Opinion; Subjects: GABON, ARBITRARY DETENTION; [WGAD: UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung, willkürliche Haft; Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire; Gruppo di lavoro sulla detenzione arbitraria]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.18-15596 (E) 221018 221018
Human Rights Council
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention at its eighty-first session, 17–26 April 2018
Opinion No. 25/2018 concerning Étienne Dieudonné Ngoubou (Gabon)
1.
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of
the Commission on Human Rights, which extended and clarified the Working Group’s
mandate in its resolution 1997/50. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251 and
Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the
Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a
three-year period in its resolution 33/30.
2.
In accordance with its methods of work (A/HRC/36/38), on 15 December 2017 the
Working Group transmitted to the Government of Gabon a communication concerning
Étienne Dieudonné Ngoubou. Having requested an extension of the deadline, the
Government replied to the communication on 12 March 2018. The State is a party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the Covenant).
3.
The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following
cases:
(a)
When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the
deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or
her sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);
(b)
When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or
freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and, insofar as States parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22,
25, 26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);
(c)
When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating
to the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in
the relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity
as to give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);
(d)
When asylum seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged
administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or
remedy (category IV);
(e)
When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on
the grounds of discrimination based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,
religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation,
disability, or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of
human beings (category V).
United Nations
A/HRC/WGAD/2018/25
General Assembly
Distr.: General
20 September 2018
English
Original: French
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Submissions
Communication from the source
4.
Étienne Dieudonné Ngoubou is a 53-year-old Gabonese citizen resident in
Libreville. Mr. Ngoubou is a former Minister of Energy and Oil.
5.
Shortly before 11 January 2017, Mr. Ngoubou reportedly heard rumours that he was
wanted by the authorities. The source explains that, based on these rumours, Mr. Ngoubou
feared he would be arrested. As a result, he reported to the Gabonese judicial authorities,
specifically the Director General of Investigations, of his own accord on 11 January 2017.
6.
According to the source, Mr. Ngoubou was arrested and placed in pretrial detention
on 12 January 2017. He has been detained at Libreville Central Prison since then. His
detention is based on an order of 12 January 2017 by the senior investigating judge to
whom the case was referred by the State prosecutor in accordance with article 76 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. According to the prosecutor’s indictment, Mr. Ngoubou is
charged with misappropriation of public funds in the exercise of his functions as director
general and later minister. However, Mr. Ngoubou was not provided with any other details,
and no evidence to substantiate the charge of misappropriation was presented.
7.
According to the source, Mr. Ngoubou’s lawyers and family were refused access to
Libreville Central Prison on several occasions.
8.
On 16 January 2017, Mr. Ngoubou filed an appeal against the investigating judge’s
order on the grounds that the judge clearly lacked jurisdiction to investigate the case and
could therefore not order his detention. The source claims that only the High Court of
Justice has jurisdiction ratione personae to rule on this case, as the alleged offences took
place in the exercise of the minister’s duties. This rule is set out in article 78 of the
Constitution, according to which ministers are criminally responsible only before the High
Court of Justice.
9.
The source explains that the senior investigating judge claimed jurisdiction on the
grounds that the investigation of cases brought before the Special Criminal Court is
conducted by an investigating magistrate of the court of first instance at the seat of the
Libreville Court of Appeal. The source claims that, in doing so, the senior investigating
judge was confusing the Criminal Court with the High Court of Justice. Thus, there was no
basis for the investigating judge to claim jurisdiction.
10.
In view of these findings, the Prime Minister referred the case to the Constitutional
Court for interpretation of article 78 of the Constitution.
11.
On 13 March 2017, the Constitutional Court ruled that, on leaving office, ministers
lost their jurisdictional privileges and were criminally responsible before the ordinary
courts for offences committed in the exercise of their duties. However, the source alleges
that this interpretation is incorrect and was made for the Court’s own ends, since it is clear
from article 78 of the Constitution that it is the date on which the acts were committed that
determines the jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice and, in the present case, that would
thus be the only court to have jurisdiction.
12.
Mr. Ngoubou filed another appeal against the order for pretrial detention on the
basis of an objection to the court’s jurisdiction. On 28 March 2017, the appeal was declared
admissible but was rejected by the indictment division, which did not give the grounds for
its conclusions.
13.
The source explains that, on 19 July 2017, Mr. Ngoubou’s defence lawyer filed an
application for release on bail on the basis of his state of health, in accordance with articles
115, 116 and 126 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Ngoubou’s type 2 diabetes had
led to high blood pressure and, in addition, a diagnosis of the first signs of hearing loss, all
of which was substantiated by a medical certificate and two medical reports produced in
2017 during his detention. The source explains that his state of health had deteriorated
during his detention. The investigating judge never ruled on the merits of this application.
14.
Consequently, the source explains that, on 31 July 2017, Mr. Ngoubou’s defence
lawyer referred the case to the president of the indictment division of the Libreville Court
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of Appeal, in accordance with article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under this
article, the indictment division must make a decision within eight days of receipt of the
application. If the division does not give a ruling by that deadline, the accused must
automatically be released by the Prosecutor General. According to the source, these actions
did not yield any results. However, under the aforementioned legal provisions, Mr.
Ngoubou should have been released on 9 August 2017; there has thus been no legal basis
for his detention since that date.
15.
The source also explains that Mr. Ngoubou’s defence lawyer wrote to the Prosecutor
General on 14 August 2017, requesting his release. The Minister of Justice was also
informed of the situation in a letter dated 14 August 2017. Furthermore, the senior
management of the prison service decided to return Mr. Ngoubou to the prison despite his
state of health and against his doctor’s advice. On arrival, he was transferred to the military
hospital and waited for an hour in the emergency room before being treated. Since then,
proceedings have stalled and there has been no response to the defence lawyer’s requests.
Deprivation of liberty under category I
16.
The source alleges that, under the Constitution, only the High Court of Justice has
jurisdiction over cases involving ministers. Consequently, the detention of Mr. Ngoubou
ordered by the investigating judge is unconstitutional and devoid of any legal basis. Legal
actions taken by a court that does not have jurisdiction are null and void and this results in
release.
17.
Furthermore, the source alleges that, under article 122 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the indictment division must make a ruling within eight days of receipt of the
application for pretrial release. If the division does not give a ruling in that time, the
accused shall automatically be released by the Prosecutor General. According to the source,
these actions did not yield any results and there is thus no legal basis for maintaining Mr.
Ngoubou in detention.
Arbitrary detention under category III
18.
The source maintains that the State prosecutor’s indictment indicates only that Mr.
Ngoubou is being prosecuted for misappropriation of public funds, which he allegedly
committed while serving as a minister. According to the source, the accused was not
provided with sufficient details of the charges against him and the failure to provide this
information is contrary to articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant.
19.
The source also alleges that principle 10 of the United Nations Basic Principles and
Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right of Anyone Deprived of Their Liberty
to Bring Proceedings Before a Court, which provides that “procedures shall allow anyone
to bring proceedings before a court to challenge the arbitrariness and lawfulness of the
deprivation of liberty and to obtain without delay appropriate and accessible remedies”, was
violated in this case. Indeed, the indictment division rejected Mr. Ngoubou’s appeal against
the order for his pretrial detention lodged on the basis of an objection to jurisdiction on its
merits without reasoning its decision. Furthermore, there has been no response to any of the
requests submitted since 28 March 2017.
Response from the Government
20.
On 15 December 2017, the Working Group transmitted the source’s allegations to
the Government of Gabon under its regular communications procedure. The Working
Group requested the Government to provide any comments that it would like to make on
the allegations contained in the communication by 14 February 2018. On 13 February 2018,
the Government replied and requested that the deadline be extended by one month as of 14
February 2018. It submitted its response on 12 March 2018, which was received by the
Working Group on 14 March.
21.
The Government rejects the source’s allegations concerning Mr. Ngoubou’s
situation.
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22.
First, the Government wishes to make it clear that Mr. Ngoubou’s placement in
detention was decided by order of 12 January 2017 and not 11 January, as suggested by the
source. The Government does not agree with the source’s allegations that the lack of
information and details as to the charges against Mr. Ngoubou in the State prosecutor’s
indictment render the detention arbitrary. According to the Government, in accordance with
criminal procedure, the indictment is not intended to expand on the charges but simply to
indicate the nature of the offence and the text of the applicable law.
23.
Furthermore, in relation to Mr. Ngoubou’s first appearance before the court and his
indictment, the Government specifies that he was properly notified of the charges against
him, specifically misappropriation of public funds. The Government contests the objection
to jurisdiction raised by the source and Mr. Ngoubou’s lawyer, citing various decisions of
the Gabonese judicial authorities. Furthermore, the Government recognizes that Mr.
Ngoubou’s application for pretrial release dated 31 July 2017 went unanswered, as the
investigating judge did not make a ruling within eight days as required under article 3 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
24.
Lastly, with regard to Mr. Ngoubou’s health, the Government stresses that he was
authorized to return to prison as of 22 August 2017 after his state of health was deemed
satisfactory by the doctor.
Further information from the source
25.
The Government’s response was transmitted to the source on 19 March 2018, which
in turn replied on 4 April 2018. It notes that the Government’s request for an extension of
the deadline for submission of what were ultimately just a few unclear arguments shows the
lack of interest it attaches to the issue of pretrial detention.
26.
As to the arbitrary nature of the detention, the source reiterates that the indictment
division had a set deadline, in accordance with article 161 (2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, to make its ruling, in this case 22 March 2017. However, no ruling was made.
Mr. Ngoubou’s defence lawyer consequently sent multiple letters to the Prosecutor General
and the Minister of Justice. Despite these requests, Mr. Ngoubou remains in detention.
27.
Concerning the Government’s argument that the indictment need only indicate the
nature of the offence in question and the applicable law, the source maintains that this is not
in compliance with the relevant principles and international instruments by which Gabon is
bound. The source recalls that the case was referred to the investigating judge in rem and
that it is thus not possible, on reading the indictment, to know the charges against Mr.
Ngoubou. This lack of certainty makes it impossible for him to prepare his defence. The
source also notes that the Government did not acknowledge in its response that, during his
first appearance in court, Mr. Ngoubou did not receive any additional information on the
nature, date and material elements of the offences with which he is charged. The source
argues that, in the circumstances, he could not defend himself and request that the
necessary steps be taken to prove his innocence and could not give the required
explanations in view of the notification he received. The source also maintains that the
preliminary investigation was opened on the basis of an introductory indictment and that, as
the indictment division found, it is a complex case. Accordingly, it would be reasonable to
assume that the prosecutor has useful information on the alleged offences committed.
However, none of the offences was indicated and Mr. Ngoubou has still not been informed
of them. If the charge does not include these elements, the pretrial detention is unjustified.
In any case, there is a violation of the right to a defence.
28.
Concerning the Government’s explanation that the investigating judge rejected the
objection to jurisdiction filed by the defence, a decision upheld by the indictment division,
the source notes that the Government has not responded to the objections raised by the
defence on this point.
29.
The source also notes that the Government acknowledges that the investigating
judge did not make a ruling within eight days, as provided for in article 122 (3) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. However, it does not comment on the fact that the State prosecutor
did not submit the case to the investigation chamber promptly so that it could rule on the
merits of the application. The source thus notes that a decision on the application for
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pretrial release of 19 July 2017 was issued by order of 29 September 2017, that is, 2 months
and 10 days after the application was submitted. According to the source, this delay shows
the Government’s lack of interest in the case. In addition, it violates article 9 (4) of the
Covenant, which provides for the right to take proceedings before a court without undue
delay. The source also indicates that the Prosecutor General’s Office put forward an
argument that is compatible with that made by the defence in the context of Mr. Ngoubou’s
applications for pretrial release.
Discussion
30.
Firstly, the Working Group wishes to express its gratitude to the parties for their
cooperation in the present procedure.
31.
The Working Group has in its jurisprudence established the ways in which it deals
with evidentiary issues. If the source has established a prima facie case for breach of
international requirements constituting arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be
understood to rest upon the Government if it wishes to refute the allegations (see
A/HRC/19/57, para. 68). In the present case, the Government has challenged the allegations
made by the source.
32.
The Working Group recalls several reports that express concern at conditions of
detention, access to health care for prisoners, the excessive length of pretrial detention and
the failings of the Gabonese system, particularly in Libreville Central Prison.1 Furthermore,
the Working Group notes that the use of pretrial detention by the Gabonese authorities is a
systematic practice (see CAT/OP/GAB/1, para. 44).
33.
In the first instance, the Working Group notes that the source contests the
jurisdiction of the judge who ordered Mr. Ngoubou’s pretrial detention on the basis of
article 78 (5) of the Constitution. According to the source, this lack of jurisdiction of the
investigating judge constitutes a violation of Mr. Ngoubou’s rights that falls under category
I, as there is no legal basis for his arrest and detention. Nevertheless, the source’s
allegations concerning the lack of jurisdiction of the court to which Mr. Ngoubou’s case
was referred are not compelling. After all, when considering a communication, the Working
Group does not, in principle, take the place of the domestic courts. However, it must ensure
that the principle by which each individual has the right to a hearing by an independent and
impartial court has been respected. In the present case, the argument put forward
concerning the jurisdiction of the investigating judge has no relevance under international
law and the Working Group thus cannot take a decision on it.
34.
However, pretrial detention remains an exception and must always be justified,
taking into account the individual’s specific circumstances. In the present case, the
Government has not substantiated the decision to keep him in pretrial detention by
providing any information showing that Mr. Ngoubou’s state of health was taken into
account and that none of the alternative measures to detention was appropriate. This failure
to take an individualized approach and to give reasons for the pretrial detention is contrary
to international human rights law and thus renders the detention arbitrary under category I.
35.
Second, according to the information provided by the source, the prosecutor’s
indictment does not include any information on the offences with which Mr. Ngoubou is
charged. He therefore does not know the charges against him. The Working Group is of the
view that it cannot be concluded from the information provided by the source that
notification of the offence of misappropriation of public funds2 was not received by Mr.
Ngoubou and his defence lawyer.3 However, the Working Group considers that, in view of
1 The Committee against Torture highlights the lack of information on the enforcement of the law
adopted on 26 December 2009 that provides for improved monitoring of persons serving their
sentences and better prison management (see CAT/C/GAB/CO/1, para. 17 and
A/HRC/WG.6/28/GAB/2, para. 16).
2 Gabonese Criminal Code, art. 307.
3 The court notification and indictment issued by the State prosecutor on the day of Mr. Ngoubou’s
arrest and pretrial detention, respectively, and the questioning to which Mr. Ngoubou was submitted
suggest that he was aware of the charges against him as of the time of his arrest.
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the reliability of the allegations made by the source, neither Mr. Ngoubou nor his defence
lawyer had access to sufficient information justifying his arrest and detention. In fact, this
view has not been disputed by the Government, which notes in its response that, under the
country’s criminal procedure, the indictment is not required to provide details of the
charges against the accused. However, the Working Group believes that the preliminary
indictment, the purpose of which is to inform the accused, should indicate the charges and
the legal categorization of the offences.
36.
In fact, this view is shared by the Human Rights Committee, which states that the
reasons for arrest must include not only the general legal basis of the arrest, but also enough
factual specifics to indicate the substance of the complaint.4 The Working Group recalls
that, under the Covenant and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, all arrested
persons must be informed of the reasons for their arrest and be promptly notified of any
charges against them if ordinary criminal proceedings are brought against them5 in order to
guarantee equality of arms between the parties to the proceedings.6 In the present case, the
lack of information provided in the indictment constitutes a violation of Mr. Ngoubou’s
right to a fair trial. It thus falls under category III, as the lack of detail means that the
accused does not know all the charges against him and cannot properly prepare his defence.
37.
Third, the source and the Government disagree about the circumstances surrounding
Mr. Ngoubou’s first appearance before the investigating judge. The source claims, without
providing any supporting evidence, that he was not provided with any details and that no
evidence to support the charge of misappropriation was presented. The Government
contests this assertion but does not provide any evidence to the contrary. It simply states
that, during his court appearance, Mr. Ngoubou was indeed informed of the charges against
him. However, the evidentiary rules defined in the Working Group’s jurisprudence stipulate
that if the source has established a prima facie case for breach of international requirements
constituting arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be understood to rest upon the
Government if it wishes to refute the allegations (see A/HRC/19/57, para. 68). Thus, the
fact that the Working Group is not able to fully establish the facts in the present case does
not preclude it from concluding that there has been a violation of Mr. Ngoubou’s right to a
fair trial, falling within category III, to the extent that the Government has not provided
convincing evidence to support its version of events.
38.
Fourth, the source submits that there is no legal basis for Mr. Ngoubou’s detention
since he has remained in pretrial detention in violation of domestic law. Indeed, as the
indictment division did not make a ruling on the application for Mr. Ngoubou’s pretrial
release within the established deadline, in accordance with article 122 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure,7 he should automatically have been released on 9 August 2017 (paras.
13 to 15 above). The Government does not deny these facts and acknowledges that the
application for pretrial release went unanswered. Although the indictment division rejected
the application on 29 September 2017, that ruling was made well after the established
deadline. Thus, Mr. Ngoubou is still in pretrial detention in violation of domestic law,
which establishes a maximum duration of pretrial detention of one year, and article 9 (3) of
4 General comment No. 35 (2014) on article 9 (Liberty and security of person), para. 25.
5 Ibid., para. 24.
6 Rule 119 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson
Mandela Rules);
7 Under article 122 of the Gabonese Code of Criminal Procedure, all accused persons who have applied
to the investigating judge under article 121 have the right to apply directly to the indictment division
if the investigating judge does not respond within the established deadline. The indictment division
then has eight days as of the date of receipt of the application to make a ruling on the application for
release. If it does not make a ruling by that deadline, the individual must automatically be released.
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the Covenant, which requires the accused to be brought promptly before a judge.8 The law
guarantees the right to be tried within a reasonable time or to be released.9
39.
The Working Group recalls that pretrial detention is not the rule and should not be a
systematic practice in Gabon (see CAT/OP/GAB/1, para. 44). It notes that the Human
Rights Committee has explained that an important element of a fair trial is its
expeditiousness and that, in cases in which the court refuses the accused release on bail, he
or she must be tried as quickly as possible. The Committee has also recalled that the
detention of defendants awaiting trial should not be the general practice, as pretrial
detention must be based on an individualized determination that it is reasonable and
necessary.10
40.
Consequently, the fact that Mr. Ngoubou has been in pretrial detention since 2017,
during which time the trial has not begun and there has been no individualized evaluation of
the appropriateness of his detention, leads to the conclusion that his rights have been
violated.11 However, this violation does not fall under category I owing to a lack of legal
basis, as claimed by the source, but under category III, as it is a violation of the right to an
effective remedy.
41.
Fifth, the source notes that, because of his state of health, Mr. Ngoubou requires
ongoing care in a specialized centre and regular monitoring. In view of the prison
conditions and practices in Gabon (see CAT/OP/GAB/1, para. 87 et seq.), the Working
Group is particularly concerned at Mr. Ngoubou’s lack of access to care during his
detention at Libreville Central Prison. The Government claims, on the contrary, that Mr.
Ngoubou has received care since 2 August 2017. He was transferred to a military hospital,
where he stayed until 22 August 2017, when his state of health was declared satisfactory,
according to the medical documents submitted by the Government.
42.
The Working Group recalls that when prison conditions are so poor as to weaken a
person in pretrial detention and, consequently, reduce equality of opportunity, a fair trial is
no longer guaranteed, even if procedural guarantees are otherwise rigorously respected.12
Although the medical certificates state that Mr. Ngoubou’s state of health is satisfactory,
the Working Group has serious reason to be concerned that the conditions of Mr.
Ngoubou’s pretrial detention have affected his capacity to defend himself and are in
violation of article 10 of the Covenant, articles 4 and 5 of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights and rules 24 and 25 of the Nelson Mandela Rules.
43.
In view of the foregoing, the Working Group considers that the failure to meet the
obligation to provide specific information concerning the charges against Mr. Ngoubou and
the violations of the right to an effective remedy, provided for in article 2 (3) of the
Covenant and article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of the rights to be
tried in a reasonable time, to equality of arms,13 to liberty pending trial and to a defence and
the obligation on judges to give reasoned decisions, in the light of article 11 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, constitute a broader violation of the right to a fair
trial under article 14 of the Covenant and article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
8 Article 117 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, in criminal cases, the maximum duration
of detention is 1 year.
9 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 19 (3) and 14 (3); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, art. 9; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 7 (1); Body of Principles
for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, principle 38.
10 General comment No. 35, para. 29.
11 See opinion No. 34/2017, paras. 40–42.
12 See Human Rights Committee general comment No. 32 (2007) on the right to equality before courts
and tribunals and to a fair trial, para. 69.
13 See the United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right
of Anyone Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court, guideline 5.
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44.
The Working Group finds that the source’s claims raise many other violations of the
right to a fair trial, in particular the right to receive visits from relatives14 and the right to
access to a lawyer.15
45.
Taken together, all of these violations of the right to a fair trial are sufficiently
serious for the Working Group to conclude that Mr. Ngoubou’s detention is arbitrary under
category III.
Disposition
46.
In light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:
The deprivation of liberty of Mr. Ngoubou, being in contravention of articles 8, 9,
10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of articles 2, 9, 10 and
14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is arbitrary and falls
within categories I and III.
47.
The Working Group requests the Government of Gabon to take the steps necessary
to remedy the situation of Mr. Ngoubou without delay and bring it into conformity with the
relevant international norms, including those set out in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
48.
The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the
case, the appropriate remedy would be to release Mr. Ngoubou immediately and accord him
an enforceable right to reparation, including compensation and a guarantee of non-
repetition, in accordance with international law, and to provide him with medical care as
needed and appropriate for his condition.
49.
The Working Group urges the Government to ensure a full and independent
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of Mr.
Ngoubou and to take appropriate measures against those responsible for the violation of
their rights.
Follow-up procedure
50.
In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group
requests the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in
follow-up to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including:
(a)
Whether Mr. Ngoubou has been released and, if so, on what date;
(b)
Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to Mr. Ngoubou;
(c)
Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of Mr.
Ngoubou’s rights and, if so, the outcome of the investigation;
(d)
Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made
to harmonize the laws and practices of Gabon with its international obligations in line with
the present opinion;
(e)
Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.
51.
The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may
have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and
whether further technical assistance is required, for example, through a visit by the
Working Group.
52.
The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the above
information within six months of the date of the transmission of the present opinion.
However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up to the
14 Rules 43, 58 and 106 of the Nelson Mandela Rules; principle 19 of the Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment;
15 See the United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right
of Anyone Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court, principles 9 and 10.
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opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action
would enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in
implementing its recommendations, as well as any failure to take action.
53.
The Government should disseminate through all available means the present opinion
among all stakeholders.
54.
The Working Group recalls that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all
States to cooperate with the Working Group and requested them to take account of its views
and, where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken.16
[Adopted on 23 April 2018]
16 See Human Rights Council resolution 33/30, paras. 3 and 7.