compare the methods of work in 1993 (E/CN.4/1993/24, annex IV, para. 16) with the present
methods of work adopted in 2017 (A/HRC/36/38).
23 See, for example, opinions No. 10/2013, paras. 28 and 29; No. 3/2016, paras. 16 and 20; No. 53/2016,
paras. 42 and 51; No. 52/2020, para. 75; No. 68/2020, para. 59; and No. 62/2021, para. 35.
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anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest
and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.
72.
In relation to the source’s argument that the detainees were detained solely on the
basis of the criminal judgments delivered by the Ukrainian courts before the armed conflict
and there was no basis for the continued detention following the Russian occupation, the
Working Group notes that no provision of international human rights law or international
humanitarian law provides that pre-existing convictions and sentences are automatically
annulled on the takeover of a territory by an occupying force. In particular, the source has
not pointed to any facet of article 9 of the Covenant that requires automatic release of
individuals serving pre-existing sentences simply because an occupying force takes control
of an area. Noting that the source acknowledges that the detainees had been convicted
pursuant to criminal judgments by Ukrainian courts, issued before the start of the armed
conflict in February 2022, and sentenced to periods of between four and eight years of
imprisonment, no violation of article 9 has been demonstrated in relation to the fact that the
individuals were detained at the time that the occupying forces of the Russian Federation
took control of the area where their prisons were located.
73.
To the extent that international humanitarian law is applicable, the source has not
shown that the automatic release of all persons serving sentences for pre-existing convictions
is required. On the contrary, the occupying force, while assuming responsibility for ensuring
the continuation of regular civilian activities, may only enact new laws to the extent necessary
to ensure security in the occupied territory and for limited other exceptional reasons, in
accordance with article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Article 64 provides that the
penal laws of the occupied territory (in this case, Ukraine) should remain in force and are still
applicable to the detained individuals, with limited exceptions for provisions which are
essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under the present
Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of
the Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or
administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them.
74.
Consequently, there was a legal basis for the detention of the six individuals when
they were first detained in Ukraine and at the time of the takeover of Kherson by the
occupying authorities of the Russian Federation. The fact that the Russian Federation took
control of the region in which the individuals were detained did not automatically render their
detention arbitrary.
75.
In relation to the basis for the deprivation of liberty of the detainees, the source also
argues that none of the alleged victims were formally arrested and presented with arrest
warrants by the occupying forces of the Russian Federation when they took over the territory.
The Government does not address this argument.
76.
Again, noting that the detainees had been arrested long before the occupying forces
of the Russian Federation took over the territory and had been tried and convicted before the
occupation, the right to notification of the reasons for arrest and the nature of the charges is
not relevant in the present instance. Similarly, the source’s arguments that the detainees were
not informed of the reasons for their arrest, nor brought promptly before a judicial officer
when first detained, to verify that there was a proper basis for their arrests, relate to their
initial arrests by the Ukrainian authorities and do not apply to the period after they were
convicted and sentenced in Ukraine. Consequently, the Working Group cannot discern a
violation under category I by the Government of the Russian Federation concerning their
detention in these specific respects.
77.
While no violation has been shown in the preceding respects, in the light of the Human
Rights Committee’s findings regarding the communication concerning Messrs. Bratsylo,
Golovko and Konyukhov, the transfer of the detainees, incommunicado detention and the
conversion of their sentences are separate issues addressed below.24
24 CCPR/C/140/D/3022/2017, para. 8.6.
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13
Incommunicado detention, transfer to the Russian Federation and sentence conversion
78.
The source submits that, following the takeover of Kherson by the Russian Federation,
the detainees were held incommunicado for large proportions of their captivity, including
when they were transferred from Ukraine to the Russian Federation. It submits that this
impeded their ability to challenge the legality of their detention. The Government has chosen
not to respond to this allegation.
79.
The Working Group recalls that holding persons incommunicado may undermine the
right under article 9 of the Covenant to challenge the lawfulness of the detention before a
court. Pursuant to article 9 (4), anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention
shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without
delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.
Judicial oversight of detention is a fundamental safeguard of personal liberty and is essential
in ensuring that detention has a legal basis. Moreover, prohibiting contact with the outside
world may violate rule 58 of the Nelson Mandela Rules and principles 15, 16 (1) and 19 of
the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment.
80.
Noting the lack of a response from the Russian Government, the Working Group
considers that these circumstances demonstrate that the incommunicado nature of the
detention was contrary to rule 58 of the Nelson Mandela Rules and principles 15, 16 (1) and
19 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention
or Imprisonment. The Working Group further notes that, in the present case, article 9 (4) of
the Covenant is relevant, as although the trials of the detainees had already occurred, they
were brought under a new legal regime when they were transferred by the occupying power
to its own territory. Consequently, their incommunicado detention violated their right to
challenge their detention under article 9 (4) of the Covenant and principles 11 (1) and 32 of
the Body of Principles.
81.
As referred to above, the source makes additional arguments concerning the transfer
of the prisoners from Ukraine to the Russian Federation via other areas of Ukraine. In
mid-November 2022, during the retreat of the occupying forces of the Russian Federation
from Kherson, prisoners convicted by the Ukrainian courts who had been serving their
sentences in Kherson prisons were transferred to penal facilities in the Russian Federation.
The Government has chosen not to respond to these allegations.
82.
The Working Group notes that, according to rule 59 of the Nelson Mandela Rules,
prisoners shall be allocated, to the extent possible, to prisons close to their homes or their
places of social rehabilitation. The Working Group itself has decried the detention of persons
in remote locations. Such remote detention can impede access to family visits,25 potentially
impede access to legal assistance and undermine the ability to challenge detention under
article 9 (4) of the Covenant. Consequently, the transfer of the detainees from Ukraine to the
Russian Federation was not conducted in accordance with international human rights law.
Moreover, to the extent that international humanitarian law applies to civilians who have
been detained for reasons unconnected to the conflict, it would also not permit their transfer.
Instead, article 76 of the Fourth Geneva Convention that protected persons accused of
offences shall be detained in the occupied country and if convicted shall serve their sentences
therein. That protection is consistent with the fundamental principle forbidding
deportations.26 The Russian authorities have not provided any explanation or cited a legal
basis for the transfer of the detainees to Russian territory. Noting the deleterious impact on
the detainees’ rights that the transfer to a foreign country has created, particularly their right
to challenge the basis for their detention under article 9 (4) of the Covenant on having been
moved to a new jurisdiction, the Working Group considers that the transfer exacerbated the
arbitrariness of their detention under category I, as already established in paragraphs 78–80
above.
83.
In relation to Mr. Babaiev, Mr. Skrypnik and Mr. Rolya, the Working Group has been
informed that their sentences were “converted” under Russian law. The source argues that
25 Opinions No. 5/2021, para. 66; and No. 5/2023, para. 85.
26 Commentary of 1958 on article 76.
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this was improperly imposed and that they were not provided with a hearing before a judge.
The Government has not addressed this argument.
84.
The Working Group considers that the Government has not explained how the law
under which the sentences were converted is consistent with human rights law, nor its
application to persons in Ukraine. Further, it has not justified the retroactive application of
the conversions. Under human rights law, the principle of non-retroactivity applies, as set out
in article 15 of the Covenant, among other instruments. Under international humanitarian
law, when an occupying power brings into effect new legal regimes applicable to civilians
under its control, those new legal provisions can only relate to the purposes specified in
article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and they cannot be applied retroactively, as set
out in articles 65 and 67 of the Convention.
85.
On that basis and noting that the detainees were not properly able to contest the
application of the conversion law to their circumstances, the Working Group considers that
the conversion of their sentences under Russian law violated their rights under articles 9 and
15 of the Covenant and articles 9 and 11 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which further rendered their detention arbitrary under category I.
86.
In relation to the other three individuals, Federal Law No. 395-FZ has not yet been
applied (namely, the sentences delivered against them by the Ukrainian courts were not
formally converted under Russian law) as far as the Working Group is aware. Consequently,
the Working Group enters no finding in this respect.
87.
In the light of the above, the Working Group concludes that the deprivation of liberty
of the six individuals is arbitrary under category I.
b.
Category V
88.
The source submits that the detention of the six individuals falls under category V of
arbitrary detention, as it is discriminatory based on their national and ethnic origin as
Ukrainians. The Government has not addressed this submission.
89.
The Working Group notes the source’s uncontested submission that, as part of a large
group of Ukrainian prisoners, the six individuals have been treated differently from prisoners
convicted by the Russian courts and serving sentences in Russian facilities, in particular due
to their transfer to and detention in a country other than Ukraine, where they were convicted
and sentenced. The Working Group further notes their incommunicado detention and the lack
of access to the courts in the Russian Federation to challenge the basis for their detention in
another country. The Working Group also notes that other human rights bodies have
determined that prisoners being transferred from Ukrainian to Russian territory have
similarly been discriminated against, as was held, for example, by the Human Rights
Committee with regard to Messrs. Bratsylo, Golovko and Konyukhov.27
90.
Based on the targeted differential treatment of the six individuals, which fits within a
larger pattern directed against Ukrainian detainees, the Working Group concludes that their
ongoing detention is discriminatory in nature on the basis of their nationality, in breach of
articles 2 (1) and 26 of the Covenant.
c.
Concluding remarks
91.
The Working Group notes the source’s submission that the detainees may have been
severely mistreated, in a manner amounting to torture. In the location where Mr. Babaiev was
serving his sentence, the prisons were overcrowded, food and medicine were in short supply
and the detainees were subject to deteriorating health conditions. Mr. Skrypnik, together with
other inmates in Northern correctional facility No. 90 (Kherson) also experienced degrading
treatment, as inmates were reportedly used as labour in the construction of fortifications by
the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation.
92.
The Working Group reminds the Government of the Russian Federation of its
obligation under article 10 (1) of the Covenant and rules 1, 12 and 21 of the Nelson Mandela
27 CCPR/C/140/D/3022/2017, para. 8.18.
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15
Rules that all persons deprived of their liberty must be treated with humanity. Moreover, it
notes the country’s ongoing obligations under the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the importance of the Russian
Federation ceasing to engage in the torture of detainees and investigating and punishing
incidents of torture of detainees.
3.
Disposition
93.
In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:
The deprivation of liberty of Viktor Viktorovich Babaiev, Ruslan Volodymyrovich
Skrypnik, Mykita Andriyovich Rolya, Oleksii Mykolaiovych Chinchoi, Dmitro
Oleksandrovich Mocharny and Danyyl Yvgenyovich Khlopetsky, being in
contravention of article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (and
article 11 (2) in relation to Viktor Viktorovich Babaiev, Ruslan Volodymyrovich
Skrypnik and Mykita Andriyovich Rolya) and article 9 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (and article 15 in relation to Viktor Viktorovich Babaiev,
Ruslan Volodymyrovich Skrypnik and Mykita Andriyovich Rolya) is arbitrary and
falls within category I.
The deprivation of liberty of Viktor Viktorovich Babaiev, Ruslan Volodymyrovich
Skrypnik, Mykita Andriyovich Rolya, Oleksii Mykolaiovych Chinchoi, Dmitro
Oleksandrovich Mocharny and Danyyl Yvgenyovich Khlopetsky is also in
contravention of articles 2 and 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
articles 2 (1) and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
falls within category V.
94.
The Working Group requests the Government of the Russian Federation to take the
steps necessary to remedy the situations of Mr. Babaiev, Mr. Skrypnik, Mr. Rolya,
Mr. Chinchoi, Mr. Mocharny and Mr. Khlopetsky without delay and bring them into
conformity with the relevant international norms, including those set out in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
95.
The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the
case, the appropriate remedy would be to release Mr. Babaiev, Mr. Mocharny and
Mr. Khlopetsky immediately and accord them and Mr. Skrypnik, Mr. Rolya and
Mr. Chinchoi an enforceable right to compensation and other reparations, in accordance with
international law.
96.
The Working Group urges the Government to ensure a full and independent
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of
Mr. Babaiev, Mr. Skrypnik, Mr. Rolya, Mr. Chinchoi, Mr. Mocharny and Mr. Khlopetsky,
and to take appropriate measures against those responsible for the violation of their rights.
97.
The Working Group requests the Government to bring its laws into conformity with
the recommendations made in the present opinion and with its obligations under international
human rights law.
98.
The Working Group requests the Government to disseminate the present opinion
through all available means and as widely as possible.
4.
Follow-up procedure
99.
In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group requests
the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in follow-up
to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including:
(a)
Whether Mr. Babaiev, Mr. Mocharny and Mr. Khlopetsky have been released
and, if so, on what date;
(b)
Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to the six
individuals;
(c)
Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of the rights of
the six individuals and, if so, the outcome of the investigation;
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(d)
Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made to
harmonize the laws and practices of the Russian Federation with its international obligations
in line with the present opinion;
(e)
Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.
100.
The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may
have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and
whether further technical assistance is required, for example through a visit by the Working
Group.
101.
The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the
above-mentioned information within six months of the date of transmission of the present
opinion. However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up
to the opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action
would enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in
implementing its recommendations, as well as of any failure to take action.
102.
The Working Group recalls that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all States
to cooperate with the Working Group and has requested them to take account of its views
and, where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken.28
[Adopted on 10 April 2025]
28 Human Rights Council resolution 51/8, paras. 6 and 9.