Opinion; Subjects: ISRAEL, ARBITRARY DETENTION; [WGAD: UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung, willkürliche Haft; Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire; Gruppo di lavoro sulla detenzione arbitraria]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.25-07756 (E)
Human Rights Council
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention at its 102nd session, 1–10 April 2025
Opinion No. 24/2025 concerning Layan Kayed, Ahmad Maher Abdul
Raziq Kharouf and Khalida Kanaan Mohammad Jarrar (Israel)
1.
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of
the Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution 1997/50, the Commission extended and
clarified the mandate of the Working Group. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251
and Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the
Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a
three-year period in its resolution 42/22.
2.
In accordance with its methods of work,1 on 8 August 2024 the Working Group
transmitted to the Government of Israel a communication concerning Layan Kayed, Ahmad
Maher Abdul Raziq Kharouf and Khalida Kanaan Mohammad Jarrar. The Government has
not replied to the communication. The State is a party to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.
3.
The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases:
(a)
When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the
deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or her
sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);
(b)
When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or
freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and, insofar as States parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25,
26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);
(c)
When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to
the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the
relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity as to
give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);
(d)
When asylum-seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged
administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy
(category IV);
(e)
When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on
the grounds of discrimination, based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,
religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability
or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings
(category V).
1 A/HRC/36/38.
United Nations
A/HRC/WGAD/2025/24
General Assembly
Distr.: General
11 July 2025
Original: English
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1.
Submissions
(a)
Communication from the source
4.
Layan Kayed, born on 24 April 1998, is a Palestinian master’s student at Birzeit
University. She was previously the subject of a Working Group opinion, No. 8/2021, in which
the Working Group concluded that her detention was arbitrary under categories I, II, III and V.
5.
Ahmad Maher Abdul Raziq Kharouf, born on 31 August 1999, is a Palestinian student
at Birzeit University.
6.
Khalida Kanaan Mohammad Jarrar, born on 2 September 1963, is a Palestinian human
rights activist and a former member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. She was
previously the subject of opinion No. 15/2016, in which the Working Group concluded that
her deprivation of liberty was arbitrary under categories II, III, and V.
(i)
Context
7.
According to the source, the case of the three individuals exemplifies the
Government’s use of administrative detention against Palestinians to restrict the exercise of
freedom of speech and expression of political opinion. Their case exemplifies the conditions
that approximately 3,424 Palestinians have been facing in administrative detention since
7 October 2023.
(ii)
Arrest and detention of Ms. Kayed
8.
The source submits that on 7 April 2024, at 3.30 a.m., Ms. Kayed was arrested at her
home by Israel Defense Forces officers. She was pushed to the ground, stomped on the head,
handcuffed with plastic ties, beaten and searched. Subsequently, the officers blindfolded her,
violently pushed her, slammed her head against a wall and took her to a vehicle. Ms. Kayed
requested to have a female soldier with her, and in response, the officers threw another
detainee on top of her and proceeded to hit them.
9.
Reportedly, Ms. Kayed was not presented with an arrest warrant or provided with the
reasons for her arrest.
10.
Immediately thereafter, Ms. Kayed was taken to a military camp, where she was
searched. When she objected, officers reportedly hit her and insulted her. She was placed in
a small room with a mattress and told to lie down, but she refused. She was then handcuffed
and blindfolded.
11.
While still blindfolded and restrained, Ms. Kayed was examined by a doctor. An
interrogator entered and reportedly cursed at her and slapped her. Israel Defense Forces
officers also played a recording threatening Palestinians with more arrests and urging them
to “leave this land”.
12.
Subsequently, Ms. Kayed was transferred in a military vehicle to Ofer Prison for
interrogation.
13.
Thereafter, upon arrival at Hasharon Prison, Ms. Kayed and another detainee were
reportedly strip-searched in front of each other by Israel Defense Forces officers. Despite
there being six people in her cell, they were only given four mattresses and one tray of food.
14.
The next day, Ms. Kayed was strip-searched again in the bathroom of the prison cell.
15.
Ms. Kayed’s administrative detention order was issued for the period up until
6 August 2024. It was then renewed for another four months, until 5 December 2024. She is
currently being held at Damon Prison, in the same cell as Ms. Jarrar.
16.
Reportedly, Ms. Kayed was arrested under article 285 (A) of Military Order 1651 of
2009, which permits arrest on the basis of a military commander’s belief that it is necessary
for regional security or public security. She has not been charged with a criminal offence, nor
has she had family members present during her interrogations or hearings.
17.
The source reports that Ms. Kayed has been denied effective legal representation and
was interrogated without a lawyer. Moreover, the evidence against her is considered secret.
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18.
The source reports that Ms. Kayed had previously been arrested on 8 June 2020 at the
Za’tara checkpoint near Nablus and held in administrative detention.2 Additionally, she had
been arrested by the Israel Defense Forces in 2023.
(iii)
Arrest and detention of Mr. Kharouf
19.
On 9 December 2023 at 7.30 p.m., Mr. Kharouf was reportedly arrested by 10 Israel
Defense Forces officers at his home, without being shown an arrest warrant or informed of
the reasons for his arrest.
20.
During his arrest, the officers searched his house and car. About half an hour later,
they handcuffed him with plastic ties and blindfolded him using a family member’s hijab.
They threw him on the floor of a military vehicle and beat him on the head with batons.
21.
His arrest was pursuant to article 285 (A) of Military Order 1651, and on the same
day as his arrest, an administrative detention order was issued. However, he was not granted
a court hearing; instead, he was sent to prison.
22.
No reason was given for his detention, and the military judge stated only that serious
security concerns justified his detention, which would be for an initial period of six months.
23.
Mr. Kharouf was initially taken to Ofer Prison, where he was placed in an outdoor
courtyard for an hour. He was then transported for police interrogation, and was later moved
to the Gush Etzion detention facility, where he was held for two days alongside civilian
detainees.
24.
Mr. Kharouf was then transferred back to Ofer Prison, where he was held for four
days in section 24 before being moved to section 26.
25.
Reportedly, he was interrogated without a lawyer being present. He was able to
receive a visit from his lawyer on 18 January 2024, but no further visits have been allowed.
Since his arrest, he has also been denied communication with his family.
26.
Mr. Kharouf was kept in a room designed for eight detainees, though it holds nine. He
sleeps on a thin mattress on the floor without sufficient warmth or a pillow. The detainees
wear the clothes they arrived in, with only a jacket provided. They receive a small packet of
shampoo daily, and recently, half a bar of soap. Showers are allowed once every two days
for about 10 minutes. Meals are provided but are insufficient and of poor quality.
27.
On 8 June 2024, Mr. Kharouf’s detention order expired, and on 9 June 2024 his
detention was renewed for a further six months, until December 2024.
28.
The source reports that Mr. Kharouf has been denied access to effective legal
representation, and that evidence against him is considered secret.
29.
Furthermore, Mr. Kharouf has not been given access to the evidence against him and
has no meaningful opportunity to challenge his ongoing detention.
30.
Reportedly, Mr. Kharouf is currently being held in Ofer Prison.
31.
The source reports that Mr. Kharouf had previously been arrested on three occasions.
His first arrest took place in 2019, when he was detained for 44 days before being released
on 10 October 2019. He was arrested again on 6 June 2022 and was held for 10 months at
Ofer Prison, accused of affiliation with a student group potentially threatening the
Government. He was released in April 2023, resulting in a two-year delay to his university
studies.
(iv)
Arrest and detention of Ms. Jarrar
32.
According to the source, Ms. Jarrar published a report documenting alleged patterns
of arrest and detention of Palestinians and abuse against detainees following 7 October 2023.
33.
On 26 December 2023, following the publication of her report, Ms. Jarrar was arrested
at 5 a.m. during a surprise raid by masked Israel Defense Forces officers. She was
2 Opinion No. 8/2021.
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photographed, had her hands tied with zip ties and was blindfolded before being taken away
in a detention vehicle. She was not presented with an arrest warrant or informed of the reasons
for her arrest. Subsequently, she was taken by a female soldier to an unknown location, where
a military doctor examined her. The authorities allowed her to bring her medicine but
confiscated her phone before returning her to the car.
34.
Ms. Jarrar was then transferred to a military camp, where she was held in a courtyard
for approximately 15 minutes, before being taken into a room. She was then taken to Ofer
Prison. Up until that moment, Ms. Jarrar was still blindfolded.
35.
Upon arrival at Ofer Prison, a female soldier forcefully pushed Ms. Jarrar’s head down,
yelling at her to lower it. She was then led to a cell, where the soldiers pushed her inside.
36.
In the afternoon, Ms. Jarrar was interrogated for 15 minutes by a police detective, who
instructed that she be allowed to walk normally without a blindfold. While at Ofer Prison,
between 5 a.m. and 2 p.m., she received no food or water. She was later transferred to
Hasharon Prison.
37.
Upon arrival at Hasharon Prison, she was strip-searched and given a three-day supply
of medicine. Her usual blood pressure medication was replaced with an unapproved
alternative, and although her blood sugar was high, she received no diabetes treatment or
follow-up. Her medication remained in the clinic when she was moved to a cell.
38.
The conditions in Hasharon Prison are substandard. Ms. Jarrar was held in a small
2 x 2 metre cell with two other detainees. In the cell, there was an exposed toilet, with a
broken tap that caused flooding, and surveillance cameras. They received three mattresses –
one of them wet – and were given food the next morning. Later that day, they were
strip-searched and transferred to Damon Prison. On arrival, Ms. Jarrar was searched in the
clinic. The prison conditions are poor: meals are minimal, only tap water is available, the
cells are overcrowded and the detainees are given thin mattresses. The clinic provides no real
medical care, offering only water for any health issue.
39.
Ms. Jarrar appeared before the Military Court on 2 January 2024; the judge was
granted six days to issue her with an administrative detention order. However, the order was
issued on 10 January – 24 hours late – allegedly making her detention unlawful.
40.
The military judge described her as an activist and a leader of a banned organization,
claiming she had not learned from past arrests. When her lawyer pointed out that the detention
order had been issued 24 hours late, in violation of Israeli law, the judge dismissed the
concern, citing secret evidence suggesting that she posed a security threat.
41.
The military judge justified Ms. Jarrar’s six-month detention citing the serious
security situation. Her detention order, initially set to expire on 26 June 2024, was renewed
a day earlier, on 25 June 2024, extending her detention until 24 December 2024.
42.
Ms. Jarrar has not been charged with any crime, nor has she been allowed any family
presence during interrogations or hearings. She has also been denied effective legal
representation, with the evidence against her kept secret and inaccessible. Since her arrest,
she has been denied communication with her family and was interrogated without legal
counsel.
43.
Ms. Jarrar had previously been arrested in 1993 after attending an International
Women’s Day march. In 1998, she was banned from leaving the Occupied Palestinian
Territory after attending a human rights defenders’ summit abroad. That ban was lifted in
2010 due to medical treatment needs. In August 2014, the Israel Defense Forces issued an
expulsion order, requiring her to move from Ramallah to Jericho under restricted conditions
for six months.
44.
Ms. Jarrar was arrested on 2 April 2015, charged with incitement and membership in
an illegal organization due to her role in the Palestinian Legislative Council, her political
leadership and her advocacy for prisoners. The Working Group concluded that that detention
was arbitrary.3
3 Opinion No. 15/2016.
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45.
She was arrested again on 2 July 2017 by the Israel Defense Forces, with her personal
belongings confiscated. She was interrogated at Ofer Prison and held in administrative
detention at Damon Prison for 19 months, before being released on 28 February 2019.
Furthermore, on 31 October 2019 she was arrested again and was accused of holding a
position in a terrorist organization due to her political activism. She was transferred between
Ofer Prison, Hasharon Prison, the Mascobiyah interrogation centre and Damon Prison. She
was held in administrative detention for 24 months and released on 26 September 2021.
46.
Ms. Jarrar is currently being held at Damon Prison alongside Ms. Kayed.
(v)
Legal analysis
47.
The source argues that the arrest and detention of Ms. Kayed, Mr. Kharouf and
Ms. Jarrar are arbitrary and fall under categories I, II, III and V of the Working Group.
a.
Category I
48.
The source argues that administrative detention violates the prohibition of arbitrary
detention, as the legal process under the Military Order fails to meet the fundamental due
process standards outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant.4
Recent amendments to the Military Order further extend incommunicado detention and also
limit access to legal counsel and judicial review,5 undermining due process and exacerbating
the risk of torture.
49.
The source argues that Israeli law fails to meet fundamental due process standards
under the Covenant and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For example, article 290
of Military Order 1651 permits the use of secret evidence against detainees, 6 and
article 287 (A) requires that detainees be brought before a judge within eight days 7 –
reportedly extended to 12 days since 7 October 2023. The source asserts that the Military
Order constitutes a de jure violation of article 9 (3) of the Covenant because it does not require
officials to bring civilians before a judge within 48 hours. After 7 October 2023, the Knesset
moved Israeli law farther from international standards by enacting Temporary Military Order
2148, authorizing Israeli officials to detain Palestinians for up to 12 days incommunicado.8
50.
The source argues that Ms. Jarrar, Mr. Kharouf and Ms. Kayed were not brought
promptly before a judge, in violation of article 9 (3) of the Covenant. Ms. Jarrar appeared
before a judge seven days after her arrest. Mr. Kharouf was informed that he would face
administrative detention even before a court hearing, and was only presented to a judge after
the 12-day limit specified in Temporary Military Order 2148. Ms. Kayed was first brought
before a judge nearly two weeks after her arrest. The source concludes that delays beyond
48 hours are systemic under Military Order 1651, violating article 9 (3) of the Covenant.
51.
The source contends that the three individuals were not provided with the reasons for
their arrest at the time of arrest, in violation of article 9 (2) of the Covenant.
52.
The source contends that the Israel Prison Service imposes severe restrictions on legal
visits for Ms. Kayed, Mr. Kharouf and Ms. Jarrar. Lawyers often face delays or cancellations,
or are misled about detainees’ locations, effectively placing them in incommunicado
detention. It can reportedly take one to two months for detainees to have access to legal
counsel. These practices, the source argues, violate article 9 (4) of the Covenant.
53.
The source argues that article 290 (A) of Military Order 1651 allows judges to rely on
secret evidence in administrative detention cases, without disclosing it to the detainee or their
4 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 15; and CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4,
para. 10. See opinions No. 73/2018, No. 8/2021 and No. 61/2021.
5 See communication ISR 9/2023. All communications mentioned in the present report are available
from https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/Tmsearch/TMDocuments. See also Human Rights Committee,
general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 36.
6 Military Order 1651 of 2009, sect. 290.
7 Ibid., sect. 287 (A).
8 See communication ISR 9/2023; and Israel Defense Forces, Order Regarding the Extension of
Administrative Detention Periods (No. 2148) (2023) (also known as Temporary Military Order 2148).
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lawyer if it is considered a security risk.9 This, the source contends, prevents detainees from
effectively challenging their detention and undermines their right to a fair hearing.
54.
The source contends that none of the three individuals has had prompt or consistent
access to legal counsel. Mr. Kharouf has not met his lawyer since 18 January 2024. Ms. Jarrar
was only visited twice by her lawyer, on 26 December 2023 and 27 May 2024. Ms. Kayed
had four lawyer visits (on 11 March, 7 June, 1 July and 18 July 2024). All three were also
reportedly interrogated without legal representation.
55.
Furthermore, none of them has been informed of the charges or given access to the
evidence against them, severely limiting their ability to challenge the legality of their
detention, in violation of article 9 (4) of the Covenant.
b.
Category II
56.
The source notes that the Working Group previously found Ms. Jarrar’s earlier
detention to be arbitrary due to a violation of her freedom of expression. 10 Similarly,
Ms. Kayed’s prior detention was also found to be arbitrary, partly because of her activities
with a student group at Birzeit University.11
57.
The source argues that Ms. Jarrar’s fourth arrest, occurring shortly after she published
a report on alleged Israeli abuses, reflects a pattern of targeting her for her activism and role
as a former member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. It notes that Council members are
frequently arrested, and that a military judge’s remark – that she had “not learned” from past
arrests – indicates that her detention serves as punishment for exercising her rights to freedom
of expression, opinion and association.
58.
The source contends that Israeli authorities have repeatedly targeted Birzeit
University and its students through raids and arrests. It recalls that the Working Group
previously found violations of the right to freedom of association in similar cases, including
that of Ms. Kayed.12 Her repeated detentions, the source suggests, are likely connected to her
student activism, with the cited security threat possibly referring to her involvement in
university activities.
59.
Reportedly, Mr. Kharouf, also a student at Birzeit University, has previously been
arrested and accused of threatening the Government of Israel due to his involvement with
student groups. Thus, his arrest and detention are likely linked to student activities at Birzeit
University.
c.
Category III
60.
The source recalls that the right to a fair trial is enshrined in article 11 (1) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant.
61.
The source concludes that the authorities’ failure to notify the three individuals of the
reasons for their arrest and to promptly review their detention indicates arbitrary detention
under category III, in violation of articles 9 (2) and 14 (3) (a) of the Covenant.
62.
The source recalls that the Working Group has previously found that the Military
Order permits the misuse of secret evidence, which neither the detainee nor their legal
representative can access. It is argued that this practice violates the right to a fair trial under
the Covenant.13 Furthermore, depriving detainees and their counsel of access to the case file
undermines the right to be tried by an impartial tribunal.14 The Human Rights Committee has
also recommended that Israel cease using secret evidence in administrative detention
proceedings.
9 Military Order 1651, sect. 290 (C).
10 Opinion No. 15/2016, para. 30.
11 Opinion No. 8/2021, paras. 63–65.
12 Ibid., para. 64.
13 Opinion No. 13/2023, para. 70.
14 Opinion No. 83/2017, para. 81.
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63.
The Military Court classified the evidence concerning the three individuals as secret,
preventing them and their lawyers from challenging the grounds for their detention, in
violation of their right to fair trial under article 14 (3) (b) of the Covenant.15
64.
The source asserts that since 7 October 2023, the Israeli authorities have denied
effective legal representation to the three individuals. The Israel Prison Service has reportedly
prohibited the detainees from contacting their lawyers and has held them incommunicado.
This has limited their access to family, legal counsel and medical assistance. Furthermore,
lawyers have frequently been uninformed about the detainees’ transfers between facilities,
hindering their ability to challenge the legality of their detention.
65.
Furthermore, since 7 October 2023, all detention review hearings concerning the three
individuals have been held via live video, with the detainees attending remotely. Reportedly,
interpreters were provided, though their translations were often incomplete and inaccurate,
necessitating the assistance of lawyers fluent in Hebrew.
66.
The source notes that the Working Group has consistently held that the military courts
of Israel are not independent or impartial tribunals, and that civilians should never be tried in
these courts.16
67.
The source argues that administrative detention, authorized by the Military Order and
adjudicated by military courts, reflects a systemic practice, despite the call for it only to be
used on an exceptional basis.17 Although the three individuals are civilians, their cases have
been overseen by military judges, rendering their detention arbitrary. Moreover, the
authorities have failed to ensure their proceedings were conducted without delay.
68.
Despite hearing allegations and observing signs of torture, the Israeli military judges
have failed to take measures to protect the detainees. Moreover, the Israel Prison Service’s
denial of medical care violates the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules).18
69.
The source argues that the Israel Prison Service has subjected all three individuals to
poor conditions in Ofer and Damon Prisons. For example, Ms. Jarrar was denied proper
access to her blood pressure medication, further highlighting the arbitrariness of their
detention.
d.
Category V
70.
The source claims that the increased use of administrative detention since 7 October
2023 reflects a discriminatory policy by the Government of Israel, targeting Palestinians on
the basis of their national origin and perceived political views.
71.
The source recalls that the Working Group has highlighted the existence of two
separate and unequal legal systems in Israel, in violation of category V. Palestinians in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory are tried in military courts, while Jewish Israelis in the West
Bank are subject to civilian courts.19 In the present case, all three detainees are Palestinians
holding Palestinian Authority identification cards.
72.
Furthermore, the source asserts that the three individuals have been deprived of their
liberty on a discriminatory basis due to their political opinion or perceived political opinion.
73.
Ms. Jarrar has been repeatedly arrested because of her political roles and human rights
activism. In 2015, the Military Court charged her with incitement and membership in an
illegal organization on the basis of her role in the Palestinian Legislative Council and her
advocacy for prisoners. Moreover, the temporal proximity between the publication of her
recent report and her arrest strongly suggests that she was detained for her activism and
political opinion.
15 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007), paras. 33 and 40.
16 Opinions No. 31/2017, para. 27; and No. 13/2023, paras. 71 and 72.
17 A/HRC/53/59, para. 6.
18 Opinion No. 60/2021, para. 61.
19 Opinion No. 61/2021, para. 53.
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74.
The source argues that the three individuals, in common with many other Palestinian
detainees, have been subjected to discrimination on the basis of “other status”,20 as former
detainees. Since 7 October 2023, the Israel Defense Forces have reportedly rearrested
individuals with prior arrests, particularly Palestinian rights activists. The rearrest of
Ms. Kayed, Mr. Kharouf and Ms. Jarrar demonstrates a clear pattern by Israeli authorities,
rendering their detention arbitrary under category V.
(b)
Response from the Government
75.
In accordance with its methods of work, on 8 August 2024 the Working Group
transmitted the allegations from the source to the Government under its regular
communications procedure, requesting a reply by 7 October 2024.
76.
The Working Group regrets that the Government did not submit any reply, nor did it
seek an extension in accordance with paragraph 16 of Working Group’s methods of work.
The Working Group notes that it has not received a reply from the Government in response
to its communications since 2017,21 and invites the Government to engage with the Working
Group constructively by taking the opportunity to respond to communications.
2.
Discussion
77.
In determining whether the detention of Ms. Kayed, Mr. Kharouf and Ms. Jarrar is
arbitrary, the Working Group has regard to the principles established in its jurisprudence to
deal with evidentiary issues. If the source has established a prima facie case for breach of
international law constituting arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be understood
to rest upon the Government if it wishes to refute the allegations.
78.
In the present case, the Government has chosen not to challenge the prima facie
credible allegations made by the source. In the absence of a response from the Government,
the Working Group has decided to render the present opinion, in conformity with
paragraph 15 of its methods of work.
79.
By way of preliminary observation, the Working Group notes that two of the three
individuals, Ms. Kayed and Ms. Jarrar, were previously the subjects of separate opinions
from the Working Group for very similar treatment by the State. It further notes that these
two individuals – Ms. Kayed and Ms. Jarrar – have been released. In the case of Ms. Kayed,
the Israeli authorities renewed her administrative detention order for an additional six months,
and she was subsequently released on 5 December 2024 – the final day of the extended order.
Despite her release, Ms. Kayed reportedly remains at constant risk of rearrest, and therefore
her movements have been severely restricted to avoid any potential redetention. In the case
of Ms. Jarrar, on 24 December 2024 the Israeli authorities renewed her administrative
detention order for six months, and she was released on 19 January 2025 as part of the first
phase of a prisoner exchange deal. However, her release has reportedly been marked by
threats of rearrest.
80.
In accordance with its methods of work, the Working Group reserves the right to
render an opinion, on a case-by-case basis, on whether or not the deprivation of liberty was
arbitrary, notwithstanding the release of two of the persons concerned.22 In the present case,
the Working Group is of the view that the allegations made by the source are extremely
serious. Therefore, it will proceed to deliver the opinion.
81.
The source has argued that the three individuals’ detention is arbitrary and falls under
categories I, II, III and V. The Working Group will proceed to consider these in turn.
20 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 20 (2009), para. 27.
21 Opinions No. 31/2017, No. 44/2017, No. 86/2017, No. 34/2018, No. 73/2018, No. 84/2019,
No. 12/2020, No. 8/2021, No. 60/2021, No. 61/2021, No. 4/2022, No. 44/2022, No. 68/2022,
No. 13/2023, No. 60/2023, No. 44/2024 and No. 65/2024.
22 A/HRC/36/38, para. 17 (a).
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(a)
Category I
82.
The source has submitted, and the Government has not refuted, that when the Israel
Defense Forces arrested and subsequently detained Ms. Kayed, Mr. Kharouf and Ms. Jarrar,
they did not have any legal basis to do so, because the authorities did not present any arrest
warrant and did not promptly inform them of the reasons for their arrests or the charges
against them. Their detention was based on administrative detention orders, but no charge
sheet or oral communication of a charge was provided. They were administratively detained
because there were “reasons to do with regional security or public security”. This has not
been rebutted by the State.
83.
The Working Group recalls that pursuant to article 9 (1) of the Covenant, no one is to
be deprived of their liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures
as are established by law. Article 9 (2) of the Covenant provides that anyone who is arrested
is to be informed, at the time of the arrest, of the reasons for their arrest and is to be promptly
informed of any charges against them.
84.
As the Working Group has previously stated, in order for a deprivation of liberty to
have a legal basis, it is not sufficient that there is a law that may authorize the arrest. The
authorities must invoke that legal basis and apply it to the circumstances of the case.23 This
is typically done through an arrest warrant or arrest order (or equivalent document).24 The
reasons for the arrest must be provided immediately upon arrest and must include not only
the general legal basis of the arrest, but also enough factual specifics to indicate the substance
of the complaint, such as the wrongful act and the identity of an alleged victim.25
85.
The Working Group refers to the source’s allegations, which are unrefuted by the
Government, that the three individuals were not presented with an arrest warrant at the time
of arrest. Taking into consideration the information available to it in the present case, the
Working Group considers that the failure to present the three individuals with arrest warrants
and to provide them with the reasons for their arrest, at the time of arrest, was in violation of
article 9 (1) and (2) of the Covenant and article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
86.
Furthermore, the Working Group takes note of the source’s uncontested allegations
that the three individuals were held in administrative detention without being informed of
any charge or accusation against them. Under article 9 (2) of the Covenant, anyone who is
arrested must be promptly informed of any charges against them. The right to be promptly
informed of charges concerns notice of criminal charges, and as the Human Rights
Committee has noted, that right applies in connection with ordinary criminal prosecutions
and in connection with military prosecutions or other special regimes directed at criminal
punishment.26 That requirement was not satisfied in the present case. The Working Group
thus finds a violation of article 9 (2) of the Covenant.
87.
The Working Group observes that the three individuals were subjected to
administrative detention on the basis of Military Orders, without charge or trial. In that regard,
the Working Group concurs with the Human Rights Committee that administrative detention
presents severe risks of arbitrary deprivation of liberty. The Committee has noted that such
detention would normally amount to arbitrary detention, as other effective measures to
address the threat, including the criminal justice system, would be available. If, under the
most exceptional circumstances, a present, direct and imperative threat is invoked to justify
the detention of persons considered to present such a threat, the burden of proof lies on the
23 Opinions No. 9/2019, para. 29; No. 46/2019, para. 51; and No. 59/2019, para. 46.
24 Opinions No. 88/2017, para. 27; No. 3/2018, para. 43; and No. 30/2018, para. 39. In cases of arrests
made in flagrante delicto, the opportunity to obtain a warrant will typically not be available.
25 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 25; opinion No. 30/2017, paras. 58
and 59; and opinion No. 85/2021, para. 69.
26 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 29; and opinion No. 44/2022,
para. 66.
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State to show that the individual poses such a threat and that it cannot be addressed by
alternative measures, and that burden increases with the length of the detention.27
88.
The source submits that Ms. Kayed, Mr. Kharouf and Ms. Jarrar were not brought
promptly before a judge. Ms. Jarrar, arrested on 26 December 2023, was only brought before
a judge seven days later, on 2 January 2024. Mr. Kharouf was brought before a judge after
the 12-day period specified in Temporary Military Order 2148, while Ms. Kayed, arrested on
7 April 2024, was first brought before a judge on 21 April 2024. The source thus argues that
the text of article 287 (A) of Military Order 1651 and the experiences of those detained
indicate that waiting more than 48 hours to bring a detainee before a judge is a common
practice and not exceptional in nature. In the absence of any arguments to the contrary from
the Government, the Working Group finds a breach of the rights of Ms. Kayed, Mr. Kharouf
and Ms. Jarrar under article 9 (3) of the Covenant.
89.
The Working Group observes that Mr. Kharouf has been in detention since his arrest,
without ever being notified of any charges against him. Moreover, Ms. Kayed and Ms. Jarrar
remained in detention for 11 months and 28 days, and seven months and 28 days, respectively,
without ever being notified of the charges. The Government did not avail itself of the
opportunity it was given to explain to the Working Group what present, direct and imperative
threat the three individuals posed at the time of their arrests and how that threat persisted
during their detentions. As the Human Rights Committee has stated, disclosure to the
detainee of at least the essence of the evidence on which the decision is taken to issue an
administrative detention order is necessary to ensure that the requirements of article 9 of the
Covenant are met.28 The Working Group thus finds that the three individuals did not have the
ability to effectively challenge the lawfulness of their detention,29 contrary to article 9 (4) of
the Covenant.
90.
Based on the unrebutted claims of the source, the Working Group observes that
immediately after 7 October 2023, the Israel Prison Service prohibited detainees from
establishing contact with their attorneys, and held the three individuals incommunicado,
without adequate access to family members, lawyers or doctors. The Working Group recalls
that holding persons incommunicado prevents prompt presentation before a judge, as
provided for in article 9 (3) of the Covenant,30 and violates the right under article 9 (4) of the
Covenant to challenge the lawfulness of the detention before a court.31 As the Human Rights
Committee has stated, the physical presence of detainees at hearings may serve the inquiry
into the lawfulness of the detention and serves as a safeguard for the right to security of
person.32
91.
Furthermore, the source alleges that neither Ms. Kayed, Mr. Kharouf or Ms. Jarrar or
their lawyers were able to challenge the detention because the military authorities denied
them access to the “secret information” relied upon by the Israeli military court for the
administrative detention order against them. This allegation stands unchallenged by the
Government. Article 9 (4) of the Covenant states that anyone who is deprived of liberty by
arrest or detention is entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may
decide without delay on the lawfulness of the detention and order the person’s release if the
detention is not lawful. The Working Group thus finds a violation of this right.
27 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 15; and opinions No. 13/2023 and
No. 60/2023.
28 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 15; and opinions No. 73/2018,
para. 49; No. 12/2020, para. 26; and No. 68/2022, para. 53.
29 The Working Group has made similar findings involving Israel when the detention was based on
evidence not available to the detainee. See opinions No. 44/2017, No. 86/2017, No. 34/2018,
No. 73/2018, No. 12/2020 and No. 68/2022.
30 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 35.
31 Opinions No. 35/2018, para. 27; No. 9/2019, para. 30; No. 44/2019, para. 54; No. 45/2019, para. 53;
and No. 25/2021, paras. 46 (b)–51.
32 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), paras. 34 and 42. See also
principles 32 (2) and 37 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form
of Detention or Imprisonment.
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92.
Judicial oversight of detention is a fundamental safeguard of personal liberty33 and is
essential in ensuring that detention has a legal basis. Given that Ms. Kayed, Mr. Kharouf and
Ms. Jarrar were unable to challenge their detention before a court, their rights to an effective
remedy under article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 2 (3) of the
Covenant were violated. They were also placed outside the protection of the law, in violation
of their right to be recognized as a person before the law under article 6 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and article 16 of the Covenant.
93.
The source also submits that Ms. Kayed, Mr. Kharouf and Ms. Jarrar were not
permitted to contact their families during their incommunicado detention. A detainee must
be allowed to communicate with and receive visits from family members, and any restrictions
and conditions with regard to such contact must be reasonable. As the Human Rights
Committee has observed, giving prompt and regular access to family members is an essential
and necessary safeguard for the prevention of torture and for protection against arbitrary
detention and infringement of personal security.34 Accordingly, in the absence of a response
from the Government justifying these restrictions, the Working Group finds that the right of
the three individuals to contact with the outside world was denied, in contravention of
rule 43 (3) and 58 (1) of the Nelson Mandela Rules35 and principles 15, 16 (1) and 19 of the
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment.
94.
The Working Group concludes that the three individuals’ arrest and subsequent
detention are arbitrary and fall under category I.
(b)
Category II
95.
The source contends that the deprivation of liberty of Ms. Kayed, Mr. Kharouf and
Ms. Jarrar is arbitrary because it results from their exercise of universally recognized human
rights, in particular the right to freedoms of opinion and expression, and association. It notes
that Israeli authorities have routinely targeted Birzeit University and its students and have
previously raided the campus and arrested its students. Ms. Kayed, a student at Birzeit
University, has been detained by the Israel Defense Forces multiple times due to her student
activities at the university. Mr. Kharouf, also a student at Birzeit University, has previously
been arrested and accused of threatening the Government of Israel due to his involvement
with student groups. Furthermore, Ms. Jarrar was reportedly arrested less than a week after
publishing a report she had authored, addressing the alleged abuse suffered by Palestinian
detainees from the Israel Defense Forces since 7 October 2023. The Government has not
contested these allegations, despite having the opportunity to do so.
96.
The Working Group notes that the freedoms of opinion and expression and of peaceful
assembly are fundamental human rights enshrined in articles 19 and 20 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant.36 Governments must
respect, protect and fulfil the right to hold and express opinions, including those that are not
in accordance with its official policy, and to think and manifest personal convictions at odds
with its official ideology, under the peremptory norms (jus cogens) of customary
international law.37
97.
In the absence of any arguments contesting the source’s prima facie credible
allegations, the Working Group considers that the three individuals’ conduct fell within the
exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression protected under article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 19 of the Covenant, and within the
33 United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right of Anyone
Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court (A/HRC/30/37), para. 3.
34 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 58; and opinion No. 84/2020,
para. 70.
35 Opinions No. 35/2018, para. 39; No. 44/2019, paras. 74 and 75; and No. 45/2019, para. 76.
36 CCPR/C/78/D/878/1999, para. 7.2.
37 Opinions No. 94/2017, para. 59; No. 88/2017, para. 32; No. 83/2017, para. 80; and No. 76/2017,
para. 62.
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exercise of their right to freedom of association enshrined in article 20 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and article 21 of the Covenant.
98.
The Working Group finds that the deprivation of liberty of Ms. Kayed, Mr. Kharouf
and Ms. Jarrar is arbitrary and falls under category II.
(c)
Category III
99.
The source argues that the three individuals’ detention is arbitrary under category III
as they have been denied the right to due process, given that they have been held in
administrative detention without any charges, evidence, time limit or legal representation.
100.
The Working Group notes that the present case is one concerning administrative
detention, which does not involve charges or a trial within the criminal justice system, and
that the fair trial guarantees in article 14 of the Covenant would not normally apply. However,
as the Human Rights Committee has stated, the nature of the sanction must be considered,
regardless of its classification under domestic law, in determining whether the fair trial
guarantees in article 14 apply in each case. Criminal charges relate in principle to acts
declared to be punishable under domestic criminal law. The notion may also extend to acts
that are criminal in nature with sanctions that, regardless of their qualification in domestic
law, must be regarded as penal because of their purpose, character or severity.38
101.
The Working Group has adopted that reasoning in its jurisprudence, noting that the
provisions of article 14 of the Covenant on the right to a fair trial are applicable where the
sanctions imposed, because of their purpose, character or severity, must be regarded as penal,
even if, under national law, the detention is qualified as administrative.39 Without such an
enquiry into the nature of the sanction imposed, States could effectively circumvent their
obligations under the Covenant simply by characterizing their detention regime as
administrative under domestic law. That is particularly significant in the context of
administrative detention orders imposed in Israel, which appear to be used as a substitute for
criminal proceedings, rather than to prevent an imminent threat, when there is insufficient
evidence to charge and prosecute an individual.40
102. In the present case, the three individuals’ detention must be regarded as penal in nature,
and the Working Group will consider whether their detention meets the requirements of
article 14 of the Covenant and other relevant provisions. The Working Group has previously
found that, in cases involving an excessive length of detention, the individual is to enjoy the
same guarantees as in criminal cases, including those under article 14 of the Covenant, even
if the detention is qualified as administrative under national law.41 The Working Group notes
that Mr. Kharouf remains in administrative detention, since his arrest on 9 December 2023,
while Ms. Kayed and Ms. Jarrar were held in administrative detention until their releases on
5 and 24 December 2024 respectively.
103.
The Working Group observes that the three individuals appeared separately before a
military court, which imposed administrative detention on them. With regard to the
jurisdiction of military courts, the Working Group has consistently stated its view that the
trial of civilians by military courts is in violation of the Covenant and customary international
law and that, under international law, military tribunals can only be competent to try military
personnel for military offences.42
104.
In the present case, the Government failed to explain, despite having the opportunity
to do so, the reasons for having the three individuals appear before a military court. In the
absence of an explanation from the Government to the contrary, the Working Group does not
consider that Israeli military courts meet the standard of an independent and impartial tribunal
38 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007), para. 15; and CCPR/C/81/D/1015/2001,
para. 9.2.
39 Opinions No. 3/2012, No. 20/2012, No. 45/2012, No. 58/2012, No. 43/2014, No. 31/2017,
No. 73/2018, No. 12/2020, No. 60/2021, No. 61/2021, No. 4/2022 and No. 68/2022.
40 A/HRC/37/42, para. 21.
41 See opinions No. 31/2017, No. 73/2018, No. 12/2020 and No. 49/2020.
42 A/HRC/27/48, paras. 66–71. See also opinions No. 44/2016, No. 30/2017, No. 28/2018, No. 32/2018,
No. 66/2019 and No. 68/2022.
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13
for the purposes of considering matters involving civilians. Moreover, it recalls that under
article 14 of the Covenant, the court must be independent and impartial. In that regard, in its
earlier jurisprudence, the Working Group has stated that the military courts of Israel that
impose such administrative detention do not satisfy that criterion.43 In the light of the source’s
unrebutted submissions, the Working Group finds that they were deprived of the right to have
their cases determined in a fair hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal,
as required under article 14 (1) of the Covenant and article 10 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
105.
The source alleged that the right of Ms. Kayed, Mr. Kharouf and Ms. Jarrar to
communicate with their legal counsel had been subjected to severe violations, observing that
they had been held incommunicado upon their arrest, and thus had had no possibility of
meeting their lawyer. The Working Group reiterates that access to counsel is a right enshrined
in article 14 (3) of the Covenant and principles 11 (2), 17 and 18 of the Body of Principles
for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment and
reinforced by article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 14 (3) (b) of
the Covenant sets out the right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of
one’s defence and to communicate with counsel of one’s own choosing.
106.
The Working Group recalls that all persons deprived of their liberty are to have the
right to legal assistance by counsel of their choice, at any time during their detention,
including immediately after their apprehension.44 The right to legal assistance is an essential
element of the right to fair trial, as it serves to ensure that the principle of equality of arms is
duly observed.45 Given the source’s unrebutted claim that they were held incommunicado
and were afforded no chance to meet with their counsel, the Working Group finds that their
right to legal assistance was violated.
107.
The source’s unrefuted submissions show that neither Ms. Kayed, Mr. Kharouf or
Ms. Jarrar or their lawyers had access to the “secret” evidence on which their administrative
detention was based. Article 14 (3) (b) of the Covenant sets out the right of persons charged
with a criminal offence to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their
defence, and article 14 (3) (e) guarantees them the right to examine, or to have examined, the
witnesses against them and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on their
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against them. Whereas some evidence may
occasionally be withheld from an accused, this should be exceptional and the reasons for this
should be conveyed to the accused and his or her defence counsel.46 These protections are
reinforced by articles 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The
Government has not explained the nature of the secret evidence against the three individuals,
nor provided any justification as to why they could not be given access to it. The Working
Group concludes that this constitutes a violation of their rights under article 14 (3) (b) and (e)
of the Covenant and articles 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
108.
The source further submits that the three individuals were denied the right to trial
without undue delay. The Working Group recalls that the reasonableness of any delay in
bringing a case to trial must be assessed in the circumstances of each case, taking into account
the complexity of the case, the conduct of the accused during the proceedings and the manner
in which the matter was dealt with by the authorities.47 It notes that that the Military Court
continues to hold Mr. Kharouf, while Ms. Jarrar and Ms. Kayed were held in detention for
11 months and 28 days, and seven months and 28 days, respectively, without any specific
reason being provided for the detention orders alleging the “serious security situation” as
43 Opinions No. 15/2016, paras. 25–27; No. 24/2016, para. 21; No. 3/2012; and No. 58/2012.
44 United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right of Anyone
Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court, principle 9 and guideline 8; Human
Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 35; A/HRC/45/16, paras. 50–55; and
A/HRC/48/55, para. 56. See also A/HRC/27/47, para. 13.
45 See opinion No. 35/2019.
46 Opinion No. 4/2022, para. 61.
47 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 37; and Human Rights Committee,
general comment No. 32 (2007), para. 35.
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justification for their deprivation of liberty. The Working Group considers that the period
during which they have been held without charge is excessive.
109.
The Working Group notes the source’s unrebutted claims that the three individuals’
conditions of detention are poor, constituting cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Noting
the severity of the allegations, the Working Group is concerned about the potential impact of
these conditions of detention on their ability to properly defend themselves.48 The Working
Group has consistently concluded that, when it is not possible for a person who is subjected
to torture or other forms of ill-treatment or punishment to prepare an adequate defence before
the judicial proceedings, this amounts to a fair trial violation.49
110.
The Working Group concludes that the non-observance of the international norms
relating to a fair trial and due process are of such gravity as to give the deprivation of liberty
of Ms. Kayed, Mr. Kharouf and Ms. Jarrar an arbitrary character, falling within category III.
(d)
Category V
111.
The source claims that the three individuals’ detention meets the definition of arbitrary
detention under category V because it is a form of discrimination on the basis of their national,
ethnic or social origin as Palestinians.50 According to the source, their detention fits a pattern
and practice by Israeli authorities of using administrative detention against Palestinians on
the basis of their Palestinian identity, to punish them, rather than to prevent an imminent
threat, and where there is not enough evidence to charge and prosecute them in the Israeli
military courts. The Government has not responded to these allegations.
112.
The Working Group has determined that detaining individuals on the basis of their
national origin is a violation of their right to equality before the law and to equal protection
of the law under article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 26 of the
Covenant.51
113.
Administrative detention on the basis of Military Order 1651 has been directed
particularly against Palestinians.52 Throughout the occupation of the West Bank by Israel,
most persons held in administrative detention have been Palestinians. In the absence of any
explanation from the Government, the Working Group takes note of the pattern that has
emerged through the number of cases that have been brought before it in the past with similar
facts,53 and notes the general manner in which the administrative detention orders in those
cases were used against Palestinians in particular, a usage also highlighted by the Human
Rights Committee54 and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.55
114.
Furthermore, the Working Group observes the source’s uncontested allegations that
the three individuals have been deprived of their liberty also due to their actual or perceived
political opinion. In the present case, the Working Group has found, under category II, that
the three individuals’ detention resulted from their legitimate exercise of freedom of
expression and association. When detention results from the active exercise of civil and
political rights, there is a strong presumption that it also constitutes a violation of
international law on the grounds of discrimination based on political or other views.
115.
According to the source, Ms. Jarrar has been repeatedly arrested because of her
political roles and human rights activism. Ms. Kayed, a Birzeit University student, has also
been detained multiple times because of her involvement in student activities. Similarly,
Mr. Kharouf’s engagement with student groups at Birzeit University has led to his arrest and
accusations of threatening the Government of Israel. In the absence of an explanation to the
contrary, the Working Group considers that the three individuals have been arrested and
48 E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.3, para. 33; and opinion No. 92/2017, para. 56.
49 Opinions No. 32/2019, para. 42; No. 59/2019, para. 69; and No. 65/2022, para. 117.
50 Opinion No. 34/2018, paras. 43 and 44.
51 Opinions No. 85/2020, para. 84; and No. 13/2023, para. 75.
52 Opinion No. 31/2017, para. 35.
53 See opinions No. 13/2016, No. 24/2016, No. 3/2017, No. 44/2017, No. 86/2017, No. 34/2018 and
No. 4/2022.
54 CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 10.
55 CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-16, para. 27.
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subsequently detained on a discriminatory basis due to their actual or perceived political
opinion.
116.
Therefore, the Working Group concludes that the three individuals’ arrest and
detention was conducted on discriminatory grounds, namely their national, ethnic and social
origin as Palestinians, as well as their political opinion. This violated articles 2 and 7 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 2 (1) and 26 of the Covenant, under
category V of the Working Group. The Working Group refers the present case to the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967.
(e)
Concluding remarks
117.
The Working Group is gravely concerned by the source’s unrebutted submissions that
the system of the Government of Israel of administrative detention of Palestinians in the West
Bank has been in effect since 1967 and that the Israel Defense Forces have arrested more
than 800,000 Palestinians through administrative detention since 1967 in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory.56 Reportedly, the majority of those detained are held in administrative
detention under Military Order 1651 of 2009; and since 7 October 2023, the Israeli Knesset
has adopted amendments to the Military Order, which allegedly further infringe the due
process and fair trial rights of detainees,57 notably by extending the amount of time that can
pass before a detainee receives judicial review of the detention order,58 and establishing
further restrictions in relation to release dates; and with regard to access to lawyers.59
118.
The Working Group expresses alarm that these amendments reflect further severe
erosion of Palestinian detainees’ due process and fair trials rights under Military Order 1651
of 2009, which reportedly was already in de jure violation of detainees’ rights prior to those
amendments.
119.
Furthermore, the present case is one of several brought before the Working Group in
recent years concerning arbitrary detention in Israel.60 The Working Group is concerned that
this may indicate a widespread or systemic practice of arbitrary detention in the country. The
Working Group underlines that States have the obligation not to engage in acts
that could constitute crimes against humanity and to prevent and punish them if they are
committed.
3.
Disposition
120.
In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:
The deprivation of liberty of Layan Kayed, Ahmad Maher Abdul Raziq Kharouf and
Khalida Kanaan Mohammad Jarrar, being in contravention of articles 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 2, 9, 14, 16,
19, 21 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is arbitrary
and falls within categories I, II, III and V.
121.
The Working Group requests the Government of Israel to take the steps necessary to
remedy the situation of Ms. Kayed, Mr. Kharouf and Ms. Jarrar without delay and bring it
into conformity with the relevant international norms, including those set out in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
122.
The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the
case, the appropriate remedy would be to release Mr. Kharouf immediately and accord him
and Ms. Kayed and Ms. Jarrar an enforceable right to compensation and other reparations, in
accordance with international law.
123.
The Working Group urges the Government to ensure a full and independent
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of
56 See A/HRC/53/59.
57 See communication ISR 9/2023.
58 Ibid.; and Temporary Military Order 2148.
59 See communication ISR 9/2023.
60 Opinions No. 65/2024, No. 44/2024, No. 60/2023, No. 13/2023, No. 68/2023, No. 44/2022,
No. 4/2022, No. 61/2021, No. 60/2021 and No. 8/2021.
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Ms. Kayed, Mr. Kharouf and Ms. Jarrar and to take appropriate measures against those
responsible for the violation of their rights.
124.
In accordance with paragraph 33 (a) of its methods of work, the Working Group refers
the present case to the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian
territories occupied since 1967, for appropriate action.
125.
The Working Group requests the Government to disseminate the present opinion
through all available means and as widely as possible.
4.
Follow-up procedure
126.
In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group requests
the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in follow-up
to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including:
(a)
Whether Mr. Kharouf has been released;
(b)
Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to Ms. Kayed,
Mr. Kharouf and Ms. Jarrar;
(c)
Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of the rights of
Ms. Kayed, Mr. Kharouf and Ms. Jarrar and, if so, the outcome of the investigation;
(d)
Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made to
harmonize the laws and practices of Israel with its international obligations in line with the
present opinion;
(e)
Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.
127.
The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may
have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and
whether further technical assistance is required, for example through a visit by the Working
Group.
128.
The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the
above-mentioned information within six months of the date of transmission of the present
opinion. However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up
to the opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action
would enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in
implementing its recommendations, as well as of any failure to take action.
129.
The Working Group recalls that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all States
to cooperate with the Working Group and has requested them to take account of its views
and, where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken.61
[Adopted on 7 April 2025]
61 Human Rights Council resolution 51/8, paras. 6 and 9.