Opinion; Subjects: IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF), ARBITRARY DETENTION; [WGAD: UNO-Arbeitsgruppe über willkürliche Inhaftierung, willkürliche Haft; Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire; Gruppo di lavoro sulla detenzione arbitraria]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.17-22909(E)
Human Rights Council
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention at its eightieth session, 20–24 November 2017
Opinion No. 92/2017 concerning Ahmadreza Djalali (Islamic Republic
of Iran)
1.
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of
the Commission on Human Rights, which extended and clarified the Working Group’s
mandate in its resolution 1997/50. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251 and
Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the
Commission. The mandate of the Working Group was most recently extended for a three-
year period in Council resolution 33/30 of 30 September 2016.
2.
In accordance with its methods of work (A/HRC/36/38), on 18 September 2017 the
Working Group transmitted to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran a
communication concerning Ahmadreza Djalali. The Government has not replied to the
communication. The State is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
3.
The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following
cases:
(a)
When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the
deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or
her sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I);
(b)
When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or
freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and, insofar as States parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22,
25, 26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II);
(c)
When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating
to the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in
the relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity
as to give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);
(d)
When asylum seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged
administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or
remedy (category IV);
(e)
When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on
the grounds of discrimination based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language,
religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation,
disability, or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of
human beings (category V).
United Nations
A/HRC/WGAD/2017/92
General Assembly
Distr.: General
20 December 2017
Original: English
A/HRC/WGAD/2017/92
2
Submissions
Communication from the source
4.
Mr. Djalali, born on 15 September 1971, is an Iranian national with a Swedish
permanent residency permit. He usually resides in Stockholm. He is a medical doctor,
lecturer and researcher in disaster medicine and has worked for the disaster medicine
research centre at the Universita Degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale, Italy, and the
European Society for Emergency Medicine. Mr. Djalali teaches on the Master of Science in
Disaster Medicine course, a joint programme run by the Universita Degli Studi del
Piemonte Orientale and the Vrjje Universiteit Brussel, Brussels. He collaborates with
Iranian universities and with the Karolinska Institutet in Sweden and maintains contacts
with scientists worldwide, including in Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United States of
America.
5.
The source informs the Working Group that, in April 2016, at the invitation of the
University of Tehran and Shiraz University, Mr. Djalali travelled to the Islamic Republic of
Iran to attend a number of workshops on disaster medicine. He planned to stay in the
country for two weeks and to return to Sweden on 28 April 2016.
6.
According to the source, on 25 April 2016, Mr. Djalali was arrested by officials
from the Ministry of Intelligence and Security while travelling by car from Tehran to Karaj.
At the time of his arrest, the officials did not present a warrant or any other document
issued by a public authority, nor did they inform Mr. Djalali of the reason(s) for his arrest.
7.
The source submits that, approximately two weeks after his arrest, officials showed
Mr. Djalali an allegedly fake letter, supposedly from his spouse. The Iranian authorities
claimed that the letter constituted evidence that Mr. Djalali had collaborated with Israel.
The source notes that it was only at that moment that Mr. Djalali understood the alleged
reasons for his arrest.
8.
According to the source, Mr. Djalali was initially held at an undisclosed location for
a week. His family knew that he had been arrested, but did not know where he was being
held. One week after his arrest, Mr. Djalali was transferred to section 209 of Evin Prison,
run by the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, where he spent seven months.
9.
The source further argues that, during his period of detention in section 209 of Evin
Prison, Mr. Djalali spent three months in solitary confinement and four months in partial
isolation with one other person in the same cell. During those seven months, Mr. Djalali
was denied access to a lawyer and was allowed to call his family for only two minutes
every two weeks.
10.
After seven months spent in section 209 of Evin Prison, Mr. Djalali was moved to
section 7 of the same facility. On 29 January 2017, he was returned, without a warning, to
section 209. On 7 February 2017, the authorities transferred Mr. Djalali back to section 7.
On 14 February 2017, Mr. Djalali was transferred back to section 209 again, where he
remains to date.
11.
The source states that Mr. Djalali’s family in the Islamic Republic of Iran was
informed that the investigation was related to an issue of national security. Mr. Djalali may
be accused of collaboration with enemy States. The source is not aware of any evidence
against Mr. Djalali.
12.
The source submits that Mr. Djalali’s arrest and detention are arbitrary, being in
contravention of articles 9 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
articles 9 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and fall within
categories I and III of the categories applied by the Working Group.
13.
With regard to category I, the source argues that, although it is not known whether
Mr. Djalali was deprived of his liberty on grounds and in accordance with the procedure
established by Iranian law, he was taken into custody without an arrest warrant, contrary to
article 9 (1) of the Covenant, to which the Islamic Republic of Iran has been a party since
1975.
A/HRC/WGAD/2017/92
3
14.
In addition, Mr. Djalali was not informed of the reasons for his arrest at the moment
it was carried out, in violation of article 9 (2) of the Covenant. The source submits that it
was only two weeks after that event that Mr. Djalali understood the reasons for his arrest,
after authorities showed him a letter, which they claimed had been written by his spouse
and which allegedly constituted evidence of his collaboration with Israel. According to the
Human Rights Committee, the reasons must include not only the general legal basis of the
arrest, but also enough factual specifics to indicate the substance of the complaint, such as
the wrongful act and the identity of an alleged victim.1 The source argues that the Iranian
authorities not only failed to inform Mr. Djalali of the reasons for his arrest at the moment
of his arrest, but also failed to provide any evidence other than a letter, which the source
claims is fraudulent.
15.
The source further argues that Mr. Djalali has not been promptly informed of any
charges against him, in violation of article 9 (2) of the Covenant. The source asserts that,
for months after his arrest, Mr. Djalali was unaware of the charges against him. The source
reports that it is likely that Mr. Djalali was taken to Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court
in Tehran only on 31 January 2017, nine months after his arrest. The source asserts that, in
any case, Mr. Djalali was not brought before a judge for over a week after his arrest. In this
regard, the source notes that the Human Rights Committee states that delays should not
exceed a few days from the time of arrest and any delay longer than 48 hours must remain
absolutely exceptional and be justified under the circumstances.2
16.
The source reports that, during the first hearing, the presiding judge formally
charged Mr. Djalali with espionage, informing him that he could face the death penalty.
The source adds that Mr. Djalali’s lawyer was not present at that hearing. The source also
adds that the prosecution has no evidence against Mr. Djalali, except the above-mentioned
letter.
17.
The source further argues that Mr. Djalali was not tried within a reasonable time
frame, in violation of article 9 (3) of the Covenant. Mr. Djalali informed his family that his
trial might be scheduled to take place during the week of 13 February 2017, nearly 10
months after his arrest. However, it was postponed because the authorities decided that the
lawyer chosen by Mr. Djalali could not represent him.
18.
The source reports that Mr. Djalali’s trial was scheduled to take place on 24
September 2017. Mr. Djalali has met his current lawyer — his third — only once. His first
and second lawyers were rejected by authorities, who provided no reason for barring
lawyers of Mr. Djalali’s choice from assisting him. The source therefore argues that Mr.
Djalali has repeatedly been denied the right to a fair trial with a lawyer of his own
choosing.
19.
The source further notes that it is not known whether Mr. Djalali has been informed
of his right to challenge the lawfulness of his detention in line with the provisions of article
9 (4) of the Covenant. It is argued by the source that, even if Mr. Djalali were to be
informed of that right, he would have no practical means of exercising it by taking
proceedings before a court, as he had no access to a lawyer for more than nine months after
his arrest. The source argues that this situation is in contravention of principle 9 of the
United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right
of Anyone Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court, which stipulates
that any persons deprived of their liberty shall have the right to legal assistance by counsel
of their choice, at any time during detention, including immediately after the moment of
apprehension.
20.
The source notes that, since his arrest, Mr. Djalali has chosen two lawyers to
represent him, both of whom were subsequently rejected by the authorities. The source
recalls that the Human Rights Committee states that practices that render such review
1 See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person, para.
25.
2 Ibid., para. 33.
2 Ibid., para. 33.
A/HRC/WGAD/2017/92
4
effectively unavailable to an individual amount to a violation of article 9 (4) of the
Covenant.3 The source argues that no effective review was possible for Mr. Djalali since he
had not been afforded access to a counsel. The source therefore considers that Mr. Djalali
has also been deprived of his right to take proceedings before a court, in order that that
court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if
the detention is not lawful, in contravention of article 9 (4) of the Covenant.
21.
With regard to category III, the source notes that, although rules on fair trial are
principally aimed at ensuring fair court proceedings, they may also be applicable to the
pretrial stages of criminal investigations to the extent necessary to ensure a subsequent fair
trial before an independent and impartial tribunal. In this regard, the source highlights
information that various international norms relating to fair trial before an independent and
impartial tribunal were not observed and that Mr. Djalali’s fundamental right to a fair trial
is at serious risk of being ignored by the Iranian authorities.
22.
The source asserts that Mr. Djalali has not been informed promptly and in detail of
the nature and cause of the charge against him, in violation of article 14 (3) of the
Covenant. Although Mr. Djalali was formally charged of espionage at the hearing before
Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court in Tehran on 31 January 2017, it is unclear whether
he was informed of the law and of the alleged general facts on which this charge is based.
The source suggests that it is likely that no actual facts have ever been presented to Mr.
Djalali in order to explain the basis of the charges, in contravention of article 14 (3) of the
Covenant.4
23.
The source also reports that Mr. Djalali has not been given adequate time or
facilities for the preparation of his defence. Mr. Djalali has not been allowed to
communicate with a counsel of his own choosing, in violation of article 14 (3) of the
Covenant.
24.
The source argues that according to the Human Rights Committee, adequate
facilities must include access to documents and other evidence. 5 However, to date, Mr.
Djalali has been systematically denied such access.
25.
Furthermore, the source argues that the right to communicate with counsel requires
that the accused be granted prompt access to counsel.6 The source observes that, despite this
norm, Mr. Djalali’s two chosen lawyers have been rejected by the judge.
26.
The source also notes that, while Mr. Djalali was prevented from meeting his first
appointed lawyer, he had access to his second appointed lawyer in the presence of police
officers. The source considers this insufficient to meet the standard of effective access to a
lawyer, as stipulated in article 14 (3) of the Covenant. The source recalls that the Human
Rights Committee states that counsel should be able to meet their clients in private and to
communicate with the accused in conditions that fully respect the confidentiality of their
communications.7
27.
According to the source, Mr. Djalali was repeatedly denied the right to have counsel
of his own choosing, as both lawyers appointed by Mr. Djalali were informed by the Iranian
authorities that they could not take up his case. Moreover, the source asserts that the
prosecution service refused to share court files with both lawyers.
28.
The source suggests that the decision to systematically reject lawyers chosen by Mr.
Djalali is based on article 48 of the Iranian Code of Criminal Procedure, which states that
individuals facing national security-related charges are not allowed access to an
independent lawyer of their own choosing throughout the entire investigation phase and
may only select lawyers from a roster approved by the head of the judiciary. The source
3 Ibid., para. 46.
4 See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007) on the right to equality before courts
and tribunals and to a fair trial, para. 31.
5 Ibid., para. 33.
6 Ibid., para. 34.
7 Ibid.
A/HRC/WGAD/2017/92
5
argues that this provision prevents detainees from effectively accessing lawyers of their
own choosing and is in clear violation of article 14 (3) of the Covenant.
29.
The source observes that Mr. Djalali’s right to be tried without undue delay has not
been respected, in contravention of article 14 (3) of the Covenant, and that the Human
Rights Committee states that if someone suspected of a crime and detained on the basis of
article 9 of the Covenant is charged with an offence but not brought to trial, the prohibitions
of unduly delaying trials as provided for by articles 9 (3) and 14 (3) (c) of the Covenant
may be violated at the same time.8 In this regard, the source highlights the fact that Mr.
Djalali has been kept in a state of uncertainty about his fate for a prolonged period of time.
30.
The source states that, for the same reasons outlined concerning the denial of Mr.
Djalali’s right to prepare his defence and to communicate with a counsel of his own
choosing, he may also be denied the right to be tried in his presence and to defend himself
through legal assistance of his own choosing, in violation of article 14 (3) (d) of the
Covenant.
31.
The source also believes that Mr. Djalali’s right not to be compelled to testify
against himself or to confess guilt, enshrined in article 14 (3) (g) of the Covenant, has been
violated. The Human Rights Committee states that this safeguard must be understood in
terms of the absence of any direct or indirect physical or undue psychological pressure from
the investigating authorities on the accused, with a view to obtaining a confession of guilt.
A fortiori, it is unacceptable to treat an accused person in a manner contrary to article 7 of
the Covenant in order to extract a confession.9
32.
In this regard, the source observes that Mr. Djalali has been put under intense
pressure to sign a statement confessing to spying for a hostile Government. According to
the source, Mr. Djalali has been subjected to numerous attempts to coerce him into
confessing to collaborating with Israel. The source also claims that Mr. Djalali was forced
to sign a confession, the contents of which are unknown. The source expresses concern that
this statement may be included as evidence in the court proceedings. The source alleges that
the Revolutionary Courts use confessions obtained under torture or other ill-treatment as
evidence in court. The source highlights that the admission of statements obtained as a
result of torture or of other ill-treatment as evidence in criminal proceedings renders the
proceedings as a whole unfair.
33.
The source notes that its concerns about Mr. Djalali’s right to a fair trial could
equally be based on similar cases involving other detainees. In this regard, the source cites
the most recent concluding observation of the Human Rights Committee concerning the
Islamic Republic of Iran, in which the Committee expressed its concerns about frequent
violations of fair trial guarantees provided for under the Covenant, especially in the
Revolutionary Courts and the Evin Prison Court.10
34.
The source also notes the fact that Mr. Djalali may face the death penalty. It
therefore highlights that, in cases of trials leading to the imposition of the death penalty,
scrupulous respect of the guarantees of fair trial is particularly important.11
35.
According to the source, Mr. Djalali is detained in inhuman conditions, in
contravention of his right to be treated with humanity and respect for his inherent dignity.
The source considers that this treatment constitutes a violation of article 10 (1) of the
Covenant and falls short of the requirements of the United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules).12 In addition, the source
claims that the treatment to which Mr. Djalali has been subjected is a violation of the
prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under
article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 7 of the Covenant.
8 Ibid., para. 61.
9 Ibid., para. 41.
10 See CCPR/C/IRN/CO/3, para. 21.
11 See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007) on the right to equality before courts
and tribunals and to a fair trial, para. 59.
12 Rules 1 and 24–27.
A/HRC/WGAD/2017/92
6
36.
More specifically, the source notes that Mr. Djalali was held in solitary confinement
for three months. During that period, he was subjected to intense interrogations and was
forced to sign statements under significant emotional and psychological pressure. The
Iranian authorities allegedly insulted Mr. Djalali and threatened to transfer him to Raja’i-
Shahr Prison in Karaj, to be held with other inmates on death row in extremely poor
conditions of detention.
37.
The source further reports that, in December 2016, the Iranian authorities put Mr.
Djalali under intense psychological pressure to sign a statement “confessing” to spying for
a hostile government. When he refused, the authorities allegedly stated that they would
charge Mr. Djalali with enmity against God (moharebeh), which is a capital offence. Due to
those threats, there are serious fears for Mr. Djalali’s life. Mr. Djalali also allegedly
received a number threats relating to the lives of his family members in Sweden.
38.
Finally, the source claims that Mr. Djalali has been prevented from accessing
adequate medical care, similarly to many other prisoners in the Islamic Republic of Iran and
in Evin Prison. Mr. Djalali’s health has seriously deteriorated since he entered Evin Prison.
He currently suffers from kidney pain and has blood in his urine. In addition, he has very
low blood pressure, has lost consciousness on a number of occasions and his weight has
dropped by 24 kg.
39.
The source reports that Mr. Djalali has gone on hunger strike on several occasions in
protest against his arrest and detention. The first three such protests lasted a week each,
while the fourth started on 26 December 2016 and lasted for 49 days, until 12 February
2017. Mr. Djalali began his fifth hunger strike on 15 February 2017, when he was informed
that his chosen lawyer was not allowed to represent him.
40.
The source points to the inhuman conditions in Evin Prison, highlighting that, in its
most recent concluding observations concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Human
Rights Committee also expressed its concerns about poor conditions in Evin Prison, the use
of solitary confinement, unreasonable limits on family visits and the reported denial of
medical treatment for many prisoners in Ward 350/Correctional Facility 3 of Evin Prison.13
41.
Mr. Djalali was the subject of a joint urgent appeal sent to the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran on 10 February 2017 by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
Islamic Republic of Iran. The Working Group acknowledges the reply of the Government
to this joint urgent appeal, received on 25 August 2017.
Response from the Government
42.
On 18 September 2017, the Working Group transmitted the source’s allegations to
the Government under its regular communications procedure. The Working Group
requested the Government to provide, by 17 November 2017, detailed information about
the current situation of Mr. Djalali and any comments on the source’s allegations.
43.
The Working Group regrets that it did not receive a response from the Government,
nor did the Government request an extension of the time limit for its reply, as provided for
in the Working Group’s methods of work.
Discussion
44.
In the absence of a response from the Government, the Working Group has decided
to render the present opinion, in conformity with paragraph 15 of its methods of work.
45.
The Working Group has, in its jurisprudence, established the ways in which it deals
with evidentiary issues. If the source has established a prima facie case for breach of
international requirements constituting arbitrary detention, the burden of proof should be
understood to rest upon the Government if it wishes to refute the allegations (see
13 See CCPR/C/IRN/CO/3, para. 19.
A/HRC/WGAD/2017/92
7
A/HRC/19/57, para. 68). In the present case, the Government has chosen not to challenge
the prima facie credible allegations made by the source.
46.
The source has submitted, and the Government has chosen not to contest, allegations
that the arrest and detention of Mr. Djalali are arbitrary and fall within categories I and III
of the Working Group. The Working Group shall consider these allegations in turn.
47.
The source argues that the detention of Mr. Djalali was arbitrary and falls within
category I, as he was arrested on 25 April 2016 without an arrest warrant, he was not
informed of any charges against him until 31 January 2017 and he was unable to challenge
the lawfulness of his detention due to lack of legal assistance.
48.
The Working Group notes that Mr. Djalali was arrested without a warrant and that
he did not learn of any of the accusations against him until some two weeks later when he
deduced them from the contents of a letter he was shown; however, this disclosure did not
constitute an official presentation of charges. Consequently, even though the said letter was
shown to Mr. Djalali, the authorities failed to formally notify Mr. Djalali of any of the
charges against him. The only formal notification of charges appears to have taken place on
31 January 2017, more than nine months after Mr. Djalali’s arrest.
49.
The Working Group recalls that article 9 (2) of the Covenant requires that anyone
who is arrested is promptly informed not only of the reasons for his or her arrest but also of
any charges against him or her. The right to be promptly informed of charges applies to
notice of criminal charges and, as the Human Rights Committee states, that right applies in
connection with ordinary criminal prosecutions and also in connection with military
prosecutions or other special regimes directed at criminal punishment.14 This right was not
observed in the case of Mr. Djalali.
50.
Furthermore, anyone detained has the right to take proceedings before a court in
order to establish the lawfulness of his or her detention, as envisaged by article 9 (4) of the
Covenant. The Working Group wishes to recall that the right to challenge the lawfulness of
detention before a court is a self-standing human right, which is essential to preserve
legality in a democratic society. 15 This right, which is in fact a peremptory norm of
international law, applies to all forms of arbitrary deprivation of liberty 16 and to all
situations of deprivation of liberty, including not only to detention for purposes of criminal
proceedings but also to situations of detention under administrative and other fields of law,
including military detention, security detention, detention under counter-terrorism
measures, involuntary confinement in medical or psychiatric facilities, migration detention,
detention for extradition, arbitrary arrests, house arrest, solitary confinement, detention for
vagrancy or drug addiction and detention of children for educational purposes.17 Moreover,
it also applies irrespective of the place of detention or the legal terminology used in the
legislation. Any form of deprivation of liberty on any ground must be subject to effective
oversight and control by the judiciary.18
51.
The Working Group notes that, in order to ensure the effective exercise of this right,
detained persons should have access to legal assistance of their own choosing. This choice
was denied to Mr. Djalali, seriously adversely affecting his ability to effectively exercise
his right to challenge the lawfulness of his detention. Moreover, the Working Group
attaches special importance to the allegation, uncontested by the Government, that Mr.
Djalali was held in detention for a week at an undisclosed location. This is akin to
incommunicado detention and effectively prevented him from challenging the lawfulness of
his detention, denying him his rights under article 9 (4) of the Covenant.
14 See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person, para.
29.
15 See A/HRC/30/37, paras. 2 and 3.
16 Ibid., para. 11.
17 United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right of Anyone
Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court, para. 47 (a).
18 Ibid., para. 47 (b).
A/HRC/WGAD/2017/92
8
52.
The Working Group therefore concludes that, in the light of Mr. Djalali’s detention
without an arrest warrant, the fact that no formal charges were brought against him for
nearly 10 months and the fact that he was effectively prevented from exercising his right to
challenge the lawfulness of his detention, his arrest and detention are arbitrary and fall
within category I.
53.
The source has further submitted that the detention of Mr. Djalali is arbitrary and
also falls within category III, as he was prevented from having a lawyer of his own
choosing, was unable to communicate with his lawyer properly, was not afforded sufficient
opportunity to prepare his defence, was forced to sign a self-incriminating confession, was
denied medical care and was held in inhuman detention conditions. The Government has
chosen not to respond to any of these allegations.
54.
The Working Group is of the view that these allegations reveal serious breaches of
the right to fair trial. Mr. Djalali was unable to choose his own lawyer as the authorities
rejected the two lawyers he chose. The third lawyer, who was not chosen by Mr. Djalali,
was approved but even then he was not allowed to communicate freely with his client.
Denial of legal assistance is a violation of article 14 (3) (b) of the Covenant and principle
17 (1) of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment, as well as of principle 9 of the United Nations Basic Principles
and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Rights of Anyone Deprived of Their
Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court. The Working Group also observes that Mr.
Djalali’s right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence under article
14 (3) (b) of the Covenant was violated. Furthermore, Mr. Djalali’s lawyer was unable to
access all the necessary files and the authorities did not promptly notify Mr. Djalali of the
charges against him.
55.
The Working Group is alarmed at the submission stating that Mr. Djalali, while held
incommunicado, was forced to sign self-incriminating confessions, and finds that this
constitutes a prima facie breach of the presumption of innocence under article 14 (2) of the
Covenant and the right not to testify against himself under article 14 (3) (g) of the
Covenant, as well as a breach of the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, which
is a peremptory norm of international law. This situation also constitutes a breach of the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, as well as of principle 6 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment and of rule 1 of the Nelson
Mandela Rules.
56.
Moreover, although the Working Group’s mandate does not cover conditions of
detention or the treatment of prisoners, it must consider to what extent detention conditions
can negatively affect the ability of detainees to prepare their defence as well as their
chances of a fair trial.19 The detention of Mr. Djalali took place in poor conditions, a fact
which is especially alarming given his status as an unconvicted person and which
constitutes a breach of article 10 (2) of the Covenant. He was also denied medication and
treatment for serious health conditions, in violation of the Nelson Mandela Rules, in
particular rules 24, 25, 27 and 30.
57.
The Working Group further finds that the Iranian authorities’ failure to inform Mr.
Djalali’s family of his whereabouts or to allow him to do so constitutes a violation of
principle 19 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment.
58.
The Working Group therefore concludes that there has been a non-observance of the
international norms relating to a fair trial, as established in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and in relevant international instruments accepted by the Islamic Republic of
Iran, of such gravity as to give Mr. Djalali’s deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character,
falling within category III.
19 See E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.3, para. 33.
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9
59.
Given the seriousness of the issues raised by this case, the Working Group refers the
present case to the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic
Republic of Iran for appropriate action.
60.
The Working Group would welcome the opportunity to conduct a country visit to
the Islamic Republic of Iran, so that it can constructively engage with the Government and
offer assistance in addressing its serious concerns relating to the arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. The Working Group considers that now is an appropriate time to conduct such a
visit, noting the significant period of time that has passed since its most recent visit to the
Islamic Republic of Iran in 2003. The Working Group notes that the Government issued a
standing invitation to all thematic special procedure mandate holders on 24 July 2002 and
looks forward to a positive response from the Government to its country visit request,
which was made on 10 August 2016.
Disposition
61.
In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group renders the following opinion:
The deprivation of liberty of Ahmadreza Djalali, being in contravention of articles 3,
5, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of articles 7, 9,
10 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is arbitrary
and falls within categories I and III.
62.
The Working Group requests the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to take
the steps necessary to remedy the situation of Mr. Djalali without delay and bring it into
conformity with the relevant international norms, including those set out in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
63.
The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the
case, the appropriate remedy would be to release Mr. Djalali immediately and accord him
an enforceable right to compensation and other reparations, in accordance with
international law.
64.
In accordance with paragraph 33 (a) of its methods of work, the Working Group
refers the present case to Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic
Republic of Iran for appropriate action.
Follow-up procedure
65.
In accordance with paragraph 20 of its methods of work, the Working Group
requests the source and the Government to provide it with information on action taken in
follow-up to the recommendations made in the present opinion, including:
(a)
Whether Mr. Djalali has been released and, if so, on what date;
(b)
Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to Mr. Djalali;
(c)
Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of Mr.
Djalali’s rights and, if so, the outcome of the investigation;
(d)
Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made
to harmonize the laws and practices of the Islamic Republic of Iran with its international
obligations in line with the present opinion;
(e)
Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.
66.
The Government is invited to inform the Working Group of any difficulties it may
have encountered in implementing the recommendations made in the present opinion and
whether further technical assistance is required, for example, through a visit by the
Working Group.
67.
The Working Group requests the source and the Government to provide the above
information within six months of the date of the transmission of the present opinion.
However, the Working Group reserves the right to take its own action in follow-up to the
opinion if new concerns in relation to the case are brought to its attention. Such action
A/HRC/WGAD/2017/92
10
would enable the Working Group to inform the Human Rights Council of progress made in
implementing its recommendations, as well as any failure to take action.
68.
The Working Group recalls that the Human Rights Council has encouraged all
States to cooperate with the Working Group and requested them to take account of its views
and, where necessary, to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation of persons arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty, and to inform the Working Group of the steps they have taken.20
[Adopted on 24 November 2017]
20 See Human Rights Council resolution 33/30, paras. 3 and 7.