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A/HRC/WGAD/2025/28

Opinion No. 28/2025 concerning Tayeb Benabderrahmane (Qatar)

UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung (WGAD) · 2025-04-10 · en UN

Opinion; Subjects: QATAR, ARBITRARY DETENTION; [WGAD: UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung, willkürliche Haft; Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire; Gruppo di lavoro sulla detenzione arbitraria]

Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)

GE.25-08846 (E) 040725 040725

Human Rights Council

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention

Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary

Detention at its 102nd session, 1–10 April 2025

Opinion No. 28/2025 concerning Tayeb Benabderrahmane (Qatar)

1.

The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established by resolution 1991/42 of

the Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution 1997/50, the Commission extended and

clarified the mandate of the Working Group. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251

and Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the

Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a

three-year period in its resolution 51/8.

2.

In accordance with its methods of work,1 on 3 December 2024 the Working Group

transmitted to the Government of Qatar a communication concerning Tayeb

Benabderrahmane. The Government submitted a late response on 4 March 2025. The State

is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

3.

The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases:

(a)

When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the

deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or her

sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);

(b)

When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or

freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and, insofar as States Parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25,

26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);

(c)

When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to

the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the

relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity as to

give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);

(d)

When asylum-seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged

administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy

(category IV);

(e)

When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on

the grounds of discrimination, based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,

religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability

or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings

(category V).

1 A/HRC/36/38.

United Nations

A/HRC/WGAD/2025/28

General Assembly

Distr.: General

7 July 2025

Original: English

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1.

Submissions

(a)

Communication from the source

4.

Tayeb Benabderrahmane, born on 24 January 1981, is a national of France and

Algeria. He is an entrepreneur and investor in the field of geopolitics and geoeconomics

consulting. Before his arrest, Mr. Benabderrahmane worked as General Adviser to the

National Human Rights Committee of Qatar.

(i)

Context

5.

According to the source, Mr. Benabderrahmane provided services to Qatari officials

in relation to the alleged diplomatic crisis that erupted in 2017, which resulted in the

imposition of a blockade against Qatar. His services were requested to help Qatar to raise

awareness of its situation and that of its people among international public opinion.

6.

As a result of the successes achieved by Mr. Benabderahmane, the National Human

Rights Committee of Qatar offered him the position of General Adviser, which he accepted.

In June 2019, Mr. Benabderrahmane and his family moved to Doha, where he continued his

work for the National Human Rights Committee and developed his own professional activity

there.

7.

His work for the National Human Rights Committee of Qatar evolved. The fight

against corruption became a priority for the highest authorities of the Government, and he

was instructed to gather all elements relating to that subject in Europe. It was in these

circumstances that Mr. Benabderrahmane began to gather information during his missions.

However, the lack of any substantial reaction to the information he gathered led him to

reconsider the real purpose of the services he had been requested to perform, and in

November 2019 he informed the National Human Rights Committee of his decision to

terminate his duties as General Adviser, with effect from 31 December 2019.

8.

Reportedly, Mr. Benabderrahmane’s arrest took place just a few days after he had

returned to Qatar, after the end-of-year holiday season, and his arrest was directly linked to

the suspicions of the State Security Bureau of Qatar that he had come into possession of

information that could be detrimental to the Government and key Qatari officials.

(ii)

Arrest and detention

9.

The source submits that, on the morning of 13 January 2020, Mr. Benabderrahmane

was stopped near his home in Doha by around 15 security forces officers. He was restrained

and taken to his residence, where other officers were already conducting a search and seizing

his documents, equipment and funds, without the consent of the family member present or

his own upon arrival.

10.

Reportedly, at the end of the search, Mr. Benabderrahmane was forced to sign a

document in Arabic, without any translation being provided to him and in the absence of an

interpreter. Following this, at around 4.30 p.m., he was placed in an unmarked vehicle, while

hooded and handcuffed, and taken to a secret detention facility. This secret detention facility

was the annex building of the Ministry of the Interior in Doha.

11.

It is submitted that Mr. Benabderrahmane was not informed of the charges against

him or the reasons for his arrest. He was informed only that his arrest was carried out under

“the Emir’s orders”. Moreover Mr. Benabderrahmane’s desktop computer, papers, boxes

with personal files and records, bank statements, mobile phones, a laptop and USB sticks, as

well as his small safe, were seized by the security forces.

12.

During the three weeks after his arrest, Mr. Benabderrahmane was reportedly

subjected to various forms of physical and psychological torture by security forces officers,

including: repeated full-body searches for no reason; sleep deprivation, through constant

lighting; and extreme physical constraints during interrogations, in which he was forced to

remain standing for extended periods and was threatened with physical violence against him

and his family if he did not cooperate with the interrogation. During this time, he was

reportedly asked numerous questions, including about the location of his professional

documents; information and names of all his family members, and whether they were aware

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of his activities in Qatar; his business and professional relationships; the nature of his activity,

and where he had obtained his assets. At no point was Mr. Benabderrahmane asked questions

about any specific accusations or criminal offences. Moreover, he was held in cramped

spaces and received death threats against him and his family.

13.

On 21 January 2020, Mr. Benabderrahmane’s family member was brought to the

secret detention centre where he was being held. Reportedly, his family member was

blindfolded and was only able to meet with him under the strict control of a member of the

security forces of Qatar. The sole purpose of this meeting was for Mr. Benabderrahmane to

instruct a family member about the demands he had received from the authorities, namely to

retrieve professional records and databases that he had stored in their family home in a third

country. Reportedly, his family member was first debriefed on what she needed to do for his

potential release, and was given strict instructions, namely: (a) to refrain from contacting

anyone; (b) to refrain from alerting the French authorities in Qatar or in France; and (c) to

refrain from disclosing Mr. Benabderrahmane’s situation to anyone. In addition, the source

submits that, to secure Mr. Benabderrahmane’s family member’s compliance with these

instructions while travelling to Algeria to retrieve the requested documents, another close

family member, who was a minor at the time, had to remain in Qatar under the control of the

Qatari security forces.

14.

On 1 February 2020, after three weeks of being held in total isolation in a secret

detention facility, Mr. Benabderrahmane was transferred to the Salwa Road prison.

15.

On 10 February 2020, he was brought before the Public Prosecutor for the first time,

almost a month after his arrest. Reportedly, at this hearing, he was not allowed to speak, and

was denied the right to be assisted by a lawyer or to benefit from the services of an interpreter.

According to the source, a four-day detention order was then issued against him for the

purpose of investigation, pending judicial review. At this time, he was reportedly informed

that his arrest was based on allegations of “intelligence with a foreign power and espionage”.

16.

On 13 February 2020, Mr. Benabderrahmane was brought again before the Public

Prosecutor, without a lawyer and without an interpreter, and his detention was extended for

an additional four days.

17.

During the two hearings before the Public Prosecutor on 10 and 13 February 2020, he

was questioned about transmitting information to a foreign party. However, it is reported that

he had difficulty understanding the questions, as the authorities spoke to him in the Qatari

Arabic dialect.

18.

On 16 February 2020, Mr. Benabderrahmane appeared before a court for the first time,

allegedly the court of misdemeanour. The hearing lasted only a few seconds, during which

Mr. Benabderrahmane was asked whether he was guilty, to which he responded that he was

innocent. The court extended his detention to one month (28 days).

19.

On 8 March 2020, Mr. Benabderrahmane’s family member was able to visit him for

the second and final time, while he was being held at the Salwa Road prison. This brief

meeting took place under strict and close surveillance by the security forces. After the

meeting, Mr. Benabderrahmane’s contact with his family member was limited to short

telephone calls, which he was only allowed to make when the security forces required him to

pass instructions to his family member. These instructions included: urging her to return to

Qatar, providing her with the details of a one-way aeroplane ticket; and asking her to cease

any legal actions in France and to retrieve USB drives from their home in France and bring

them back to Doha. At no point during his detention was he able to communicate freely with

his family without the strict control and interference of the security forces.

20.

The source submits that the authorities seemed anxious to recover all the documents

in Mr. Benabderrahmane’s possession, allegedly considering that these documents were

likely to compromise certain high-level individuals in Qatar or in other countries.

21.

On 16 March 2020, a second hearing was held before a court of misdemeanour, during

which Mr. Benabderrahmane’s detention was extended for an additional month (31 days).

However, on this occasion, Mr. Benabderrahmane was kept in the car parked near the court

and, as a result, did not appear before the court.

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22.

He was subsequently placed in solitary confinement for five months at the Salwa Road

prison. During this time, he reportedly endured further cruel, inhuman and degrading

treatment at the hands of the security forces. He was only removed from his cell for

interrogation sessions that appeared to serve no investigative purpose, other than to exert

psychological pressure on him. The security forces repeatedly asked him the same questions

that he had already answered during his time in the secret detention facility, such as the

whereabouts of his archives and professional assets.

23.

In the summer of 2024, Mr. Benabderrahmane was able to access his case file, which

revealed the existence of four additional court hearings. However, Mr. Benabderrahmane was

neither informed about nor present at these hearings. According to Mr. Benabderrahmane’s

case file, the hearings took place on the following dates, resulting in the corresponding

extensions of his detention:

24.

On 15 April 2020, the court of misdemeanour extended Mr. Benabderrahmane’s

pretrial detention by 14 days.

25.

On 28 April 2020, the court of misdemeanour extended Mr. Benabderrahmane’s

pretrial detention by 30 days.

26.

On 17 May 2020, the court of misdemeanor extended Mr. Benabderrahmane’s pretrial

detention by 30 days.

27.

On 25 June 2020, an undefined court extended Mr. Benabderrahmane’s pretrial

detention by 7 days.

28.

The source submits that at no time during the above-mentioned hearings was

Mr. Benabderrahmane informed of the charges against him.

29.

According to the source, at the beginning of June 2020, the authorities set the

conditions for Mr. Benabderrahmane’s release, which included that: (a) he was to hand over

all his documents and professional databases, whether related to Qatar or not, that had not

already been seized by the Qatari authorities; and (b) he was to sign a memorandum of

understanding or confidentiality agreement, compelling him not to disclose the conditions

under which he had been forced to transfer all his business data and archives to Qatar.

30.

On 28 June 2020, the Head of the State Security Bureau of Qatar ordered the Public

Prosecutor to release Mr. Benabderrahmane and place him under house arrest, with the

following statement: “We inform you that the aforementioned individuals [i.e.

Mr. Benabderrahmane’s relatives] have delivered what was asked from them […], thus we

decide upon temporary release under guarantee of place of residence, with a continuous travel

ban procedure”. The source notes that no judicial authority was called upon to order or

validate this release or to approve Mr. Benabderrahmane’s placement under house arrest.

31.

On 1 July 2020, the State Security Bureau of Qatar arranged for

Mr. Benabderrahmane’s release from prison and his placement under house arrest in Qatar

with a formal travel ban. Reportedly, from 1 July to 31 October 2020, Mr. Benabderrahmane

was held under house arrest in a room at the Intercontinental Hotel in Doha, under the

surveillance of the security forces.

32.

On 10 July 2020, Mr. Benabderrahmane was reportedly forced to sign the

above-mentioned memorandum of understanding or confidentiality agreement, obliging him

to remain silent about any facts of which he may have been aware and the conditions of his

detention in Qatar. According to the source, this memorandum of understanding was signed

with the highest-ranking official representative of Qatar in France, who is a close relative of

the Head of the State Security Bureau of Qatar. Reportedly, this memorandum of

understanding contained a provision specifying that, in case of breach of

Mr. Benabderrahmane’s contractual commitments, he would be liable, without prior notice,

to a contractual penalty of five million euros.

33.

On 1 November 2020, Mr. Benabderrahmane was reportedly deported to France.

34.

On 16 December 2020, Mr. Benabderrahmane submitted to the Qatari authorities:

(a) a criminal complaint; and (b) a petition to the National Human Rights Committee of

Qatar. These complaints, the source notes, set out the serious and repeated violations against

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Mr. Benabderrahmane by the security forces and called for investigations into these

allegations. On 3 December 2021, another petition was submitted to the National Human

Rights Committee. However, no answer followed from these petitions.

35.

On 18 August 2022, Mr. Benabderrahmane initiated legal proceedings in France to

request the judicial annulment of the memorandum of understanding on the grounds that:

(a) his consent had been forced by violence; and (b) the object of the agreement was illegal,

since it amounted to stopping him from reporting the abuse that had been inflicted upon him.

Allegedly, in response, the abovementioned highest-ranking official representative of Qatar

in France filed a counterclaim before the court, requesting that Mr. Benabderrahmane be

ordered to pay the five million euro penalty. The case was heard by the Judicial Court of

Paris on 26 November 2024, which is expected to render its decision on 25 April 2025.

36.

The source submits that, in September 2023, Mr. Benabderrahmane learned from the

press that he had been subjected to criminal proceedings in Qatar and had been sentenced to

death by the Qatari courts on 31 May 2023. This judgment, rendered in absentia, was

reportedly based on confessions obtained under torture and was, according to the source, an

evident reprisal for Mr. Benabderrahmane’s efforts to seek justice.

37.

The source reports that, throughout the entire duration of Mr. Benabderrahmane’s

detention, he did not receive the effective legal assistance capable of realistically challenging

the conditions of his arrest and detention. On 23 April 2020, he was visited by a Qatari

lawyer. However, the lawyer told Mr. Benabderrahmane that he had not been informed of

the charges against him and had not been authorized to review the case file. The source further

notes that the lawyer was not present at any of the hearings allegedly held before the Qatari

courts, nor did he file any requests for Mr. Benabderrahmane’s release or seek basic

information regarding the charges that could have justified his arrest or detention. In addition,

after Mr. Benabderrahmane’s arrival in France, the lawyer reportedly refused to provide any

further information or documents related to his actions to Mr. Benabderrahmane’s legal

counsel in France, asserting that he had never been formally appointed as his legal counsel.

38.

According to the source, Mr. Benabderrahmane suffered severe physical and mental

harm as a result of the inhuman and degrading treatment inflicted on him by the Qatari

authorities. Reportedly, the examinations carried out on his arrival to France showed: a

weight loss of almost 11 kg; severe intestinal disorders; a “permanent functional deficit” of

between 5 and 10 per cent, as well as a “post-traumatic stress state” for which there is a direct

and certain link between the facts observed and the traumatic acts; recurring knee pain

following long hours of torture. Moreover, as attested by one doctor, Mr. Benabderrahmane

is currently experiencing symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, which have had an

impact on all areas of his life and is disabling his daily life. He presents: anxiety-depressive

symptoms as a reaction to the detention and psychological pressures to which he was

subjected; severe sleep disorders; hypervigilance that prevents him from carrying out his

activities serenely each day; cognitive problems such as difficulty concentrating; and

flashbacks leading to feelings of intense fear and powerlessness accompanied by physical

symptoms (palpitations, tremors and shivering). The source further reports that, according to

the doctors, Mr. Benabderrahmane is coping to overcome his trauma, but is showing

exhaustion and a risk of severe psychic or even suicidal collapse.

39.

The source states that Mr. Benabderrahmane is currently in France, following his

deportation on 1 November 2020.

(iii)

Legal analysis

40.

The source argues that the arrest and detention of Mr. Benabderrahmane are arbitrary

under categories I, II and III of the working methods of the Working Group.

a.

Category I

41.

The source contends that Mr. Benabderrahmane’s arrest and detention lacked legal

basis, as he was never informed of the reasons for his detention – initially in secret detention,

then at the Salwa Road prison, and later under house arrest. He was arrested without being

shown a warrant, informed of any charges or advised of his right to consular assistance. He

was also denied access to justice, preventing him from knowing or challenging any charges.

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42.

In the present case, the source asserts that the conditions under which

Mr. Benabderrahmane was arrested then detained for almost 10 months constitute a violation

of these provisions. Moreover, he was held in solitary confinement and tortured for the first

three weeks during which he was held in a secret detention facility, without being notified of

any charges against him. He was then reportedly held, still in solitary confinement, for five

months at the Salwa Road prison, during which time he was verbally informed that his arrest

and detention were allegedly motivated by “intelligence with a foreign power and

espionage”, without being formally notified of this. Lastly, after his release from the Salwa

Road prison, he was put under house arrest, without any judicial review or justification of the

reasons for this new measure.

43.

In the summer of 2024, Mr. Benabderrahmane obtained a copy of his case file,

including an investigation report dated 1 January 2020 and an arrest and search warrant dated

2 January 2020. Both documents were allegedly issued by the investigative services of the

Deputy Prosecutor of the State Security Bureau of Qatar and allegedly authorized

Mr. Benabderrahmane’s arrest on 13 January 2020. However, the source notes that these

documents do not reference any legislative or regulatory text or provision that would have

justified his arrest. Furthermore, the source highlights that the expert analysis of the six

judgments as well as other documents in the case file revealed numerous signs of forgery,

including identical photographic passages, numerous irregularities and inconsistencies, as

well as deletions and alterations. The six detention renewal documents – signed by six judges,

six prosecutors and six registrars on different dates – were found to contain serious

anomalies: all were completed by the same person, as confirmed by the expert analysis. The

source submits that this is a material impossibility, as each session should have been validated

by a different clerk. It contends that there are only three possible explanations for this: the

absence of clerks; duplication of the same document; or deliberate falsification. In all cases,

these documents have allegedly been falsified, and their credibility is compromised.

Furthermore, the source argues that Mr. Benabderrahmane’s signatures, which can be found

on some of the documents of the case file, including some of the documents that were later

used as pieces of evidence in the trial in absentia that led to his death sentence, are forged.

44.

Reportedly, one of the judges who authorized Mr. Benabderrahmane’s continued

detention stated publicly before the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination

that he was not aware of the present case.2 This, the source argues, confirms the falsified

nature of the documents in Mr. Benabderrahmane’s case file. Similarly, the other members

of the Qatari delegation present before the Committee, which included members of the

Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Public

Prosecution, were not aware of Mr. Benabderrahmane’s case.

45.

The source contends that the absence of any official notification of legal grounds

justifying detention of almost 10 months must be assimilated to a lack of legal basis and

confirms the arbitrary nature of Mr. Benabderrahmane’s arrest and detention, contrary to

article 9 (2) of the Covenant.

46.

Furthermore, throughout the period of Mr. Benabderrahmane’s detention, he

underwent numerous interrogations and was forced to sign false documents and certificates

implicating his relatives, as well as numerous foreign personalities. His interrogations were

all carried out without the presence of his lawyer, and he was subjected to numerous acts of

physical and psychological torture and kept in isolation throughout his detention.

Mr. Benabderrahmane spent almost 10 months in detention without any procedural

guarantees, without access to a lawyer of his choice during the first 3 months, without access

to the services of an interpreter, and in direct contravention of the international obligations

and national law of Qatar.

47.

For the above reasons, the source concludes that Mr. Benabderrahmane’s detention is

arbitrary as it lacked a legal basis and thus falls under category I.

2 CERD/C/SR.3063, paras. 16 and 20.

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b.

Category II

48.

The source argues that Mr. Benabderrahmane’s arrest and subsequent detention

stemmed from the exercise of his rights and freedoms. It submits that Mr. Benabderrahmane

was arrested and subsequently detained after submitting his resignation as General Adviser

to the National Human Rights Committee of Qatar. Following his resignation, the President

of the National Human Rights Committee reportedly requested that he refrain from disclosing

any information related to his work. This request was reiterated when he was under house

arrest.

49.

In the present case, the source asserts that Mr. Benabderrahmane’s arrest and

deprivation of liberty resulted directly from the exercise of his freedom of opinion and

expression, protected by article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and

article 19 (1) and (2) of the Covenant. By refusing to comply with requests from the National

Human Rights Committee of Qatar to falsify or conceal information, Mr. Benabderrahmane

was exercising his right to freedom of conscience and expression.

50.

The source argues that Mr. Benabderrahmane’s arrest was directly linked to the

suspicions of the State Security Bureau of Qatar that he had come into possession of

information that could be detrimental to the Government or key government officials, and to

his decision to terminate his duties as General Adviser to the National Human Rights

Committee of Qatar. The source asserts that all available elements confirm this argument.

51.

Mr. Benabderrahmane’s arrest took place immediately after his resignation from his

work as General Adviser to the National Human Rights Committee of Qatar;

52.

All his documents and databases located in Qatar were seized upon his arrest (and

never returned) and the Qatari security forces used all possible means, including threatening

Mr. Benabderrahmane’s life and that of his close family members, to retrieve his professional

archives located abroad.

53.

Most of the violent interrogations to which Mr. Benabderrahmane was subjected

during his detention were related to information he might have acquired, as well as to whether

there were any other professional archives that should be retrieved.

54.

His release from detention was directly conditioned upon the remittal of all documents

(whether or not they were related to Qatar or Qatari officials).

55.

Considering the above, the source concludes that Mr. Benabderrahmane’s arrest and

detention are directly linked to the exercise of the above-mentioned rights, and are thus

arbitrary under category II.

c.

Category III

56.

The source argues that Mr. Benabderrahmane’s detention is arbitrary under

category III because he was denied the right to due process. It asserts that

Mr. Benabderrahmane’s detention was accompanied by serious and repeated violations of

fundamental rights guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the

Covenant, including the right to a fair trial.

57.

The source recalls that the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and

impartial tribunal established by law is a fundamental right. 3 In this case, the treatment

inflicted by the authorities between January and November 2020 constitutes a violation of

Mr. Benabderrahmane’s fundamental right on several counts. First, he was not notified of the

acts that motivated his arrest and detention. He only discovered that his arrest and detention

had been provided for by an arrest warrant dated 2 January 2020, when he had already been

deported to France and had access to a copy of his case file. However, this act, like all other

acts relating to his treatment by the Qatari authorities between January and November 2020,

was never made known to him in a language he could understand, and was thus in violation

of articles 104, 106 and 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Qatar and articles 9 (2)

and 14 of the Covenant.

3 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007), para. 6.

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58.

Moreover, the source argues that Mr. Benabderrahmane did not have access to a legal

remedy. During the 307 days of his detention and after his deportation on 1 November 2020,

he was never given the opportunity to contest the reasons for or conditions of his detention.

Indeed, the hearings regarding his detention – if they occurred – were held in his absence and

that of his lawyer.

59.

The source asserts that during Mr. Benabderrahmane’s detention, he did not benefit

from any effective assistance by a lawyer. Reportedly, his appointed lawyer never had access

to his case file and was essentially prevented from meeting him. In addition, the lawyer,

allegedly appointed by persons assisting Mr. Benabderrahmane’s family in France, due to

either fear of retaliation or personal interest, did not actively defend Mr. Benabderrahmane’s

rights.

Such

a

situation,

the

source

contends,

constitutes

a

violation

of

Mr. Benabderrahmane’s right to an effective legal defence, a right fundamental to

guaranteeing a fair trial in accordance with article 14 (3) (b) of the Covenant. His right to

benefit from the services of an interpreter was also denied.

60.

The source asserts that these elements show that any domestic remedy that

Mr. Benabderrahmane might have sought in Qatar was bound to fail. His arrest and detention

were decided at the highest level of the Qatari security structure, and the authorities

reportedly forged documents to conceal the illegal and inhuman treatment he suffered.

61.

The source further argues that Mr. Benabderrahmane was held in detention for

307 days without being informed of any charges. This prolonged detention, without

notification of the reasons or an opportunity to challenge it, constitutes excessive detention

in violation of article 12 (2) of the Covenant.

62.

During his detention, Mr. Benabderrahmane was subjected to threats of torture and

inhuman treatment, leading him to sign confessions of guilt and false statements implicating

his relatives. The source asserts that these actions violate articles 7 and 14 (3) (g) of the

Covenant. These confessions and statements, obtained under duress and in the absence of

legal representation, were used in the proceedings that led to Mr. Benabderrahmane’s death

sentence in May 2023.

63.

It is asserted that such confessions and statements were manifestly inadmissible, both

formally (documents not drawn up in a language mastered by their author and signed in the

absence of any lawyer or interpreter) and substantively (documents obtained under duress

and torture). However, they were used in the proceedings that led to Mr. Benabderrahmane’s

death sentence in May 2023.

64.

The source concludes that the actions of Qatar in relation to Mr. Benabderrahmane’s

arrest and detention are characterized by serious violations of articles 9, 12 (2) and 14 (1) and

(3) (a)–(f) of the Covenant.

(b)

Response from the Government

65.

On 3 December 2024, the Working Group transmitted the allegations from the source

to the Government under its regular communications procedure. The Working Group

requested the Government to provide, by 3 February 2025, detailed information about the

situation of Mr. Benabderrahmane and to clarify the legal provisions justifying his detention,

as well as their compatibility with the obligations of Qatar under international human rights

law, and in particular with regard to the treaties ratified by the State.

66.

On 30 January 2025, the Government requested an extension, which was granted until

3 March 2025. The Government submitted its reply on 4 March 2025, which was after the

deadline. The Working Group cannot accept this response as if it were provided within the

time limit. In accordance with paragraph 16 of its methods of work, the Working Group will

render its opinion based on all the information it has obtained.

2.

Discussion

67.

In determining whether Mr. Benabderrahmane’s detention is arbitrary, the Working

Group has regard to the principles established in its jurisprudence to deal with evidentiary

issues. If the source has established a prima facie case for breach of international law

constituting arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be understood to rest upon the

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9

Government if it wishes to refute the allegations.4 Mere assertions by the Government that

lawful procedures have been followed are not sufficient to rebut the source’s allegations.

68.

The Working Group notes that Mr. Benabderrahmane’s release and transfer to house

arrest was ordered on 28 June 2020 by the Head of the State Security Bureau of Qatar. He

was then deported to France on 1 November 2020. According to the source,

Mr. Benabderrahmane learned from the press in September 2023 that he had been sentenced

to death in absentia in Qatar on 31 May 2023. Given these circumstances, and according to

paragraph 17 (a) of its methods of work, the Working Group reserves the right to render an

opinion, on a case-by-case basis, whether or not the deprivation of liberty was arbitrary,

notwithstanding the release of the person concerned. In the present case, the Working Group

opines that the allegations made by the source are extremely serious and therefore shall

proceed to deliver the opinion.

69.

The source has argued that the detention of Mr. Benabderrahmane is arbitrary and

falls under categories I, II and III. The Working Group will examine these in turn.

(a)

Category I

70.

The source submits that Mr. Benabderrahmane’s arrest and detention lack a legal

basis, as he was never informed of the grounds for his detention – first in secret detention,

then at the Salwa Road prison, and finally under house arrest. It argues that he was not

provided with an arrest warrant nor the reasons for his arrest at the moment of his arrest on

13 January 2020 and was not promptly informed of the charges against him. In its late

response, the Government states that an arrest warrant against Mr. Benabderrahmane was

issued by the Public Prosecutor on 2 January 2020 and executed against him by the State

Security Service on 13 January 2020, the date of his arrest.

71.

Pursuant to article 9 (1) of the Covenant, no one is to be deprived of their liberty

except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law.

Article 9 (2) of the Covenant provides that anyone who is arrested is to be informed, at the

time of arrest, of the reasons for their arrest and is to be promptly informed of any charges

against them. As the Working Group has previously stated, in order for a deprivation of

liberty to have a legal basis, it is not sufficient that there is a law that may authorize the arrest.

The authorities must invoke that legal basis and apply it to the circumstances of the case.5

This is typically done through an arrest warrant or arrest order (or equivalent document).6

The reasons for the arrest must be provided immediately upon arrest and must include not

only the general legal basis of the arrest, but also enough factual specifics to indicate the

substance of the complaint, such as the wrongful act and the identity of an alleged victim.7

72.

While the Government asserts that Mr. Benabderrahmane was arrested based on an

arrest warrant issued by the Public Prosecutor, it has not addressed the relevant question,

namely whether a warrant or equivalent document was shown to him at the time of his arrest.

In this regard, the Working Group notes the distinction between issuing an arrest warrant and

showing it to a suspect before the arrest. In the Working Group’s view, the Government does

not explain how the arrest was conducted, nor the place of arrest or what authorities

conducted the arrest. This contrasts with the detailed account provided by the source, who

states that on the morning of 13 January 2020 Mr. Benabderrahmane was stopped near his

home in Doha by around 15 security forces officers. He was then restrained and taken to his

home, where other officers were searching and seizing documents. Taking into account all

information available to it, the Working Group is not satisfied that Mr. Benabderrahmane

was presented with an arrest warrant at the moment of his arrest, irrespective of whether one

was duly issued. It thus finds that his arrest violates article 9 (1) and (2) of the Covenant and

article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

4 A/HRC/19/57, para. 68.

5 Opinions No. 9/2019, para. 29; No. 46/2019, para. 51; and No. 59/2019, para. 46.

6 Opinions No. 88/2017, para. 27; No. 3/2018, para. 43; and No. 30/2018, para. 39. In cases of arrests

made in flagrante delicto, the opportunity to obtain a warrant will typically not be available.

7 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 25; and opinions No. 30/2017,

paras. 58 and 59; and No. 85/2021, para. 69.

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73.

Furthermore, the Working Group recalls that, under article 9 (2) of the Covenant,

anyone who is arrested must be promptly informed of any charges against him or her. The

right to be promptly informed of charges concerns notice of criminal charges and, as the

Human Rights Committee has noted, that right applies in connection with ordinary criminal

prosecutions and also in connection with military prosecutions or other special regimes

directed at criminal punishment.8

74.

According to the source, Mr. Benabderrahmane was not informed of the charges

against him and was only informed that his arrest had been carried out under “the Emir’s

orders”. It was only on 10 February 2020, when Mr. Benabderrahmane was brought before

the Public Prosecutor, almost a month after his arrest, that he was informed that his arrest

was based on allegations of “intelligence with a foreign power and espionage”. The

Government limits itself to claim that all legal and judicial procedures concerning

Mr. Benabderrahmane have been carried out properly. In the absence of any information to

dispute the source’s assertions, the Working Group finds a breach of article 9 (2) of the

Covenant.

75.

The Working Group observes the source’s allegations that Mr. Benabderrahmane was

held in secret detention and in isolation for three weeks, from the moment of his arrest until

1 February 2020, when he was transferred to the Salwa Road prison. In its late response, the

Government does not contest the source’s allegations in this regard.

76.

The Working Group notes that judicial oversight of any detention is a central

safeguard for personal liberty and is critical in ensuring that detention has a legitimate basis.

The Working Group recalls that holding persons at secret locations and in circumstances

undisclosed to the person’s family violates their right to contest the legality of their detention

before a court or tribunal under article 9 (3) and (4) of the Covenant.9 It further recalls that:

“No jurisdiction should allow for individuals to be deprived of their liberty in secret for

potentially indefinite periods, held outside the reach of law, without the possibility of

resorting to legal procedures, including habeas corpus”.10 In the absence of any information

to the contrary from the Government, the Working Group finds that Mr. Benabderrahmane

was deprived of his rights under article 9 (3) and (4) of the Covenant and was placed outside

the protection of the law, in violation of article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights and article 16 of the Covenant.

77.

Furthermore, article 9 (3) of the Covenant provides that anyone arrested or detained

on a criminal charge should be brought promptly before a judge. As the Human Rights

Committee has stated, 48 hours is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy the requirement for

promptness. Any delay longer than that must remain absolutely exceptional and be justified

under the circumstances.11

78.

The Working Group notes the source’s allegation that Mr. Benabderrahmane was first

brought before a judge over a month after his arrest, on 16 February 2020, information

acknowledged by the Government in its late response, wherein it states that the criminal court

judge ordered a one-month extension of his detention. No explanation has been provided for

this time without a judicial hearing. It follows from this information that

Mr. Benabderrahmane’s right to be promptly brought before a judge following his arrest was

violated, contrary to article 9 (3) of the Covenant and principle 32 of the Body of Principles

for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.

79.

In addition, the Working Group observes that, according to the source,

Mr. Benabderrahmane first appeared before the Public Prosecutor on 10 and 13 February

2020, and only later was brought before a court. The Government in its late response does

not contest the source’s allegations in this respect, confirming that Mr. Benabderrahmane

was indeed brought before the Public Prosecution on those days, and only later brought

8 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 29; and opinion No. 44/2022,

para. 66.

9 Opinion No. 17/2024, para. 62.

10 A/HRC/16/47, para. 54.

11 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), paras. 32 and 33.

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GE.25-08846

11

before a court. The Working Group recalls that a prosecutor cannot be considered a judicial

authority for the purposes of article 9 (3) of the Covenant.12

80.

The Working Group recalls that it is a well-established norm of international law that

pretrial detention shall be the exception rather than the rule and that it should be ordered for

as short a period as possible.13 Article 9 (3) of the Covenant provides that it is not to be the

general rule that persons awaiting trial are to be detained in custody, but their release may be

subject to guarantees to appear for trial and at any other stage of the judicial proceedings. It

follows that liberty is recognized as a principle and detention as an exception in the interests

of justice. Thus, when pretrial detention takes place, it must be justified by specific risks and

supported by an explanation of why alternative measures such as bail would be insufficient.

81.

In its late response, the Government provides eight dates on which the Public

Prosecution and the criminal court ordered Mr. Benabderrahmane’s detention to be extended,

as well as the date on which the Attorney General of the State Security and Anti-Terrorism

Department at the Public Prosecutor’s Office ordered his provisional release. The Working

Group considers that the Government has not established whether alternative measures were

considered, nor provided the reasons for holding Mr. Benabderrahmane in pretrial detention.

The Working Group thus finds a violation of article 9 (3) of the Covenant.

82.

For all these reasons, the Working Group concludes that Mr. Benabderrahmane’s

detention lacked a legal basis, and is therefore arbitrary under category I.

(b)

Category II

83.

The source alleges that the deprivation of liberty of Mr. Benabderrahmane was

arbitrary under category II because it resulted from the exercise of his rights and freedom. It

argues that Mr. Benabderrahmane’s arrest and detention are directly linked to his decision to

terminate his duties as General Adviser to the National Human Rights Committee of Qatar,

as well as the suspicions of the State Security Bureau of Qatar that he had come into

possession of information that could be detrimental to the Government or key government

officials.

84.

The source explains that the absence of any meaningful response to the information

that Mr. Benabderrahmane had gathered led him to question the true purpose of the tasks he

had been assigned. Consequently, in November 2019, he informed the National Human

Rights Committee of Qatar of his decision to resign from his position as General Adviser,

effective 31 December 2019, and, as a response, its Chair requested that he refrain from

disclosing any information related to his work, a request that was reportedly reiterated during

his house arrest.

85.

In its late response, the Government refutes the source’s allegations, asserting that

Mr. Benabderrahmane was not working as an adviser to the National Human Rights

Committee during the period from June 2019 to the date of his departure from the country,

on 1 November 2020, but was working at an investment group, as confirmed by the

employment contract concluded between Mr. Benabderrahmane and the investment group on

1 July 2019, and also confirmed by his residence card issued by the Ministry of the Interior

of Qatar.

86.

In its additional comments, the source asserts that the decision to remunerate

Mr. Benabderrahmane for his services to the National Human Rights Committee of Qatar

through a contract with the investment group company – an entity owned by the Chair of the

Committee – was taken unilaterally by the latter. As a foreign national, the source notes,

Mr. Benabderrahmane had no effective means to contest this arrangement, and he never

carried out any work or provided any service for the investment group. On the contrary, he

maintained regular contact with the Deputy Chair of the Committee, through which he

coordinated conferences and high-level meetings and prepared weekly briefs and quarterly

12 Ibid., para. 32; and opinions No. 14/2015, para. 28; No. 5/2020, para. 72; No. 6/2020, para. 47; and

No. 41/2020, para. 60. See also A/HRC/45/16/Add.1, para. 35.

13 Opinions No. 28/2014, para. 43; No. 49/2014, para. 23; No. 57/2014, para. 26; No. 1/2020, para. 53;

and No. 8/2020, para. 54. See also Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014),

para. 38; and A/HRC/19/57, paras. 48–58.

A/HRC/WGAD/2025/28

12

GE.25-08846

activity reports. In January 2019, he played a key role in facilitating the Chair’s audience

with the Pope; in February 2019, he organized several high-level meetings with French

ministries; and in September 2019, he arranged a meeting between a Committee delegation

and the European Union Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. All these activities were undertaken

in his capacity as General Adviser to the Chair of the National Human Rights Committee of

Qatar.

87.

The Working Group recalls that freedom of expression is a fundamental human right,

guaranteed in article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 19 of the

Covenant. It protects even that which may shock, offend or disturb or which may insult an

individual or group or criticize an institution.14 Moreover, the Working Group applies a

heightened standard of review in cases in which freedom of expression and opinion is

restricted or where human rights defenders are involved.

88.

Under article 19 (3) of the Covenant, any restriction imposed on the right to freedom

of expression must be provided by law, designed to achieve a legitimate aim (namely the

protection of national security, public order, public health or morals) and imposed in

accordance with the requirements of necessity and proportionality.15

89.

In the present case, the Government does not explain how these criteria were met. In

its late response, the Government states that legal procedures followed against

Mr. Benabderrahmane for having committed offences of criminal conspiracy and

maintaining intelligence with a foreign State against Qatar, and that these procedures were

carried out under the supervision of the competent judicial authority of Qatar, in accordance

with the provisions of Law No. 2004-23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, it does

not provide a sufficiently detailed account of the factual basis for these allegations.

90.

The Working Group takes note of the source’s allegations that numerous elements in

Mr. Benabderrahmane’s case confirm that his arrest and subsequent detention stemmed from

his decision to resign his position as General Adviser to the National Human Rights

Committee of Qatar: (a) his arrest took place immediately after his resignation; (b) all his

documents and databases located in Qatar were seized upon his arrest (and reportedly never

returned), and the Qatari security forces used all possible means, including threatening his

life and that of his close family members, to retrieve his professional archives abroad; (c)

most of the interrogations, conducted violently, to which he was subjected related to

information he might have acquired, as well as to whether there were any other professional

archives that should be retrieved; and (d) his release from detention was directly conditioned

upon the remittal of all documents, whether or not they were related to Qatar or Qatari

officials.

91.

Having reviewed all information available to it, the Working Group is convinced that

the conduct of Mr. Benabderrahmane fell within the exercise of the right to freedom of

opinion and expression protected under article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights and article 19 of the Covenant and that he was detained for exercising these rights.

His deprivation of liberty is thus arbitrary under category II.

(c)

Category III

92.

The source submits that Mr. Benabderrahmane’s deprivation of liberty is arbitrary

under category III because he was denied the right to due process and his detention was

accompanied by serious and repeated violations of fundamental rights, including the right to

a fair trial. It is argued that Mr. Benabderrahmane was denied access to effective legal

assistance and interpretation in a language he could understand; was subjected to torture and

interrogated in the absence of legal counsel; and was coerced into making false statements

and confessing guilt.

93.

In particular, the source alleges that Mr. Benabderrahmane did not benefit from any

effective legal assistance by a lawyer, as his lawyer, due to either fear of retaliation or

14 Opinions No. 7/2008; No. 35/2012; No. 46/2013; No. 4/2019; and No. 33/2019.

15 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34 (2011), paras. 21–36. See, for instance, opinions

No. 8/2020; and No. 52/2024, para. 90.

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GE.25-08846

13

personal interest, did not actively defend his rights. According to the source, his lawyer never

had access to his case files, was essentially prevented from meeting him and was never

present at any of the hearings. Moreover, the source argues that Mr. Benabderrahmane had

access for the first time to his case file in the summer of 2024, four years after his arrest and

deportation to France. In its late response, the Government asserts that Mr. Benabderrahmane

benefited from all necessary legal and judicial guarantees for a fair trial in accordance with

legal standards.

94.

The Working Group recalls that all persons deprived of their liberty are to have the

right to legal assistance by counsel of their choice, at any time during their detention,

including immediately after their apprehension, and that such access is to be provided without

delay.16 The right to legal assistance is an essential element of the right to fair trial, as it serves

to ensure that the principle of equality of arms is duly observed.17 The Working Group further

recalls that access to counsel is a right enshrined in article 14 (3) of the Covenant and

principles 11 (2), 17 and 18 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under

Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment and reinforced by article 11 of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights. Article 14 (3) (b) of the Covenant sets out the right to have

adequate time and facilities for the preparation of one’s defence and to communicate with

counsel of one’s own choosing.

95.

Article 14 (3) (b) of the Covenant provides that a defendant is entitled to “have

adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with

counsel of his own choosing”. Defendants must have access to documents and other

evidence, including “all materials that the prosecution plans to offer in court against the

accused or that could assist the defence”. The Covenant further requires that defendants “be

able to meet their clients in private and to communicate with the accused in conditions that

fully respect the confidentiality of their communications”.18

96.

The Working Group notes that the Government did not specifically address whether

the lawyer was able to visit Mr. Benabderrahmane and be present at the hearings, or if

communication between Mr. Benabderrahmane and his lawyer was granted. Noting the lack

of information from the Government to refute the source’s allegations in this regard, the

Working Group is of the view that Mr. Benabderrahmane was denied his right to effective

legal counsel, in violation of article 14 (3) of the Covenant. Furthermore, considering the

source’s submissions and the Government’s general response in its late reply, the Working

Group concludes that, by not allowing Mr. Benabderrahmane timely access to the case file,

the authorities violated article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and

article 14 (1) and (3) (b) of the Covenant.

97.

The Working Group also notes that Mr. Benabderrahmane was subjected to torture,

inhuman treatment, including repeated full-body searches for no reason, sleep deprivation

and threats of physical violence to him and his family, and was forced to remain standing for

extended periods. This reportedly led him to sign confessions of guilt and false statements

implicating his relatives. He was asked numerous questions, including about the location of

his professional documents, information and names of all his family members, and whether

they were aware of his activities in Qatar, and his professional relationships. Furthermore,

the source asserts that these confessions and statements, obtained under duress and in the

absence of legal representation, were used in the proceedings that led to his death sentence

in May 2023. The Government did not contest the source’s allegations in this regard.

98.

The Working Group recalls that torture is not only a grave violation of human rights

per se, but also undermines the ability to defend oneself, thereby hindering the exercise of

the right to a fair trial. The Working Group notes that the use of confessions extracted through

ill-treatment that is tantamount if not equivalent to torture is a breach of article 14 (3) (g) of

the Covenant and may also constitute a violation of the State’s obligations under article 15

of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

16 A/HRC/30/37, annex, principle 9 and guideline 8; Human Rights Committee, general comment No.

35 (2014), para. 35; A/HRC/45/16, paras. 50–55; and A/HRC/48/55, para. 56. See also A/HRC/27/47,

para. 13.

17 See, for example, opinion No. 35/2019.

18 Human Rights Committee, general comment, No. 32 (2007), paras. 33 and 34.

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Punishment.19 Furthermore, principle 21 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All

Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment specifically prohibits taking undue

advantage of the situation of a detained person to compel confession or incriminating

statements. The admission into evidence of a statement allegedly obtained through torture or

ill-treatment and without the presence of a lawyer renders the entire proceedings unfair,

regardless of whether other evidence was available to support the verdict.20 The burden is on

the Government to prove that statements were given freely,21 but in this case it has not done

so.

99.

In the absence of any information to the contrary, the Working Group is inclined to

consider that the fairness of proceedings was tainted by mistreatment and torture, amounting

to a violation of Mr. Benabderrahmane’s fair trial rights under article 11 (1) of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights and article 14 (3) (g) of the Covenant.

100.

The source submits that Mr. Benabderrahmane was denied the right to benefit from

the services of an interpreter. In particular, the source argues that Mr. Benabderrahmane was

forced to sign a document in Arabic, without any translation being provided to him and in

the absence of an interpreter, and that during the two hearings before the Public Prosecution,

he was questioned about transmitting information to a foreign party, but that he had difficulty

understanding the questions, as the authorities spoke to him in the Qatari Arabic dialect and

there was no interpretation available. The Working Group observes the lack of response by

the Government to the allegation made by the source in this regard, and thus considers that

Mr. Benabderrahmane’s right was violated, contrary to article 14 (3) (f) of the Covenant.

101.

For all the above reasons, the Working Group concludes that the violations of

Mr. Benabderrahmane’s due process rights are of such gravity as to render his detention

arbitrary under category III.

3.

Disposition

102.

In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:

The deprivation of liberty of Tayeb Benabderrahmane, being in contravention of

articles 6, 9, 10, 11 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and

articles 9, 14, 16 and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

is arbitrary and falls within categories I, II and III.

103.

The Working Group requests the Government of Qatar to take the steps necessary to

remedy the situation of Mr. Benabderrahmane without delay and bring it into conformity

with the relevant international norms, including those set out in the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

104.

The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the

case, the appropriate remedy would be to accord Mr. Benabderrahmane an enforceable right

to compensation and other reparations, in accordance with international law.

105.

The Working Group urges the Government to ensure a full and independent

investigation

of

the

circumstances

surrounding

the

arbitrary

detention

of

Mr. Benabderrahmane and to take appropriate measures against those responsible for the

violation of his rights.

106.

The Working Group requests the Government to disseminate the present opinion

through all available means and as widely as possible.

19 Ibid., para. 49.

20 Opinions No. 43/2012, para. 51; No. 34/2015, para. 28; No. 52/2018, para. 79 (i); No. 32/2019,

para. 43; No. 59/2019, para. 70; and No. 73/2019, para. 91.

21 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007), para. 41. See also opinions No. 86/2020

and No. 41/2020.

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15

4.

Follow-up procedure

107.

In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group requests

the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in follow-up

to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including:

(a)

Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to

Mr. Benabderrahmane;

(b)

Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of

Mr. Benabderrahmane and, if so, the outcome of the investigation;

(c)

Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made to

harmonize the laws and practices of Qatar with its international obligations in line with the

present opinion;

(d)

Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.

108.

The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may

have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and

whether further technical assistance is required, for example through a visit by the Working

Group.

109.

The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the

above-mentioned information within six months of the date of transmission of the present

opinion. However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up

to the opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action

would enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in

implementing its recommendations, as well as of any failure to take action.

110.

The Working Group recalls that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all States

to cooperate with the Working Group and has requested them to take account of its views

and, where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily

deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken.22

[Adopted on 8 April 2025]

22 Human Rights Council resolution 51/8, paras. 6 and 9.