Opinion; Subjects: IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF), ARBITRARY DETENTION; [WGAD: UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung, willkürliche Haft; Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire; Gruppo di lavoro sulla detenzione arbitraria]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.25-07104 (E) 270625 300625
Human Rights Council
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention at its 102nd session, 1–10 April 2025
Opinion No. 27/2025 concerning Shahab Dalili (Islamic Republic of
Iran)
1.
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of
the Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution 1997/50, the Commission extended and
clarified the mandate of the Working Group. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251
and Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the
Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a
three-year period in its resolution 51/8.
2.
In accordance with its methods of work,1 on 29 October 2024 the Working Group
transmitted to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran a communication concerning
Shahab Dalili. The Government has not replied to the communication. The State is a party to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
3.
The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases:
(a)
When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the
deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or her
sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);
(b)
When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or
freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and, insofar as States Parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25,
26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);
(c)
When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to
the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the
relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity as to
give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);
(d)
When asylum-seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged
administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy
(category IV);
(e)
When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on
the grounds of discrimination, based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,
religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability
or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings
(category V).
1 A/HRC/36/38.
United Nations
A/HRC/WGAD/2025/27
General Assembly
Distr.: General
30 June 2025
Original: English
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1.
Submissions
(a)
Communication from the source
4.
Shahab Dalili, born on 24 April 1962, is a legal permanent resident of the
United States of America and has a permanent residence in the State of Virginia. Mr. Dalili
is associated with the maritime and shipping profession and has been held in detention in the
Islamic Republic of Iran since April 2016.
(i)
Arrest, detention and sentencing
5.
Mr. Dalili, a retired Iranian ship captain who emigrated to the United States in 2014
with his family, was arrested in Tehran while attending his father’s funeral in April 2016.
6.
On 11 April 2016, as Mr. Dalili was on his way to the airport in a taxi to return to the
United States, his journey was abruptly halted. It is understood that sport-utility vehicles
belonging to the Ministry of Intelligence intercepted the vehicle in which Mr. Dalili was
travelling and he was taken into custody without any explanation or the presentation of a
warrant for his arrest.
7.
For several days, Mr. Dalili’s family did not know of his whereabouts or the reason
for his detention. Eventually, it became known that he was being held in Evin Prison in
Tehran. It is unclear when Mr. Dalili was first presented before a judge and there are no
records to confirm whether a lawyer was present during that initial hearing.
8.
Mr. Dalili was accused of aiding and abetting a hostile foreign nation, although the
exact date of the start of legal proceedings, their duration and his sentencing remain unknown.
Repeated requests by Mr. Dalili for a copy of the charge sheet have been denied by the
authorities.
9.
Mr. Dalili had a lawyer at one point but the opportunity to confidentially prepare his
defence was limited. His first lawyer has died and, at one point, the source suggests, he might
have been jailed. The source argues that, even if Mr. Dalili could have presented a robust
defence, his case was presided over by a judge known for his harsh rulings in politically
sensitive cases.
10.
After a trial marked by such deficiencies, Mr. Dalili was sentenced to 10 years in
prison. He was allowed to appeal the sentence but the appeal failed. Mr. Dalili’s lawyers have
tried unsuccessfully to appeal on several occasions.
11.
During his detention, Mr. Dalili has been subjected to mistreatment and psychological
torture, often referred to as “white torture”. The source submits that one specific incident
occurred during an interrogation in which he was placed in a dark room and threatened by an
interrogator, who falsely claimed that his wife had been arrested. The interrogator demanded
that Mr. Dalili sign a confession, warning him that his failure to do so would result in his
spouse being charged and subjected to severe harm. The source submits that there were also
other, similar incidents of mistreatment.
12.
The source further notes that the prolonged detention and poor living conditions have
taken a toll on Mr. Dalili’s health. At 62 years of age, he has spent over eight years in Evin
Prison, enduring infestations of bedbugs, poor food, isolation, implied and explicit threats
and uncertainty. He has been granted sporadic furloughs, ostensibly for good behaviour,
every one or two years, typically lasting one to two days, but they have offered little reprieve.
13.
Most recently, Mr. Dalili was denied another request for conditional release,
reportedly because his case involved national security and he was therefore not eligible for
conditional release. Mr. Dalili remains in Evin Prison.
(ii)
Legal analysis
14.
It is argued that Mr. Dalili’s detention violates multiple obligations of the Islamic
Republic of Iran under international human rights law, including article 9 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, articles 9, 10 and 14 of the Covenant and principle 16 of the
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
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Imprisonment. His arrest and detention are therefore arbitrary and fall under categories I, II,
III and V of the Working Group.
a.
Category I
15.
With reference to category I, the source submits that there is no legal justification for
Mr. Dalili’s detention. On 11 April 2016, Mr. Dalili was abruptly detained by the authorities
while traveling in a taxi to Tehran airport. He was taken into custody without any explanation.
16.
The authorities did not provide any reason for Mr. Dalili’s detention at the time of his
arrest and, for several days following his arrest, his family did not know where he was being
held or why he had been apprehended. It is submitted that that manner of arrest violated
article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
17.
The source further submits that the failure to inform Mr. Dalili of the reasons for his
arrest further breached article 9 (2) of the Covenant, which requires that arrested persons be
promptly informed of any charges against them.
18.
The source argues that the refusal by the authorities to provide any information during
the arrest of Mr. Dalili indicates the lack of a legitimate legal basis for his detention.
Furthermore, the right to a fair trial was denied, supporting the argument that his detention is
arbitrary under category I. It is unclear when Mr. Dalili was first presented before a judge
and there is no evidence that a lawyer was present during the initial hearing.
19.
The source also recalls that Mr. Dalili was allegedly accused of aiding and abetting a
hostile foreign nation and notes that that was a vague and politically charged allegation,
lacking specificity and credible evidence. It is argued that it violated article 14 (3) (a) of the
Covenant, which provides that accused persons must be promptly informed of the nature and
cause of the charges against them. The authorities’ failure to provide specific charges against
Mr. Dalili and access to the evidence further obstructed his ability to challenge his detention
or prepare a defence, rendering the detention arbitrary and unjustified under international
standards.
20.
The source further notes that article 190 of the Criminal Code of Procedure stipulates
that defendants and their lawyers must be granted access to all evidence and documents used
against them, ensuring they have an opportunity to prepare an adequate defence. That
provision is a cornerstone of the right to a fair trial, which requires that the accused be
informed of the charges and the evidence in a timely and transparent manner.
21.
In addition, the source notes that Mr. Dalili was held incommunicado for several days,
without access to his family or a lawyer, further exemplifying the lack of a legal basis for his
detention. He was eventually taken to Evin Prison, a facility that the source submits is
notorious for holding political prisoners and is known for its harsh conditions. The lack of
immediate access to legal representation and the denial of communication with his family
and his lawyer violated article 14 (3) (b) of the Covenant, which guarantees the right to
adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence, including access to legal counsel.
22.
Although Mr. Dalili eventually secured a lawyer, his legal counsel was repeatedly
denied full access to the charging documents, despite numerous requests to obtain them,
further violating Mr. Dalili’s right to a fair trial and demonstrating that his detention lacked
a legal basis.
23.
Furthermore, it is submitted that, given safety concerns, his lawyers could not
collaborate with other lawyers, human rights groups and other stakeholders. The source
submits that that is not a unique situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran and that there have
been similar patterns with prior cases in the country.
24.
The arbitrary nature of Mr. Dalili’s detention is further underscored by the conditions
of his detention and the mistreatment that he has endured. During his interrogation, he was
subjected to psychological torture. On one occasion, he was placed in a dark room where an
interrogator threatened him by falsely claiming that his spouse had been arrested.
25.
It is submitted that the interrogator demanded that Mr. Dalili sign a confession under
the threat that, otherwise, his spouse would be charged and subjected to extreme harm.
According to the source, the use of such tactics to coerce a confession further demonstrated
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the lack of legitimate grounds for his detention and violated article 7 of the Covenant, which
prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
26.
Moreover, Mr. Dalili’s sentencing process lacked transparency and fairness. After a
trial marked by severe procedural deficiencies, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison.
Although he was allowed to appeal, his appeal was unsuccessful and there is no evidence that
the appeal process was fair or met international standards for due process.
27.
The source submits that the refusal of the authorities to ensure a transparent legal
process or meaningful review mechanisms underscores the fact that Mr. Dalili’s detention is
not based on any substantive legal grounds.
28.
The source further submits that the conditions of Mr. Dalili’s detention are further
evidence of its arbitrary nature. He has been held in Evin Prison for over eight years under
harsh and inhumane conditions, including inadequate living facilities and prolonged periods
of solitary confinement. The source argues that those conditions, along with the denial of a
fair legal process, suggest that Mr. Dalili’s detention is not based on legitimate legal reasons
but is, instead, part of a broader pattern of politically motivated detentions.
29.
The source submits that the above elements demonstrate that Mr. Dalili’s detention
lacks a legal basis and therefore falls within category I. His detention violates multiple
international human rights norms, including those established under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant, and fails to meet the requirements for lawful
detention under national and international law.
b.
Category II
30.
Regarding category II, the source submits that Mr. Dalili’s detention resulted from his
exercise of his fundamental rights and freedoms, including his rights to freedom of
movement, association and perceived expression.
31.
The source submits that Mr. Dalili’s detention violates his right to freedom of
movement, as protected under article 12 of the Covenant, which provides that everyone has
the right to liberty of movement and the freedom to leave any country, including their own.
As a legal permanent resident of the United States, Mr. Dalili was exercising his fundamental
right to freedom of movement when he was detained by the authorities on 11 April 2016
while attempting to return to that country after attending his father’s funeral.
32.
The source submits that Mr. Dalili’s arrest occurred in a taxi while he was on his way
to the airport, after his vehicle was intercepted by black government sport-utility vehicles
belonging to the Ministry of Intelligence. He was taken into custody without any explanation
and his family was unaware of his whereabouts for several days. His detention effectively
restricts his right to leave the Islamic Republic of Iran and return to his country of residence,
violating his right to freedom of movement.
33.
In addition, the vague charges against Mr. Dalili of aiding and abetting a hostile
foreign nation suggest an attempt to punish him for his professional association with the
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and his status as a legal permanent resident of the
United States.
34.
Furthermore, the source submits that the Islamic Republic of Iran has a documented
history of targeting individuals with connections to foreign Governments or international
organizations, viewing those ties as a threat to national security.
35.
In that context, the source submits that Mr. Dalili’s detention appears to have resulted
from his perceived exercise of his right to freedom of association. His former employment
with the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, a State-run enterprise subjected to
international scrutiny and sanctions, likely contributed to his arrest. That fits within category
II, under which detention is arbitrary when it results from the exercising of rights guaranteed
by international instruments, such as freedom of association as protected under article 22 of
the Covenant.
36.
Furthermore, the source submits that Mr. Dalili’s detention may be seen as a
retaliatory action by the Iranian authorities based on his perceived disloyalty or dissent
against the Government. His residency status in the United States, his attempt to leave the
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Islamic Republic of Iran and his past employment with the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping
Lines could have been construed as acts of defiance or opposition to State interests,
particularly given the shipping line’s ties to the country’s strategic sectors and its subjection
to international sanctions.
37.
The source submits that Mr. Dalili’s detention therefore reflects an attempt by the
authorities to punish or silence his perceived dissent by limiting his freedom of movement
and association. Such use of detention to suppress or retaliate against the exercise of
fundamental rights falls within category II, as it involves the deprivation of liberty for
exercising rights protected under international law.
38.
The source further states that the case fits within a broader pattern of detention
practices by the Iranian authorities aimed at restricting freedom of expression, association
and movement. The Government has reportedly systematically detained individuals
connected to foreign entities or State-run enterprises or those perceived to raise politically
sensitive issues as part of its strategy to suppress dissent or control information. It is
submitted that Mr. Dalili’s detention is consistent with that pattern, as he was targeted on the
basis of his foreign ties and past professional affiliation with a State-run enterprise connected
to the country’s sensitive strategic sectors.
39.
The source notes that the Working Group has previously found that such detentions
are often motivated by an intent to punish or prevent the exercise of fundamental freedoms,
further justifying the application of category II to the present case.
40.
The source submits that Mr. Dalili’s detention resulted from his exercise of
fundamental rights, including freedom of movement and association. His arrest while he was
attempting to leave the Islamic Republic of Iran legally, his United States residency status
and his prior employment with the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines indicate that his
detention is not based on legitimate legal grounds but is instead an attempt by the authorities
to retaliate against or restrict his exercise of fundamental freedoms. It is also aimed at sending
a message to other similarly situated individuals who work or have worked in strategic sectors
of the Iranian economy.
c.
Category III
41.
Regarding category III, the source argues that Mr. Dalili’s detention is arbitrary
because his right to a fair trial as guaranteed by international law was denied.
42.
The source submits that, since 11 April 2016, when was arrested, Mr. Dalili has been
denied access to legal counsel and to due process. His detention began under conditions that
were inherently unfair and violated fundamental rights. After his arrest, Mr. Dalili was not
informed of the charges against him and his family did not know of his whereabouts for
several days. That secrecy and lack of transparency violated article 14 (3) (b) of the Covenant,
which guarantees the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence, including
access to legal counsel.
43.
Although Mr. Dalili eventually secured a lawyer, his legal team was denied access to
the charging documents, which made it impossible to prepare an effective defence. That
denial of access violated his right to legal representation.
44.
Furthermore, the absence of information about when Mr. Dalili was first presented
before a judge and whether he had access to a lawyer at that hearing indicates a significant
breach of his rights. Article 14 (3) (a) of the Covenant provides that the accused be informed
promptly of the nature and cause of the charges against them and, yet, according to the source,
that provision was not adhered to in Mr. Dalili’s case. The failure of the authorities to provide
that information impeded Mr. Dalili’s ability to challenge the legality of his detention and
violated his right to due process.
45.
Mr. Dalili’s counsel has been attempting to secure a conditional release for Mr. Dalili
based on good behaviour. The request has reportedly been repeatedly rejected, however, by
the Public Prosecutor of Tehran, who, according to the source, is known for his disregard for
human rights.
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46.
Mr. Dalili was previously represented by a lawyer who died in September 2023.
During his time representing Mr. Dalili, the lawyer reportedly faced threats and intimidation
due to his criticism of the authorities.
47.
The source submits that lawyers in the Islamic Republic of Iran are not allowed to
practise without fear and face constant pressure and the threat of retaliation for defending
clients in politically sensitive cases. It is recalled that, in prior decisions, the Working Group
has noted that lawyers in the Islamic Republic of Iran who represent clients in such cases
frequently face harassment, intimidation and threats from the authorities. The source submits
that lawyers’ fear of retaliation for taking on politically sensitive cases further demonstrates
a denial of the right to a fair trial and supports the argument that Mr. Dalili’s detention is
arbitrary.
48.
According to the source, the trial process in Mr. Dalili’s case was neither transparent
nor fair. There is no evidence that his trial was conducted in public or that he was allowed to
present a defence effectively. The process appears to have been carried out behind closed
doors, in violation of article 14 (1) of the Covenant, which guarantees the right to a fair public
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal.
49.
Article 165 of the Constitution and article 352 of the Criminal Code of Procedure of
the Islamic Republic of Iran clearly state that trials should generally be held in public and
defendants should be present to hear and challenge the evidence against them.
50.
It is further argued that the lack of an impartial tribunal further violated Mr. Dalili’s
rights, making his detention arbitrary. The source submits that a particular concern in that
matter is the fact that the judge who presided over Mr. Dalili’s case is widely known for his
harsh rulings in politically sensitive cases and for disregarding the principles of justice and
fairness. The source notes that the judge has been sanctioned by both the United States and
the European Union for his alleged role in human rights abuses. His rulings reportedly often
feature severe punishments, including long prison terms, lashings and executions, often in
trials marked by a lack of due process.
51.
The source submits that the judicial proceedings in the present case appear to have
been influenced by political considerations rather than grounded in law and that the
involvement of the aforementioned judge in Mr. Dalili’s case cast serious doubt on the
independence and impartiality of the tribunal, which is a core requirement under article 14
(1) of the Covenant. Moreover, the withholding of crucial information regarding the case
further suggests that the judiciary was not acting impartially or independently and instead
engaged in a politically motivated prosecution.
52.
In addition, Mr. Dalili was reportedly subjected to psychological pressure and
coercion to extract a confession. The source argues that those tactics violated article 14 (3)
(g) of the Covenant.
53.
The source submits that article 3 of the Criminal Code of Procedure underscores the
critical need for transparency and accountability in all criminal proceedings. Those principles
are essential to maintaining the credibility and fairness of the judicial process and ensuring
that justice is done and seen to be done.
54.
The source further recalls that, after his arrest in April 2016, Mr. Dalili was held in
pretrial detention for an unspecified duration without being brought promptly before a judge,
in contravention of article 9 (3) of the Covenant. The lack of information about the duration
of Mr. Dalili’s pretrial detention and the absence of a timely judicial ruling further support
the claim that he was subjected to excessive pretrial detention without adequate judicial
oversight or review. The source submits that his prolonged detention without due process is
another indication that his arrest was arbitrary under category III.
55.
Moreover, according to the source, the lack of a proper mechanism for judicial review
violated article 9 (4) of the Covenant, which entitles a detainee to take proceedings before a
court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of their detention. The source submits that
the authorities did not provide any meaningful opportunity for Mr. Dalili to challenge the
legality of his detention before an impartial court, further reinforcing the arbitrariness of his
detention.
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56.
The source further notes that, although Mr. Dalili was permitted to appeal his 10-year
sentence, in accordance with article 427 of the Criminal Code of Procedure, the appeal
process failed and there is no evidence to suggest that it was conducted fairly or under
international standards. Article 14 (5) of the Covenant guarantees the right to have a
conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. According to the source, however,
given the lack of access to legal counsel, the absence of transparent proceedings and the
continued denial of key documents, the appeal process did not allow for redress.
d.
Category V
57.
With regard to category V, the source submits that the detention of Mr. Dalili is
arbitrary because it is based on discrimination relating to the exercise of his rights or
freedoms, particularly due to his status as a legal permanent resident of the United States, his
connections to that country and his former employment with the Islamic Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines.
58.
The source recalls that the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines has been
sanctioned by several countries, including the United States and the European Union, for its
alleged involvement in transporting materials related to the nuclear and missile programmes
of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The
source submits that individuals associated with the shipping line, especially those with
connections abroad, are often perceived to possess sensitive information or to have engaged
in activities perceived as threats to national security by the Iranian authorities.
59.
The source also submits that the authorities have systematically targeted dual
nationals, foreign citizens and individuals like Mr. Dalili, who have ties to strategic sectors
or foreign States, using false charges to imprison them. The source submits that that practice
is aimed at leveraging the detention of such individuals to extract concessions from foreign
Governments. According to the source, Mr. Dalili was arrested in a manner that clearly
showed discriminatory intent. The vague allegation of aiding and abetting a hostile foreign
nation was framed explicitly to implicate his ties to the United States, effectively making his
connection to a foreign country the primary basis for his detention.
60.
The source notes that the discriminatory intent behind Mr. Dalili’s detention is further
evidenced by the lack of a legal basis for his arrest and the subsequent proceedings.
Mr. Dalili’s arrest, conducted without explanation and characterized by secrecy and a lack of
access to legal representation, suggests that his detention was driven by discriminatory
motives.
(b)
Response from the Government
61.
On 29 October 2024, the Working Group transmitted the allegations from the source
to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran under its regular communications
procedure. The Working Group requested the Government to provide it, by 30 December
2024, with detailed information about Mr. Dalili and to clarify the legal provisions justifying
his detention and its compatibility with the obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran under
international human rights law and, in particular, with regard to the treaties ratified by the
State.
62.
The Government requested an extension in accordance with paragraph 16 of the
Working Group’s methods of work, which was granted, with a new deadline of 30 January
2025. The Working Group regrets that, despite the extension, it has received no reply from
the Government.
2.
Discussion
63.
In the absence of a response from the Government, the Working Group has decided
to render the present opinion, in conformity with paragraph 15 of its methods of work.
64.
In determining whether the detention of Mr. Dalili is arbitrary, the Working Group
has regard to the principles established in its jurisprudence to deal with evidentiary issues. If
the source has established a prima facie case for breach of international law constituting
arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be understood to rest upon the Government if
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it wishes to refute the allegations. In the present case, the Government has chosen not to
challenge the prima facie credible allegations made by the source.
65.
The source has argued that the detention of Mr. Dalili is arbitrary and falls within
categories I, II, III and V. The Working Group shall proceed to examine those in turn.
(a)
Category I
66.
The Working Group finds that the source has provided credible information, which
has not been rebutted by the Government, that Mr. Dalili was arrested on 11 April 2016
without an arrest warrant. According to the source, vehicles belonging to the Ministry of
Intelligence intercepted the taxi in which Mr. Dalili was travelling to the airport and he was
taken into custody without any explanation, told only that he had been detained for being a
threat to national security.
67.
The Working Group recalls its well-established jurisprudence that article 9 (2) of the
Covenant provides that anyone who is arrested be informed, at the time of arrest, of the
reasons for the arrest and be promptly informed of any charges 2 and that, thus, for a
deprivation of liberty to have a legal basis, it is not sufficient that there is a law that may
authorize the arrest. The authorities must invoke that legal basis and apply it to the
circumstances of the case. This is typically done through an arrest warrant or arrest order (or
equivalent document).3 The right to be presented with an arrest warrant is inherent in the right
to liberty and security of person and in the prohibition of arbitrary detention under articles 3
and 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and principles 2, 4 and 10 of the Body
of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment.4
68.
The Working Group further notes the uncontested submissions by the source that
Mr. Dalili was held at an unknown location and prevented from having any contact with the
outside world during his first several days in detention. He was further held incommunicado
for several days and the authorities refused to provide any information as to his whereabouts.
That amounted to enforced disappearance, in breach of article 9 (1) of the Covenant. Enforced
disappearance is prohibited by international law and constitutes a particularly aggravated
form of arbitrary detention.5 The failure to allow Mr. Dalili to notify his family of his
whereabouts and the authorities’ failure to inform his family of his whereabouts were
violations of principle 19 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under
Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.
69.
The source has submitted, and it follows from the uncontested claim of enforced
disappearance, that Mr. Dalili was not brought promptly before a judge, in violation of article
9 (3) of the Covenant. The Working Group has consistently held, in line with the Human
Rights Committee, that 48 hours is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy the requirement of bringing
a detainee promptly before a judge; any longer delay must remain absolutely exceptional and
be justified under the circumstances.6 Absent any explanation from the Government, the
Working Group finds that that provision was also violated.
70.
The Working Group has also considered the source’s submissions regarding the vague
and broad nature of the charges against Mr. Dalili, who was accused of aiding and abetting a
2 See, for example, opinions No. 6/2017, No. 30/2017, No. 2/2018, No. 4/2018, No. 42/2018,
No. 43/2018, No. 79/2018 and No. 49/2019.
3 Opinions No. 88/2017, para. 27; and No. 3/2018, para. 43. See also Human Rights Committee, general
comment No. 35 (2014), paras. 23 and 27.
4 The Working Group has maintained from its early years that the practice of arresting persons without
a warrant renders their detention arbitrary. See, for example, opinions No. 1/1993, paras. 6 and 7;
No. 3/1993, paras. 6 and 7; No. 4/1993, para. 6; No. 5/1993, paras. 6, 8 and 9; No. 27/1993, para. 6;
No. 30/1993, paras. 14 and 17 (a); No. 36/1993, para. 8; No. 43/1993, para. 6; and No. 44/1993,
paras. 6 and 7. For more recent examples, see opinions No. 66/2019, para. 61; No. 6/2020, para. 40;
No. 11/2020, para. 38; No. 13/2020, para. 47; No. 14/2020, para. 50; and No. 89/2020, para. 53.
5 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 17. See also opinions No. 5/2020,
No. 6/2020, No. 11/2020, No. 13/2020, No. 77/2020, No. 25/2021, No. 38/2021, No. 20/2023 and
No. 36/2023.
6 See, for example, opinions No. 60/2020, No. 64/2020 and No. 66/2020.
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hostile foreign nation. The Working Group has raised the issue of prosecution under vague
and overly broad penal laws in the Islamic Republic of Iran on several occasions, including
the offence of aiding and abetting a hostile foreign nation and similar national security-related
charges.7 As the use of vague laws can undermine the principle of legality, the Working
Group has consistently held that the principle of legality requires that laws be formulated
with sufficient precision to enable individuals to have access to and understand the law and
regulate their conduct accordingly.8 In Mr. Dalili’s case, the Working Group considers that
he could not have foreseen that his status as a retired Iranian ship captain who had emigrated
to the United States would amount to aiding and abetting a hostile foreign nation. Thus, his
detention and prosecution under those vague provisions were incompatible with article 11
(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 9 (1) and 15 (1) of the
Covenant. Vague laws may have a deterrent effect on the exercise of fundamental freedoms,
as they have the potential for abuse, including the arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
71.
For those reasons, the Working Group considers that the deprivation of liberty of
Mr. Dalili lacks a legal basis and is thus arbitrary, falling within category I.
(b)
Category II
72.
The source submits that Mr. Dalili’s detention falls within category II, as it results
from his exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms.
73.
While the source argues that Mr. Dalili’s detention violates his right to freedom of
movement under article 12 of the Covenant, the Working Group considers that there is
insufficient basis to conclude that Mr. Dalili’s detention was related to the exercise of that
right. Although Mr. Dalili was arrested while attempting to return to the United States after
attending his father’s funeral in the Islamic Republic of Iran, he does not appear to have been
detained specifically for exercising his right to freedom of movement. That is, Mr. Dalili was
not prosecuted for any offences relating to entering or attempting to leave the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Rather, his detention appears to be related to allegations of aiding and
abetting a hostile foreign nation.
74.
Regarding the alleged violation of the right to freedom of association under article 22
of the Covenant, the source’s submissions are not sufficiently specific to establish that
Mr. Dalili was detained for exercising that right. While the source mentions Mr. Dalili’s
former employment with the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, it does not provide
specific information showing that his detention resulted directly from his association with
that organization or any other exercise of his right to freedom of association.
75.
The source has not provided any substantiation to its claim that Mr. Dalili was
engaged in the exercise of his fundamental rights and freedoms as protected under articles
19, 21, 22 or other relevant provisions of the Covenant at the time of his arrest or that his
detention was a direct result of such exercise.
76.
In the absence of more specific information demonstrating that Mr. Dalili’s detention
resulted from the exercise of his rights or freedoms as guaranteed by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant, the Working Group is unable to conclude
that his detention falls within category II.
(c)
Category III
77.
The source makes several submissions under category III. First, the Working Group
notes the source’s submission that Mr. Dalili’s right to legal representation was severely
restricted. Although Mr. Dalili had a lawyer at one point, the opportunity to confidentially
prepare his defence was limited. The source also alleges that his first lawyer died, and at one
point, might have been jailed. Those facts, not contested by the Government, have seriously
impeded Mr. Dalili’s ability to prepare an adequate defence, in violation of article 14 (3) (b)
7 Opinions No. 52/2018, para. 78; and No. 37/2023, para. 61.
8 See, for example, opinion No. 41/2017, paras. 98–101. See also Human Rights Committee, general
comment No. 35 (2014), para. 22; and opinions No. 62/2018, paras. 57–59; and No. 32/2019,
para. 31.
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of the Covenant and principles 17 (1) and 18 (2) of the Body of Principles for the Protection
of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.
78.
The Working Group has also established above that Mr. Dalili was held
incommunicado during his first days of detention. It recalls that all persons deprived of their
liberty have the right to legal assistance by counsel of their choice at any time during their
detention, including immediately after their apprehension, and that such access must be
provided without delay.9 The right to prompt legal assistance is essential to the right to a fair
trial as it serves to ensure that the principle of equality of arms is duly observed. Equally,
according to the source, the confidentiality of Mr. Dalili’s meetings with his lawyer was
limited. The Working Group reiterates that the right of a defendant to have private
discussions with their legal counsel, without surveillance, constitutes one of the fundamental
aspects of a fair trial.10 If a lawyer is unable to confer with his or her client and obtain
confidential instructions, the legal assistance is significantly undermined. In the present case,
it appears that articles 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article
14 (3) (b) and (d) of the Covenant were violated.
79.
The Working Group is further gravely concerned about the alleged lack of
independence and impartiality of the judiciary in Mr. Dalili’s case. According to the source,
Mr. Dalili’s case was presided over by a judge known for harsh rulings in politically sensitive
cases. 11 The source specifically notes that the judge has been sanctioned by both the
United States and the European Union for his alleged role in human rights abuses.
80.
The Working Group recalls that judicial impartiality must be assessed through both
subjective considerations – examining whether a judge demonstrated personal bias in a given
case – and objective considerations – determining whether the tribunal offered sufficient
guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to its impartiality. In Mr. Dalili’s case, there
are substantial objective grounds to question the judge’s impartiality, given that Mr. Dalili, a
legal permanent resident of the United States, was charged with aiding and abetting a hostile
foreign nation (understood to be the United States) and his case was adjudicated by a judge
who had been internationally sanctioned by that same nation for human rights violations.
Thus, the conspicuous conflict between the judge’s sanctioned status and the nature of the
charges against Mr. Dalili creates an appearance of bias that no objective observer could
reasonably dismiss. In the absence of information from the Government refuting those
allegations, the Working Group finds that Mr. Dalili was not tried by an independent and
impartial tribunal, contrary to article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
article 14 (1) of the Covenant.
81.
The Working Group notes with profound concern the source’s allegations regarding
Mr. Dalili’s treatment during detention. According to the source, Mr. Dalili was subjected to
a form of psychological torture often referred to as white torture. During one particularly
disturbing interrogation, he was placed in a darkened room where an interrogator falsely
claimed that his wife had been arrested, and then proceeded to threaten that she would be
charged and subjected to severe harm if Mr. Dalili refused to sign a confession. The Working
Group notes that a threat of conduct prohibited by international human rights law, when
sufficiently real and immediate, may itself constitute prohibited treatment. The psychological
impact of such threats against a detainee’s loved ones can significantly exacerbate mental
suffering and may amount to torture.
82.
In Mr. Dalili’s case, the cruel manipulation of his concern for his wife’s safety,
combined with his isolation and powerlessness, would have created intense fear and
apprehension designed to break his resistance. Such methods of interrogation, explicitly
intended to exploit familial bonds to extract confessions, strike at the core of human dignity
as protected by article 7 of the Covenant and article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. The burden was on the State to prove that any statements by the accused were given
9 A/HRC/45/16, paras. 51 and 52; and United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies
and Procedures on the Right of Anyone Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a
Court, principle 9 and guideline 8. See also Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, paras. 16–22.
10 A/HRC/54/51, para. 50.
11 Opinions No. 85/2021, paras. 86 and 87; and No. 37/2023, para. 73.
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11
of their own free will.12 In the absence of any refutation from the Government, the Working
Group finds that the use of confessions extracted through treatment as described is a breach
of article 14 (3) (g) of the Covenant and may also constitute a violation of article 15 of the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. Furthermore, principle 21 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment specifically prohibits taking undue
advantage of the situation of detention to compel confession or incriminating statements.
83.
In addition, article 14 (1) of the Covenant provides that, in the determination of any
criminal charge, everyone is entitled to a public hearing. Article 10 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights similarly guarantees the right to a public hearing. As the
Human Rights Committee has explained, the publicity of hearings ensures the transparency
of proceedings and thus provides an important safeguard for the interest of the individual and
of society at large. Although the right to a public hearing is not absolute, it may only be
restricted for reasons of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, or
when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would be
prejudicial to the interest of justice, and, in the absence of such exceptional circumstances, a
hearing must be open to the general public, including members of the media, without entrance
being limited to a particular category of persons.13 It is submitted by the source that the
authorities closed Mr. Dalili’s trial to the public and the media in violation of the above
provisions. Absent any explanation from the Government, the Working Group finds that the
hearing of Mr. Dalili’s case behind closed doors violated his rights under article 10 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 14 (1) of the Covenant.
84.
The Working Group is concerned about the conditions of Mr. Dalili’s detention.
According to the source, Mr. Dalili has spent over eight years in Evin Prison, enduring
difficult conditions, including infestations of bedbugs, poor food, isolation, implied and
explicit threats and uncertainty. Such conditions may constitute a violation of the
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson
Mandela Rules), particularly rules 1, 13, 22 and 23, which require that all prisoners be treated
with dignity and provided with adequate living conditions. The prolonged detention and poor
living conditions have reportedly taken a toll on Mr. Dalili’s health, further undermining his
ability to prepare his defence and participate effectively in the proceedings against him.
85.
Based on the foregoing, the Working Group concludes that the non-observance of the
international norms relating to the right to a fair trial in Mr. Dalili’s case was of such gravity
as to give his deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character, falling within category III.
(d)
Category V
86.
The source further submits that the detention of Mr. Dalili falls within category V, as
it is based on discrimination concerning his status as a legal permanent resident of the
United States, his connections to that country and his former employment with the Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines.
87.
The Working Group notes that, in its earlier jurisprudence, it identified a practice in
the Islamic Republic of Iran of arbitrarily detaining persons who were foreign nationals, dual
nationals and Iranian nationals with permanent residence in another country.14 The present
case is consistent with that pattern.
88.
The source argues that, for years, the authorities have systematically targeted dual
nationals, foreign citizens and individuals who, like Mr. Dalili, have ties to strategic sectors
or foreign States, using trumped-up charges. That practice is allegedly aimed at leveraging
the detention of such individuals to extract concessions from foreign Governments.
89.
The Working Group observes that the vague charge against Mr. Dalili of aiding and
abetting a hostile foreign nation explicitly implicates his ties to the United States, effectively
12 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007), para. 41.
13 Ibid., paras. 28 and 29.
14 See, for example, opinions No. 28/2013, No. 28/2016, No. 50/2016, No. 92/2017, No. 27/2021 and
No. 29/2021.
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making his connection to a foreign country the primary basis for his detention. That aligns
with category V of the Working Group, which identifies detention as arbitrary when it results
from discrimination based on nationality or political opinion.
90.
Furthermore, the source submits that Mr. Dalili’s background as a former employee
of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, a State-run enterprise under international
scrutiny and sanctions, also contributed to his discriminatory detention. Individuals
associated with the shipping line, especially those with connections abroad, are reportedly
often viewed with suspicion by the authorities and targeted for arrest.
91.
In the absence of any explanation from the Government refuting those allegations, the
Working Group finds that Mr. Dalili was deprived of his liberty on discriminatory grounds
on the basis of his national or social origin as a legal permanent resident of the United States,
in violation of his rights under articles 2 and 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and articles 2 (1) and 26 of the Covenant. His deprivation of liberty is therefore arbitrary
under category V.
(e)
Concluding remarks
92.
The Working Group notes with grave concern Mr. Dalili’s prolonged detention, which
has now lasted over eight years, and the reports of his deteriorating health and the deplorable
conditions of his detention. According to article 10 (1) of the Covenant, all persons deprived
of their liberty must be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person, which includes receiving appropriate medical care.
93.
The present case is one of several brought before the Working Group in recent years
concerning arbitrary detention in the Islamic Republic of Iran.15 The Working Group is
concerned that that might indicate a widespread or systemic practice of arbitrary detention in
the country. The Working Group underlines that States have the obligation not to engage in
acts that could constitute crimes against humanity and to prevent and punish them if they are
committed.
94.
The Working Group refers the present case to the Special Rapporteur on the situation
of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
3.
Disposition
95.
In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:
The deprivation of liberty of Shahab Dalili, being in contravention of articles 2, 3, 5,
7, 9, 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 2, 7, 9, 14,
15 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is arbitrary and
falls within categories I, III and V.
96.
The Working Group requests the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to take
the steps necessary to remedy the situation of Mr. Dalili without delay and bring it into
conformity with the relevant international norms, including those set out in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
97.
The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the
case, the appropriate remedy would be to release Mr. Dalili immediately and accord him an
enforceable right to compensation and other reparations, in accordance with international
law.
98.
The Working Group urges the Government to ensure a full and independent
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of
Mr. Dalili and to take appropriate measures against those responsible for the violation of his
rights.
15 See, for example, opinions No. 18/2013, No. 28/2013, No. 52/2013, No. 55/2013, No. 16/2015,
No. 44/2015, No. 1/2016, No. 2/2016, No. 25/2016, No. 28/2016, No. 50/2016, No. 7/2017,
No. 9/2017, No. 48/2017, No. 49/2017, No. 92/2017, No. 19/2018, No. 52/2018, No. 83/2018,
No. 32/2019, No. 33/2019, No. 20/2022, No. 46/2022, No. 54/2022, No. 82/2022, No. 21/2023,
No. 37/2023 and No. 53/2024.
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99.
The Working Group requests the Government to bring its laws into conformity with
the present opinion and with its obligations under international human rights law.
100.
In accordance with paragraph 33 (a) of its methods of work, the Working Group refers
the present case to the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, for appropriate action.
101.
The Working Group requests the Government to disseminate the present opinion
through all available means and as widely as possible.
4.
Follow-up procedure
102.
In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group requests
the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in follow-up
to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including:
(a)
Whether Mr. Dalili has been released and, if so, on what date;
(b)
Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to Mr. Dalili;
(c)
Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of Mr. Dalili’s
rights and, if so, the outcome of the investigation;
(d)
Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made to
harmonize the laws and practices of the Islamic Republic of Iran with its international
obligations in line with the present opinion;
(e)
Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.
103.
The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may
have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and
whether further technical assistance is required, for example through a visit by the Working
Group.
104.
The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the
above-mentioned information within six months of the date of transmission of the present
opinion. However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up
to the opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action
would enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in
implementing its recommendations, as well as of any failure to take action.
105.
The Working Group recalls that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all States
to cooperate with the Working Group and has requested them to take account of its views
and, where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken.16
[Adopted on 7 April 2025]
16 Human Rights Council resolution 51/8, paras. 6 and 9.