Opinion; Subjects: IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF), TÃRKÄ°YE, ARBITRARY DETENTION; [WGAD: UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung, willkürliche Haft; Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire; Gruppo di lavoro sulla detenzione arbitraria]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.21-08506(E)
Human Rights Council
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention at its ninetieth session, 3–12 May 2021
Opinion No. 15/2021 concerning Nasibe Shamsaei (Islamic Republic of
Iran and Turkey)
1.
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of
the Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution 1997/50, the Commission extended and
clarified the mandate of the Working Group. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251
and Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the
Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a
three-year period in its resolution 42/22.
2.
In accordance with its methods of work,1 on 11 January 2021 the Working Group
transmitted to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Government of Turkey
a communication concerning Nasibe Shamsaei. The Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran did not reply to the communication on time, while the Government of Turkey replied to
the communication on 10 March 2021. Both States are parties to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.
3.
The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases:
(a)
When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the
deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or her
sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);
(b)
When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or
freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and, insofar as States parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25,
26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);
(c)
When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to
the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the
relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity as to
give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);
(d)
When asylum seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged
administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy
(category IV);
(e)
When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on
the grounds of discrimination based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,
religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability,
1 A/HRC/36/38.
United Nations
A/HRC/WGAD/2021/15
General Assembly
Distr.: General
23 June 2021
Original: English
A/HRC/WGAD/2021/15
2
or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings
(category V).
Submissions
Communication from the source
4.
Nasibe Shamsaei, born in 1984, is a national of the Islamic Republic of Iran, architect
and women’s rights activist. She usually resides in Teheran. Ms. Shamsaei fled from the
Islamic Republic of Iran to Turkey in February 2020 and faces deportation after having been
arrested in Istanbul.
5.
According to the information received, since 2016 Ms. Shamsaei had engaged in
virtual activities expressing her opinion against the compulsory use of the hijab in the Islamic
Republic of Iran. In 2018, she climbed the highest peak in the country, Mount Damavand,
and took off her scarf for a picture in solidarity with the “Girls of Revolution Street”, who
had participated in protests against the compulsory hijab in 2017. After that, she continued
her activities in the form of civil protest in the city and crowded places, buses and subways,
in defence of political prisoners and protesting against the forced hijab. She was also in a
“White Wednesdays” video, in which she could be seen handing out white flowers to women
passengers in the Tehran metro, to show solidarity with Nasrin Sotoudeh, a prominent human
rights lawyer who was in prison.
6.
Ms. Shamsaei was arrested at her home in Tehran on 18 June 2019. Allegedly, the
arresting officers did not show a warrant, nor did they cite legislation or reasons for such
deprivation of liberty. The source reports that eight men and a woman blindfolded her and
drove her to an unknown location. She was then charged with insulting the sanctities of
Islamic society and colluding against national security, collaborating with dissident
networks, and engaging in propaganda activity against the Government. She was transferred
to solitary confinement in Evin Prison for, among other things, removing her hijab in public
places and insulting the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
7.
Ms. Shamsaei allegedly spent 15 days in solitary confinement, undergoing repeated
daily interrogations and experiencing psychological pressure and harassment. Her family was
not aware of her whereabouts. She was then transferred to Qarchak Prison in Varamin.
8.
In August 2019, the first trial hearing took place at Branch 28 of the Islamic
Revolutionary Court. Ms. Shamsaei was reportedly convicted of all charges and sentenced to
12 years in prison. The source claims that she was denied the right to a lawyer throughout
the proceedings, and her family was prohibited from attending court. In addition, Ms.
Shamsaei was forced to sign a paper without being given the opportunity to read it; it stated
that she was unable to post bail.
9.
After three weeks before the Court of Appeals, Ms. Shamsaei’s sentence was
suspended for five years. She was released on parole from Qarchak Prison in October 2019.
Ms. Shamsaei went to the prosecutor’s office to recover belongings that had been confiscated
from her house on the day of the arrest, including laptops, mobile telephones, hard drives,
and passports. Once there, she found out that the prosecutor had reissued the 12-year prison
sentence and that the 5-year suspension had been revoked.
10.
Ms. Shamsaei left the Islamic Republic of Iran and entered Turkey through the
mountains at the border near Maku, Islamic Republic of Iran around May 2020. Once in
Istanbul, Turkey, she was kept hidden by a smuggler for six months, without contact with
anyone, with the promise that she would be able to travel to another country, in Europe, to
seek asylum. On 5 November 2020, Ms. Shamsaei, in possession of a fake passport, was
arrested by the Turkish police at the Istanbul airport while she was trying to reach another
country in Europe to seek asylum.
11.
Ms. Shamsaei was transferred to a location in Fatih, Turkey, where conditions were
unpleasant and dirty; there she endured inhuman treatment by unknown people. She was then
transferred to the Edirne removal centre. On the second day in Edirne, she had to resist
attempts to force her to sign an order for deportation to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
A/HRC/WGAD/2021/15
3
a.
Alleged violations in respect of the Islamic Republic of Iran
i.
Category II
12.
The source claims that the Islamic Republic of Iran has violated Ms. Shamsaei’s right
to freedom of expression under article 19 of the Covenant, which is also protected under
article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Freedom of expression is essential
for the full development of an individual. In its general comment No. 34 (2011), the Human
Rights Committee described the right as a foundation stone for every democratic society and
the vehicle for the exchange and development of ideas. The Committee has recognized that
this freedom includes the right of individuals to criticize or openly and publicly evaluate their
Governments without fear of interference or punishment.2
13.
Ms. Shamsaei allegedly expressed her views regarding the hijab in the Islamic
Republic of Iran in various ways. The source argues that expressing her opinion regarding
banning the wearing of the hijab and her criticism of the Government cannot be classified as
insulting or as propaganda against the Government.
14.
Although the right is not absolute, the source insists that there is no arguable basis for
the violation of Ms. Shamsaei’s right to freedom of expression in this case. Article 19 (3) of
the Covenant provides that freedom of expression may be restricted only when provided by
law and necessary for respect of the rights or reputations of others, for the protection of
national security or of public order, or of health or morals. The Human Rights Committee
has interpreted this limitation narrowly, noting that such restrictions must not jeopardize the
right itself. The Committee has held that government limitations must be for one of the
enumerated purposes and must meet a strict test of justification.3
15.
According to the source, the Government has no legitimate grounds for restricting Ms.
Shamsaei’s right to freedom of expression. As an anti-hijab activist, Ms. Shamsaei peacefully
expressed her views and the Government failed to meet the strict requirements of article 19
(3) of the Covenant. Thus, the source alleges that the rights of Ms. Shamsaei under article 19
were violated.
ii.
Category III
16.
The source claims that the detention of Ms. Shamsaei by the Islamic Republic of Iran
amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty under category III. Due process is one of the
tenets of the right to a fair trial. The minimum international standards of due process are
established in the Covenant, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Body of
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment,
and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson
Mandela Rules).
17.
Article 9 (1) of the Covenant, which confirms the right to liberty and freedom from
arbitrary detention, states that no one is to be deprived of his or her liberty except on such
grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. This right is
reiterated in principles 2 and 36 (2) of the Body of Principles and article 9 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Article 9 (2) of the Covenant requires that anyone who is
arrested must be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for the arrest and be promptly
informed of any charges. The source informs the Working Group that, both under the
Constitution and under the Code of Criminal Procedure, an arrest warrant must be issued
prior to any arrest.
18.
In the case of Ms. Shamsaei, it is alleged that no warrant was presented to her at the
time of her arrest. Hence, her rights under article 9 (1) of the Covenant were violated.
19.
The source states that, in accordance with article 9 (3) of the Covenant, detainees must
be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial
power to challenge the legality of their continued detention. In its general comment No. 35
(2014), the Human Rights Committee provides that a public prosecutor cannot be considered
2 Marques de Morais v. Angola (CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002), para. 6.7.
3 Park v. Republic of Korea (CCPR/C/64/D/628/1995), para. 10.3.
A/HRC/WGAD/2021/15
4
as an officer exercising judicial power under article 9 (3). Aside from acting as a guarantee
against arbitrary detention, these provisions also safeguard other related rights, such as
freedom from torture. Reportedly, under the Code of Criminal Procedure an accused person
can be detained for a maximum of 24 hours without a detention order, but a judge must issue
a temporary detention order to detain an accused person for longer than 24 hours.
20.
The source indicates that after Ms. Shamsaei’s arrest on 18 June 2019, she was not
brought promptly before a judge to challenge the legality of her detention. Rather, she was
brought before a judge only after six months of detention. By denying Ms. Shamsaei prompt
access to an unbiased judge to challenge the legality of her detention, the Islamic Republic
of Iran allegedly violated article 9 (3) and 9 (4) of the Covenant, and principles 4, 11, 32 (1)
and 37 of the Body of Principles.
21.
Article 14 (3) (c) of the Covenant guarantees that every defendant must have the right
to be tried without undue delay. As stated by the Human Rights Committee in its general
comment No. 32 (2007), an important aspect of the fairness of a hearing is its
expeditiousness, and in cases where the accused are denied bail by the court, they must be
tried as expeditiously as possible. In addition, this guarantee relates not only to the time
between the formal charging of the accused and the time by which a trial should commence,
but also the time until the final judgement on appeal. The right to be tried without undue
delay is reiterated in principle 38 of the Body of Principles. Article 37 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure requires that all orders for temporary detention be reasonable and based on
documents, and must state the reasons for the detention and the right for the detainee to
object. It also stipulates that if an extension is required, a judge must renew the court order
for temporary detention after a month, stating the reasons and providing documentation;
otherwise the accused must be released with proper bail.
22.
The source claims that Ms. Shamsaei was arrested on 18 June 2019 but her trial did
not begin for six months. There was no basis for the long delay between Ms. Shamsaei’s
arrest and her initial hearing. As such, it alleges that the Islamic Republic of Iran violated
article 14 (3) (c) of the Covenant and principle 38 of the Body of Principles.
b.
Allegations in respect of Turkey
i.
Category II
23.
The source submits that Ms. Shamsaei has been deprived of liberty as a result of the
exercise of the rights guaranteed under article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, according to which everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution.
24.
Turkey allegedly held Ms. Shamsaei in detention at the Edirne removal centre on the
grounds that she had entered the territory illegally, namely, without permission. Ms.
Shamsaei’s intention was to seek asylum and she fled to Turkey from the Islamic Republic
of Iran owing to the 12-year prison sentence imposed on her. Ms. Shamsaei’s administrative
arrest allegedly violated her rights under article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
ii.
Category III
25.
The source states that article 14 (3) (d) of the Covenant guarantees the right to legal
defence by stating that those charged with a criminal offence have the right to be tried in their
presence, and to defend themselves in person or through legal assistance of their own
choosing. In addition, article 14 (3) (b) of the Covenant guarantees such defendants the right
to communicate with counsel of their own choosing. In its general comment No. 35, the
Human Rights Committee clarified that the guarantee requires that the accused be granted
prompt access to counsel, and that States parties should permit and facilitate access to counsel
for detainees in criminal cases from the outset of their detention.
26.
The source claims that Ms. Shamsaei was not allowed to communicate with her lawyer
when she was under administrative arrest at the Edirne removal centre.
A/HRC/WGAD/2021/15
5
iii.
Category IV
27.
Finally, the source states that at the time of submission of the communication, Ms.
Shamsaei was being held in administrative detention in the Edirne removal centre, and had
been there since 15 November 2020. She faced prolonged detention as a refugee and was not
granted any remedies. She filed a petition before domestic courts for her release from
administrative detention; the first and second instance courts rejected the application. The
source alleges that the prolonged administrative detention of Ms. Shamsaei violates her rights
under category IV.
Response from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
28.
On 11 January 2021, the Working Group transmitted the allegations from the source
to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran under its regular communications
procedure. The Working Group requested the Government to provide, by 12 March 2021,
detailed information about the current situation of Ms. Shamsaei and to clarify the legal
provisions justifying her detention, as well as its compatibility with the State’s obligations
under international human rights law, in particular with regard to the treaties ratified by the
State.
29.
The Working Group regrets that it did not receive a response from the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Iran on time. The Government did not request an extension of the
time limit for its reply, as provided for in paragraph 16 of the Working Group’s methods of
work. The Government submitted a response on 1 June 2021, after the adoption of the present
opinion.
Response from the Government of Turkey
30.
On 11 January 2021, the Working Group transmitted the allegations from the source
to the Government of Turkey under its regular communications procedure. The Working
Group requested the Government to provide, by 12 March 2021, detailed information about
the current situation of Ms. Shamsaei and to clarify the legal provisions justifying her
continued detention, as well as its compatibility with the State’s obligations under
international human rights law, in particular with regard to the treaties ratified by the State.
Moreover, the Working Group called upon the Government to ensure the physical and mental
integrity of Ms. Shamsaei.
31.
On 10 March 2021, the Government of Turkey submitted its reply. The Government
explains that on 5 November 2020, Ms. Shamsaei was apprehended at the Istanbul airport on
suspicion that exit stamps in her passport had been forged. In the interview conducted with
her at airport security, she stated that she had entered Turkey illegally, that she had purchased
a forged passport in the Islamic Republic of Iran and that she herself had forged a stamp in
her passport at the airport. The relevant public prosecutor’s office ordered her statement to
be taken, as she was considered a suspect in relation to the offence of counterfeiting official
documents.
32.
Ms. Shamsaei’s forged passport was confiscated and her statement was taken in the
presence of an interpreter. Prior to making the statement, she was informed of her legal rights.
Ms. Shamsaei did not request defence counsel and confirmed the statement she had provided
at the airport.
33.
On 6 November 2020, the Directorate General of Migration Management in Istanbul
issued a removal decision and ordered administrative detention on the grounds that she had
breached the rules of entry into and exit from Turkey, and posed a threat to public order and
a risk of absconding, in accordance with the Law on Foreigners and International Protection.
Ms. Shamsaei was informed of the decisions in Farsi through an interpreter. She did not
appeal against the decisions. She was placed in the Edirne removal centre by the Directorate
General of Migration Management in Edirne.
34.
The Government states that in an interview with Ms. Shamsaei, on 15 November
2020, she specified that she had not faced any violence or ill-treatment from the authorities
in Turkey. Ms. Shamsaei also has not lodged any such complaint with the relevant authorities.
A/HRC/WGAD/2021/15
6
She was also able to meet with and be represented by her lawyers when she was under
administrative detention at the removal centre.
35.
On 15 December 2020, her administrative detention was ended on the condition that
she check in with the removal centre every two weeks; she currently resides in Turkey.
36.
The Government considers that Ms. Shamsaei’s detention was not arbitrary and was
in accordance with international human rights law. The Government underlines that Ms.
Shamsaei is no longer in administrative detention and was able to apply for legal remedies
and benefit from legal aid. It therefore submits that the allegations put forward in the
communication letter should be dismissed.
Further comments from the source
37.
The reply of the Government of Turkey was transmitted to the source for further
comments, which it submitted on 22 March 2021. The source confirms that Ms. Shamsaei
was released on 15 December 2020, but argues that immigration detention should be
gradually abolished as migrants in an irregular situation have not committed any crime.
Hence, Ms. Shamsaei as a migrant in an irregular situation did not commit any crime by how
she entered Turkey, and should not have been detained.
38.
The source also contests the decision of the Government to order administrative
detention in this case on the grounds that she had breached the rules of entry into and exit
from Turkey and posed a threat to public order and a risk of absconding, in accordance with
the Law on Foreigners and International Protection. The source submits that if there must be
administrative detention, the principle of proportionality requires it to be the last resort, and
strict legal limitations must be observed and judicial safeguards provided. According to the
source, the Government failed to show how the principle of proportionality was met with
respect to the administrative detention of Ms. Shamsaei between 15 November and 15
December 2020. The fact that Ms. Shamsaei was released from administrative detention after
one month does not preclude the Working Group from rendering an opinion as to whether
the administrative detention was arbitrary or not.
39.
The source reiterates that Ms. Shamsaei was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment
in the Islamic Republic of Iran and therefore fled to Turkey as a step towards seeking asylum
in another country in Europe. However, despite the fact that she is facing 12 years of
imprisonment, the Government of Turkey issued a decision of removal on the grounds that
she allegedly posed a threat to public order and a risk of absconding, under the Law on
Foreigners and International Protection. The decision of removal is the result of Ms.
Shamsaei’s exercise of the right to seek asylum, as she had fled to Turkey in an attempt to
seek asylum in another country in Europe. The source submits that the right to seek asylum
is a human right under article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Owing to its
decision of removal and by not allowing her to leave Turkey to seek asylum in other
countries, the Government of Turkey has allegedly violated Ms. Shamsaei’s rights under
article 12 (1) and (2) of the Covenant and article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Ms. Shamsaei reportedly did not apply for asylum protection in Turkey because
Turkey is not safe for her, as many Iranians who have fled to Turkey have been deported
back to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
40.
The source further argues that the principle of non-refoulement, prohibiting the return
of a refugee to a territory where his or her life or freedom is threatened, is considered a rule
of customary international law. As such it is binding on all States, regardless of whether they
have acceded to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or the Protocol relating to
the Status of Refugees. A refugee seeking protection must not be prevented from entering a
country, as this would amount to refoulement.
41.
Turning to the Government’s claim that Ms. Shamsaei was granted a lawyer and that
she did not claim any remedy, the source insists that it is incumbent on the Government to
submit evidence proving that the right to a lawyer was granted. The source also highlights
that the Government failed to submit evidence proving that Ms. Shamsaei did not claim any
remedy.
A/HRC/WGAD/2021/15
7
42.
The source concludes by requesting the Working Group to find a violation of the rights
referred to in the submission, including article 12 of the Covenant, and that it conclude that
Ms. Shamsaei must be released immediately and unconditionally and must be allowed to
leave Turkey.
Discussion
43.
Before proceeding to examine the allegations in relation to the two States, the
Working Group must address a preliminary issue, noting that Ms. Shamsaei is no longer
being detained following her release from administrative detention in Turkey on 15
December 2020.
44.
The Working Group considers that the application raises serious allegations
concerning the arrest, detention, trial and treatment of Ms. Shamsaei in the Islamic Republic
of Iran. Given the lengthy imprisonment she would face there, the Working Group has no
doubt that Ms. Shamsaei would be detained should she return. Therefore, it will proceed to
consider the case vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic of Iran in accordance with paragraph 17 (a)
of its methods of work.
45.
Equally, although Ms. Shamsaei has been released, she was nevertheless detained in
Turkey and the allegations raised by the source are serious. The Working Group therefore
will proceed to consider the case also vis-à-vis Turkey, in accordance with paragraph 17 (a)
of its methods of work.
Allegations in respect of the Islamic Republic of Iran
46.
In the absence of a timely response from the Government, the Working Group has
decided to render the present opinion, in conformity with paragraph 15 of its methods of
work.
47.
In determining whether Ms. Shamsaei’s detention was arbitrary, the Working Group
has regard to the principles established in its jurisprudence to deal with evidentiary issues. If
the source has established a prima facie case for breach of international law constituting
arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be understood to rest upon the Government if
it wishes to refute the allegations. 4 In the present case, the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran has chosen not to challenge the prima facie credible allegations made by the
source.
48.
The source has argued that the arrest and detention of Ms. Shamsaei was arbitrary and
falls under categories II and III of the Working Group. The Working Group shall examine
these allegations in turn.
a.
Category I
49.
While the source has not made submissions under category I, the Working Group
observes that Ms. Shamsaei was arrested on 18 June 2019 and that no arrest warrant was
presented to her. Upon arrest, she was taken to an undisclosed location where she was
charged, although it is unclear as to which authority was charging her. The Government has
chosen not to contest these allegations.
50.
The Working Group recalls that a detention is considered arbitrary under category I if
it lacks legal basis. As it has previously stated, for a deprivation of liberty to have a legal
basis, it is not sufficient for there to be a law that might authorize the arrest. The authorities
must invoke that legal basis and apply it to the circumstances of the case through an arrest
warrant.5 Indeed, international law protecting against arbitrary deprivation of liberty includes
the right to be presented with an arrest warrant, which is procedurally inherent in the right to
liberty and security of person and the prohibition of arbitrary detention under articles 3 and
9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 9 of the Covenant and principles 2,
4 and 10 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of
4 A/HRC/19/57, para. 68.
5 See opinions No. 46/2017, No. 66/2017, No. 75/2017, No. 79/2018 and No. 35/2018.
A/HRC/WGAD/2021/15
8
Detention or Imprisonment.6 Detention and any form of imprisonment should be ordered by,
or be subject to the effective control of, a judicial or other authority under the law whose
status and tenure should afford the strongest possible guarantees of competence, impartiality
and independence, in accordance with principle 4 of the Body of Principles. In the present
case, Ms. Shamsaei was arrested without a warrant, in clear violation of her rights under
article 9 (1) and (2) of the Covenant.
51.
The Working Group notes the uncontested submissions that upon her arrest, Ms.
Shamsaei was taken to an unknown location and that subsequently her family did not know
of her whereabouts (see para. 7 above).
52.
The Working Group considers that this amounted to incommunicado detention. It
recalls its consistent jurisprudence confirming that holding persons incommunicado violates
their right to be brought before a court under article 9 (3) of the Covenant and to challenge
the lawfulness of their detention before a court under article 9 (4) of the Covenant.7 This view
is consistent with that of the Human Rights Committee, which, in paragraph 35 of its general
comment No. 35, stated that incommunicado detention that prevented prompt presentation
before a judge inherently violated article 9 (3). The Working Group recalls that judicial
oversight of detention is a fundamental safeguard of personal liberty8 and is essential in
ensuring that detention has a legal basis. Given that Ms. Shamsaei was unable to contact
anyone, including her lawyer, which is an essential safeguard to ensure the ability of any
detainee to personally challenge his or her detention, her right to an effective remedy under
article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 2 (3) of the Covenant was
also violated.
53.
Ms. Shamsaei was allegedly charged at the undisclosed location, although it is unclear
by which authority. Under no circumstances can the Working Group accept that all these
events constituted a properly executed arrest whereby the legal safeguards to ensure Ms.
Shamsaei’s right not to be subjected to arbitrary detention as stipulated in article 9 (1) and
(2) of the Covenant were observed. The Working Group therefore concludes that her
detention violated articles 9 (1) and (2) of the Covenant.
54.
Furthermore, in accordance with article 9 (3) of the Covenant, anyone arrested or
detained on a criminal charge must be brought promptly before a judge or other officer
authorized by law to exercise judicial power. As the Human Rights Committee has noted, 48
hours is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy the requirement of bringing a detainee “promptly”
before a judge or other officer authorized by law following an arrest; any longer delay must
remain absolutely exceptional and be justified under the circumstances.9
55.
Furthermore, any detainee has the right to challenge the lawfulness of his or her
detention before a court, as provided for in article 9 (4) of the Covenant. The Working Group
wishes to recall that the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention before a court is a self-
standing human right that is essential to preserve legality in a democratic society.10 This right,
which is in fact a peremptory norm of international law, applies to all forms of deprivation
of liberty,11 including not only to detention for purposes of criminal proceedings but also to
situations of detention under administrative and other fields of law, including military
detention, security detention, detention under counter-terrorism measures, involuntary
confinement in medical or psychiatric facilities, migration detention, detention for
extradition, arbitrary arrests, house arrest, solitary confinement, detention for vagrancy or
drug addiction, and detention of children for educational purposes.12 Moreover, it also applies
irrespective of the place of detention or the legal terminology used in the legislation. Any
6 Opinions No. 88/2017, para. 27; No. 3/2018, para. 43; and No. 30/2018, para. 39.
7 See, e.g., opinions No. 79/2017, No. 45/2017, No. 46/2017, No. 11/2018 and No. 35/2018.
8 A/HRC/30/37, para. 3.
9 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35, paras. 32–33.
10 A/HRC/30/37, paras. 2–3.
11 Ibid., para. 11.
12 United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right of Anyone
Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court, para. 47 (a).
A/HRC/WGAD/2021/15
9
form of deprivation of liberty on any ground must be subject to effective oversight and
control by the judiciary.13
56.
In the present case, the Working Group notes the uncontested allegations that Ms.
Shamsaei was arrested on 18 June 2019 but was not presented before the judicial authority
until some months later, when her trial commenced in August 2019. The Government had
the opportunity to explain reasons for such a delay, but it has chosen not to do so. In these
circumstances the Working Group finds that the detention of Ms. Shamsaei violated articles
9 (3) and (4) of the Covenant. It also violated her rights under article 8 of the Universal
Declaration and article 2 (3) of the Covenant as she was denied an effective remedy.
57.
Noting all the above, the Working Group concludes that the detention of Ms.
Shamsaei is arbitrary under category I, as lacking a legal basis.
b.
Category II
58.
The source has submitted, and the Government has not contested, that Ms. Shamsaei
was arrested, detained, tried, and sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment purely for exercising
her freedom of opinion and expression.
59.
The Working Group recalls that freedom of opinion and freedom of expression as
expressed in article 19 of the Covenant are indispensable conditions for the full development
of the person; they are essential for any society and constitute the foundation stone for every
free and democratic society.14 The Human Rights Committee has further stated that the
freedom of expression includes the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of
all kinds, regardless of frontiers. That right includes the expression and receipt of
communications of every form of idea and opinion capable of transmission to others,
including political opinions.15
60.
In the present case, the Government had the opportunity to explain the detention and
subsequent charges against Ms. Shamsaei, but has chosen not to do so. The source, on the
other hand, has explained her arrest and detention as being based on her activities as a
women’s rights activist, taking active part in expressing her opinion against the compulsory
use of the hijab in the Islamic Republic of Iran. There is no evidence that her activities have
been anything but peaceful nor is there any evidence of her inciting others to violence.
61.
It is therefore clear to the Working Group that the basis for the arrest and subsequent
detention of Ms. Shamsaei was her freedom of opinion and expression. While freedom of
expression is not an absolute right, the Human Rights Committee has stated in its general
comment No. 34 that when a State party imposes restrictions on the exercise of freedom of
expression, these may not put in jeopardy the right itself. Moreover, it stipulates that article
19 (3) may never be invoked as a justification for the muzzling of any advocacy of multi-
party democracy, democratic tenets and human rights. The permitted restrictions on the right
may relate either to respect of the rights or reputations of others or to the protection of national
security or of public order (ordre public) or of public health or morals. In the same general
comment, the Committee stipulates that restrictions are not allowed on grounds not specified
in article 19 (3), even if such grounds would justify restrictions to other rights protected in
the Covenant. Restrictions must be applied only for those purposes for which they were
prescribed and must be directly related to the specific need on which they are predicated.
62.
The Working Group also considers that Ms. Shamsaei was arrested, detained, tried,
and sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment for peacefully exercising her rights under articles
18 and 25 of the Covenant, namely, freedom of conscience and the right to take part in public
affairs. Although the right to freedom of conscience also is not absolute, the Working Group
notes that the permitted exceptions to the restrictions are the same as those under article 19
(3) of the Covenant. Article 25, however, does not permit any unreasonable restrictions on
the right to participate in public affairs.
13 Ibid., para. 47 (b).
14 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 34, para. 2.
15 Ibid., para. 11.
A/HRC/WGAD/2021/15
10
63.
In accordance with the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals,
Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, everyone has the right, individually and in association with
others, to promote and to strive for the protection and realization of human rights and to draw
public attention to the observance of human rights.16 The source has demonstrated that Ms.
Shamsaei was detained for the exercise of her rights under that Declaration. The Working
Group has in the past concluded that being a human rights defender is a status protected by
article 26 of the Covenant.17
64.
The Working Group wishes to express its concern over the types of crimes that Ms.
Shamsaei was charged with and appears to have been ultimately sentenced for, which
included such vaguely formulated offences as “insulting the sanctities of Islamic society”,
“colluding against national security”, “collaborating with dissident networks” and
“propaganda activity against the Government”.
65.
The Working Group reiterates that the principle of legality requires that laws be
formulated with sufficient precision so that individuals may have access to and understand
the law and regulate their conduct accordingly.18 The Working Group further notes that laws
that are vaguely and broadly worded may have a deterrent effect on the exercise of the rights
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of opinion and expression, freedom
of peaceful assembly and association, participation in political and public affairs, equality
and non-discrimination, and protection of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities, as they have the potential for abuse, including the arbitrary deprivation of
liberty.19 In the present case, the vaguely formulated offences of “insulting the sanctities of
Islamic society”, “colluding against national security”, “collaborating with dissident
networks” and “propaganda activity against the Government” were used to stifle the freedom
of expression legitimately exercised by Ms. Shamsaei.
66.
The Working Group consequently finds that the detention of Ms. Shamsaei resulted
from her legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and conscience, opinion and expression,
and her participation in public affairs, as protected by articles 18, 19 and 25 of the Covenant,
and was therefore arbitrary, falling under category II. The Working Group refers the case to
the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion
and expression.
c.
Category III
67.
Given its finding that the deprivation of liberty of Ms. Shamsaei was arbitrary under
category II, the Working Group wishes to emphasize that her trial should not have taken
place. However, the trial did take place, Ms. Shamsaei was sentenced to 12 years of
imprisonment and the source has made numerous allegations concerning violations of her
fair trial rights, none of which are contested by the Government.
68.
The Working Group initially notes the circumstances of Ms. Shamsaei’s arrest, which
involved numerous officials who blindfolded her and took her to an undisclosed location,
following which she was transferred to solitary confinement in Evin Prison. While in solitary
confinement, she was subjected to repeated daily interrogations and psychological pressure
and harassment. The interrogations took place in the absence of Ms. Shamsaei’s lawyer and
her family members were not informed of her whereabouts. The Working Group notes the
absence of response from the Government to any of these allegations.
69.
The Working Group recalls that the right to legal assistance must be ensured from the
moment of deprivation of liberty and, in the context of the criminal justice setting, prior to
questioning by the authorities.20 Ms. Shamsaei’s right to legal assistance under article 14 (3)
(b) of the Covenant was thus violated, as she was repeatedly interrogated in the absence of
16 Articles 1 and 6 (c). See also General Assembly resolution 74/146, para. 12.
17 See, e.g., opinions No. 48/2017, No. 50/2017, No. 88/2017, No. 19/2018 and No. 36/2020, and
A/HRC/36/37, para. 49.
18 See, e.g., opinion No. 41/2017, paras. 98–101. See also opinion No. 62/2018, paras. 57–59.
19 Opinion No. 10/2018, para. 55.
20 A/HRC/45/16, para. 51.
A/HRC/WGAD/2021/15
11
her lawyer. This right was further violated, as were her rights under article 14 (3) (d), when
she was also denied legal assistance during her trial before Branch 28 of the Islamic
Revolutionary Court in August 2019.
70.
Furthermore, the treatment of Ms. Shamsaei during and following her arrest gives rise
to concern over the compliance of the Islamic Republic of Iran with article 7 of the Covenant.
The Working Group therefore refers the case to the Special Rapporteur on torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment for appropriate action.
71.
The source alleges that Ms. Shamsaei was held in solitary confinement for 15 days
following her arrest. In accordance with rule 45 of the Nelson Mandela Rules, the imposition
of solitary confinement must be accompanied by certain safeguards. Solitary confinement
must be used only in exceptional cases as a last resort, for as short a time as possible, subject
to independent review, and authorized by a competent authority. These conditions do not
appear to have been observed in the present case. The Working Group also recalls that
prolonged solitary confinement in excess of 15 consecutive days is prohibited under rules 43
(1) (b) and 44 of the Nelson Mandela Rules.21
72.
The Working Group further finds that the failure by the authorities to allow Ms.
Shamsaei to notify her family of her whereabouts is a violation of principles 16 (1) and 19 of
the Body of Principles. Although the source has not submitted that the trial was conducted
behind closed doors, the Working Group also notes that Ms. Shamsaei’s family was not
allowed to be present at her trial and the Government has not provided any explanation for
this. The Working Group reminds the Government that article 14 (1) of the Covenant requires
trials to be conducted in public.
73.
Finally, the Working Group considers that Ms. Shamsaei was not afforded the right
to be tried without undue delay, given that some six months elapsed between her arrest and
trial. The reasonableness of any delay in bringing a case to trial must be assessed in the
circumstances of each case, taking into account the complexity of the case, the conduct of
the accused, and the manner in which the matter was dealt with by the authorities.22 The delay
in bringing Ms. Shamsaei to trial was unacceptably long, given the Working Group’s findings
under category II above, and therefore in violation of articles 9 (3) and 14 (3) (c) of the
Covenant. As noted, it is clear that Ms. Shamsaei should never have been detained for the
peaceful exercise of her rights under international human rights law, and the delay in trying
her was unacceptable.23
74.
Noting all the above, the Working Group concludes that the detention of Ms.
Shamsaei also falls under category III.
d.
Category V
75.
Finally, the Working Group recalls that the deprivation of liberty is regarded as
arbitrary under category V when it constitutes a violation of international law on the grounds
of discrimination based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language, religion,
economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or any
other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings. It also
recalls that it applies a heightened standard of review in cases in which the freedom of
expression and opinion is restricted or where human rights defenders are involved.24
21 See also opinions No. 52/2018, para. 79 (d) and No. 61/2020, para. 85.
22 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35, para. 37; and general comment No. 32, para. 35.
23 Compare with opinion No. 46/2019, para. 63, in which the Working Group was not convinced that
there was a category II violation and was unable to find that a 16-month delay before the trial was
unreasonable. See also opinions No. 15/2020 and No. 16/2020.
24 Opinions No. 64/2011, para. 20, No. 54/2012, para. 29; No. 62/2012, para. 39; No. 41/2017, para. 95;
No. 57/2017, para. 46; and No. 88/2017, para. 25. Domestic authorities and international supervisory
bodies should apply the heightened standard of review of government action, especially when there
are claims of a pattern of harassment (opinion No. 39/2012, para. 45). See also the Declaration on the
Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect
Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 9 (3).
A/HRC/WGAD/2021/15
12
76.
The present case concerns a prominent women’s right activist in the Islamic Republic
of Iran who has actively engaged in many public campaigns and displays of her opposition
to the compulsory wearing of the hijab in the Islamic Republic of Iran since at least 2016.
Her activism was not welcomed by the authorities and in fact resulted in her being sentenced
to 12 years of imprisonment for what the Working Group has established above was merely
the peaceful exercise of her rights under articles 18, 19 and 25 of the Covenant. The Working
Group also established that she had been detained owing to her status as a human rights
defender, in violation of her rights under article 26 of the Covenant.
77.
Furthermore, the Working Group also finds that Ms. Shamsaei was detained because
of her gender. As a women’s rights activist, she engaged in a gender-specific type of protest
by taking off her hijab in public places.
78.
Noting all of the above, the Working Group finds that the detention of Ms. Shamsaei
was due to her gender, the expression of her opinions and her status as a human rights
defender, in violation of articles 2 and 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
articles 2 (1) and 26 of the Covenant. Her deprivation of liberty is arbitrary according to
category V. The Working Group refers the case to the Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights defenders and the Working Group on discrimination against women and girls
for appropriate action.
e.
Final remarks
79.
In its 30-year history, the Working Group has found the Islamic Republic of Iran in
violation of its international human rights obligations in over 40 cases.25 The Working Group
is concerned that this indicates a widespread or systemic arbitrary detention in the country,
which amounts to a serious violation of international law. The duty to comply with
international human rights standards rests with all State organs, officers and agents. The
Working Group recalls that under certain circumstances, widespread or systematic
imprisonment or other severe deprivation of liberty in violation of the rules of international
law may constitute crimes against humanity.26
80.
The Working Group considers that the present case involves serious human rights
violations and has decided to refer the present case to the Special Rapporteur on the situation
of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran for appropriate action.
Allegations in respect of Turkey
81.
The Working Group thanks the source and the Government of Turkey for their
submissions.
82.
In determining whether Ms. Shamsaei’s detention was arbitrary, the Working Group
has regard to the principles established in its jurisprudence to deal with evidentiary issues. If
the source has presented a prima facie case for breach of international requirements
constituting arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be understood to rest upon the
Government if it wishes to refute the allegations. Mere assertions by either of the Government
25 See decisions No. 1/1992, No. 28/1994 and No. 14/1996; and opinions No. 39/2000, No. 30/2001,
No. 8/2003, No. 14/2006, No. 19/2006, No. 26/2006, No. 4/2008, No. 34/2008, No. 39/2008, No.
6/2009, No. 2/2010, No. 8/2010, No. 20/2011, No. 21/2011, No. 58/2011, No. 30/2012, No. 48/2012,
No. 54/2012, No. 18/2013, No. 28/2013, No. 52/2013, No. 55/2013, No. 16/2015, No. 44/2015, No.
1/2016, No. 2/2016, No. 25/2016, No. 28/2016, No. 50/2016, No. 7/2017, No. 9/2017, No. 48/2017,
No. 49/2017, No. 92/2017, No. 19/2018, No. 52/2018, No. 83/2018, No. 32/2019, No. 33/2019; No.
51/2019 and No. 83/2020.
26 A/HRC/13/42, para. 30; and opinions No. 1/2011, para. 21; No. 37/2011, para. 15; No. 38/2011, para.
16; No. 39/2011, para. 17; No. 4/2012, para. 26; No. 38/2012, para. 33; No. 47/2012, paras. 19 and
22; No. 50/2012, para. 27; No. 60/2012, para. 21; No. 9/2013, para. 40; No. 34/2013, paras. 31, 33
and 35; No. 35/2013, paras. 33, 35 and 37; No. 36/2013, paras. 32, 34 and 36; No. 48/2013, para. 14;
No. 22/2014, para. 25; No. 27/2014, para. 32; No. 34/2014, para. 34; No. 35/2014, para. 19; No.
36/2014, para. 21; No. 44/2016, para. 37; No. 60/2016, para. 27; No. 32/2017, para. 40; No. 33/2017,
para. 102; No. 36/2017, para. 110; No. 51/2017, para. 57; and No. 56/2017, para. 72.
A/HRC/WGAD/2021/15
13
that lawful procedures have been followed are not sufficient to rebut the source’s
allegations.27
83.
The source alleges that the administrative detention of Ms. Shamsaei by the Turkish
authorities from 15 November to 15 December 2020 was arbitrary, falling under categories
II, III and IV.
84.
In relation to allegations under category II, the source submits that Ms. Shamsaei was
detained due to her legitimate exercise of the right to seek asylum. The Government however
denies this and explains that Ms. Shamsaei was arrested because she presented a passport
with forged exit stamps in it. When questioned about this by the authorities at the Istanbul
airport, Ms. Shamsaei admitted to having entered Turkey illegally, with the help of people
smugglers, to purchasing a forged passport and to forging the requisite exit stamps herself,
which prompted her detention as required by the law. The source contests this and argues
that the detention of Ms. Shamsaei was disproportionate in the circumstances.
85.
The Working Group recalls that article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights vests everyone with the right to seek asylum. However, Ms. Shamsaei was not seeking
asylum in Turkey and indeed, was not detained for seeking to do so. By the source’s own
account, Ms. Shamsaei was detained because she presented a forged passport and, following
that, she was detained for one month before being released. In these circumstances, the
Working Group considers that the Turkish authorities did not detain Ms. Shamsaei because
of her legitimate exercise of the rights protected by international law but rather on the basis
of a reasonable suspicion that she had violated the law by forging a passport. Her detention
consequently does not raise an issue under category II.
86.
The source has further submitted that the detention of Ms. Shamsaei falls under
category III as during her administrative detention she was denied legal assistance. The
Working Group notes that the Government has addressed these allegations specifically and
explained the circumstances of her detention at the Istanbul airport. The Government
stipulated that an interpreter was called to assist Ms. Shamsaei, that her legal rights were
explained to her with the assistance of an interpreter and that only following her declining
legal assistance was her statement taken with the assistance of an interpreter. Thereafter the
Government also contends that on 6 November 2020, when the deportation decision was
taken, it was explained to her with the assistance of an interpreter and subsequently she was
able to meet with and be represented by her lawyers when she was under administrative
detention at Edirne removal centre. In its further comments the source does not contest any
of this detailed submission but merely points out a lack of evidence from the Government
substantiating the material it had provided.
87.
In these circumstances, noting the discrepancies between the submissions, the
Working Group is unable to reach a conclusion concerning allegations in relation to Turkey
under category III.
88.
Finally, in relation to category IV, the source has also argued that this was
administrative detention of a migrant in an irregular situation and, as such, should have been
a measure of last resort. In the view of the source, the Government failed to act
proportionately by detaining Ms. Shamsaei. The Government however denies this and
reiterates that Ms. Shamsaei presented a forged passport at the Istanbul airport and freely
admitted to having entered Turkey illegally, having engaged people smugglers to assist her,
purchasing a forged passport and forging the requisite exit stamps.
89.
As the Working Group has explained in its revised deliberation No. 5, any form of
administrative detention or custody in the context of migration must be applied as an
exceptional measure of last resort, for the shortest period and only if justified by a legitimate
purpose, such as documenting entry and recording claims or initial verification of identity if
in doubt.28
27 A/HRC/19/57, para. 68.
28 A/HRC/39/45, annex, para. 12.
A/HRC/WGAD/2021/15
14
90.
This echoes the views of the Human Rights Committee, which stated the following in
paragraph 18 of its general comment No. 35 on liberty and security of person:
Asylum seekers who unlawfully enter a State party’s territory may be detained for a
brief initial period in order to document their entry, record their claims and determine
their identity if it is in doubt. To detain them further while their claims are being
resolved would be arbitrary in the absence of a particular reason specific to the
individual, such as an individualized likelihood of absconding, a danger of crimes
against others or a risk of acts against national security.
91.
In the present case, Ms. Shamsaei was first detained after having presented a forged
passport to the authorities at Istanbul airport and thereupon admitting to having entered
Turkey illegally, having engaged people smugglers to assist her, purchasing the said forged
passport and forging the requisite exit stamps herself. Thereafter, from 15 November to 15
December 2020 she was detained administratively as a migrant in an irregular situation
before being released on a condition of fortnightly reporting. The source has confirmed that
Ms. Shamsaei has been released.
92.
The Working Group recalls that category IV applies to cases of prolonged
administrative detention of migrants without the possibility of administrative or judicial
review. In the present case, the Working Group considers that the Turkish authorities did not
act disproportionately by detaining her, as the true nature of her being smuggled into the
country and her stay in Turkey, including the full picture of the surrounding circumstances,
had to be established.
93.
Moreover, the decision to administratively detain Ms. Shamsaei was reviewed, as she
was released after a month of administrative detention, a period that cannot be described as
prolonged. Although it was submitted by the source and confirmed by the Government that
during this time a deportation order was issued, the Working Group observes that it was never
executed. Instead, Ms. Shamsaei was released. While it could be argued that such a release
may have been enacted more speedily, for the Working Group to make such an assessment
would require it to trespass into the sovereign domain of domestic authorities, which it has
consistently refrained from doing. The Working Group therefore considers that the detention
of Ms. Shamsaei does not raise an issue under category IV.
94.
The Working Group wishes to take this opportunity to remind the Government of
Turkey of the absolute prohibition of non-refoulement. In the present case, noting the
findings of the Working Group above clearly establishing that Ms. Shamsaei was subjected
to arbitrary detention in the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is the duty of the Government not to
return Ms. Shamsaei there. Indeed, doing otherwise would constitute a clear violation of the
absolute prohibition of non-refoulement. The Working Group urges the Government to
consider positively the wish of Ms. Shamsaei to leave Turkey for another State in Europe.
The Working Group refers the case to the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants
for appropriate action.
95.
The Working Group also recalls that article 10 of the Covenant requires that all
persons deprived of their liberty be treated with respect for their human dignity and that this
applies also to those held in the context of migration. As the Working Group stated in its
revised deliberation No. 5, all detained migrants must be treated humanely and with respect
for their inherent dignity. The conditions of their detention must be humane, appropriate and
respectful, noting the non-punitive character of the detention in the course of migration
proceedings.29
Disposition
96.
In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:
Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran:
The deprivation of liberty of Nasibe Shamsaei, being in contravention of articles 2, 3,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 2 (1)
29 Ibid., para. 38.
A/HRC/WGAD/2021/15
15
and (3), 9, 14, 18, 19, 25 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, is arbitrary and falls within categories I, II, III and V.
In relation to Turkey:
The detention of Ms. Nasibe Shamsaei in Turkey did not amount to arbitrary
detention.
97.
The Working Group requests the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to take
the steps necessary to remedy the situation of Ms. Shamsaei without delay and bring it into
conformity with the relevant international norms, including those set out in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
98.
The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the
case, the appropriate remedy would be to cease all proceedings against Ms. Shamsaei, quash
her existing convictions and expunge her criminal record, if such exists, and accord her an
enforceable right to compensation and other reparations, in accordance with international
law.
99.
The Working Group urges the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure
a full and independent investigation of the circumstances surrounding the arbitrary
deprivation of liberty of Ms. Shamsaei and to take appropriate measures against those
responsible for the violation of her rights.
100.
In accordance with paragraph 33 (a) of its methods of work, the Working Group refers
the present case to: (a) the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants; (b) the Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; (c) the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment; (d) the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
Islamic Republic of Iran; (e) the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights
defenders; and (f) the Working Group on discrimination against women and girls, for
appropriate action.
101.
The Working Group requests the Government to disseminate the present opinion
through all available means and as widely as possible.
Follow-up procedure
102.
In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group requests
the source and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide it with information
on action taken in follow-up to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including:
(a)
Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to Ms. Shamsaei;
(b)
Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of Ms.
Shamsaei’s rights and, if so, the outcome of the investigation;
(c)
Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made to
harmonize the laws and practices of the Islamic Republic of Iran with its international
obligations in line with the present opinion;
(d)
Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.
103.
The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may
have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and
whether further technical assistance is required, for example through a visit by the Working
Group.
104.
The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the above-
mentioned information within six months of the date of transmission of the present opinion.
However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up to the
opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action would
enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in
implementing its recommendations, as well as any failure to take action.
105.
The Working Group recalls that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all States
to cooperate with the Working Group and has requested them to take account of its views
A/HRC/WGAD/2021/15
16
and, where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken.30
[Adopted on 7 May 2021]
30 Human Rights Council resolution 42/22, paras. 3 and 7.