A/HRC/WGAD/2025/2

GE.25-08047 (E) 110825 120825

Human Rights Council

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention

Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary

Detention at its 102nd session, 1–10 April 2025

Opinion No. 2/2025 concerning Bechir Akremi (Tunisia)

1.

The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of

the Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution 1997/50, the Commission extended and

clarified the mandate of the Working Group. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251

and Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the

Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a

three-year period in its resolution 51/8.

2.

In accordance with its methods of work,1 on 23 December 2024 the Working Group

transmitted to the Government of Tunisia a communication concerning Bechir Akremi. The

Government did not reply to the communication within the established time frame. The State

is a Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

3.

The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases:

(a)

When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the

deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or her

sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);

(b)

When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or

freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and, insofar as States Parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25,

26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);

(c)

When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to

the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the

relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity as to

give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);

(d)

When asylum-seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged

administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy

(category IV);

(e)

When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on

the grounds of discrimination, based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,

religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability

or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings

(category V).

1 A/HRC/36/38.

United Nations

A/HRC/WGAD/2025/2

General Assembly

Distr.: General

29 May 2025

English

Original: French

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1.

Submissions

(a)

Communication from the source

4.

Bechir Akremi, born in 1955, is a Tunisian judge. He usually resides in Ariana,

Tunisia.

5.

Mr. Akremi is said to have begun his career as a judge in 1989 and to have held a

number of important judicial posts, including investigating judge at the court of first instance

of Tunis and public prosecutor in charge of international cooperation, in which capacity he

represented Tunisia in international forums. In addition to his judicial duties, Mr. Akremi

taught law at the Higher Institute of Lawyers and at higher institutes of judges in Tunisia and

abroad.

6.

The source reports that, on 25 July 2021, the President of Tunisia, Kaïs Saïed, adopted

a series of measures that raised concerns about respect for the Constitution. Such measures

included the dismissal of the Head of Government, the suspension of all parliamentary

activities, the waiver of parliamentary immunity in violation of the Constitution and the

imposition of numerous restrictions on individual and collective freedoms.

7.

The High Council of the Judiciary, which was responsible for appointing and

disciplining judges and prosecutors, was dissolved by decree and replaced by a “provisional”

body, despite protests by judges.2 The provisional High Council of the Judiciary is made up

of members who have been directly appointed by the President, thus conferring on him de

facto judicial power.

8.

The source reports that, under a new decree-law, many judges have been arbitrarily

dismissed from their posts, without any criminal charges having been brought against them.3

The source notes that the decree-law gives the President the power to unilaterally dismiss or

suspend judges and prosecutors, on the basis of reports submitted by unidentified “competent

authorities”, on the grounds that they represent a threat to public security or the national

interest or are alleged to have committed acts compromising the reputation, independence or

proper functioning of the judiciary.4

9.

The source submits that these events led the special procedure mandate holders of the

Human Rights Council to express their deep concern regarding respect for the right to a fair

trial and the status of the judiciary in Tunisia.5

(i)

Disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Akremi

10.

The source reports that, as the senior investigating judge at the court of first instance

of Tunis,6 Mr. Akremi was responsible for investigating major crimes, including the most

significant terrorism and corruption cases in the country’s recent judicial history.

11.

For example, Mr. Akremi investigated the assassination, in 2013, of the

Secretary-General of the Democratic Patriots’ Unified Party. That incident had triggered

demonstrations and calls for the then Government to be overthrown and had also led to the

setting alight of the headquarters of the Ennahda movement, which was accused of instigating

the murder. Upon the conclusion of the investigation in 2015, the case was referred to the

investigating division of the court of appeal, which, after approving the case, sent it for trial.

However, the case has not yet been heard owing to recurrent political interference. According

to the source, members of the Tunisian executive and certain political parties close to the

President attempted to influence the course of the investigation to ensure that their political

2 Decree-Law No. 2022-11 of 12 February 2022 on the establishment of the provisional High Council

of the Judiciary.

3 Decree-Law No. 2022-35 of 1 June 2022 supplementing Decree-Law No. 2022-11 of 12 February

2022 on the establishment of the provisional High Council of the Judiciary.

4 Ibid., art. 1.

5 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Tunisia: Presidential decrees

undermine judicial independence and access to justice, says UN expert”, press release, 15 July 2022.

6 According to the source, this court is particularly important since it has exclusive domestic

jurisdiction over corruption and terrorism cases.

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and ideological opponents from the Ennahda party were charged. The source reports that

Mr. Akremi was accused of obstructing the case and was the subject of several administrative

and criminal complaints filed in 2021 by the Democratic Patriots’ Unified Party, all of which

were dismissed.

12.

Mr. Akremi also led the investigation into the terrorist attack at the Bardo National

Museum in Tunis in March 2015. In the context of that investigation, he drew attention to

the torture suffered by certain defendants during the preliminary investigation conducted by

the criminal investigation police. He denounced that torture in a report to the Ministry of the

Interior, in which he placed the blame on two police officials. According to the source, this

denunciation earned him the hostility of the security services, police unions and certain media

outlets.

13.

As part of his investigation of another case, Mr. Akremi ordered the arrest of several

members of the coastguard for gross negligence, which again drew the ire of his critics.

14.

Lastly, Mr. Akremi was tasked with investigating a number of corruption cases

involving senior government officials and judges, in the course of which he was also

subjected to pressure from the executive.

15.

In 2016, Mr. Akremi was appointed to the position of public prosecutor at the court

of first instance of Tunis and put in charge of the economic, financial and counter-terrorism

units.

16.

In August 2020, during a judicial reshuffle, the High Council of the Judiciary decided

to transfer Mr. Akremi to the Ministry of Justice against his wishes.

17.

Mr. Akremi filed an application for the annulment of that decision before the

administrative court of appeal of Tunis, which, on 31 December 2020, ruled that the transfer

should be cancelled since it constituted an abuse of power. Although this ruling was

subsequently upheld by the administrative high court, the source reports that the final ruling

was not implemented, in violation of the law, and that Mr. Akremi was not reinstated in his

position.

18.

In March 2021, the Democratic Patriots’ Unified Party once again filed criminal

complaints against Mr. Akremi, on the same grounds as in previous years. These complaints

unexpectedly gave rise to new investigations by the Inspectorate General of the Ministry of

Justice, before being dismissed again.

19.

On 13 July 2021, Mr. Akremi was taken aback to learn that the disciplinary board of

the High Council of the Judiciary had decided to suspend him from his duties as public

prosecutor following disciplinary proceedings that the source describes as being marred by

numerous irregularities. The disciplinary proceedings were triggered by a complaint lodged

by the Democratic Patriots’ Unified Party on the basis of the same allegations it had made

against Mr. Akremi in March that year.

20.

Mr. Akremi then filed an appeal before the administrative court of appeal of Tunis,

which, in a judgment dated 20 January 2022, decided to annul the decision to suspend

Mr. Akremi on the grounds that it constituted an abuse of power and that the High Council

of the Judiciary had not been competent to take up Mr. Akremi’s disciplinary case. The court

also ruled that the composition of the disciplinary board was illegal, since it included a

member who had breached confidentiality rules. 7 The court found that the decision

challenged by Mr. Akremi was devoid of any grounds in fact or in law and, as a result,

violated article 63 of Act No. 2016-34 of 28 April 2016 on the High Council of the Judiciary.

21.

The High Council of the Judiciary appealed this decision, which was again upheld by

the high administrative court in its final ruling of 2 June 2022.

22.

In anticipation of that ruling, on 1 June 2022, the President had issued a presidential

decree providing for the dismissal of Mr. Akremi and 56 other judges, thereby presenting the

judiciary with a fait accompli.8

7 Organic Act No. 2016-34 of 28 April 2016 on the High Council of the Judiciary, art. 65.

8 Presidential Decree No. 2022-516 of 1 June 2022 on the dismissal of judges.

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23.

The source reports that this decree was annulled by the appeals chamber of the

administrative court, whose decision was subsequently confirmed in June 2022 by the high

administrative court, which called for the judges to be reinstated in their posts. To date, the

Government has refused to implement this final court ruling.

(ii)

Arrest and detention

24.

The source reports that, on 12 February 2023, a number of police vehicles surrounded

Mr. Akremi’s home. Around 20 plain-clothed police officers from the counter-terrorism

brigade entered the property. The source explains that Mr. Akremi was brutally arrested

without a warrant and without being informed of the reasons for his arrest.

25.

That evening, after learning of the arrest, Mr. Akremi’s lawyers went to the court of

first instance of Tunis and then to the El Gorjani barracks to enquire about his fate but were

not given any information by the police.

26.

The following morning, his lawyers contacted the senior deputy public prosecutor at

the court of first instance of Tunis and learned that Mr. Akremi’s case file had been

transferred to the Charguia judicial counter-terrorism unit in Tunis. The lawyers made their

way to Charguia, where they learned that Mr. Akremi had been transferred to the Bouchoucha

barracks, which are the headquarters of the counter-terrorism brigade.

27.

Mr. Akremi’s lawyers subsequently went to the Bouchoucha barracks to enquire about

his situation. They were informed that Mr. Akremi was the subject of a complaint lodged

against him by the two police officials who had committed the acts of torture that he had

reported to the Ministry of the Interior in the context of the investigation into the terrorist

attack at the Bardo National Museum in 2015.

28.

Mr. Akremi’s lawyers were expecting him to be released when the time limit for

police custody expired on 17 February 2023. On that day, however, the senior deputy public

prosecutor of the Tunis judicial counter-terrorism unit informed them that, while Mr. Akremi

was not the subject of a detention order, he had been admitted to the psychiatric ward of the

Razi de La Manouba hospital in response to a medical report prepared by several

psychiatrists.

29.

While Mr. Akremi’s family was allowed to visit him in hospital, the police prohibited

his lawyers from entering the premises. That ban was subsequently confirmed by a decision

of the court of first instance of Tunis.

30.

According to the source, Mr. Akremi claimed to have been tortured by being deprived

of sleep over several consecutive nights while in police custody. He was woken by police

officers every time he fell asleep, to the point where the disturbances plunged him into a state

of anxiety and intense stress.

31.

On 24 February 2023, as Mr. Akremi’s family and lawyers waited for him following

the conclusion of the hospital discharge process, some 20 members of the counter-terrorism

brigade arrived in police vehicles and surrounded the psychiatric ward before rearresting him

on the pretext that he was to be immediately interviewed in connection with another case.

Mr. Akremi was again taken to the Bouchoucha barracks.

32.

After a further period in police custody, Mr. Akremi was brought before the

investigating judge of the counter-terrorism unit, who issued a detention order against him

on the grounds that he was the subject of another complaint lodged by the Democratic

Patriots’ Unified Party, which is a party close to the President. In its complaint, the party

again accused Mr. Akremi of concealing evidence in the case involving the assassination of

its Secretary-General and of aiding and abetting terrorism.

33.

The source claims that Mr. Akremi is currently being detained arbitrarily and is the

subject of criminal proceedings, brought under Tunisian counter-terrorism law, that are

politically motivated, completely unfounded and in violation of the non bis in idem principle.

The source is of the view that Mr. Akremi has been accused of acts that were already

addressed in previous complaints, all of which resulted in decisions not to proceed or were

dismissed in view of his position as investigating judge.

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34.

On 5 January 2024, the investigating judge of the judicial counter-terrorism unit

decided to extend Mr. Akremi’s detention by an additional four months, despite there being

no legal reason or need to do so. The source adds that Mr. Akremi is currently being held on

ambiguous legal grounds in connection with three cases pending before the court of appeal

and the court of cassation and that the hearings are yet to be scheduled.

35.

Mr. Akremi’s current conditions of detention are a serious cause for concern owing to

his lack of access to medical care and the inhumane prison conditions in which he is being

held.

(iii)

Legal analysis

36.

The source argues that Mr. Akremi’s detention is arbitrary under categories I, III and

V of the methods of work of the Working Group.

a.

Category I

37.

The source submits that Mr. Akremi’s continued detention lacks a legal basis in that

the grounds for his detention do not meet the lex certa criteria, thus rendering his deprivation

of liberty arbitrary under category I.

38.

The source recalls that, according to article 9 (1) of the Covenant, no one may be

deprived of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure

as are established by law. The source stresses that the mere existence of a law does not,

however, mean that the deprivation of liberty is not arbitrary. The source cites the Human

Rights Committee, which states that an arrest or detention may be authorized by domestic

law and nonetheless be arbitrary, since the notion of “arbitrariness” is not to be equated with

“against the law” but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of

inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law, as well as elements

of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality.9

39.

In the present case, the source notes that Mr. Akremi was arrested, detained and

charged with aiding and abetting terrorism, including in connection with the assassination of

the Secretary-General of the Democratic Patriots’ Unified Party, under counter-terrorism

legislation that is in no way consistent with the principles of lex certa. The legislation’s lack

of clarity and its unpredictability mean that it effectively renders the deprivation of liberty

arbitrary.

40.

The source explains that several United Nations experts have expressed concern about

this legislation. For example, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of

human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism highlighted issues

concerning the definition of terrorism and reminded Tunisia that States should ensure that

counter-terrorism legislation is applied only to criminalize behaviour that is accurately and

precisely defined on the basis of international counter-terrorism instruments and that it is

strictly guided by the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality.10

41.

The source affirms that the Government of Tunisia nevertheless continues to use this

legislation to justify terrorism charges whose factual basis has never been established in

accordance with the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The source argues that,

in the absence of the requisite clarity and precision, the application of the legislation has

become arbitrary and unpredictable, allowing it to be used for political purposes.

42.

The source also points out that, in accordance with the criteria set out by the Human

Rights Committee, there must be objective evidence to prove that a detention is absolutely

necessary. In particular, a present, direct and imperative threat must be invoked to justify the

detention. The burden of proof lies on the State, which must show that the individual

concerned poses such a threat and that it cannot be addressed by alternative measures.11 The

9 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 12.

10 See communication TUN 2/2023, available at

https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27919.

11 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014), para. 15.

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source also recalls that detention must be the exception, rather than the rule, and should be

ordered for the shortest time possible.12

43.

In the present case, Mr. Akremi was immediately detained even though there was no

proven threat to public safety to justify that measure.

44.

The investigating judge of the judicial counter-terrorism unit extended Mr. Akremi’s

detention despite there being no legal reason or need to do so.

45.

In this respect, the source notes that the investigating judge of the judicial

counter-terrorism unit was appointed by the President to replace Mr. Akremi, which, in the

source’s view, raises major questions regarding not only judicial independence, but also

impartiality and the legality of the detention. The replacement of a judge who is in post with

an investigating judge jeopardizes the balance of power by giving the executive control over

judicial proceedings. The appointment of a judge by the President, bypassing the usual

mechanisms designed to guarantee judicial independence, also suggests a potential conflict

of interest, which calls into question the legality of any resulting proceedings.

46.

Accordingly, the source asserts that the executive has exploited the justice system to

place and maintain Mr. Akremi in detention even though there is no justification for doing

so. His detention is all the more arbitrary because of the lack of an assessment to determine

whether it is reasonable and necessary and the fact that alternative measures, such as house

arrest or judicial supervision, could have been applied.

b.

Category III

47.

The source submits that the blatant disregard for international fair trial standards is of

such gravity that Mr. Akremi’s deprivation of liberty must also be considered arbitrary under

category III. The source is of the view that the conditions of his arrest and the circumstances

surrounding his interrogation and unjustified detention inevitably render any subsequent trial

unfair.

48.

According to the source, while the Tunisian Constitution establishes that the judiciary

is independent and that judges are answerable only to the law, the reality is that judges are

currently facing serious interference in their work.

49.

This interference has become all the more worrying since the President’s unilateral

decisions regarding the appointment and dismissal of judges, which represent a clear

violation of judicial independence. The source points out that Tunisian legislation currently

grants the President the power to unilaterally dismiss or suspend judges and prosecutors for

a variety of reasons, including if they are deemed likely to pose a threat to public security or

“the national interest” or if they have committed acts that could compromise the reputation,

independence or proper functioning of the judiciary.13

50.

The source claims that the independence of the judiciary has thus been seriously

compromised by the unilateral decisions made by the President, who has taken full control

of the justice system.

51.

After dissolving the High Council of the Judiciary − which had been responsible for

guaranteeing the proper functioning of the justice system and the independence of judicial

authorities and whose establishment in 2016 had been described by the United Nations High

Commissioner for Human Rights as a major advance in the consolidation of the rule of law,

the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary in Tunisia14 − the President

established a new council made up of members whom he had personally appointed, thereby

granting the executive absolute control over the body. The source maintains that this action

12 Opinions No. 5/2019, para. 26; No. 62/2019, paras. 27–29; and No. 64/2020, para. 58.

13 Decree-Law No. 2022-35 of 1 June 2022 supplementing Decree-Law No. 2022-11 of 12 February

2022 on the establishment of the provisional High Council of the Judiciary, art. 1.

14 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Dissolution of Tunisia’s High

Judicial Council seriously undermines rule of law in Tunisia – Bachelet”, press release, 8 February

2022.

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is contrary to the recommendations of the Human Rights Committee regarding the protection

of the independence of judges and prosecutors.

52.

The President also violated article 14 of the Covenant, which guarantees the fair,

impartial and independent administration of justice, by dismissing 57 judges, including

Mr. Akremi, whom he accused of corruption and other offences. While their dismissal was

suspended by the Tunisian courts, the judges concerned, who are said to have been subjected

to multiple acts of intimidation, have still not been reinstated in their positions owing to the

refusal by the Government to give effect to the relevant judicial decisions.

53.

In this respect, the source invokes general comment No. 32 (2007) of the Human

Rights Committee, in which the Committee states that judges may be dismissed only on

serious grounds of misconduct or incompetence, in accordance with fair procedures ensuring

objectivity and impartiality set out in the Constitution or the law.15

54.

Mr. Akremi now finds himself dealing with judges who have been directly appointed

by the executive and are thus under its total control.16 As a result, he has no effective legal

remedies through which he can assert his rights.

55.

The source also highlights that Mr. Akremi is currently being prosecuted on charges

that he had already faced and that had been dismissed. According to the source, the fact that

he is being prosecuted again on the same charges constitutes a clear violation of article 14 (7)

of the Covenant, which enshrines the principle of non bis in idem. In this respect, the source

notes that only the existence of new or newly discovered facts, or a fundamental flaw in the

previous proceedings that was likely to have affected the decision made, could justify

prosecution based on the same charges.

56.

In the present case, there were no new facts that justified the launch of new

proceedings, which means that Mr. Akremi should not have been prosecuted again for

allegedly concealing evidence in the investigation into the assassination of the

Secretary-General of the Democratic Patriots’ Unified Party. The source recalls that, in that

case, the investigating division had approved the investigation conducted by Mr. Akremi and

had sent the case for trial, doing so several years previously.

57.

According to the source, Mr. Akremi’s deprivation of liberty in violation of the non

bis in idem principle is, therefore, a clear demonstration of the desire of the Tunisian

authorities to punish him for having discharged his duties in an independent and impartial

manner.

c.

Category V

58.

The source considers that, in the light of the facts, it is clear that Mr. Akremi’s

deprivation of liberty is motivated by discrimination.

59.

The source affirms that, on more than one occasion during the exercise of his

functions, in particular when he was an investigating judge, Mr. Akremi had to withstand

pressure and intimidation from the executive and certain political players who criticized him

for refusing to implicate the leaders of the Ennahda party, even though the investigation had

brought to light no evidence that would have justified doing so. The Tunisian authorities and

his political adversaries thus regarded him as a militant of that party, despite the fact that he

had carried out his duties in a competent, independent and impartial manner.

60.

The implications of this erroneous connection have been exacerbated by the political

context in Tunisia, where the Ennahda party faces systematic repression. As part of this

repression, Mr. Akremi has been subjected to the same treatment, namely, unjustified

deprivation of liberty, as the party’s leaders, to whom he is allegedly linked.

61.

As a result of Mr. Akremi’s refusal to remain silent and his denunciation of police

officials who committed acts of torture in the course of their investigation into the terrorist

15 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007), para. 20.

16 Ibid., para. 19.

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attack on the Bardo National Museum, he has likewise faced open hostility from the police

union and senior officials within the Ministry of the Interior.

62.

Mr. Akremi’s treatment thus constitutes a clear violation of his right to equality before

the law. According to the source, this treatment and the circumstances surrounding

Mr. Akremi’s arrest and detention point to the discriminatory and arbitrary nature of his

deprivation of liberty under category V.

(b)

Response from the Government

63.

On 23 December 2024, the Working Group transmitted a communication concerning

Mr. Akremi to the Government of Tunisia, requesting it to provide detailed information about

him by 21 February 2025 and to ensure his physical and mental integrity.

64.

On 5 March 2025, the Government requested an extension of the deadline for its

response. The Working Group rejected the request on the grounds that it was made after the

initial deadline of 21 February 2025. The Working Group regrets that the Government did

not submit a response within the established time frame.17

2.

Discussion

65.

In the absence of a response from the Government, the Working Group has decided

to render the present opinion, in conformity with paragraph 15 of its methods of work.

66.

In determining whether the deprivation of liberty of Mr. Akremi is arbitrary, the

Working Group has regard to the principles established in its jurisprudence to deal with

evidentiary issues. If the source has established a prima facie case for breach of international

requirements constituting arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be understood to

rest upon the Government if it wishes to refute the allegations.18 In the present case, the

Government has chosen not to challenge the prima facie credible allegations made by the

source.

(a)

Category I

67.

The Working Group will first consider whether there have been violations under

category I, which concerns deprivation of liberty without a legal basis.

68.

In the light of the facts presented by the source, which were not refuted by the

Government, it is clear that there was no legal basis for the detention of Mr. Akremi at the

time of his arrest. The Government has given no plausible reasons for suspecting him of an

offence. Even if the acts attributed to him (namely, his alleged obstruction of the investigation

into the assassination of the Secretary-General of the Democratic Patriots’ Unified Party –

an allegation that, according to the source, had already been dismissed − and his denunciation

of the acts of torture committed by police officials in the course of the investigation into the

terrorist attack at the Bardo National Museum) were proven, they would not justify the charge

of aiding and abetting terrorism, since no information linking his behaviour to that crime has

been submitted to the Working Group. These charges appear to have served as a pretext for

targeting Mr. Akremi for having exercised his judicial independence and conducted his

professional duties, rather than as a means of tackling actual criminal behaviour.19

69.

In the absence of any explanation from the Government, the Working Group cannot

but conclude that Mr. Akremi’s detention violates his right to liberty and security of person

under articles 3 and 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 9 of the

Covenant.

70.

Furthermore, according to the source’s unrefuted statements, Mr. Akremi was not

informed of the reasons for his arrest at the time it took place, in violation of article 9 (2) of

the Covenant and article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

17 The Government replied to the communication on 16 April 2025, after the adoption of the present

opinion.

18 A/HRC/19/57, para. 68.

19 Opinion No. 61/2024, para. 51.

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71.

The Working Group also takes note of the source’s submissions that Mr. Akremi’s

detention has been extended despite there being no legal reason or need to do so. In this

respect, the Working Group recalls that it is a well-established norm of international law that

pretrial detention is to be the exception and not the rule, and that it should be ordered for as

short a time as possible.20 Article 9 (3) of the Covenant provides that it is not to be the general

rule that persons awaiting trial are to be detained in custody, but that their release may be

subject to guarantees to appear for trial and at any other stage of the judicial proceedings. It

follows that liberty is recognized as a principle and detention as an exception in the interests

of justice. Thus, when pretrial detention takes place, it must be justified by specific risks and

supported by an explanation of why alternative measures such as bail would be insufficient.

In the present case, the Working Group is of the view that the authorities failed to justify

Mr. Akremi’s detention, since they did not take into account the specific circumstances of

the case or consider other preventive measures. In the absence of any argument to the

contrary, the Working Group finds his detention to be in violation of article 9 (3) of the

Covenant.

72.

In view of the above findings, the Working Group considers Mr. Akremi’s detention

to be in violation of article 9 of the Covenant and articles 3 and 9 of the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights. His detention is therefore arbitrary under category I.

(b)

Category III

73.

The source highlights numerous violations of Mr. Akremi’s right to a fair trial, in

particular the judiciary’s lack of independence and impartiality following the President’s

unilateral actions in appointing and dismissing judges, the prosecutions that were in breach

of the non bis in idem principle and Mr. Akremi’s forced detention in a psychiatric facility

without judicial oversight.

74.

The Working Group recalls that judicial independence is a sine qua non condition of

the right to a fair trial, as guaranteed under article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights and article 14 of the Covenant. The Working Group is particularly concerned about

the attacks on the independence of the judiciary since 2021, which have created a situation

in which the right to a fair trial cannot be adequately protected. In this respect, it notes the

concerns expressed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and several

special rapporteurs.21 In view of these circumstances and the unrebutted allegations that

Mr. Akremi’s case is being handled by a structurally compromised judicial system, the

Working Group concludes that Mr. Akremi has been deprived of his right to be tried by an

independent and impartial tribunal, in violation of article 10 of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and article 14 (1) of the Covenant.

75.

The Working Group is also concerned about the reported violations of the principle

of non bis in idem, which is protected under article 14 (7) of the Covenant. According to the

source’s uncontested allegations, Mr. Akremi is being prosecuted for matters that have

already been dealt with through binding decisions, even though there are no new facts or

fundamental procedural flaws that would justify the reopening of the cases. The Government

has neither provided information to contradict these allegations nor demonstrated how the

current proceedings differ in substance from the previous ones or why the previous

proceedings merit review. In the absence of such explanations, the Working Group cannot

but conclude that the reinitiation of proceedings against Mr. Akremi on substantially identical

grounds constitutes a violation of the fundamental principle of non bis in idem, which is a

key fair trial guarantee that protects individuals from being tried or punished twice for the

same offence.

20 Opinions No. 28/2014, para. 43; No. 49/2014, para. 23; No. 57/2014, para. 26; No. 1/2020, para. 53;

and No. 8/2020, para. 54; see also Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014),

para. 38; and A/HRC/19/57, paras. 48–58.

21 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Dissolution of Tunisia’s

High Judicial Council seriously undermines rule of law in Tunisia – Bachelet”, press release,

8 February 2022; “Tunisia: Presidential decrees undermine judicial independence and access to

justice, says UN expert”, press release, 15 July 2022; and “Tunisia: Interference with the judiciary

and harassment of lawyers must end, say UN experts”, press release, 31 May 2024.

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76.

The Working Group is also deeply disturbed by reports that Mr. Akremi was detained

in a psychiatric unit without appropriate judicial oversight, which represents a serious

violation of his right to liberty and security of person.22 The Working Group is of the view

that subjecting an individual to involuntary psychiatric treatment because of his or her

professional activities, in this case as a judge, constitutes a serious violation of human rights

and international law. It recalls that it has already condemned psychiatric detention when it

is used to restrict freedom of expression.23 The deployment of psychiatric institutions as

instruments of repression not only undermines the integrity of mental healthcare but also

erodes the fundamental principles of justice and the rule of law.24 In Mr. Akremi’s case, the

fact that, following his detention, he was committed to a hospital psychiatric ward without

any apparent medical justification and his lawyers were prohibited from gaining access to the

ward raises serious concerns about the misuse of mental health facilities as a means of

prolonging detention outside the normal judicial framework.

77.

Lastly, the Working Group is concerned about the allegations that Mr. Akremi was

subjected to torture through sleep deprivation while in police custody. According to the

source, Mr. Akremi reported that police officers had deliberately prevented him from

sleeping for several consecutive nights, to the point that the disruptions caused him to fall

into a state of anxiety and intense stress. The Government has not denied these claims. The

use of sleep deprivation as an interrogation technique or punishment could, depending on the

circumstances, constitute a form of torture25 and would seriously compromise the fairness of

any subsequent judicial proceedings. Such treatment is contrary to the absolute prohibition

against torture and ill-treatment enshrined in the Covenant and the Convention against

Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

78.

In the absence of any information to the contrary from the Government, the Working

Group concludes that the violations of Mr. Akremi’s right to a fair trial are of such gravity as

to give his detention an arbitrary character under category III.

(c)

Category V

79.

The source maintains that Mr. Akremi’s deprivation of liberty is arbitrary under

category V since his detention is motivated by discrimination. According to the source, in

the course of his judicial duties, Mr. Akremi came under pressure from the executive and

political actors who criticized him for refusing to implicate the leaders of the Ennahda party

on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence for him to do so. This professional

decision led him to be associated with the political movement in question, despite the fact

that he had carried out his duties in a completely independent and impartial manner.

80.

The source adds that the implications of that association have been exacerbated by the

political context in Tunisia, in which the Ennahda party faces systematic repression.

Furthermore, the source claims that, after denouncing the acts of torture committed by police

officials in the context of the investigation into the terrorist attack at the Bardo National

Museum, Mr. Akremi faced hostility from police unions and senior officials from the

Ministry of the Interior.

81.

While these allegations raise significant concerns about possible discriminatory

treatment, the Working Group notes that the precise grounds for discrimination under

category V have not been outlined with sufficient clarity. Alleged ties to a political party, in

particular when they appear to be perceived rather than actual ties, are a complex matter that

does not clearly fall within category V. Similarly, although there are allegations concerning

the repercussions of Mr. Akremi’s professional decision to denounce acts of torture, it is not

immediately clear that these circumstances constitute discrimination on the grounds

enumerated under category V.

82.

The Working Group recognizes the seriousness of allegations of discriminatory

treatment. It is not, however, in a position to come to a definitive conclusion with regard to

22 E/CN.4/2005/6, para. 58 (e).

23 Opinion No. 47/2024, para. 60; see also E/CN.4/2005/6, para. 58 (g).

24 Opinion No. 47/2024, para. 73.

25 A/52/44, paras. 56 and 258; and A/HRC/43/49, paras. 26, 49 and 50.

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GE.25-08047

11

this category. This decision does not diminish the seriousness of the other violations found

by the Working Group in its examination of categories I and III.

(d)

Concluding remarks

83.

The Working Group wishes to emphasize that the detention of a judge for reasons that

appear to be linked to the exercise of his judicial duties strikes at the very heart of the rule of

law. It adds that the circumstances of Mr. Akremi’s case − including his arrest following his

refusal to give in to external pressure in sensitive cases, his committal to a psychiatric unit

with no apparent justification and the fact that he is being prosecuted for matters that have

been concluded or dismissed − represent an alarming pattern of judicial intimidation that

transcends Mr. Akremi’s individual case by threatening not only his own rights, but also the

integrity of the Tunisian judicial system. Such action could send a chilling message to all

judges who remain independent in the face of political pressure.

84.

In accordance with paragraph 33 (a) of its methods of work, the Working Group refers

this case to the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers so that she

may take any action she considers appropriate.

3.

Disposition

85.

In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:

The deprivation of liberty of Bechir Akremi, being in contravention of articles 3, 9

and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 9 and 14 of the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is arbitrary and falls within

categories I and III.

86.

The Working Group requests the Government of Tunisia to take the steps necessary

to remedy the situation of Mr. Akremi without delay and bring it into conformity with the

relevant international norms, including those set out in the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights and the Covenant.

87.

The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the

case, the appropriate remedy would be to release Mr. Akremi immediately and accord him

an enforceable right to compensation and other reparations, in accordance with international

law.

88.

The Working Group urges the Government to ensure a full and independent

investigation of the circumstances surrounding the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of

Mr. Akremi and to take appropriate measures against those responsible for the violation of

his rights.

89.

In accordance with paragraph 33 (a) of its methods of work, the Working Group refers

the present case to the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, for

appropriate action.

90.

The Working Group requests the Government to disseminate the present opinion

through all available means and as widely as possible.

4.

Follow-up procedure

91.

In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group requests

the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in follow-up

to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including:

(a)

Whether Mr. Akremi has been released and, if so, on what date;

(b)

Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to Mr. Akremi;

(c)

Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of

Mr. Akremi’s rights and, if so, the outcome of the investigation;

(d)

Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made to

harmonize the laws and practices of Tunisia with its international obligations in line with the

present opinion;

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(e)

Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.

92.

The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may

have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and

whether further technical assistance is required, for example through a visit by the Working

Group.

93.

The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the

above-mentioned information within six months of the date of transmission of the present

opinion. However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up

to the opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action

would enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in

implementing its recommendations, as well as of any failure to take action.

94.

The Working Group recalls that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all States

to cooperate with the Working Group and has requested them to take account of its views

and, where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily

deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken.26

[Adopted on 1 April 2025]

26 Human Rights Council resolution 51/8, paras. 6 and 9.