Opinion; Subjects: MOROCCO, ARBITRARY DETENTION; [WGAD: UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung, willkürliche Haft; Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire; Gruppo di lavoro sulla detenzione arbitraria]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.18-17554 (E) 071118 071118
Human Rights Council
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention at its eighty-second session, 20–24 August 2018
Opinion No. 58/2018 concerning Ahmed Aliouat (Morocco)
1.
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of
the Commission on Human Rights, which extended and clarified the Working Group’s
mandate in its resolution 1997/50. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251 and
Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the
Commission. The mandate of the Working Group was most recently extended for a three-
year period in Council resolution 33/30.
2.
In accordance with its methods of work (A/HRC/36/38), on 24 January 2018, the
Working Group transmitted to the Government of Morocco a communication concerning
Ahmed Aliouat. The Government replied to the communication on 9 April 2018, after it
had been granted an extension of the deadline. The State is a party to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
3.
The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following
cases:
(a)
When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the
deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or
her sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);
(b)
When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or
freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and, insofar as States parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22,
25, 26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);
(c)
When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating
to the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in
the relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity
as to give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);
(d)
When asylum seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged
administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or
remedy (category IV);
(e)
When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on
the grounds of discrimination based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,
religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation,
disability, or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of
human beings (category V).
United Nations
A/HRC/WGAD/2018/58
General Assembly
Distr.: General
22 October 2018
English
Original: French
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Submissions
Communication from the source
4.
Ahmed Aliouat is a 23-year-old Moroccan national. He is a soldier.
(a)
Arrest and detention
5.
The source explains that, in March 2017, Mr. Aliouat was approached by his
commander while he was on duty. The commander insulted him, accused him of being an
enemy of his own country and called him a “Polisario enemy”. The source states that the
Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente
POLISARIO) is a liberationist group made up of recognized representatives of the people
of Western Sahara. The commander then gave him a shove and threatened to imprison him
for not doing his regular chores as a soldier. According to the source, the commander told
Mr. Aliouat that, as commander, he could have Mr. Aliouat thrown into prison if he wanted
and that Mr. Aliouat could not stop him.
6.
The source reports that, after that incident, the commander often discriminated
against Mr. Aliouat on account of his Saharan identity. The source states that Mr. Aliouat
was also threatened with rape if he did not follow his commander’s orders. The commander
also threatened to make false accusations against him so as to ensure that he would be sent
to prison. After being threatened in that way, Mr. Aliouat requested a transfer. He was told
that if he wanted to be transferred to other barracks, he would have to spend two weeks in
solitary confinement and pay a fine of 2,500 dirhams (DH) (US$ 260), which would be
deducted from his salary of DH 4,000 (US$ 416).
7.
According to the source, Mr. Aliouat was arrested on 4 March 2017 in Bir Gandouz
in Western Sahara by the military police and the gendarmerie. Those who arrested him did
not show an arrest warrant. Mr. Aliouat spent 4 days in Bir Gandouz and was then detained
in a military police station in Agadir for 10 days. On 18 March 2017, he was moved to the
section of Sale prison that was reserved for members of the military. In September 2017, he
was transferred to Alagat prison, where he is still being held.
8.
The source reports that, during the first two periods of imprisonment, Mr. Aliouat
was tortured and was forced to sign confessions that had been drafted by the Moroccan
authorities.
9.
During that time, his family was not told where he was being held and he was
prevented from communicating with anyone. Since Mr. Aliouat’s telephone was switched
off, his family launched a missing person appeal and contacted the Moroccan authorities
and the general military barracks in Western Sahara.
10.
The source also notes that, on 6 March 2017, two days after Mr. Aliouat’s arrest, a
man from the barracks where Mr. Aliouat had been arrested telephoned Mr. Aliouat’s
family to inform them that Mr. Aliouat had been detained because he had been discussing
political problems on Facebook with Saharan friends and their families who were in refugee
camps in Tindouf and because of the videos and news that had been shared on his Facebook
page.
11.
According to the source, Mr. Aliouat’s family continued to look for him. On 17
March 2017, Mr. Aliouat’s father travelled to Dakhla, a town in the south of Western
Sahara, in order to obtain information about his son. There, the police informed him that his
son was settling some administrative matters in Agadir, 1,200 km away. On his way to
Agadir, Mr. Aliouat’s father received a telephone call from the police, who told him that his
son was actually in Rabat, some 1,600 km from there, and that he would stand trial the
following morning. When he arrived in Rabat, Mr. Aliouat’s father was refused access to
the courtroom on the grounds that the trial was private. However, he was able to see his son
through the door of the courtroom. Mr. Aliouat’s family was subsequently informed that the
trial had been postponed to 20 March 2017, the same day as the trial of the Gdeim Izik
group, which would be closely followed by Saharan society. The source believes that this
was an attempt to ensure that Mr. Aliouat’s case did not attract much attention.
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12.
The source then explains that, on 20 March 2017, Mr. Aliouat’s family and
international media were denied access to his trial. They were reportedly informed by a
court guard that Mr. Aliouat had already been convicted by the court. However, according
to the source, the trial had not taken place because it had been postponed for a second time,
to 4 July 2017.
13.
The source reports that, on 4 July 2017, the press and Mr. Aliouat’s family, with the
exception of his father, were once again refused access to his trial. At the trial before the
military court in Rabat, the prosecution presented conversations on the social network
Facebook Messenger as evidence that Mr. Aliouat had discussed political issues with
Saharans in refugee camps and had sent pictures of Saharan flags. The defence argued that
Facebook conversations were not admissible evidence and that the prosecution had not
been able to verify the usernames. These arguments were ignored by the judge. According
to the source, the judge concluded that the prosecution had proven that Mr. Aliouat had sent
messages to Saharan refugee camps. Mr. Aliouat was therefore convicted of inciting
civilians and military personnel to defect and “join the enemy”, in reference to the Frente
POLISARIO.
(b)
Deprivation of liberty under category II
14.
The source argues that Mr. Aliouat was targeted because he belongs to the Saharan
minority, whose leaders are claiming the right to self-determination.
15.
The source states that Mr. Aliouat has been deprived of his liberty on account of the
messages that he exchanged with other Saharans and the political opinions that he
expressed on social media. The source claims that this constitutes a violation of articles 7,
18 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 18, 19, 22, 26 and 27
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the “Covenant”).
16.
In view of the above, the source concludes that the detention of Mr. Aliouat should
be considered arbitrary under category II.
(c)
Deprivation of liberty under category III
17.
According to the source, the proceedings brought against Mr. Aliouat were flawed in
the light of international fair trial standards. The source maintains that the violations
committed are of such gravity as to render the detention of Mr. Aliouat arbitrary under
category III.
18.
The source claims that Mr. Aliouat was not informed of the reasons for his arrest
until 17 March 2017. The source considers that the Government of Morocco violated Mr.
Aliouat’s right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, in contravention of article 9 (1) of the
Covenant, article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 6 of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and principle 36 (2) of the Body of Principles for
the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.
19.
In addition, the source considers that Mr. Aliouat suffered inhuman treatment that
was intended to weaken him and to force him to make a confession, in violation of articles
7, 10 (1) and 14 (3) of the Covenant, articles 1 and 4 of the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, article 5 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights and principles 6 and 21 (2) of the Body of Principles. According to the source, under
duress, Mr. Aliouat eventually signed confessions that later served as the sole basis for his
conviction. This constitutes a violation of article 14 (3) (g) of the Covenant, which prohibits
self-incrimination.
20.
The source also states that Mr. Aliouat was not permitted to contact his lawyers at
any stage of the proceedings. On 20 March 2017, his family received false information
about his trial from a military court guard and they were unable to attend the trial, with the
exception of his father, who attended a hearing. His trial was postponed twice and his case
was therefore not handled swiftly, contrary to article 9 (3) of the Covenant, which stipulates
that anyone arrested or detained should be brought promptly before a judge.
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21.
Lastly, the source reiterates that the charge brought against Mr. Aliouat was based
on his Saharan identity and his perceived political affiliation.
22.
Consequently, the source concludes that the detention of Mr. Aliouat should be
considered arbitrary under category III.
(d)
Deprivation of liberty under category V
23.
The source claims that Mr. Aliouat was detained specifically because of his Saharan
ethnicity and because the authorities believe him to be a member of the Frente
POLISARIO.
24.
This is illustrated by the charges of incitement to defection that were brought against
Mr. Aliouat. The source adds that many Saharans in Western Sahara and Morocco,
especially those who support or are perceived to support the Saharan people’s right to self-
determination, have been subjected to intimidation, discrimination and violence on the basis
of their ethnic and social origin. In addition, the source claims that the prosecution’s
submission of private messages sent via social networks as evidence constitutes a violation
of privacy.
25.
The source maintains that Mr. Aliouat was arrested and detained because he had
spoken out in favour of the Saharan people’s right to self-determination. His arrest and
detention constitute discrimination based on political opinion and therefore fall within
category V.
Response from the Government
26.
On 24 January 2018, the Working Group sent a communication to the Government
of Morocco, giving the Government until 26 March 2018 to respond. The Government
replied to the communication on 9 April 2018, having been granted a one-month extension
of the deadline.
27.
In its reply, the Government rejects the source’s accusations, describing them as
defamatory and false. As a preliminary remark, the Government states that the defence has
lodged an appeal. The available domestic remedies have not been exhausted and the
communication sent by the source to the Working Group is therefore not in accordance
with international standards.
28.
The Government then confirms that criminal proceedings are being brought against
Mr. Aliouat, a soldier in the Royal Armed Forces, for the offence of treason. However, it
denies all allegations of discrimination, ill-treatment and abuse relating to those
proceedings.
29.
The Government explains that, on 3 March 2017, an investigation was opened under
the supervision of the Crown Prosecutor-General, in accordance with the Code of Criminal
Procedure and the Code of Judicial Procedure. Mr. Aliouat was not initially placed in
detention, but was immediately brought before the military court, on 18 March 2017. After
examining his case file, which contained documents and information showing that the act
committed was a serious offence, the District Prosecutor decided to refer the case to the
President, in accordance with the law. The same day, after an initial interrogation, Mr.
Aliouat was placed in pretrial detention, in accordance with articles 175 and 177 of the
Criminal Code. On 4 June 2017, the court sentenced him to life imprisonment. He lodged
an appeal against this decision on 12 July 2017 and appeared before the court of appeal on
20 March 2018.
30.
The Government also asserts that, throughout the proceedings, Mr. Aliouat never
mentioned that he had been assaulted by his superiors or filed a complaint of that nature,
personally or through his lawyers, against his commander, his unit or anyone else.
31.
With respect to the allegation of discrimination against Mr. Aliouat, the Government
notes that Mr. Aliouat is a soldier in the Royal Armed Forces and a Moroccan national; he
enjoys all his rights as a soldier, subject to certain legal conditions. The allegations that his
detention is linked to his Saharan origin are unacceptable inasmuch as Mr. Aliouat is
treated as military personnel, without distinction as to ethnicity, race or tribe, like all other
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Moroccans. In this regard, the Government notes that hundreds of members of the military
from the southern provinces (Western Sahara) behave in an exemplary manner and perform
their duties like everyone else in the rest of Moroccan territory, without facing any kind of
discrimination. Moreover, another soldier, who does not come from Western Sahara, was
charged in the same case and received the same sentence for committing the same offence
with his colleague.
32.
The Government also states that the judge received no evidence of violence or
torture. Mr. Aliouat did not, either personally or through his legal representative, file a
complaint or request to be examined by a doctor or to go to a hospital where injuries could
be detected. No such request was made because he was in good health.
33.
The Government denies that the trial was held in camera, claiming that it was
attended by the press.
34.
Regarding the allegation that Mr. Aliouat was denied the freedom to express his
political opinions on social media, the Government notes that Mr. Aliouat is a soldier and is
therefore subject to the requirements of the law of military discipline, which imposes
restrictions on various areas of life, for example by prohibiting soldiers from participating
in any political activity or employing any means of communication without prior, direct
authorization from their superiors. Furthermore, in this particular case, social media was
used to abuse the army and the country in general. The Government also notes that the
findings of the criminal investigation with respect to Mr. Aliouat’s mobile telephones and
his Facebook account clearly show that he deliberately committed an act of treason by
siding with the enemy. Under article 205 of the Military Justice Act, this offence is
punishable by life imprisonment.
35.
Lastly, in response to the allegation that Mr. Aliouat was not represented by a
lawyer and was unable to communicate with his family, the Government confirms that Mr.
Aliouat was granted all fair trial guarantees, including the right to be assisted by a lawyer
and the right to be tried without undue delay. The Government provides the names of the
lawyers who represented Mr. Aliouat. At the request of his lawyers, the court decided to
postpone the trial twice. It was postponed for the first time on 19 June 2017, after his
lawyers requested time to prepare the case, then for a second time on 29 June 2017, after
his lawyers requested a deferral because one of them was out of the country at the time.
36.
Moreover, according to the Government, on 20 March 2017, the mother and father
of the accused were granted a permit (No. 05/2017) to visit their son and to verify the
conditions of detention whenever they wanted.
37.
In conclusion, the Government argues that national legislation is in accordance with
all fair trial guarantees. The allegations made by the source are false and unverified,
considering that all the rights of the person concerned were respected, from his arrest until
the ruling on the case in question. His trial met all of the fair trial requirements set forth in
articles 9, 10 and 14 of the Covenant.
Further comments from the source
38.
On 11 April 2018, the Working Group transmitted the Government’s response to the
source, which submitted the following additional comments, in which it confirms and
reiterates its initial allegations.
39.
The source contests the Government’s argument that the communication violates
international standards because the available domestic remedies have not been exhausted.
The source argues that the Working Group has the power to investigate individual
complaints even if the available domestic remedies have not been exhausted, in accordance
with its methods of work. Moreover, the source claims that appeals against a verdict handed
down by the military court are referred to the Moroccan Court of Cassation. Pursuant to
articles 568 and 586 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, while the Court decides whether
the military court complied with the law, it does not examine the facts of the case.
Therefore, the Court of Cassation does not constitute a court of third instance and does not
examine the merits of the case. Given the background to this case, there are reasons to
believe that a domestic remedy would not be effective. The factual circumstances of the
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case — for example, the fact that Mr. Aliouat was kept in secret detention for around 10
days before he was brought before a judge, the false information given to the family, the
reports of torture, the use of confessions obtained through torture as evidence, the trial
before a military court without access to a lawyer — illustrate the State’s refusal to respect
the complainant’s right to a fair trial.
Discussion
40.
The Working Group thanks the parties for their cooperation and will now examine
their allegations with a view to rendering an opinion.
41.
The Working Group has, in its jurisprudence, established the ways in which it deals
with evidentiary issues. If the source has established a prima facie case for breach of
international requirements constituting arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be
understood to rest upon the Government if it wishes to refute the allegations (see
A/HRC/19/57, para. 68). As the Working Group has often pointed out, including in cases
concerning Morocco,1 it is not enough to make a formal objection to the allegations: the
State is in possession of all the material relating to the proceedings and should be able to
provide any evidence that it deems necessary to support each of its counterarguments.2 In
the present case, the Government attached three documents to its response: extracts of the
Military Code, a document regarding penalties and the visit form of Mr. Aliouat’s parents.
42.
As a preliminary remark, the Working Group recalls that “the public procedures
established by the Commission on Human Rights in accordance with Economic and Social
Council resolution 1235 (XLII) of 1967, like the procedure governed by the Commission
on Human Rights resolutions 1991/42 and 1997/50, are not subject to exhaustion of
domestic remedies as a requirement for admissibility”.3 The Working Group has confirmed
this several times in its jurisprudence 4 and therefore rejects the claim that the present
communication is inadmissible.
43.
First of all, the source claims that Mr. Aliouat was arrested on 4 March 2017 without
an arrest warrant, was not informed of the reasons for his arrest, was detained
incommunicado during that period and was not brought before a judge until 17 March
2017. The Government denies this allegation, claiming that Mr. Aliouat was not placed in
detention on 4 March 2017 but was brought directly before the military court on 18 March
2017 and that he was then detained on the basis of a pretrial detention order. The Working
Group notes that the Government has not provided any documentary evidence to support
this claim, even though it is under an obligation to do so. Consequently, the Working Group
is not convinced by the Government’s response and believes that Mr. Aliouat was arrested
without an arrest warrant, was not promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest and
detention, and was detained incommunicado during that period, in violation of article 9 of
the Covenant. Under these circumstances, his arrest and detention are without legal basis
and therefore arbitrary under category I.
44.
The source also states that Mr. Aliouat is Saharan and is suffering reprisals for
having exercised his freedom of expression in favour of the Saharan people. The
Government does not dispute the fact that he is Saharan and the Working Group has no
reason to doubt it. The Government states that the proceedings brought against Mr. Aliouat,
a member of the Royal Armed Forces, were not linked in any way to his Saharan origin but
that he committed treason by inciting others to support the enemy. The Government does,
therefore, set this case in the context of the crisis that has gripped Western Sahara for
decades. The Working Group considers this to be partial corroboration, for the Government
does not deny that Mr. Aliouat is Saharan, yet it provides no information on the specific
1 See, in particular, opinions Nos. 11/2017 and 27/2016.
2 See paras. 27–28 of opinion No. 41/2013, in which the Working Group noted that the source of a
communication and the Government do not always have equal access to the evidence and frequently
the Government alone possesses the relevant information. See also Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic
of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 55.
3 See opinion No. 11/2000.
4 See opinions Nos. 19/2013 and 22/2017.
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content of the charge brought against him and the acts that constituted treason. The
Working Group was able to see for itself the consequences of the tension in this region
during its visit to Morocco in 2013. It observed that members of the Saharan population,
specifically, are subjected to violence and human rights violations in order to stifle their
calls for self-determination.5
45.
Moreover, the Government provides no evidence to support its claim and merely
states that another soldier, who is not Saharan, was convicted on the same charge, even
though it bears the burden of proof and is therefore responsible for providing all relevant
evidence, such as, in this instance, the case file. The Working Group must therefore accept
the source’s allegation that Mr. Aliouat’s expression of political views on social networks
was the cause of his indictment, arrest and detention. In this regard, the Government points
out that Mr. Aliouat’s freedom of expression, as provided for in article 19 of the Covenant,
is restricted because he is a member of the Royal Armed Forces. The Working Group
recalls general comment No. 10 (1983) of the Human Rights Committee on article 19 of the
Covenant (Freedom of opinion), which reads: “Paragraph 3 [on the restriction of freedom
of expression] expressly stresses that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression
carries with it special duties and responsibilities and for this reason certain restrictions on
the right are permitted which may relate either to the interests of other persons or to those
of the community as a whole. However, when a State party imposes certain restrictions on
the exercise of freedom of expression, these may not put in jeopardy the right itself.
Paragraph 3 lays down conditions and it is only subject to these conditions that restrictions
may be imposed: the restrictions must be “provided by law”; they may only be imposed for
one of the purposes set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 3; and they must be
justified as being “necessary” for that State party for one of those purposes.” In this case,
the Government has not provided the texts that serve as the basis for the restriction of
soldiers’ freedom of expression, nor any justification as to the purpose and necessity of
restricting Mr. Aliouat’s freedom of expression. The Working Group therefore considers
his arrest and detention to be arbitrary under category II.
46.
Given that Mr. Aliouat’s detention falls within category II, he should not be tried.
However, since the trial has taken place and the source has submitted arguments in that
regard, the Working Group will assess those arguments as an additional consideration.
47.
The source claims that Mr. Aliouat was subjected to ill-treatment that led him to
confess to the charges against him while he was being detained incommunicado. The
Government simply denies the ill-treatment, adding that the judge did not note any signs of
ill-treatment and that the accused did not report any such acts, a claim that is contested in
the additional comments from the source. The Government does not mention the
confessions. The Working Group recalls that a formal objection without supporting
evidence is not convincing, especially as it is up to the State to prove that no abuse took
place, for example by providing a document attesting to Mr. Aliouat’s good state of health
or a document showing that allegations of this kind have been investigated by the
authorities. However, during its visit to Morocco, the Working Group noted that “torture
and ill-treatment were used to extract confessions and that protestors were subjected to
excessive use of force by law enforcement officials”.6 The facts submitted by the source are
consistent with that observation and the use of incommunicado detention makes the
allegation of ill-treatment even more credible. The Working Group is therefore convinced
by the source’s claims and concludes that Mr. Aliouat’s trial was affected by the abuse that
he suffered in violation of his right to a fair trial. Furthermore, article 14 (3) (g) of the
Covenant prohibits forced self-incrimination. Confessions obtained through the use of
violence are the perfect example of what is prohibited by this provision. Mr. Aliouat’s right
not to be compelled to incriminate himself was therefore violated. The Government has not
provided any evidence to refute this allegation.
48.
The source also states that Mr. Aliouat was not permitted to contact his lawyers at
any stage of the proceedings. The Government counters this allegation by giving the names
5 A/HRC/27/48/Add.5, paras. 63–65.
6 Ibid., para. 63.
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of his lawyers and mentioning their applications. What is at stake, however, is not the lack
of lawyers but the fact that Mr. Aliouat was unable to communicate with them at any stage
of the proceedings. The Working Group considers this to be a violation of the right
enshrined in article 14 (3) (b) of the Covenant, which states that the accused is entitled “to
have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate
with counsel of his own choosing”.
49.
The Working Group notes that, on 20 March 2017, Mr. Aliouat’s family received
false information about his trial from a military court guard and that they were unable to
attend his trial, with the exception of his father, who attended a hearing. The Government
counters these allegations by saying that the trial was public because it was open to the
press, without providing any further evidence. The Working Group is not convinced by this
response. It considers the source’s allegation to be credible and proven, and thus concludes
that Mr. Aliouat’s right to a fair trial under article 14 has been violated.
50.
Each of these violations is serious enough to invalidate the entire trial.
Consequently, the Working Group considers that Mr. Aliouat’s detention constitutes
arbitrary deprivation of liberty under category III.
51.
Furthermore, the Working Group notes that there is a widespread practice of abuse
against persons who, like Mr. Aliouat, are either of Saharan origin or campaign for the self-
determination of the Saharan people. The Working Group has noted the abuses committed
against this community on several occasions.7 It must therefore conclude, in favour of the
source, that this situation constitutes discrimination in violation of international law, in
particular articles 1, 2 and 26 of the Covenant. On that basis, the Working Group considers
that Mr. Aliouat’s detention is also arbitrary under category V.
52.
Lastly, in line with its practice, the Working Group decides to refer the allegation of
torture in this case to the relevant special procedure mandate holder.
Disposition
53.
In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:
The deprivation of liberty of Ahmed Aliouat, being in contravention of
articles 9, 14, 19 and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
is arbitrary and falls within categories I, II, III and V.
54.
The Working Group requests the Government of Morocco to take the steps
necessary to remedy the situation of Mr. Aliouat without delay and bring it into conformity
with the relevant international norms, including those set out in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.
55.
The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the
case, the appropriate remedy would be to release Mr. Aliouat immediately and accord him
an enforceable right to reparation, including compensation and a guarantee of non-
repetition, in accordance with international law, and to provide him with medical care as
needed and appropriate for his condition.
56.
The Working Group urges the Government to ensure a full and independent
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of Mr.
Aliouat and to take appropriate measures against those responsible for the violation of his
rights.
57.
The Government should disseminate the present opinion through all available means
and as widely as possible.
7 In opinion No. 11/2017 (para. 53), the Working Group had already described discrimination against
Saharans as widespread.
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Follow-up procedure
58.
In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group
requests the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in
follow-up to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including:
(a)
Whether Mr. Aliouat has been released and, if so, on what date;
(b)
Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to Mr. Aliouat;
(c)
Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of Mr.
Aliouat’s rights and, if so, the outcome of the investigation;
(d)
Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made
to harmonize the laws and practices of Morocco with its international obligations in line
with the present opinion;
(e)
Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.
59.
The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may
have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and
whether further technical assistance is required, for example, through a visit by the
Working Group.
60.
The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the above
information within six months of the date of the transmission of the present opinion.
However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up to the
opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action
would enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in
implementing its recommendations, as well as of any failure to take action.
61.
The Working Group recalls that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all
States to cooperate with the Working Group and requested them to take account of its views
and, where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken.8
[Adopted on 24 August 2018]
8 See Human Rights Council resolution 33/30, paras. 3 and 7.