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A/HRC/WGAD/2025/16

Opinion No. 16/2025, concerning Urbain Awono Olanguena (Cameroon)

UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung (WGAD) · 2025-04-10 · en UN

Opinion; Subjects: CAMEROON, ARBITRARY DETENTION; [WGAD: UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung, willkürliche Haft; Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire; Gruppo di lavoro sulla detenzione arbitraria]

Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)

GE.25-07363 (E) 020625 030625

Human Rights Council

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention

Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary

Detention at its 102nd session, 1–10 April 2025

Opinion No. 16/2025, concerning Urbain Awono Olanguena

(Cameroon)

1.

The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of

the Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution 1997/50, the Commission extended and

clarified the mandate of the Working Group. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution

60/251 and Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the

Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a

three-year period in its resolution 51/8.

2.

In accordance with its methods of work,1 on 20 December 2024 the Working Group

transmitted to the Government of Cameroon a communication concerning Urbain Awono

Olanguena. The Government has not replied to the communication. The State is a party to

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

3.

The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following

cases:

(a)

When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the

deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or

her sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);

(b)

When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or

freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and, insofar as States parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22,

25, 26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);

(c)

When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating

to the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in

the relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity

as to give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);

(d)

When asylum-seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged

administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or

remedy (category IV);

(e)

When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on

the grounds of discrimination based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,

religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation,

1 A/HRC/36/38.

United Nations

A/HRC/WGAD/2025/16

General Assembly

Distr.: General

21 May 2025

English

Original: French

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disability, or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of

human beings (category V).

1.

Submissions

(a)

Communication from the source

4.

Urbain Awono Olanguena, a national of Cameroon born in 1955, was the Minister

of Health of Cameroon from 2001 to 2007.

5.

The source reports that, after being ranked several times among the world’s most

corrupt countries, Cameroon launched Opération Epervier (Operation Sparrowhawk) in the

2000s to fight corruption. According to the source, while the operation was initially

welcomed, it quickly turned into a political purge.

6.

As Minister of Health, Mr. Olanguena introduced reforms and revitalized the health

sector, which at the time of his appointment was considered to be in a dire state.

7.

From 2005, Mr. Olanguena was identified as being part of a group of prominent

persons with ambitions to accede to the presidency in 2011, when President Paul Biya’s

second term expired.

8.

In 2006, the Secretary-General of the President’s Office initiated an audit of health

programmes, specifically those concerning AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, through the

Supreme State Audit Office. According to the source, this audit conducted incomplete and

inaccurate investigations and produced a manifestly ill-founded audit report.

9.

Mr. Olanguena was stripped of his ministerial duties in September 2007.

(i)

Arrest and custody

10.

On 31 March 2008, some time after the submission of the health programme audit

report, Mr. Olanguena was arrested at his home in Yaoundé by members of the Criminal

Investigation Department and placed in police custody, where he was questioned about

allegations of misappropriation of public funds. The source notes that in the same week, the

constitutional provision limiting to two the number of terms a president could serve was

abolished.

11.

He was held in police custody for 10 days during the preliminary investigation, from

31 March to 9 April 2008, even though the legal maximum duration of police custody

under article 119 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is 6 days. During this period,

Mr. Olanguena was filmed lying on the floor of his cell and the footage was broadcast on

the news on the national television station.

(ii)

Charges, investigation and trial

12.

At the end of his period in police custody, Mr. Olanguena was charged on 9 April

2008 with 10 counts of alleged misappropriation of various sums of money totalling

8.55 billion CFA francs, in connection with the management of programmes to combat

AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.

13.

In response to Mr. Olanguena’s arrest, on 7 May 2008 the Global Fund to Fight

AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the leading funder of programmes to combat these

diseases, issued an official statement signed by its Executive Director. According to the

source, this statement declared that the financial and programme reports of the Global

Fund’s grant agreements in Cameroon indicated that these grants had been managed

appropriately, and that the Global Fund had found nothing to suggest that its funds had

been misused.

14.

According to the source, neither the political nor the judicial authorities in

Cameroon took into account the statement by the Executive Director of the Global Fund

clearing Mr. Olanguena of wrongdoing.

15.

The source adds that, as the Global Fund’s local representative in Cameroon, the

auditing firm PricewaterhouseCoopers continuously monitored the implementation of

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projects financed by the Fund and reported quarterly to the Fund’s management in Geneva.

It also points out that external audits did not reveal any wrongdoing during

Mr. Olanguena’s term of office.

16.

At the end of his investigation in 2009, the examining judge of the Mfoundi High

Court issued two orders concerning the 10 charges brought against Mr. Olanguena:

(a)

A separation order, issued on 21 August 2009, in respect of the charge of

misappropriation of funds for medicines allegedly not delivered by the National

Procurement Centre for Essential Drugs and Medical Devices; according to the source, this

case was referred to the Special Criminal Court on 3 October 2012 and is still pending.

(b)

An order issued on 1 October 2009, dismissing four charges – which were

thus dropped – and referring the five remaining charges to the Mfoundi High Court.

17.

According to the source, three of the five charges referred were new charges, the

examining judge having changed the original charges of unjustified expenditure and

undelivered materials to offences of misappropriation through violation of public

procurement regulations. According to the source, the examining judge modified these

three charges without requesting additional charges to be brought by the public prosecutor,

as required by article 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and without informing

Mr. Olanguena so that he could present his defence.

18.

These three charges were later dismissed by the Court of Appeal, which considered

them to be new charges for which Mr. Olanguena had never been indicted, as required

under Cameroonian criminal law.2 The Court of Appeal also ordered the proceedings to be

returned to the Mfoundi High Court, so that the latter could exercise its jurisdiction over the

two remaining charges.

19.

The source considers that this ruling by Court of Appeal has acquired the force of

res judicata following the rejection by the Supreme Court of Cameroon of an appeal in

cassation by the prosecutor’s office.3 Despite this case law, the source reports that the

public prosecutor’s office subsequently decided to bring another prosecution against

Mr. Olanguena on the charges dismissed by another court, as detailed below.

20.

The Mfoundi High Court, which had been hearing Mr. Olanguena’s case since

February 2010, had meanwhile set 15 October 2012 as the date for delivering its judgment

on the two charges.

21.

On 15 October 2012, the public prosecutor was reportedly absent from the

courtroom, meaning that the court was unable to deliver its verdict, in application of

article 128 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires the public prosecutor to

be present at all hearings under penalty of the decision being declared null and void. The

judges therefore postponed announcing the verdict until the following day, but once again

the public prosecutor did not show up to the courtroom. As a result, the case was

transferred to the new Special Criminal Court, which came into operation on 17 October

2012 and became the only court competent to hear Mr. Olanguena’s cases, given that it was

supposed to take over cases that had already spent more than four years before Mfoundi

High Court.

22.

The source describes the Special Criminal Court as a new court created in 2011 for

the apparent purpose of reducing the length of judicial proceedings. In reality, it is

reportedly not independent of the executive and offers no guarantees to defendants, under

either Cameroonian or international law.

23.

The case, which had been interrupted at the point where the verdict was about to be

announced, restarted before the Special Criminal Court in 2013 on both charges, despite

four years of proceedings before the Mfoundi High Court. The source also reports that the

2 Judgment No. 339/ADD/CRIM of 6 July 2011; and reference judgment No. 108/CRIM/ADD of

13 October 2011.

3 Judgment No. 41/P of 15 March 2012.

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three charges dismissed by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court were reintroduced

against Mr. Olanguena before the new court.

24.

On 14 June 2013, Mr. Olanguena was sentenced by the Special Criminal Court to

15 years’ imprisonment on the three charges previously dismissed.4 The source adds that

the charges were misappropriation of public funds by association, an offence it claims does

not exist in Cameroonian law or elsewhere.

25.

In response to an appeal in cassation by the defence, the Supreme Court dismissed

the charge of misappropriation of public funds by association and reduced the sentence to

10 years’ imprisonment.5

26.

On 12 August 2013, the Special Criminal Court handed down its judgment in the

case involving the two charges on which the High Court had been prevented from ruling by

the public prosecution, finding him guilty of one charge and not guilty of the other.6

27.

With regard to the charge concerning misappropriated medicines that was the

subject of the separation order, the source explains that on 3 October 2012, the examining

judge of the Mfoundi High Court referred the case to the Special Criminal Court. To date,

no judgment has been handed down in this case.

28.

Mr. Olanguena is still in detention. He has been under hospital care since July 2019

to treat the after-effects of an assault in his cell during a mutiny in Kondengui central prison

in Yaoundé.

(iii)

Legal analysis

29.

The source argues that Mr. Olanguena’s detention is arbitrary under categories I, II

and III of the methods of work of the Working Group.

a.

Category I

30.

The source claims that there is no legal basis for Mr. Olanguena’s detention, since

his arrest was carried out without a warrant, in conditions that did not respect his dignity,

and he was not immediately brought before a judge.

31.

The source recalls that an arrest without a warrant and without an order from the

judicial authorities is arbitrary, as is the ensuing detention. 7 In the case at hand,

Mr. Olanguena was arrested on 31 March 2008 without an order of any kind being

presented, and without his being informed of the reasons for his arrest.

32.

The source argues that the right of all persons deprived of their liberty to be treated

with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person under

article 10 of the Covenant gives rise to requirements concerning conditions of detention.

The source also refers to article 7 of the Covenant and principle 6 of the Body of Principles

for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment prohibit

the cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of persons deprived of their liberty. The source

also points out that the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of

Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) set standards for conditions of detention and hygiene.

33.

In the present case, the source maintains that the requirement of humanity and

respect for human dignity was constantly violated, particularly during police custody, and

that the conditions of detention were inhuman and degrading. Mr. Olanguena was forced to

sleep on a mattress on the floor and to share his cell with a former member of the

Government. The lights were on constantly in the cell, which was also unsanitary, lacking

in any facilities and infested with mosquitoes. In addition, during the period of police

4 Judgment No. 014/CRIM/TCS of 14 June 2013.

5 Judgment No. 002/SSP of 5 August 2015.

6 Judgment No. 12/CRIM/TCS of 12 August 2013. The appeal filed against this judgment was

dismissed by judgment No. 003/SSP of 4 April 2017.

7 See opinions No. 38/2013, No. 10/2015, No. 15/2015 and No. 46/2017. See also Titiahonjo v.

Cameroon (CCPR/C/91/D/1186/2003).

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custody, images of Mr. Olanguena lying on the floor were broadcast on the main news

programme on national television, in violation of the right of all persons deprived of their

liberty to be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human

person, in accordance with article 10 of the Covenant.

34.

The source reports that, based on news reports, conditions at Kondengui Central

Prison are known to be far from adequate. Mr. Olanguena spent seven years in an

eight-person cell with bunk beds, with little daylight, near a large rubbish bin and an

unsanitary septic tank, and exposed to the noise, nuisance and smell of drugs coming from

the neighbouring areas of the prison. The source notes that, given these circumstances,

Mr. Olanguena’s eyesight deteriorated and he is at risk of losing the sight in his left eye.

35.

According to the source, Mr. Olanguena has had an individual cell since 2016.

Nevertheless, it was in this cell that he suffered a violent assault during a mutiny on the

night of 19 July 2019. The source reports that, after several hours, he was evacuated to

Yaoundé Central Hospital for treatment. Since then, he has been under psychiatric care at

the hospital for post-traumatic injuries sustained during the attack.

36.

The source maintains that, according to article 9 (3) of the Covenant, anyone

arrested or detained on a criminal charge must be brought promptly before a judge. It refers

to the jurisprudence of the Working Group, which concluded that detention was arbitrary

when a person had been held without being brought before a judge for 20 days, and that his

detention thus had no legal basis.8 In the case at hand, Mr. Olanguena was held in police

custody for 10 days before being brought before a judge.

b.

Category II

37.

The source argues that Mr. Olanguena’s detention is arbitrary and falls under

category II as it is a consequence of the exercise of his right to take part in the conduct of

public affairs of his country and is in violation of article 21 of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and article 25 of the Covenant. The source maintains that Mr. Olanguena’s

arrest and detention stem directly from the exercise of his right to participate in the conduct

of his country’s public affairs in the context of Operation Épervier. According to the

source, the arrests made during this period were identified by the Human Rights Committee

as a matter of major concern in its concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of

Cameroon. The Committee also expressed concern about the endemic nature of corruption,

reports of routine extortion by public authorities, including those in the police, judicial, tax,

education and health sectors, and allegations of the exploitation and misuse of

anti-corruption measures to target certain prominent individuals, including political

figures.9

38.

The source maintains that the real reason behind Mr. Olanguena’s arrest and

detention is clear, since as of 2005, he had been identified as part of a group of prominent

persons with ambitions to accede to the presidency in 2011, when the President’s second

term expired.

c.

Category III

39.

The source affirms that Mr. Olanguena’s detention falls under category III, in view

of the seriousness of the violations of his right to a fair trial.

40.

The source states that in 2010, several members of the Government made public

statements in which they affirmed the presumed guilt of the individuals arrested during

Operation Épervier, and seriously undermined Mr. Olanguena’s presumption of innocence,

in violation of article 14 (2) of the Covenant.

41.

The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, responding to a question about

the pending cases, including those involving Mr. Olanguena, is quoted as saying:

8 See opinion No. 38/2014. See also opinion No. 38/2013.

9 CCPR/C/CMR/CO/5, para. 9.

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“I challenge anyone to prove that those arrested were innocent […]. Those who say they are

innocent did a good job of hiding what they stole.”

42.

The Minister of Communications, the Government Spokesperson, also stated at a

press conference: “All the corrupt individuals arrested as part of Operation Épervier

misused public funds because they aspired to the highest office of the nation, forgetting that

the statutes of the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement, 10 of which they are

members, stipulate that the President of the party is the natural candidate for the

presidential election.”

43.

The source also cites the jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and

Peoples’ Rights which, in a case before it concerning a prominent Cameroonian person also

arrested during Operation Épervier, declared:

In the present Communication, the Commission notes that the statements

made by the Cameroonian Minister of Justice and Minister of Communication

clearly refer to a group of former political figures detained as part of the “Operation

Sparrow Hawk”, including the Complainant. Regarding the posts occupied, the

Minister of Justice has direct links with the judicial and prosecuting authorities

while the Minister of Communication speaks officially on behalf of the Government

of the Respondent State.

Regarding the substance of the statements, the terms “theft”, “embezzlement”

and “are not innocent” used by these authorities clearly denote a presumption of

guilt. Lastly, these statements were made when the Complainant was still awaiting a

final judgement. The Commission thus concludes that the Complainant’s right under

Article 7 (1) (b) of the [African] Charter [on Human and Peoples’ Rights] has been

violated.11

44.

The source argues that by violating the presumption of innocence, the government

authorities not only formalized the political nature of the proceedings under judicial

pretexts, but also publicly affirmed their desire to influence the judges.

45.

The source also recalls that, at the end of his investigation, the examining judge of

the Mfoundi High Court ordered the proceedings to be separated on 21 August 2009. It

argues in this respect that the separation of proceedings is not provided for by law and

consequently considers that separation in these circumstances is an abnormal practice

which consists of multiplying the number of proceedings.

46.

Furthermore, the source maintains that, in his referral order, the examining judge

introduced new charges against Mr. Olanguena, changing the three original charges of

unjustified expenditure and undelivered materials to offences of misappropriation through

violation of public procurement regulations. By amending the charges without a request for

additional charges to be brought by the public prosecutor, as required under article 169 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, and without informing the accused so that he could present

his defence, the judge harmed the fundamental rights of the defence, according to the

source.

47.

The source recalls that the Court of Appeal of the Centre Region dismissed the new

charges against Mr. Olanguena. 12 On 15 March 2012, the Supreme Court declared

inadmissible the appeal in cassation lodged by the public prosecutor’s office against this

judgment of the Court of Appeal, thereby rendering the Court of Appeal’s decision to

cancel the charges irrevocable and giving it the force of res judicata. 13 The source

maintains that this jurisprudence was subsequently ignored.

48.

The source reports that, despite the judgments of the Supreme Court and the Court

of Appeal, the public prosecutor’s office decided to recommence proceedings on the three

10 The ruling party.

11 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Jean-Marie Atangana Mebara v. Cameroon,

communication No. 416/12, August 2015, paras. 102 and 103.

12 Reference judgment No. 108/CRIM/ADD of 13 October 2011.

13 Judgment No. 41/P of 15 March 2012.

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cancelled charges, without any new evidence and in violation of the law. Since the facts had

already been investigated and the charges had been dismissed, res judicata and the non bis

in idem principle should have prohibited a new judicial investigation from being initiated.

According to the source, this new investigation was thus carried out in violation of the law,

in particular articles 3 and 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this connection, it cites

Supreme Court jurisprudence, according to which once an investigating judge’s order has

acquired the force of res judicata, he or she cannot proceed with a new investigation into

the same facts against the same defendants without violating the non bis in idem principle.14

49.

The source recalls that Mr. Olanguena’s defence counsel had filed an application for

the annulment of the proceedings based on charges that had been dismissed but illegally

re-initiated. The objection was joined to the merits. In addition, Mr. Olanguena’s witness

list was rejected.

50.

The source reports that Mr. Olanguena clearly explained to the judges that the

resources transferred to partner associations for health programmes were budgeted grants

for planned activities, and that these grants were included in the Finance Act and in the

grant agreement concluded with the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

He also demonstrated that the procedure for this transfer expenditure had nothing to do with

a public procurement procedure, but the recipient of the subsidy was nevertheless required

to justify its use. Mr. Olanguena presented supporting documents and the external audits

confirming the effective services provided by partner associations.

51.

The source claims that, rejecting any technical explanation, the Special Criminal

Court convicted Mr. Olanguena for an alleged violation of public procurement rules which,

according to the source, does not exist in Cameroon or elsewhere. Mr. Olanguena was

sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment and a monetary penalty of repayment of the grants he

had allegedly misappropriated, but which in fact had been duly allocated and justified

within the framework of the health programmes. The prison sentence was subsequently

reduced to 10 years by the Supreme Court, which reproduced the erroneous reasoning of

the Special Criminal Court.

52.

The source reports that serious violations of the right to a fair trial occurred during

the proceedings against Mr. Olanguena before the High Court on two charges:

(a)

Undelivered mosquito nets worth 80 million CFA francs;

(b)

The acquisition by the National AIDS Programme of copies of

Mr. Olanguena’s book Le sida en terre d’Afrique, for a total of 11.79 million CFA francs.

53.

The defence demonstrated that neither Mr. Olanguena nor his colleagues were

responsible for the payment of 80 million CFA francs made by the Treasury to a suspect

supplier for the undelivered mosquito nets. According to the source, the supplier actually

confessed to having forged documents with fake or scanned signatures before taking flight.

The source maintains that the Ministry of Finance officials who validated and settled this

file had violated payment procedures. Hard evidence, including a report by a handwriting

expert, established that the Minister of Health and his administration had nothing to do with

the fraud that had taken place at the Ministry of Finance.

54.

With regard to the acquisition of the books, the manager of the National AIDS

Programme, acting within the scope of his authority, concluded his purchase directly with

the publisher, in accordance with the applicable rules and without involving

Mr. Olanguena.

55.

The source recalls that, at the hearing at which the judgment was to be handed down

on 15 October 2012, the public prosecutor was absent from the courtroom, meaning that the

Mfoundi High Court could not deliver its verdict. The judges therefore extended their

deliberations until the following day, but once again the public prosecutor failed to show up

to the courtroom. According to the source, the public prosecutor’s office blocked the

verdict for a strategic reason: to secure the transfer of the case to the new Special Criminal

14 Judgment No. 0314/P of 24 October 1961, BACS No. 5, p. 209. See also judgment No. 205/P of

2 June 1970, BACS No. 22, p. 2663.

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Court, which came into operation on 17 October 2012 and became the only court competent

to hear Mr. Olanguena’s cases.

56.

The source reports that the case concerning the allegedly undelivered medicines

from the National Procurement Centre for Essential Drugs and Medical Devices, which had

been frozen since the first investigating judge’s separation order was issued in August

2009, was referred to the Special Criminal Court, and a new investigating judge attached to

that court was appointed.

57.

In 2017, the investigating judge of the Special Criminal Court notified

Mr. Olanguena of an expert report that had been commissioned by the first investigating

judge and entered in the case file in June 2009. Mr. Olanguena was notified of this report

eight years after the fact. A second expert opinion was requested and accepted, and

Mr. Olanguena was informed of that report in 2018.

58.

The source maintains that, apart from these two notifications of the two expert

reports, the examining judge of the Special Criminal Court did not carry out any of the

investigative acts required under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Olanguena was

neither heard as a defendant nor confronted with the numerous witnesses called. A referral

order was nevertheless issued on 21 May 2019.

59.

The source notes that the length of the proceedings is in breach of the time limits

prescribed by law: more than 11 years of investigation in all (from 2008 to 2019), even

though the investigation is not to exceed 18 months for the High Court and 6 months for the

Special Criminal Court. 15 It recalls that between the separation order in 2009 and the

transfer of the case to the Special Criminal Court in 2012, the first investigating judge did

not take any investigative steps, while from 2013 to 2019, the second investigating judge

never interviewed Mr. Olanguena or confronted him with a witness.

60.

The source maintains that these delays cannot be justified and denounces the

behaviour of the authorities, which it considers to be solely responsible for them. In

particular, it points out that what was at stake in the dispute should have prevented these

delays, given that Mr. Olanguena was in pretrial detention and was in no way the source of

the delay in processing the case.

61.

The source also notes that several attempts by Mr. Olanguena’s defence lawyers to

assert their client’s rights were unsuccessful, including petitions for the annulment of the

proceedings on grounds of public order, and a recent petition for habeas corpus. The latter

was rejected by the judge in June 2023, three months after it was submitted.

Mr. Olanguena’s lawyers appealed against this decision immediately, but 18 months later,

the Court of Appeal had still not delivered its judgment, in violation of article 587 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, which sets a maximum deadline of 10 days for the President

of the Court of Appeal to rule on habeas corpus requests.

62.

The source claims that the procedural requirements for the investigation phase were

ignored or violated by the investigating judge, for the following reasons:

(a)

There is no record of the hearing by the examining judge;

(b)

There is no record of any confrontation between the accused and the many

prosecution witnesses heard under the various rogatory commissions, including the State

inspectors who authored the report on which the prosecution is based;

(c)

The second examining judge did not take the trouble to interview

Mr. Olanguena as a defendant, but merely interpreted the minutes of a hearing with the first

examining judge in October 2008;

15 Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 221 and Act No. 2012/011 of 16 July 2012 amending and

supplementing certain provisions of Act No. 2011/028 of 14 December 2011 on the establishment of

the Special Criminal Court, art. 9 (3). See also article 9 (3) of the Covenant, article 6 of the African

Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the preamble to the Cameroonian Constitution.

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(d)

Several of the assumptions made by the prosecution imply both a

presumption of guilt and the criminal responsibility of others, which the source considers to

be legally unacceptable;

(e)

Mr. Olanguena was not able to exercise his right to request that the expert

appointed by the examining judge carry out certain research or hear persons likely to

provide technical information, pursuant to article 214 (1) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure.16

63.

According to the source, the failure to interview Mr. Olanguena and confront him

with the witnesses meant that the investigation was purely for the prosecution, which is

tantamount to an absence of investigation.

64.

The source recalls that the first examining judge ordered the proceedings to be

separated on 21 August 2009. It asserts that the reason for this order was so that he could

continue his judicial investigation beyond the legal deadline of 18 months, even though he

had not done anything for four years, i.e. until the case was transferred to the Special

Criminal Court in 2012. As for the second examining judge, from the Special Criminal

Court, he issued his referral order after having kept the file for seven years without

interviewing Mr. Olanguena or confronting him with witnesses.

65.

The source recalls article 9 (3) of the Covenant, pursuant to which Mr. Olanguena

should have been brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to

exercise judicial power and should have been tried within a reasonable time or released.

(b)

Response from the Government

66.

On 20 December 2024, the Working Group transmitted a communication concerning

Mr. Olanguena to the Government, requesting it to provide detailed information about him

by 18 February 2025 and to ensure his physical and mental integrity.

67.

The Working Group regrets that it did not receive a response from the Government

and that the Government did not request an extension of the time limit for its reply, as

provided for in the Working Group’s methods of work.

2.

Discussion

68.

The Working Group notes that a communication concerning Mr. Olanguena was

also submitted to the Human Rights Committee in 2015, which adopted its Views in 2018.17

The Human Rights Committee is mentioned in paragraph 33 (d) (ii) of the Working

Group’s methods of work as one of the treaty bodies with the function of dealing with

individual cases, and with which the Working Group must coordinate.

69.

Having compared the circumstances of the present case with the Views adopted by

the Human Rights Committee, the Working Group considers that the person and facts

involved in the two cases are identical. Both concern the arrest of Mr. Olanguena on

31 March 2008 by the Cameroonian authorities and the proceedings that followed.

70.

Although some of Mr. Olanguena’s allegations were deemed inadmissible by the

Human Rights Committee, the latter nevertheless examined the merits of the allegations

made under articles 9 (3) and 14 (3) (c) of the Covenant concerning the excessive delay in

the conduct of the proceedings against him,18 allegations which the source reiterates in its

communication to the Working Group.

16 See also European Court of Human Rights, Mantovanelli v. France, application No. 21497/93,

judgment, 18 March 1997, para. 13; and European Court of Human Rights, Cottin v. Belgium,

application No. 48386/99, judgment, 2 June 2005, para. 30.

17 Olanguena Awono v. Cameroon (CCPR/C/123/D/2660/2015).

18 As the Committee concluded that there had been a violation of article 14 (3) (c) of the Covenant, it

did not examine the complaints alleging a violation of article 9 (3) of the Covenant; Olanguena

Awono v. Cameroon, para. 10.4.

A/HRC/WGAD/2025/16

10

GE.25-07363

71.

The Working Group therefore considers that Mr. Olanguena’s case has already been

examined by the Human Rights Committee and should be transmitted to it, in accordance

with paragraph 33 (d) (ii) of its methods of work, so that the Committee may take such

follow-up action as it considers appropriate.

[Adopted on 3 April 2025]