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A/HRC/WGAD/2022/37

Opinion No. 37/2022 concerning Alina López Miyares (Cuba)

UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung (WGAD) · 2022-04-08 · en UN

Opinion; Subjects: CUBA, ARBITRARY DETENTION; [WGAD: UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung, willkürliche Haft; Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire; Gruppo di lavoro sulla detenzione arbitraria]

Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)

GE.22-09986 (E) 100123 100123

Human Rights Council

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention

Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary

Detention at its ninety-third session, 30 March–8 April 2022

Opinion No. 37/2022 concerning Alina López Miyares (Cuba)

1.

The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of

the Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution 1997/50, the Commission extended and

clarified the mandate of the Working Group. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251

and Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the

Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a

three-year period in its resolution 42/22.

2.

In accordance with its methods of work,1 on 18 November 2021 the Working Group

transmitted to the Government of Cuba a communication concerning Alina López Miyares.

The Government replied to the communication on 17 February 2022. The State is not a party

to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

3.

The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases:

(a)

When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the

deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or her

sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);

(b)

When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or

freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and, insofar as States parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25,

26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);

(c)

When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to

the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the

relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity as to

give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);

(d)

When asylum-seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged

administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy

(category IV);

(e)

When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on

the grounds of discrimination based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,

religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability,

or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings

(category V).

1 A/HRC/36/38.

United Nations

A/HRC/WGAD/2022/37

General Assembly

Distr.: General

24 June 2022

English

Original: Spanish

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Submissions

Communication from the source

4.

Alina López Miyares is a national of Cuba and the United States of America and was

59 years old at the time of her arrest. It is reported that Ms. López Miyares suffers from

kidney failure and skin problems.

5.

Ms. López Miyares was arrested by military forces at the airport in Cuba in January

2017 as she was returning to the United States after visiting her family. The authorities

reportedly produced a warrant, issued by the Military Prosecutor’s Office, for her arrest on

suspicion of espionage under article 97 of the Criminal Code. Ms. López Miyares was taken

to an unknown location. According to the source, it was not possible to locate her because of

the lack of available information on the case, something that the authorities have denied. It

is also unclear what kind of treatment she received in the 48 hours following her arrest.

6.

According to the source, while the arrest was not violent, the requirements of due

process were not met, insofar as a precautionary measure was imposed on a civilian by a

military court. These actions allegedly prevented Ms. López Miyares from having access to

a lawyer from the beginning of her detention and made it impossible for her to challenge the

legality of her arrest. Furthermore, she had no contact with her family in the months following

her arrest because government authorities refused to provide any information on her case and

the reasons for her detention. The source claims that, owing to the lack of information from

the Government, it is not known when Ms. López Miyares first had contact with her defence

lawyer or when she was first brought before a judge.

7.

The charges filed by the Military Prosecutor’s Office were based on the alleged

relationship between Ms. López Miyares and her husband and the intelligence agencies of

the United States. Against this backdrop, the source claims that after her arrest, without the

presence of a lawyer and under coercion and torture, Ms. López Miyares was forced to

confess to giving insignificant and obsolete information to her husband, who is under

investigation for espionage and who allegedly worked for the Government as an operative of

the General Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior and was a reserve military

officer and a diplomatic official at the Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations in

New York.

8.

The source claims that the Military Prosecutor’s Office did not have any material

evidence to support the charges. However, after several months in illegal detention, and

unable to mount a defence, Ms. López Miyares was tricked into giving evidence to the

Military Prosecutor’s Office on the false promise of a reduced sentence. Her government-

appointed lawyer convinced her to ask her family in the United States to send her one of her

notebooks, which contained notes and certain names.

9.

According to the information received, Ms. López Miyares was held in pretrial

detention for nine months, from January to October 2017, when she was tried and sentenced

to 13 years’ imprisonment.

10.

The trial, which took place on the morning of 2 October 2017, lasted a few hours and

was held behind closed doors, out of public view. During the trial, Ms. López Miyares was

unable to present evidence or see the evidence presented against her. She was forced to accept

the representation of a government-appointed lawyer, rather than a lawyer of her choice.

According to the information received, the government-appointed lawyer, who was from a

collective law firm, demanded thousands of dollars for representing her. However, the source

claims that the lawyer has not communicated with Ms. López Miyares’ family or with her

lawyer in the United States, a failure suspected to be motivated by fear of reprisals from the

Government.

11.

The source claims that since her arrest, Ms. López Miyares has not been given access

to the consular assistance or representation to which she is entitled as a citizen of the United

States.

12.

The judgment describes how the relationship between Ms. López Miyares and her

husband developed, and states that, upon their marriage, he confessed to her his former role

as an officer in the intelligence services of the Government of Cuba. Ms. López Miyares,

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who travelled regularly between Cuba and the United States, was allegedly later contacted

by officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA). According to the judgment, Ms. López Miyares’ husband revealed to her the names

of Cuban agents with whom he had worked in the United States and divulged information

about their activities. The judgment also emphasizes that, from the beginning of the

investigation, Ms. López Miyares provided detailed statements describing her activities in

order to assist in clarifying the facts. The judgment also states that the defendant has criticized

the social process in Cuba in the past. Lastly, the judgment shows that the lawyer

acknowledged the facts on Ms. López Miyares’ behalf, drew attention to her cooperation and

remorse and requested a reduced sentence below the minimum set out in law.

13.

Ms. López Miyares was sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment. In response, on 9

October 2019 her defence lawyer requested a judicial review of decision No. 109 of 2017,

which set out her conviction and allegedly specified that there were no grounds for appeal.

The lawyer argued that 13 years’ deprivation of liberty was a disproportionate penalty

because it was not commensurate with the seriousness of the offence or the defendant, and

that there had not, therefore, been an adequate use of judicial discretion in accordance with

article 402 of the Military Criminal Procedure Act. The judicial review was allegedly

rejected, and in Cuba there is no higher judicial body with which an appeal may be lodged.

14.

The source claims that after having been imprisoned in the Manto Negro maximum

security women’s prison and the Western Women’s Prison from the outset of her pretrial

detention until her sentencing, Ms. López Miyares is currently being held in a minimum-

security camp in the province of Artemisa, where she is working as a teacher while serving

her sentence.

15.

The source claims that, owing to her arbitrary detention, Ms. López Miyares’ health

is deteriorating significantly and rapidly. She has suffered substantial hair loss and skin

discolouration. These symptoms require immediate medical attention, which the authorities

have allegedly denied her. The source highlights the risk to her health and safety.

16.

The source alleges that even once she has been released and has received proper health

care, Ms. López Miyares is likely to face lifelong health problems owing to her prolonged

detention. The source claims that Ms. López Miyares’ detention is not only arbitrary and in

violation of international standards, but that it also puts her life at risk because she is denied

the health care and vital medicines that she so urgently needs. Owing to the coronavirus

disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the Government’s refusal to allow access to her, her

family has also been unable to provide her with medicines and other necessary supplies.

Category I

17.

According to the source, the authorities claim that the grounds for Ms. López Miyares’

deprivation of liberty can be found in national legislation. The offence of espionage is set out

in article 97 (1) of the Criminal Code, which does not distinguish between roles or

perpetrators, stating that the offence is committed by “any person who, to the detriment of

the security of the State, participates in or collaborates or maintains relations with the

intelligence services of a foreign State, or provides them with information, or obtains or

procures information for the purpose of communicating it to such services ...”. The source

claims that, since this was not a military offence, Ms. López Miyares should have been tried

and, if appropriate, deprived of liberty in accordance with civilian law.

18.

The source claims that the proceedings against Ms. López Miyares are criminal in

nature and that the competence of the civilian courts is clearly defined under the Criminal

Procedure Act, article 4 of which states that “[t]he people’s criminal courts are responsible

for hearing cases arising from the commission of ordinary punishable acts and acts against

the security of the State and for issuing declarations in respect of persons who pose a danger”.

However, the source claims that officials in Cuba informed Ms. López Miyares’ family that

the case was political in nature and that the defendant has been told repeatedly not to

communicate with her lawyer in the United States.

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Category III

19.

The source alleges violations of Ms. López Miyares’ rights under articles 9, 10 and

11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and under articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant,

which Cuba signed on 28 February 2008.

20.

The source claims that the prosecution of civilians by military courts is incompatible

with article 14 of the Covenant because it does not meet the standard of the fair, impartial

and independent administration of justice.

21.

The source claims that the Western Territorial Military Court should have referred the

case to the corresponding people’s court, as established in the Military Offences Act, Act

No. 22 of 15 February 1979, article 2 of which states: “Military offences are committed by:

(a) members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the Youth Work Brigade or the Ministry

of the Interior, in active military service; (b) reservists, when instructed to perform military

tasks or duties ...” The source claims that, at the time of the alleged facts under investigation,

those criteria did not apply to Ms. López Miyares, or to the member of her family who also

stands accused by the Military Prosecutor’s Office, who was retired.

22.

Moreover, the source claims that the criminal sanction imposed in this case of alleged

espionage was extremely severe given that the intelligence allegedly supplied was not

serious, and that the 13-year prison sentence given to Ms. López Miyares was excessive and

disproportionate.

23.

The source claims that the sanction was directly prejudiced by the substantial violation

of the Criminal Procedure Act caused by the military investigation process, which is

incompatible with international human rights law.

24.

According to the information received, in Cuban military judicial proceedings a

defence can be mounted only belatedly, because lawyers are unable to intercede until the

investigation has concluded. In the case at hand, that provision left Ms. López Miyares unable

to defend herself, thereby violating her right to due process, the adversarial principle and

equality of arms, which requires that both parties are present during investigation proceedings

in order to monitor them effectively.

25.

The source emphasizes that, although the oral hearing is deemed the most important

part of criminal proceedings, it must be remembered that it is during the preparatory or

investigative phase that the evidence that will form the basis of the charges and that will be

presented to the judge is obtained. Given that the sanction imposed does not reflect the gravity

of the offence or the nature of the defendant, it must be concluded that proper use of judicial

discretion was not made.

26.

The source claims that the military court also failed to take into account or value Ms.

López Miyares’ positive and rigorous attitude towards clarifying the facts. Furthermore, the

judge did not consider the mitigating circumstance described in article 52 (ch) of the Criminal

Code, as provided for in article 54 (1), on the extraordinary circumstances for the mitigation

of a sanction. Article 54 (1) allows for a reduction of up to half the minimum sanction, which

in this case could have been up to five years, since the minimum penalty for the offence for

which Ms. López Miyares was sentenced is 10 years’ imprisonment.

Response from the Government

27.

On 18 November 2021, the Working Group transmitted the source’s allegations in

relation to the case of Ms. López Miyares to the Government and requested it to provide

detailed information on the case in its response. The Working Group requested the

Government to clarify the factual and legal grounds for Ms. López Miyares’ detention and

explain how it is compatible with the human rights obligations of Cuba.

28.

The Working Group also urged the Government of Cuba to fulfil its duty to ensure

her physical and mental integrity. In the context of the global pandemic, and in accordance

with the World Health Organization recommendations concerning the response to COVID-

19 in places of detention, the Government was urged to prioritize the use of non-custodial

measures at all stages of criminal proceedings, including during the pretrial phase, the trial,

sentencing and sentence enforcement.

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29.

The Government submitted its response to the Working Group on 17 February 2022,

setting out the legal and social context in which the events surrounding Ms. López Miyares’

detention took place. In its response, the Government explains to the Working Group that

Ms. López Miyares is a Cuban citizen who has resided in the United States since 1966 and

who has maintained a permanent residence in Cuba since 2016 after having submitted a

repatriation application in 2015.

30.

Ms. López Miyares married a Cuban citizen, a lieutenant colonel in the reserves who,

during his active professional life, had access to classified information relating to State

security. The Government highlights that although he had joined the reserves, he was subject

to a lifelong allegiance agreement owing to the classified nature of the information that he

possessed.

31.

The Government claims that Ms. López Miyares began to travel regularly to Cuba

from the United States and was visited at her home by officials of the United States special

services, specifically the FBI and the CIA, during one of those trips in November 2011. She

informed her spouse of the visit.

32.

According to the Government, the agents offered to guarantee residency permits in

the United States for Ms. López Miyares and her daughter in exchange for information on

her husband’s work.

33.

The Government informs the Working Group that Ms. López Miyares met with

several FBI officials, who set out the information that they required. Ms. López Miyares did

indeed pass on to them the sensitive information disclosed by her husband, for which, it is

claimed, she received payments of up to US$ 10,000. Additionally, Ms. López Miyares

arranged for her husband to leave the country illegally using funds given to her by FBI agents

during her last trip to Cuba.

34.

With regard to the source’s claims in relation to category I, the Government states that

Ms. López Miyares’ detention complies not only with Cuban criminal law, but also with its

obligations under international legal instruments. The Government claims that the

Constitution establishes and guarantees access to justice, due process and effective judicial

remedies to protect the rights of all persons, and that an investigation into Ms. López

Miyares’ detention has confirmed that the source’s allegation with regard to category I is

false.

35.

The Government informs the Working Group that Ms. López Miyares was arrested at

6 p.m. on 15 January 2017 for her involvement in an offence of illegal departure from the

territory. The complaint was filed by the relevant body of the Ministry of the Interior. The

Government’s response clarifies that the investigation and proceedings are subject to military

jurisdiction in line with the provisions of the Military Criminal Procedure Act of 1977

relating to cases involving charges against military officials, even if one of the participants

in the offence is a civilian. Persons who leave active military service after the events in

question are also subject to the jurisdiction of the military courts.

36.

The Government claims that Ms. López Miyares was brought before a judge on 18

January 2017, within the applicable 72-hour time frame, that a preliminary case file was

opened on the possible offence of disclosure of State security secrets, which is set out and

sanctioned under articles 95 (1) and (2) (a) of the Criminal Code, and that she was placed in

pretrial detention at 10 a.m.

37.

The Government denies that Ms. López Miyares was held in an unknown location.

Moreover, it claims that she was notified immediately of the decision to place her in pretrial

detention, during which she was detained in the Western Women’s Prison. The Government

also asserts that she was informed of her right to lodge a complaint with a higher body within

five days and that she did so on 19 January 2017, when she submitted a written complaint to

the Military Prosecutor appealing the precautionary measure under article 107 of the Military

Criminal Procedure Act. On 21 January at 4 p.m., within the time frame provided for in article

271 of the aforementioned Act, she was informed that her appeal had been rejected since the

assumptions on which her pretrial detention was based remained valid.

38.

The Government claims that during the investigation process, and in response to a

request made by Ms. López Miyares to her mother, documentary evidence of the offences

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with which she was charged was sent from Miami. This was submitted voluntarily for

inclusion in the investigation. Moreover, Ms. López Miyares acknowledged that her husband

had given her the documents so that she could pass on information to the United States special

services.

39.

Similarly, the Government rejects the allegation that Ms. López Miyares was forced

to accept the representation of a government-appointed lawyer instead of a lawyer of her

choice. It states that, on 15 May 2017, Ms. López Miyares entered into legal services contract

No. 130,181 with a specialist at a collective law firm located on 5a between 110A and 112

in Playa, Havana, with an instruction fee of 415 Cuban pesos. It is untrue that she was

required to pay thousands of dollars for representation.

40.

Moreover, the Government claims that Ms. López Miyares examined her file jointly

with her lawyer on 8 August 2017 for 2 hours and 10 minutes, after which they stated that

they did not consider it necessary to extend the investigation phase.

41.

The Government also informs the Working Group that Ms. López Miyares stated

freely that she understood the charges and acknowledged the facts as set out in the statements

made during the preparatory phase. She also became a collaborating witness, providing

details of her actions, the sequence of her contacts with the officers of the United States

special services, names, identifications using photographs, meeting places and topics of

discussion. This information was essential for clarifying the facts. Ms. López Miyares

continued to cooperate with the judges, who noted her genuine remorse for her actions.

42.

In its reply, the Government dismisses the source’s claims, stating that Ms. López

Miyares is currently serving her sentence in a minimum-security facility where she is able to

enjoy ordinary home leave for five days or more; indeed, it was for that reason that she was

transferred to the facility, known as Ceiba 4, in Artemisa. Furthermore, Ms. López Miyares’

sentence has been reduced on six occasions, including two reductions totalling 350 days,

allowing her to take repeated leaves of absence from the prison.

43.

In addition to the above, Ms. López Miyares worked in the prison’s medical unit and

as an English teacher at its training facility. She also studied and successfully completed

training courses in accounting, physiotherapy and crafts officially recognized by the Ministry

of Public Health, the Ministry of Education and the Cuban Association of Artisans and

Artists.

44.

The Government maintains that while serving her sentence, Ms. López Miyares has

been treated in compliance with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the

Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) and the United Nations Rules for the

Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the

Bangkok Rules). Her physical and mental integrity and human dignity have been respected

at all times, following good practices to protect and promote her rights and safety, in

accordance with national legislation.

45.

The Government contends before the Working Group that its submission, which is

organized by date, sets out the facts clearly and addresses each and every one of the source’s

claims.

Additional comments from the source

46.

In accordance with its working methods, the Working Group communicated the

Government’s response to the source, which submitted its additional comments on 15 March

2022.

47.

In its additional comments, the source reiterates the facts described initially, adding

that Ms. López Miyares was deceived during the proceedings and is in poor health.

48.

The source expands on the information submitted by pointing out facts such as Ms.

López Miyares’ enforced disappearance and the violation of the constitutional and human

right of all citizens to due process.

49.

The source has conducted a legal analysis of the jurisdiction and competence of the

courts that tried Ms. López Miyares and determined that she is being arbitrarily detained

under categories I and III.

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Discussion

50.

The Working Group thanks the source and the Government for their submissions.

51.

In determining whether Ms. López Miyares’ deprivation of liberty is arbitrary, the

Working Group has regard to the principles established in its jurisprudence to deal with

evidentiary issues. If the source has established a prima facie case for breach of international

human rights law constituting arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be understood

to rest upon the Government if it wishes to refute the allegations.2 Mere assertions by the

Government that lawful procedures have been followed are not sufficient to rebut the

source’s allegations.

52.

Resolution 1991/42 of the Human Rights Council mandates the Working Group to

investigate cases of arbitrarily imposed deprivation of liberty. In fulfilling this mandate, the

Working Group refers to the international human rights standards established, insofar as

Cuba is concerned, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the present case, the

Working Group takes note of the Government’s claims that the proceedings against Ms.

López Miyares were conducted in compliance with Cuban law. However, even when

detention is carried out in conformity with domestic legislation, the Working Group must

assess whether it was consistent with international human rights law.3

Category I

53.

Having received information from the source and the Government on the

circumstances, the Working Group has examined the legality of the arrest and detention in

the light of voluntarily accepted international instruments, seeking to interpret or qualify

domestic proceedings only insofar as they affect the State’s international obligations, as

stated previously in the Working Group’s jurisprudence.4

54.

The Working Group has established that, in accordance with articles 1, 8, 9 and 10 of

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and principle 10 of the Body of Principles for the

Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, all arrested persons

must be informed of the reasons for their arrest and of the judicial avenue by which they can

challenge its lawfulness.5 The reasons for the arrest must include the legal basis and factual

specifics to indicate the substance of the complaint and the wrongful act committed. These

reasons are understood to be the official basis for the arrest, not the subjective motivations of

the arresting officer.6

55.

In the present case, the source claims that Ms. López Miyares was arrested on

suspicion of espionage on a warrant issued by the Military Prosecutor’s Office. For its part,

the Government has contested that claim by informing the Working Group that “Alina López

Miyares was arrested at the Criminal Investigation and Operational Division for her

participation in the offence of illegal departure from the national territory. The complaint of

illegal departure was filed by the relevant body of the Ministry of the Interior.” There is

therefore a significant discrepancy between the reasons for Ms. López Miyares’ detention as

cited by the source and those put forward by the Government, which have not been duly

clarified.

56.

In that regard, the documentation submitted states that Ms. López Miyares was

detained on the orders of the Ministry of the Interior, and that the Government claims that

“this investigation and the corresponding action falls under military jurisdiction, as provided

for in the Military Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 relating to cases involving charges against

military officials, even if one of the participants in the offence is a civilian”. In the opinion

of the Working Group, this provision and the corresponding action are in direct contravention

of the fundamental guideline set out by the Working Group in its report to the Human Rights

2 A/HRC/19/57, para. 68.

3 Opinions No. 10/2018, para. 39; No. 4/2019, para. 46; No. 46/2019, para. 50; and No. 5/2020,

para. 71.

4 See opinion No. 43/2021.

5 Opinions No. 78/2020, paras. 42 and 43; and No. 82/2020, paras. 39 and 40.

6 A/HRC/30/37, annex, principle 7.

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Council on the subject of military justice. 7 In the Working Group’s view, there is an

irreconcilable contradiction of values in the make-up of military courts, the main effect of

which is not the denial of justice, but rather a direct injustice. One of the core values of a

civilian judge is his or her independence, while the most appreciated value in a military

official is exactly the opposite: his or her obedience to his or her superiors.8

57.

The Working Group notes with concern that Ms. López Miyares, a civilian, has been

detained and tried by a military court, in violation of the Working Group’s guidance on the

minimum guarantees that military justice must not fail to respect, in that military tribunals

should only be competent to try military personnel for military offences, and if civilians have

also been indicted in a case, military tribunals should not try military personnel or,

consequently, civilians.9 It follows from this statement that Ms. López Miyares’ arrest and

detention violated the basic principles of international human rights law enshrined in the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, since military law cannot form the legal basis for

the deprivation of liberty of a civilian. Therefore, such deprivation of liberty falls under

category I.

58.

The source claims that Ms. López Miyares was missing for several days. The Working

Group reiterates that enforced disappearance is considered to be the arrest, detention,

abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or

groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State,

followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate

or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection

of the law, there being no minimum time frame, however short, for it to be considered that

an enforced disappearance has occurred (article 2 of the International Convention for the

Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance). The Government claims that Ms.

López Miyares was not missing for several days, asserting that she was, in fact, brought

before the competent authority within 72 hours. However, international human rights

standards specify that the maximum time frame for bringing a detained person before the

competent authority is 48 hours and make clear that any delay must be absolutely exceptional

and justified.10 This situation contravenes article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights and principles 11 and 37 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons

under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment. Similarly, the Working Group recalls that in

order to be considered as having a legal basis, the legality of a detention must be overseen by

a judge, not a prosecution or security body, as has happened in this case.11

59.

According to the information received, Ms. López Miyares was held in pretrial

detention for nine months, from January to October 2017, when she was tried and sentenced

to 13 years’ imprisonment. The Working Group considers such a delay to be excessive and

contrary to the very nature of a democratic State governed by the rule of law, and to be in

breach of international human rights law, given that it violates the right to the presumption

of innocence and the right to personal liberty. These rights render pretrial detention

incompatible with conventions, since the presumption of innocence and personal liberty form

the backbone of the right to due process. The Working Group reiterates that the presumption

of innocence is guaranteed in article 11 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

and principle 36 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form

of Detention or Imprisonment.

60.

Moreover, the Working Group recalls that pretrial deprivation of liberty, as a

precautionary and non-punitive measure, must also comply with the principles of legality,

necessity and proportionality to the extent strictly necessary in a democratic society. It may

be imposed only within the limits strictly necessary to ensure that the efficient undertaking

of investigations is not impeded nor the action of justice evaded, and provided that the

competent authority substantiates and confirms the fulfilment of the aforementioned

7 A/HRC/27/48, paras. 66−71.

8 Ibid., para. 67.

9 Ibid., paras. 66–71.

10 Opinions No. 20/2019, para. 66; No. 26/2019, para. 89; No. 36/2019, para. 36; No. 56/2019, para. 80;

and No. 76/2019, para. 38.

11 Opinions No. 32/2020, para. 44; and No. 33/2020, para. 75.

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requirements. Owing to the particularly restrictive nature of pretrial detention, its imposition

should be the exception, rather than the rule. The exceptional nature of pretrial detention is a

consequence of the presumption of innocence, according to which, in principle, all persons

subject to trial must be tried at liberty. Liberty must be recognized as the general rule or

principle, and pretrial detention as an exception in the interests of justice.

61.

The Working Group also recalls that in order to demonstrate that a detention is indeed

lawful, any detained person has the right to challenge its lawfulness before the court, as

provided for in articles 6 and 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Receiving this

information is a self-standing human right essential to preserving legality in a democratic

society.12 Its absence constitutes a violation of principles 2, 4 and 10 of the Body of Principles

for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment. Moreover,

in accordance with the United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and

Procedures on the Right of Anyone Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before

a Court, this right constitutes a peremptory norm of international law that applies to all forms

of deprivation of liberty.13

62.

The Working Group also recalls that any form of detention or imprisonment should

be ordered by a judicial authority in keeping with the law or be immediately subjected to the

effective control of that authority, whose status and remit should afford the strongest possible

guarantees of competence, impartiality and independence, in accordance with principle 4 of

the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or

Imprisonment. The Working Group notes that Ms. López Miyares has not received

guarantees of effective judicial oversight of the necessity and proportionality of her detention

by an independent and impartial authority.14

63.

In view of the foregoing, the Working Group notes that Ms. López Miyares’ detention

was arbitrary, in violation of her rights as protected by articles 3 and 9 of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, and falls under category I.

Category III

64.

The Working Group notes that the source has submitted both personal statements and

legal analysis regarding domestic legal decisions. In that regard, the Working Group recalls

that it has consistently refrained from replacing the national judicial authorities or acting as

a kind of supranational tribunal when it is urged to review the application of domestic law by

the judiciary. In that sense, reassessing the sufficiency of the evidence or addressing errors

of law allegedly committed by the domestic courts is beyond the scope of the Working

Group’s powers. In accordance with its mandate, the Working Group must assess whether

the rights guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were respected when

Ms. López Miyares was detained and, where required, to recommend to the State the

necessary adjustments to its domestic legislation to bring it into line with the principles set

out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other rules of international law

accepted by the State.

65.

The Working Group reiterates its objection to the fact that Ms. López Miyares was

brought before a military court despite being a civilian; as previously noted, such an act is

unacceptable under international law. The Working Group stresses that international law on

personal liberty permits the restriction of that right in appropriate circumstances, but only

when decisions regarding arrest and detention are made by an external authority, that is, a

competent, independent and impartial judiciary. This is procedurally inherent in the right to

personal liberty and security and the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty under

articles 3, 9 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and principles 2, 4 and 6

of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or

Imprisonment.

12 A/HRC/30/37, paras. 2 and 3. See also opinions No. 1/2017, No. 6/2017, No. 8/2017, No. 30/2017,

No. 2/2018, No. 4/2018, No. 42/2018, No. 43/2018, No. 79/2018 and No. 49/2019.

13 A/HRC/30/37, para. 11.

14 Ibid., annex, principles 2 and 6.

A/HRC/WGAD/2022/37

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GE.22-09986

66.

The Working Group notes that Ms. López Miyares holds a second nationality in

addition to Cuban nationality, obliging Cuba to allow her to benefit from the presence of her

respective consul, in accordance with articles 5 (e), (i) and (j) and 36 of the Vienna

Convention on Consular Relations, signed by Cuba on 24 April 1963 and ratified on 15

October 1965. Consular assistance, which is invaluable for citizens with dual nationality,

plays an important role in monitoring the applicable procedures; the Working Group

therefore ties the right to consular assistance together with the right to legal assistance.

Confidentiality is implicit in the right to consular assistance. The information received by the

Working Group suggests that Ms. López Miyares has not benefited from this right, which is

enshrined in rule 62 (1) of the Nelson Mandela Rules and principle 16 (2) of the Body of

Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment;

consequently, the rules of international law relating to due process guarantees have been

breached.15

67.

The Government maintains that Ms. López Miyares’ trial fully respected the

procedural guarantees set out in the Cuban Constitution and other laws and informs the

Working Group that she examined her file, together with her lawyer, and proceeded to

cooperate with the authorities. In that connection, the Working Group takes note of the

information provided by the Government regarding the contract signed by Ms. López

Miyares with her lawyer on 15 May 2017 and her examination, with her legal representative,

of her file on 8 August 2017. The Working Group therefore notes with concern that Ms.

López Miyares did not receive legal aid from the time of her arrest on 15 January 2017 until

15 May 2017, leaving her without legal assistance or access to a lawyer for four months.

68.

The Working Group highlights that principle 18 (3) of the Body of Principles for the

Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment and rule 61 (1) of

the Nelson Mandela Rules stipulate clearly that a defendant must have access to legal counsel

without delay. As the Working Group has stated, principle 9 and guideline 8 of the United

Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right of Anyone

Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court 16 establish that persons

deprived of their liberty should have the right to legal assistance by counsel of their choice,

at any time during their detention, including immediately after the moment of apprehension,

and that upon apprehension, all persons should be promptly informed of this right. Access to

legal aid should not be unlawfully or unjustifiably restricted, as has happened in the case of

Ms. López Miyares.

69.

Furthermore, the Working Group notes that, as claimed by the source, Ms. López

Miyares was detained illegally for several months and unable to mount a defence. It has not

been possible to establish when she contacted her defence lawyer, although the Government

claims, without providing evidence, that she did so on several occasions. The Working Group

notes that the information received suggests that Ms. López Miyares did not have a defence

lawyer of her choice from the moment she was deprived of her liberty, and it recalls that

detainees must receive immediate legal assistance to provide them with independent and

appropriate guidance in making legal decisions. Once again, the Working Group emphasizes

that the presence of a lawyer from the first moment of an arrest guarantees the right to

challenge the legality of the detention before a court, which is a self-standing human right

and a peremptory norm of international law from which there can be no derogation.17 This

right applies irrespective of the place of detention or the legal terminology used in the relevant

legislation; therefore, any form of deprivation of liberty on any ground must be subject to

effective oversight and control by the judiciary.

70.

The foregoing leads the Working Group to conclude that Ms. López Miyares did not

receive a fair trial in line with the principle of equality of arms, particularly given that military

judges and prosecutors often fail to meet the fundamental requirements of independence and

impartiality. She was also denied the time and facilities necessary to prepare her defence, in

15 Opinion No. 81/2021, para. 55.

16 A/HRC/30/37.

17 A/HRC/22/44, para. 49.

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GE.22-09986

11

violation of articles 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, rendering her

detention arbitrary under category III.

Decision

71.

In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:

The deprivation of liberty of Alina López Miyares, being in contravention of

articles 3, 9, 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is arbitrary and

falls within categories I and III.

72.

The Working Group requests the Government of Cuba to take the steps necessary to

remedy the situation of Ms. López Miyares without delay and bring it into conformity with

the relevant international norms, including those set out in the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights.

73.

The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the

case, the appropriate remedy would be to release Ms. López Miyares immediately and accord

her an enforceable right to compensation and other reparations, in accordance with

international law.

74.

The Working Group urges the Government to ensure a full and independent

investigation of the circumstances surrounding the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of Ms.

López Miyares and to take appropriate measures against those responsible for the violation

of her rights.

75.

The Working Group requests the Government to disseminate the present opinion

through all available means and as widely as possible.

Follow-up procedure

76.

In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group requests

the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in follow-up

to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including:

(a)

Whether Ms. López Miyares has been released and, if so, on what date;

(b)

Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to Ms. López

Miyares;

(c)

Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of Ms. López

Miyares’ rights and, if so, the outcome of the investigation;

(d)

Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made to

harmonize the laws and practices of Cuba with its international obligations in line with the

present opinion;

(e)

Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.

77.

The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may

have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and

whether further technical assistance is required, for example, through a visit by the Working

Group.

78.

The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the above-

mentioned information within six months of the date of transmission of the present opinion.

However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up to the

opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action would

enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in

implementing its recommendations, as well as any failure to take action.

79.

The Working Group notes that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all States

to cooperate with the Working Group and requested them to take account of its views and,

A/HRC/WGAD/2022/37

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where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily

deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken.18

[Adopted on 8 April 2022]

18 Human Rights Council resolution 42/22, paras. 3 and 7.