Opinion; Subjects: GUATEMALA, ARBITRARY DETENTION; [WGAD: UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung, willkürliche Haft; Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire; Gruppo di lavoro sulla detenzione arbitraria]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.23-08547 (E) 090124 090124
Human Rights Council
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention at its ninety-sixth session, 27 March–5 April 2023
Opinion No. 24/2023 concerning Lilian Virginia Laparra Rivas
(Guatemala)
1.
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of
the Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution 1997/50, the Commission extended and
clarified the mandate of the Working Group. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251
and Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the
Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a
three-year period in its resolution 51/8.
2.
In accordance with its methods of work,1 on 2 December 2022 the Working Group
transmitted to the Government of Guatemala a communication concerning Lilian Virginia
Laparra Rivas. The Government replied to the communication on 20 February 2023. The
State is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
3.
The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases:
(a)
When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the
deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or her
sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);
(b)
When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or
freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and, insofar as States parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25,
26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);
(c)
When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to
the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the
relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity as to
give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);
(d)
When asylum-seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged
administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy
(category IV);
(e)
When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on
the grounds of discrimination based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,
religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability,
or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings
(category V).
1 A/HRC/36/38.
United Nations
A/HRC/WGAD/2023/24
General Assembly
Distr.: General
18 May 2023
English
Original: Spanish
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Submissions
Communication from the source
4.
Lilian Virginia Laparra Rivas is a Guatemalan national who was born on 5 January
1980. She is a lawyer by profession and usually resides in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala.
5.
Until the time of her arrest, Ms. Laparra Rivas was the Chief Prosecutor of the Office
of the Special Prosecutor against Impunity in Quetzaltenango, the second largest city in
Guatemala. Ms. Laparra Rivas is a career prosecutor who joined the Public Prosecution
Service in 2006 and gradually rose through the ranks. In 2016, she was promoted to the
position of Chief Prosecutor in the Office of the Special Prosecutor against Impunity in
Quetzaltenango after passing a competitive examination and integrity testing organized by
the Public Prosecution Service and the International Commission against Impunity in
Guatemala.
6.
According to the information received, as Chief Prosecutor of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor against Impunity in Quetzaltenango, Ms. Laparra Rivas was in charge of the
criminal prosecution of cases considered to be of importance or having far-reaching
consequences for society. Most of them were related to acts of corruption or large-scale crime
linked to illegal security forces and clandestine security organizations or criminal networks
embedded in public institutions. For example, she was in charge of the investigation into
municipal officials in Quetzaltenango who allegedly defrauded the State of approximately
US$ 10 million.
a.
Context
7.
The source indicates that, under the supervision of Ms. Laparra Rivas, the Public
Prosecution Service dismantled a network of justice officials who were leaking information
to persons accused of corruption. The case was being handled by a judge, hereinafter referred
to as Judge C., who was subsequently removed from it for impeding the progress of the
investigation. In addition, in 2018, Ms. Laparra Rivas filed an administrative complaint
against Judge C. for leaking information relating to the judicial corruption network case,
which was confidential. Judge C. had also reportedly obtained access to information relating
to a case that did not fall within his competence or jurisdiction.
8.
The source alleges that, in retaliation for having filed the administrative complaints
described above, Judge C. reported Ms. Laparra Rivas to the Attorney General’s Office for
abuse of power and abuse of authority. The case was brought to court in the city of
Quetzaltenango. However, Judge C. filed another complaint, on the basis of the same facts,
before Criminal Court No. 7 for Drug Trafficking and Environmental Offences in Guatemala
City. Ms. Laparra Rivas has therefore had to defend herself, on the basis of the same facts,
in two different cases in two different cities.
9.
According to the source, the legal case that led to the arrest of Ms. Laparra Rivas was
heard by Criminal Judge No. 7 for Drug Trafficking and Environmental Offences in the
Department of Guatemala, hereinafter referred to as Judge M. The source claims that, despite
the fact that the events took place in another city, Judge M. has continued to handle the case
and has engaged in conduct that demonstrates his lack of independence and impartiality. For
example, without notifying Ms. Laparra Rivas, he gave authorization for two individuals to
join the case as plaintiffs. He also ordered, on scant evidence, the criminal prosecution of
prosecutors who requested the closure of the case against Ms. Laparra Rivas.
10.
Ms. Laparra Rivas’ counsel filed three recusal requests in respect of Judge M. on the
basis of decisions made by him which demonstrated his bias towards the plaintiffs’ claims.
In the first recusal request, Ms. Laparra Rivas’ counsel noted, inter alia, that Judge M. was
continuing to hear the case despite the fact that a case relating to the same facts had already
been opened in Quetzaltenango. In the second recusal request, it was noted that Judge M. had
given authorization for new plaintiffs to join the case and conducted hearings without
notifying Ms. Laparra Rivas. The third recusal request, filed on 5 January 2022, was based
on the allegation that Judge M. had issued a ruling against Ms. Laparra Rivas at the hearing
and held pre-existing views on the case. The three requests were rejected by the judge and
the Appeals Chamber without consideration of the merits.
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b.
Arrest and presentation in court
11.
According to the information received, at 11 a.m. on 23 February 2022, at the request
of the Public Prosecution Service, a hearing took place at which Ms. Laparra Rivas’ counsel
was not present. The Public Prosecution Service requested the detention of Ms. Laparra
Rivas, arguing, inter alia, that it feared that she might flee the country, despite not presenting
any evidence to support that claim. In fact, Ms. Laparra Rivas had been summoned to a
hearing the following day to discuss whether Judge M. lacked competence to hear the case.
Judge M. authorized the arrest warrant based on the investigation by the Public Prosecution
Service despite there being nothing in the file that might suggest that an investigation had
been conducted.
12.
The source indicates that Ms. Laparra Rivas was arrested at approximately 5 p.m. on
23 February 2022 as she was leaving her workplace at the Office of the Special Prosecutor
against Impunity, in the Department of Quetzaltenango. The arrest warrant stated that she
was to be brought before the duty judge in Guatemala City or in the place where she was
arrested. Ms. Laparra Rivas was brought before the duty judge in the city of Quetzaltenango
at approximately 11 p.m. on 23 February. However, the court simply informed her of the
reason for her arrest and refrained from conducting the arraignment hearing, despite the fact
that Guatemalan law requires that this must take place within 24 hours of arrest. The duty
judge indicated that the arrest warrant had been issued by Criminal Court No. 7 in the
Department of Guatemala and therefore ordered her to be transferred there.
13.
Ms. Laparra Rivas was reportedly transferred to Guatemala City at approximately
1 a.m. on 24 February in a patrol car belonging to the National Civil Police. She was taken
to the detention cells at the court in Guatemala City at around 9 a.m. During the transfer,
Ms. Laparra Rivas was deprived of food and water and was held incommunicado.
14.
The source reports that, between 23 and 26 February 2022, the duty judges failed on
four occasions to hold the arraignment hearing. On the first occasion, it was reported that the
file was still being held at Criminal Court No. 7. Once the file had been transferred, on
25 February, the Public Prosecution Service requested that the hearing be postponed because
the plaintiffs were not present and allegedly had not been notified of it, despite the fact that
they had known about the arrest for more than 48 hours. The hearing was postponed again
the following day because there was no availability in the duty judge’s schedule.
Subsequently, the duty judge considered that the court did not have jurisdiction for the
arraignment hearing. On 28 February, the case was returned to Criminal Court No. 7.
Judge M. postponed the hearing on two further occasions. Finally, on 3 March, Judge M.
held the arraignment hearing, at which he issued an indictment on charges of abuse of
authority and abuse of power and ordered pretrial detention. Non-custodial measures are
permitted for the offences with which Ms. Laparra Rivas was charged. The source notes that,
to justify his decision, the judge argued that the appeals and briefs filed by Ms. Laparra Rivas
in exercise of her right to a defence demonstrated that she was unwilling to cooperate with
the criminal trial. He claimed that she was therefore a clear flight risk and that if she was
released, she would resume her criminal activities.
15.
The source alleges that since before her arrest, Ms. Laparra Rivas has been the victim
of ongoing online harassment campaigns that intensified once she was linked to the trial. In
fact, one of the plaintiffs published material about Ms. Laparra Rivas’ detention the day
before it was ordered.
c.
Trial proceedings
16.
According to the information received, on 4 April 2022, Judge M. decided to remove
himself from the case, notwithstanding the fact that he had already been the subject of three
recusal requests. Judge M. argued that he should remove himself from the case since, in a
letter made public on 3 April, Ms. Laparra Rivas stated that she had suffered violations of
her right to due process. In Judge M.’s opinion, the publication constituted an attack on his
honour and his independence as a judge. Judge M. made known to the Appeals Chamber his
decision to remove himself on 18 April, the same day that a hearing was scheduled to take
place to discuss the charges laid by the Public Prosecution Service and decide whether the
case would go to trial. As a result, the hearing was cancelled. Almost 20 days later, Appeals
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Chamber No. 3 rejected Judge M.’s decision to remove himself and confirmed that he would
continue to hear the case.
17.
The source indicates that the intermediate stage hearing was held on 7 June 2022, after
the plaintiffs filed appeals which delayed the process and that were rejected. At that hearing,
a trial was opened in connection with the charge of abuse of authority, and the charge of
abuse of power was dismissed. This decision was challenged by the plaintiffs in the case,
who considered that the judge had not provided a proper basis for his decision and that there
had been violations of legal certainty and due process.
18.
The source alleges that, under Guatemalan law, all appeals must be considered without
suspensive effect, except those relating to decisions that, by their nature, make it impossible
to continue hearing the case. Although in the present case the proceedings could have
continued, on 9 June, Judge M. decided to allow the appeals with suspensive effect, giving
rise to the postponement of the evidentiary hearing scheduled for 10 June 2022. On 6 July,
the competent court dismissed both appeals.
19.
The source emphasizes that at the intermediate stage hearing, a second request was
made for a review of the pretrial detention order. According to Guatemalan law, a review of
pretrial detention can be requested if the circumstances under which the order was originally
made have changed. In the present case, in his consideration of the request, Judge M. argued
that, in their public statements, Ms. Laparra Rivas and her counsel had demonstrated their
unwillingness to cooperate with the proceedings, giving rise to a risk of flight. He also
pointed out that there was a risk that the truth would not be uncovered if evidence could not
be obtained. He found that there had been no change in the circumstances under which the
pretrial detention had originally been ordered and that the factors that had made it necessary
to issue the detention order remained valid. He thus considered the request to be unfounded.
20.
Additionally, in the aforementioned hearing, Judge M. allegedly ordered the transfer
of Ms. Laparra Rivas to a maximum-security detention centre; the transfer was carried out
on 9 June 2022. This happened despite the fact that the prison system itself considered it to
be unfeasible to transfer her from the detention centre where she was being held and that she
herself had stated that she wished to remain there. The judge used a media report on the
conditions of detention to justify her transfer to the maximum-security centre.
21.
On 10 June 2022, Ms. Laparra Rivas reportedly filed an appeal against the decision in
which the request for a review of her detention had been declared unfounded. On 6 July, this
appeal was rejected without consideration of the merits.
22.
The source reports that the plaintiffs filed other briefs and appeals that delayed the
proceedings and which were declared unfounded. Consequently, the evidentiary hearing did
not take place until 12 August 2022, more than 60 days later than the date on which it had
originally been scheduled. At the hearing, the main part of the trial was scheduled to begin
on 28 November 2022.
d.
Context
23.
The source states that in August 2007, the United Nations and the State of Guatemala
signed an agreement on the establishment of an International Commission against Impunity
in Guatemala with a mandate to carry out investigations and criminal prosecutions alongside
the Public Prosecution Service. The Office of the Special Prosecutor against Impunity is part
of the Public Prosecution Service and was established in 2008 pursuant to the Agreement
between the United Nations and Guatemala.
24.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor against Impunity and the International
Commission against Impunity in Guatemala collaborated in the investigation and criminal
prosecution of high-profile cases in the State and were successful in dismantling criminal
organizations embedded in public institutions. For example, more than 70 highly complex
criminal networks were allegedly investigated and identified, and public officials, business
owners and members of the political class were prosecuted for corruption and illicit electoral
financing. In addition, criminal prosecutions were launched against former presidents, as well
as against leaders of various political parties and organized crime groups linked to drug
trafficking. Of the more than 120 cases overseen by the International Commission against
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Impunity in Guatemala, more than 100 were handled by the Office of the Special Prosecutor
against Impunity, resulting in more than 400 convictions of public officials.
25.
Various bodies recognized the important work of the International Commission
against Impunity in Guatemala and the Office of the Special Prosecutor against Impunity in
building the rule of law in Guatemala. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
highlighted the work of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala and the
Public Prosecution Service in the fight against corruption and impunity.
26.
The source alleges that individuals and groups whose interests were affected by the
investigations have sought impunity through the dismantling of democratic institutions and
the criminalization of activists, prosecutors and members of the judiciary who have been
involved in fighting corruption. The first such effort was the illegal expulsion from the
country of the staff of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala and the
criticism of the international treaty under which it had been established. In September 2019,
the Agreement with the United Nations was not renewed, and the International Commission
against Impunity in Guatemala was dismantled.
27.
According to the source, dozens of prosecutors, judges, journalists and activists have
been threatened, denounced and subjected to criminal prosecutions. Since 2021, at least
12 prosecutors from the Office of the Special Prosecutor against Impunity have been
removed or transferred from their positions, at least 4 have left the country for fear of reprisals
and 8 have been arrested in connection with criminal proceedings.
28.
The Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers found that
criminal law is being misused to attack public and judicial officials. The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights expressed its concern about the criminalization and
prosecution of judges, prosecutors, former prosecutors and magistrates as a form of
harassment following involvement in the investigation or prosecution of high-profile cases.
29.
The source alleges that the case of Ms. Laparra Rivas arose within this context of
criminalization in reprisal for efforts to fight corruption. The case is emblematic of the pattern
of criminalization of justice officials, journalists and activists.
i.
Categories I and III
30.
The source emphasizes that for a deprivation of liberty to have a legal basis, it is not
sufficient that there is a law authorizing it; the authorities must invoke that legal basis and
apply it to the circumstances of the case through a court order. According to article 9 (3) of
the Covenant, pretrial detention should be exceptional and of short duration, and release
should be preferred when measures are in place to ensure the presence of the accused at trial
and the execution of the judgment. When pretrial detention is prolonged, there is all the more
reason for the accused to be released pending trial.
31.
Article 9 (3) of the Covenant requires that the justification for pretrial detention be
analysed in a reasoned judicial decision in every case. The article specifies that release may
be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and,
should occasion arise, for execution of the judgment. Detention should be an exceptional
measure applied in the interests of justice. Detention that is neither reasonable nor necessary
violates article 9 (1) of the Covenant. The requirement of necessity is implicit in article 9 (3)
and sets out the conditions for the detention of any person accused of an offence.
32.
Both international and domestic law require that the need for pretrial detention must
be established, except in cases of flagrante delicto. In the present case, the source claims that
this requirement was not met, since neither the Public Prosecution Service nor Judge M.
established a factual basis or cited evidence to prove that there was a flight risk. The
Prosecution Service based its request on a “fear” of flight, without citing any evidence or
investigation, while Judge M. did not set out the reasons for his decision and simply invoked
the Code of Criminal Procedure in a generic manner.
33.
The source emphasizes that article 14 (3) (c) of the Covenant explicitly sets out the
right to be tried without undue delay caused by the State. Under Guatemalan legislation, the
time limit for first bringing an arrested person before a procedural court is 24 hours. However,
the arraignment hearing took place eight days after the arrest, for reasons beyond the control
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GE.23-08547
of Ms. Laparra Rivas and attributable to the State. As a result, the legal deadline for
complying with this obligation was disproportionately exceeded. Consequently, the source
alleges that the detention of Ms. Laparra Rivas is arbitrary under category I.
34.
The source further emphasizes that the court’s decision to order pretrial detention must
be based on an individual determination that such a measure is reasonable and necessary,
taking into consideration all the circumstances and with the aim of preventing flight,
interference with evidence or the reoccurrence of the criminal activity. The courts must
examine whether alternatives to detention, such as bail, would render custodial measures
unnecessary.
35.
Article 7 (2) of the American Convention on Human Rights establishes that no one
can be deprived of his or her physical liberty except for the reasons and under the conditions
established beforehand by the Constitution of the State party concerned or by a law
established pursuant thereto. Pretrial detention is the most severe measure that can be applied
to a person accused of an offence, which is why it must be applied only as an exceptional
measure, since it is limited by the principles of legality, presumption of innocence, necessity
and proportionality, which are essential in a democratic society. Similarly, if domestic law is
not observed when depriving a person of his or her liberty, the detention is unlawful and
breaches the Convention.
36.
In the present case, the source alleges that Ms. Laparra Rivas has been subject to
criminal prosecution for performing her duties. In the source’s opinion, it cannot be
considered an offence for a prosecutor, in the exercise of her office, to file an administrative
complaint.
37.
In addition to the foregoing, the source argues that the pretrial detention to which
Ms. Laparra Rivas has been subjected does not comply with the requirements of Guatemalan
legislation. The Guatemalan Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the personal liberty of
the accused must not be restricted except to the extent absolutely necessary to ensure that the
person being prosecuted appears in court. In the present case, Ms. Laparra Rivas had actively
participated in the proceedings against her and appeared in court on every occasion, despite
the fact that she had a full-time job and that it took her up to six hours to travel to the relevant
location. In addition, while Judge M. argued that there was allegedly a “flight risk” and “a
risk of obstruction”, Guatemalan law sets out the parameters within which these grounds can
be invoked. In Judge M.’s opinion, the fact that Ms. Laparra Rivas has filed appeals and legal
actions to defend herself constitutes evidence of her unwillingness to submit to criminal
prosecution. The source states that this constitutes a violation of the rights to effective judicial
protection and the right to a defence, as enshrined in articles 2 (3) (a) and 14 of the Covenant.
The Code of Criminal Procedure states that pretrial detention is not necessary for less serious
offences; none of the offences of which Ms. Laparra Rivas has been accused is serious.
38.
The source alleges that the detention is therefore in breach of Guatemalan law
(category I) and of international human rights law, with regard to a fair trial, in particular in
relation to the obligation to provide reasons for judicial decisions, the presumption of
innocence and the impartiality of the judge (category III).
39.
According to the source, the criteria of competence, impartiality and independence,
and in general the guarantees of a fair trial to which judges and magistrates must adhere, are
also applicable to prosecutors, who play an essential role in administering justice and
combating criminal activity. In this regard, the source highlights the relevance of the active
role of prosecutors in criminal proceedings, including institution of prosecution, the
investigation of crime, supervision over the legality of these investigations, supervision of
the execution of court decisions and the exercise of other functions as representatives of the
public interest.
40.
The requirement of an impartial tribunal, as set forth in article 14 (1) of the Covenant,
contains two elements. First, judges must not allow their judgments to be influenced by
personal bias or prejudice, nor harbour preconceptions about the particular case before them,
nor act in ways that improperly promote the interests of one of the parties to the detriment of
the other. Second, the tribunal must also appear to a reasonable observer to be impartial. A
trial affected by the participation of a judge who, under domestic statutes, should have been
disqualified cannot normally be considered to be impartial. Similarly, a situation whereby a
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court of appeal compels a judge to continue to hear a case in which he or she has declared a
manifest interest violates article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
article 14 (1) of the Covenant.
41.
In the present case, the source notes that the defence filed recusal requests in respect
of Judge M. on three occasions. Although none of the requests were granted, and despite the
fact that the Appeals Chamber later rejected them, Judge M. decided to remove himself from
further proceedings. In doing so, he invoked one of the grounds for recusal set out in law,
namely the existence of enmity between the judge and the parties because one of the parties
has harmed, or attempted to harm, the judge’s person, honour or property. The source alleges
that this provides further evidence that the judgment was biased. However, Judge M.’s
recusal was also rejected by the Appeals Chamber, and he was ordered to continue hearing
the case.
42.
According to the source, it is evident that Judge M.’s behaviour in the present case
does not meet all elements of the requirement of impartiality and that he should therefore
have been removed from the case. Likewise, since he was ordered to continue hearing the
case even after he had recused himself, the source argues that it cannot be considered that
Ms. Laparra Rivas’ trial was impartial.
43.
The source reports that there have been unjustified restrictions on the publication of
details of the hearings held during the trial. The criminal trial has been conducted behind
closed doors on the basis of capacity restrictions introduced due to coronavirus disease
(COVID-19), despite the fact that the restrictions had been lifted. At the hearing on 7 June
2022, the courthouse windows were covered with paper, blocking the view into the
courtroom. The hearings have continued to be held behind closed doors despite repeated
requests that, in the interest of the case, the press and members of the public should be
allowed to attend. The source states that articles 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and 14 (1) of the Covenant were thus violated, constituting arbitrary detention under
category III.
44.
In addition, the source notes that article 9 (4) of the Covenant guarantees the right of
anyone deprived of liberty to take proceedings before a court, in order that the court may
decide without delay on the lawfulness of the detention and order the individual’s release if
the detention is not lawful. The right to challenge the lawfulness of detention before a court
is a self-standing right, the absence of which constitutes a human rights violation. It is a
judicial remedy designed to protect personal liberty and physical integrity from arrest,
including pretrial detention or, inter alia, the risk of torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.
45.
The courts are the bodies responsible for reviewing the arbitrariness and legality of
the deprivation of liberty. In this context, both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the Covenant recognize the right of anyone charged with a criminal offence to a fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. This right is a
fundamental guarantee of the protection of other human rights. In this regard, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has indicated that the analysis by the competent
authority of a judicial remedy to assess the legality of the deprivation of liberty cannot be
reduced to a mere formality, instead it must examine the reasons invoked by the claimant and
make express statements regarding the same, according to the parameters established by the
American Convention on Human Rights.2
46.
The source states that Ms. Laparra Rivas’ counsel has twice requested a review of her
deprivation of liberty. However, Judge M. rejected the requests, allegedly because various
legal actions have been filed in exercise of the right to a defence and because of statements
made to the media by the defendant’s counsel.
47.
In the present case, the source alleges that the requests for release filed by Ms. Laparra
Rivas’s counsel were not treated in accordance with the standards of access to justice
enshrined in the Covenant, since there was no examination of the legal requirements for
maintaining pretrial detention or ordering an alternative to the custodial measure, as
2 Case of López Álvarez v. Honduras, Judgment of 1 February 2006, para. 96.
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requested by her counsel. Owing to the violation of the rights to due process and personal
liberty, as recognized in articles 14 and 9 of the Covenant, the detention of Ms. Laparra Rivas
is arbitrary under category III.
ii.
Categories II and V
48.
In the present case, the source alleges that Ms. Laparra Rivas was deprived of her
liberty because, in the exercise of her functions, she filed a disciplinary complaint against a
judge on the basis of information in her possession, which she considered to be credible,
according to which the judge in question had leaked details of judicial proceedings relating
to corruption. The exercise of one’s functions is part of the legitimate right to freedom of
opinion and of expression.
49.
The source claims that allegations of corruption can be considered protected under the
right to freedom of expression. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has
stressed that the criminal prosecution of corruption whistle-blowers violates their freedom of
expression and that they should be protected from legal sanctions, provided they have acted
in good faith.3 Similarly, persons who report possible misconduct with the aim of having the
facts investigated must be protected from reprisals. Article 33 of the United Nations
Convention against Corruption highlights the obligation to protect persons who report
corruption-related acts. In addition, justice officials have an obligation to report possible acts
of corruption to the competent authorities.
50.
In the present case, the source argues that Ms. Laparra Rivas has been deprived of her
liberty for exercising legitimate rights such as freedom of expression, the right to a defence
and the right to hold public office under equal conditions. The statements made by the victim
to the media have been used as a pretext by Judge M. to demonstrate her alleged
unwillingness to submit to criminal prosecution. In addition to being a violation of freedom
of expression, a right which is enshrined in article 19 of the Covenant, speaking to the media
does not in any way demonstrate the existence of a flight risk as established in article 262 of
the Guatemalan Code of Criminal Procedure.
51.
Similarly, Ms. Laparra Rivas was allegedly deprived of her liberty for exercising her
right to a defence and seeking effective protection of her judicial guarantees. Judge M.
reiterated at various stages of the proceedings that the filing of appeals by Ms. Laparra Rivas
was one of the reasons why she should be deprived of her liberty. In other words, Ms. Laparra
Rivas has been penalized for exercising her rights under articles 2 (3) and 14 of the Covenant.
52.
Lastly, the source emphasizes that the criminal proceedings themselves have been
instituted in reprisal for the independent exercise of public office and amount to a violation
of article 25 of the Covenant. Ms. Laparra Rivas has not been allowed to hold office under
equal conditions. She is being persecuted for her efforts to defend the rule of law and for her
investigations into corruption cases. Prosecutors, activists and, more generally, independent
justice officials have been perceived as enemies of the State. There is no rational explanation
for launching criminal proceedings against a prosecutor for filing a complaint. The factor that
sets Ms. Laparra Rivas apart is that she worked for the Office of the Special Prosecutor
against Impunity and was part of the teams who prosecuted powerful individuals.
Response from the Government
53.
The Working Group transmitted the source’s allegations to the Government on
2 December 2022. The Government requested, and was granted, an extension of the deadline
for providing its response. The Working Group received the Government’s response on
20 February 2023, within the established deadline.
54.
In its response, the Government points out the domestic legal provisions that formed
the basis for the trial, including articles 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 17 and 19 of the Constitution,
articles 1, 7, 47, 48 and 49 of the Organic Act on the Public Prosecution Service and articles
1 to 8, 11, 14, 16 and 71 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It asserts that all of them were
3 Corruption and Human Rights: Inter-American Standards, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 236, 6 December
2019, para. 417.
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respected in the case which is the subject of the present opinion. It notes that the State has a
duty to protect and guarantee life, liberty, justice, security, peace and the comprehensive
development of the individual.
55.
In this context, the Government refers to the prohibition of arbitrary detention, the
need to have a court order for detention and the guarantees of, inter alia, being brought before
the competent judicial authority, being informed of the reason for detention and the rights of
the detainee. It insists that at no time were these standards disregarded and that the right to a
defence was respected throughout.
56.
The Government refers to the content of the police report regarding the detention and
transfer of Ms. Laparra Rivas on 23 and 24 February 2022. The report reportedly states that
she was detained pursuant to an arrest warrant.
57.
Her arrest took place at 4.30 p.m. on 23 February 2022 on a public street in the
municipality of Quetzaltenango. That day, the police informed the judiciary that Ms. Laparra
Rivas was being held at the Quetzaltenango Regional Justice Centre. Additionally, at the time
of the arrest, Ms. Laparra Rivas was verbally informed of her constitutional rights in an
understandable manner. She was also provided with access to food and basic services, and a
family member was present at all stages of the proceedings.
58.
On 24 February 2022, the first instance judge sent the police an order for the
immediate transfer of Ms. Laparra Rivas and gave instructions for her to be brought before
the duty judge. On that day, Ms. Laparra Rivas was transferred to the headquarters of the
Directorate General of the Prison System.
59.
On 3 March 2022, Ms. Laparra Rivas made her first statement before the judge in
charge of the investigation. She was charged with the offences of ongoing abuse of authority,
abuse of power and giving false testimony (articles 71, 335, 418 and 460 of the Criminal
Code) and was bound over for trial in connection only with the first two offences. Pretrial
detention was ordered because there was a risk that she might flee and that the investigation
might be obstructed.
60.
The judge initially ordered her transfer to the Matamoros prison to protect her physical
integrity because of her role as a prosecutor for the Office of the Special Prosecutor against
Impunity, given that the Mariscal Zavala prison holds individuals who were investigated by
the Office. However, the defendant requested to remain in the Mariscal Zavala prison, and
the judge agreed.
61.
On 7 June 2022, the intermediate stage hearing was held, at which the judge ordered
the opening of a public oral trial for dereliction of duty and dismissed the charge of abuse of
power. On 12 August 2022, the evidentiary hearing took place.
62.
The public oral proceedings began on 28 November 2022 and concluded on
16 December 2022, when Ms. Laparra Rivas was convicted of the offence of ongoing abuse
of authority, given a prison sentence of 4 years, disqualified from holding public office and
stripped of her position as public prosecutor.
63.
On 10 January 2023, two appeals were filed by the defence: the first by the legal
representatives, and the second by Ms. Laparra Rivas acting on her own behalf with the
assistance of a third lawyer. Both appeals were admitted on 11 January 2023 and sent to the
Second Chamber of the Criminal Court of Appeal for Drug Trafficking and Environmental
Offences. The filing of the appeals meant that the judgment did not become final and the
enforcement stage was deferred.
64.
The Government indicates that Ms. Laparra Rivas was accused of abusing and taking
advantage of her position and carrying out arbitrary acts detrimental to the public
administration which violated the security, legal certainty and the rights of the presiding
judge of the First Instance Criminal Court for Drug Trafficking and Environmental Offences
in High-Risk Trials of the Department of Quetzaltenango, against whom she filed four
administrative complaints.
65.
The administrative complaints were filed before the Judicial Disciplinary Board in
Guatemala City. She is accused of having signed and sealed the four administrative
complaints in her capacity as prosecutor for the Office of the Special Prosecutor against
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Impunity, despite not being authorized to file administrative complaints. As a prosecutor, she
can act only in criminal matters, not in administrative matters.
66.
The Government further reports that Ms. Laparra Rivas made false assertions
regarding the presiding judge of the First Instance Criminal Court for Drug Trafficking and
Environmental Offences in High-Risk Trials of the Department of Quetzaltenango without
having received written instructions from, or having kept a record of having received verbal
instructions from, her immediate superior, namely the Section Chief of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor against Impunity.
67.
The Government points out that pretrial detention is regulated by article 13 of the
Constitution, and refers to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. In addition, it points
out the legal grounds for pretrial detention within the conventional framework of the
jurisprudence issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which is applied to
provide legal justification for the coercive measure imposed on Ms. Laparra Rivas.
68.
On 16 December 2022, the Court convicted Ms. Laparra Rivas and sentenced her to
4 years’ imprisonment. The Government points out that the sentence was commutable at a
rate of 10 quetzales per day and that once the sentence was rendered final, she would
immediately be released.
69.
She was not released because appeals were filed. One of them was filed by her counsel
and the other by the defendant herself with the assistance of a third lawyer. However, the law
does not allow the filing of appeals in such a manner: the power to do so lies with her counsel.
The appeal therefore violates article 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which stipulates
that an accused person cannot be defended by more than two lawyers in the same case.
70.
With regard to pretrial detention, judges have the power to order it in accordance with
the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality and exceptionality. Also relevant is the
principle of reasonable time, which applies to the criminal investigation. Some elements of
this principle can be directly applied to the present case, giving rise to the legal basis
justifying the detention of Ms. Laparra Rivas.
71.
The purpose of the reasonable time period is to prevent the accused from remaining
under investigation for a long period of time and to ensure that the investigation is concluded
promptly, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, conventional
safeguards and the rulings issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
72.
In the present case, it has been demonstrated that, from the outset of the investigation,
the accused has filed a series of procedural appeals and remedies, injunctions and requests
for recusal with the aim of delaying, prolonging or obstructing the investigation into her
conduct and has lodged procedural requests that fall outside the framework of the right to a
defence and to due process. The fact that these appeals and requests have repeatedly been
rejected on legal grounds proves that their use forms part of a delaying strategy to avoid
resolving her legal situation. An example of this is the fact that she filed a special appeal on
the merits, despite her release being a condition of the commutation of her sentence.
73.
In the present case, the Public Prosecution Service has fulfilled its constitutional
mandate to conduct public criminal prosecutions and to ensure strict compliance with the
laws of the country, in accordance with article 14 (1) of the Covenant and article 8 (1) of the
American Convention on Human Rights. The defendant’s rights to a defence and to due
process have been respected.
74.
Although article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights is entitled “Right to
a Fair Trial”, its application is not limited to trials in the strict sense, but rather to the set of
requirements that must be met at all stages of the proceedings so that individuals may
adequately defend themselves against any act by the State that may affect their rights. The
defendant has made use of all the procedural appeals and remedies available to her under the
Guatemalan legal system, many of them in a frivolous and dilatory manner; however, they
have been resolved by the relevant courts.
75.
The Government points out, in conclusion, that all of the appeals and remedies filed
by the defendant, before both the judge in charge of the investigation and the sentencing
court, have been resolved within a reasonable period of time and in accordance with the
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principle of effective protection, and that there are currently no appeals pending except for
the special appeal on the merits.
76.
The criminal trial was completed in nine months. All legal action has been taken in
line with the right to a defence and to due process and within the framework of the exercise
of public criminal prosecution, in strict compliance with the laws of the country and in
accordance with article 251 of the Constitution of Guatemala.
77.
Lastly, the Government indicates that both the judge in charge of the investigation and
the sentencing judge have dealt with the defendant’s requests for psychological and health
care, for which purpose authorization was issued for her transfer to the Guatemalan Social
Security Institute and for the involvement of the National Institute of Forensic Sciences to
assess the need for specialized medical care.
Additional comments from the source
78.
The Working Group transmitted the Government’s response to the source on
21 February 2023 and requested the source’s final comments and observations, which were
received on 8 March 2023.
79.
In the final observations, the source notes that Ms. Laparra Rivas is facing criminal
proceedings for the offence of ongoing abuse of authority, in retaliation for having reported
a judge who had been leaking information on corruption cases.
80.
The source emphasizes that, in its response, the Government limited itself to quoting
legal regulations, jurisprudence and international human rights standards, without making
any real arguments regarding the case. For example, in explaining the legal basis for the
proceedings against Ms. Laparra Rivas, the Government invokes the applicable regulations
and case law and claims that they were complied with, but does not provide any proof.
81.
With regard to the pretrial detention, the Government refers to the requirements for
the imposition thereof and asserts that it is compatible with the presumption of innocence.
However, it did not show how these requirements were met, and ultimately stated only that
pretrial detention can be ordered at the discretion of the judge.
82.
However, the judge’s discretion is limited by due process guarantees. In the present
case, at no stage, either when the pretrial detention was ordered or when the defence’s many
requests for an alternative measure to be applied were denied, was a well-founded and
motivated decision provided that would justify the ongoing detention of Ms. Laparra Rivas.
The decision has been defended using the argument that Ms. Laparra Rivas represented a
“latent risk” of flight, without indicating precisely why, or in what way she could influence
the investigation of the truth or how the possibility of her communicating with potential
witnesses could affect the proceedings. Certain requirements and standards must be met for
pretrial detention to be ordered; they include the existence of a flight risk or a risk of
obstruction of justice and ensuring that such detention is lawful, reasonable and necessary.
In its response, the Government did not demonstrate that any of these requirements were met
in the present case.
83.
The source emphasizes that the Government stated that Ms. Laparra Rivas remains in
prison because, although she was given the option to be released once the sentence became
final (through commutation of the sentence), this did not happen because her counsel filed
two appeals. The source indicates that this assertion reflects the State’s disdain for the use of
appeals to protect fundamental rights. The State does not recognize that the right to appeal a
conviction before a higher judge or court is a fundamental right and that, by ratifying the
Covenant, Guatemala has an international obligation to guarantee that right. The fact that
Ms. Laparra Rivas’ release is conditional on her agreeing to waive her right to appeal her
conviction could be considered an attempt to intimidate her into accepting the conviction and
allegedly constitutes an additional violation of her right to liberty and security of person, as
enshrined in article 9 of the Covenant.
84.
The Government highlighted the fact that Ms. Laparra Rivas filed an appeal on her
own behalf with the assistance of a different lawyer, in violation of procedural law. However,
the manner in which the appeal was filed, and even the fact that it was filed at all, is irrelevant
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because it does not serve to rebut any of the arguments surrounding the arbitrary detention
of Ms. Laparra Rivas or provide substantive grounds for ordering pretrial detention.
85.
At the time of sentencing, the judge could have ordered a substitute measure until the
judgment became final. This is because, since the sentence imposed is commutable, it is not
proportionate to keep Ms. Laparra Rivas in detention while the appeals filed against the
sentence proceed through the courts. This process can last years, possibly even longer than
the sentence imposed. For this reason, when ruling, the judge should have provided rigorous
justification for keeping Ms. Laparra Rivas in detention. However, she did not do so, even
when the defendant’s counsel again requested a review of the measure during the adequate
reparation hearing.
86.
Additionally, even if the defence team had not appealed the conviction and it had
become final, Ms. Laparra Rivas would not have been released. She was placed in pretrial
detention pending a second set of proceedings against her in Quetzaltenango launched on the
basis of the same facts as the case in which she was already convicted, a fact that even the
plaintiffs themselves have acknowledged.
87.
In the source’s opinion, it is unacceptable to impose negative consequences on
someone for exercising the right to appeal judicial decisions that violate human rights, for
example, by invoking the filing of appeals as a ground for ordering detention, as the
investigating judge did at the time, or by using it to justify the continuation of such detention.
Health concerns
88.
Since she was sent to prison, Ms. Laparra Rivas has been treated for a number of
medical conditions, including high blood pressure, hypothyroidism, hypertriglyceridemia,
hyperuricaemia and trigeminal neuralgia. Additionally, in recent months she developed
several uterine tumours that were recently diagnosed as fibroids. The fibroids have caused
severe bleeding that has affected Ms. Laparra Rivas’ health.
89.
Between December 2022 and January 2023, Ms. Laparra Rivas’ counsel requested on
at least five occasions that she be sent to a hospital to be assessed, but these requests were
rejected by the judge.
90.
Ms. Laparra Rivas did not obtain the care she required until more than three months
later. In the first instance, she was sent to a hospital where she was refused treatment.
Subsequently, she was given an appointment for almost two months later with a general
practitioner instead of a specialist. While waiting for that appointment, Ms. Laparra Rivas
was able to attend the Guatemalan Social Security Institute, where she was finally given a
diagnosis and told that she urgently required surgery.
91.
Currently, Ms. Laparra Rivas is awaiting permission and an appointment for the
surgery she needs. In the meantime, her health remains at risk, and the likelihood of her
situation worsening increases as time passes.
Discussion
92.
The Working Group thanks the source and the Government for their submissions. The
Working Group has in its jurisprudence established the ways in which it deals with
evidentiary issues. If the source has established a prima facie case for breach of international
requirements constituting arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be understood to
rest upon the Government if it wishes to refute the allegations.4 Mere assertions by the
Government that lawful procedures have been followed are not sufficient to rebut the
source’s allegations.
93.
As a preliminary matter, the Working Group notes that the source submitted additional
information in its final comments on the Government’s response. This includes additional
details about the trial, as well as information about the second case and arrest. As this
information was not included in the initial communication, it was not brought to the attention
of the Government, which therefore did not have the opportunity to comment on it. Therefore,
4 A/HRC/19/57, para. 68.
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GE.23-08547
13
the Working Group considers that, in the present case, it would not be appropriate to reach a
conclusion based on this information.
94.
The source makes a number of allegations with regard to the detention of Ms. Laparra
Rivas that could fall under categories I and III and categories II and V. With regard to
category III and the allegation of non-compliance with international standards relating to the
right to a fair trial, the Working Group notes that the appeal proceedings have not yet begun.
It is primarily for the domestic legal system to enable Ms. Laparra Rivas to obtain redress for
the alleged violations, and the appellate body should have the opportunity to rectify any
shortcomings. The Working Group notes, however, that prolonged inactivity or a failure to
act by the national higher judicial authority could give rise to additional issues under
category III.
Category I
95.
The source claims that Ms. Laparra Rivas was arrested at around 5 p.m. on
23 February 2022 and was brought before a judge at 11 p.m. the same day, at which time the
charges were explained to her. According to the source, no individualized analysis was
conducted regarding the risk of flight or the risk of obstructing the criminal proceedings, and
the judge simply invoked the Code of Criminal Procedure in a generic manner. The
Government does not rebut this allegation.
96.
The Working Group notes that article 9 (1) of the Covenant guarantees the right to
liberty and security of person. Article 9 (3) of the Covenant establishes that it shall not be the
general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject
to guarantees to appear for trial and at any other stage of the judicial proceedings. The
exceptions are strictly established, and the interpretation of these exceptions must meet the
objective of ensuring that no one is arbitrarily deprived of his or her liberty. It follows that,
in the interests of justice, freedom is recognized as a principle and pretrial detention as an
exception. In the present case, it appears that the authority did present an arrest warrant but
that the reasons for Ms. Laparra Rivas’ pretrial detention were not determined on the basis
of an individualized assessment. Instead, the judge, and the Government in its response, gave
formalistic and generalized reasons and did not explain why it was necessary to place her in
pretrial detention and deprive her of her liberty in the particular circumstances. This could
have included, for example, assessing the risk of flight or the risk of interference with the
investigation, trial or enforcement of the sentence. In the absence of a clear indication that
sufficient relevant and reasoned legal grounds for her arrest were provided, the Working
Group considers that her arrest was arbitrary, in violation of article 9 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and article 9 of the Covenant.
97.
In the present case, Ms. Laparra Rivas was held in pretrial detention for approximately
10 months. It is further noted that she was charged with a non-violent offence, namely abuse
of authority, and the need to detain her and isolate her from society was not explained, no
specific facts were cited and no alternative measures were considered. The Government did
not provide sufficient reasoning to justify what appears to be an excessive preventive
measure.
98.
Therefore, the Working Group considers that there has been a violation of article 9 of
the Covenant and concludes that the arrest and detention of Ms. Laparra Rivas was arbitrary
within the meaning of category I.
99.
On the other hand, the Working Group does not share the source’s view that the failure
to hold the arraignment hearing on the case within 24 hours of arrest, as prescribed by
domestic law, automatically renders the detention arbitrary under international law.
According to the information received, Ms. Laparra Rivas was brought before a judge who
explained the nature of the charges against her within six hours of her arrest.
Category II
100.
The Working Group notes that the source has made two arguments under category II.
Firstly, the source alleges that Ms. Laparra Rivas has been kept in prolonged detention for
exercising her legitimate right to a defence, since the investigating judge pointed out her
numerous appeals as one of the reasons why she should be deprived of her liberty. Secondly,
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the source claims that the criminal proceedings were launched and the detention imposed in
reprisal for her role as a whistle-blower in the investigation of corruption offences and that
she has been punished for exercising her freedom of expression by filing an administrative
complaint against a judge involved in cases she had been investigating.
101.
With regard to the first allegation, not only did the Government not refute it, but, on
the contrary, in its response it reproaches Ms. Laparra Rivas for having filed procedural
appeals and remedies and requested interim measures with the aim of delaying or obstructing
the investigation against her and making use of those defence mechanisms as a delaying
strategy to avoid resolving the case.
102.
The Working Group recalls that article 14 of the Covenant guarantees the right of
accused persons to defend themselves in person or through legal assistance of their own
choosing. While the defence strategy chosen by the petitioner and her lawyers might have
implications for assessing the reasonableness of the length of the criminal proceedings
against her, the Working Group cannot accept that deprivation of liberty is an adequate and
proportional response in such a situation.
103.
The Working Group therefore concludes that the deprivation of liberty of Ms. Laparra
Rivas was arbitrary under category II, as it resulted from her exercise of the rights guaranteed
by article 14 (3) (d) of the Covenant.
104.
With regard to the source’s allegation concerning freedom of expression, the Working
Group notes that the present case concerns a public official, namely a prosecutor, exercising
her functions, rather than informing the general public about corruption issues or acting as
an informant, as suggested by the source. Irrespective of whether or not she engaged in abuse
of authority, of which she was subsequently accused, the Working Group is of the opinion
that she acted within what she understood to be the performance of her professional duties,
rather than in exercise of her rights.
Categories III and V
105.
The Working Group notes that the source has alleged a violation of the right to a fair
trial in connection with the obligation to give reasons for judicial decisions, the presumption
of innocence and the impartiality of the judge. However, the Working Group has not received
sufficient information to reach a conclusion under category III. The appeal process remains
pending, which highlights the importance of national judges being primarily responsible for
ensuring the legality of the proceedings and safeguarding, inter alia, judicial guarantees and
the right to liberty and security of the person. Furthermore, the Working Group does not
consider that the source has established prima facie evidence of discrimination intended to
or likely to result in disregard of the equality of human beings under category V.
Concluding remarks
106.
The Working Group wishes to place on record its serious concern regarding the state
of Ms. Laparra Rivas’ physical and mental health. While the Working Group acknowledges
the Government’s submissions concerning the provision of health care, it wishes to remind
the Government that article 10 of the Covenant requires that all persons deprived of their
liberty must be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
Disposition
107.
In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:
The deprivation of liberty of Lilian Virginia Laparra Rivas, being in
contravention of article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 9
and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is arbitrary and
falls within categories I and II.
108.
The Working Group requests the Government of Guatemala to take the steps
necessary to remedy the situation of Ms. Laparra Rivas without delay and bring it into
conformity with the relevant international norms, including those set out in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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15
109.
The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the
case, the appropriate remedy would be to release Ms. Laparra Rivas and accord her an
enforceable right to compensation and other reparations, in accordance with international
law.
110.
The Working Group urges the Government to ensure a full and independent
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of
Ms. Laparra Rivas and to take appropriate measures against those responsible for the
violation of her rights.
111.
The Working Group requests the Government to disseminate the present opinion
through all available means and as widely as possible.
Follow-up procedure
112.
In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group requests
the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in follow-up
to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including:
(a)
Whether Ms. Laparra Rivas has been released and, if so, on what date;
(b)
Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to Ms. Laparra
Rivas;
(c)
Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of Ms. Laparra
Rivas’ rights and, if so, the outcome of the investigation;
(d)
Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made to
harmonize the laws and practices of Guatemala with its international obligations in line with
the present opinion;
(e)
Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.
113.
The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may
have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and
whether further technical assistance is required, for example through a visit by the Working
Group.
114.
The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the
above-mentioned information within six months of the date of transmission of the present
opinion. However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up
to the opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action
would enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in
implementing its recommendations, as well as of any failure to take action.
115.
The Working Group recalls that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all States
to cooperate with the Working Group and has requested them to take account of its views
and, where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken.5
[Adopted on 3 April 2023]
5 Human Rights Council resolution 51/8, paras. 6 and 9.