CRC/C/97/D/137/2021

GE.24-18852 (E) 121124 121124

Committee on the Rights of the Child

Decision adopted by the Committee under the Optional

Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a

communications procedure, concerning communication

No. 137/2021*, **

Communication submitted by:

T.X. (represented by counsel, Edwige Garcia)

Alleged victim:

K.E.

State party:

France

Date of communication:

13 January 2021 (initial submission)

Date of adoption of decision:

27 August 2024

Subject matter:

Placement in foster care of a prematurely born

little girl as the authorities considered that her

mother could be dangerous for her

Procedural issue:

Exhaustion of domestic remedies

Substantive issues:

Best interests of the child; separation of a child

from his or her parents; inhuman or degrading

treatment

Articles of the Convention:

2, 3, 5–9, 19, 24, 25, 27, 30, 35–37, 41, 42 and

45

Article of the Optional Protocol:

7 (e)

1.1

The author of the communication is T.X., a French national born on 23 June 1979.

She claims that her daughter, K.E., is the victim of a violation by the State party of her rights

under articles 2, 3, 5–9, 19, 24, 25, 27, 30, 35–37, 41, 42 and 45 of the Convention, as she

was ordered to be placed in foster care by the French authorities. She is represented by

counsel, Edwige Garcia. The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State party on

7 April 2016.

1.2

As an interim measure, the author requested that K.E. be returned to her while the

Committee examined the communication. On 27 January 2021, in accordance with article 6

of the Optional Protocol, the Working Group on Communications, acting on behalf of the

Committee, decided not to submit a request for interim measures to the State party.

* Adopted by the Committee at its ninety-seventh session (26 August–13 September 2024).

** The following members of the Committee participated in the examination of the communication:

Suzanne Aho, Aïssatou Alassane Moulaye Sidikou, Thuwayba Al Barwani, Hynd Ayoubi Idrissi,

Rinchen Chophel, Rosaria Correa, Bragi Gudbrandsson, Philip Jaffé, Sopio Kiladze, Faith

Marshall-Harris, Benyam Dawit Mezmur, Otani Mikiko, Luis Ernesto Pedernera Reyna, Ann Skelton,

Velina Todorova, Benoit Van Keirsbilck and Ratou Zara.

United Nations

CRC/C/97/D/137/2021

Convention on the

Rights of the Child

Distr.: General

4 November 2024

English

Original: French

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Facts as submitted by the author

2.1

On 7 February 2019, K.E. was born prematurely. The birth was particularly difficult

for her and for the author, who underwent uterine packing and suffered a postpartum

haemorrhage. K.E. was placed in an incubator in the intensive care unit. Given the

circumstances, the author, who was a first-time mother, repeatedly expressed her concerns to

the nursing staff. Prior to K.E.’s birth, she had had three miscarriages, making it necessary

for her to undergo enhanced medical monitoring during the pregnancy and to remain inactive

from the fourth month of pregnancy. The author states that she was in an anxious and

emotional state for a number of medical and hormonal reasons. She states that she arrived

from China at the age of 18 years and was brought up according to traditional Chinese

customs, as an only child. She explains that she had had no previous relations with newborn

children, which gave rise to further concerns about her suitability as a mother and her fear of

doing the wrong thing. The author notes that, given these circumstances, it was natural that

she would ask the nursing staff many questions about her daughter’s health and the care that

she needed. The author points out that M.E., K.E.’s father, has autism spectrum disorder.

2.2

The author expressed the wish to be transferred to another care centre. However, the

hospital staff responded to her request by notifying the departmental authorities of

Haute-Garonne. On 25 February 2019, the public prosecutor ordered that K.E. undergo a

court-ordered placement as a matter of urgency. It was considered that the daughter would

be in danger if she returned home in view of the author’s delusional behaviour, the adjustment

difficulties identified at the hospital despite the secure environment, the extent to which the

daughter was affected by the author’s excessive lack of trust, the cooperation difficulties

between the parents and the father’s inability to assert his presence despite his more

appropriate behaviour. The author claims that her daughter was removed from the incubator,

depriving her of any further access to her care or that of the medical staff, and placed in a

children’s home that lacked the medical equipment necessary for her state of health.

2.3

In a ruling dated 11 March 2019, the judge of the Toulouse Juvenile Court ordered

that K.E. remain in the care of the child welfare services for a period of six months and

granted the parents the right to undertake supervised visits twice per week. He also ordered

a psychiatric examination of the parents. The judge found that, in view of the observations

made at the maternity hospital and since the emergency placement, the author’s difficulties,

which were not sufficiently counterbalanced by M.E.’s support, were such as to endanger

K.E.’s ability to have her basic needs and her emotional and psychological needs satisfied.

2.4

The author filed an appeal with the Toulouse Court of Appeal. On 5 July 2019, the

Court upheld the decision on the placement. The court deemed that it was still too early for

K.E. to return to her family. Taking into account the more appropriate behaviour of K.E.’s

father, the court considered that his visiting time could be increased.

2.5

On 11 September 2019, the juvenile court judge extended the placement for a period

of eight months. This ruling was upheld by the Toulouse Court of Appeal on 15 May 2020.

The author filed an appeal against this decision with the Court of Cassation. On 17 July 2020,

she was informed by the office of the clerk for appeals of the Court of Cassation that, in order

to file an appeal with the Court, it was mandatory to have representation. The author replied

by asking for her case to be heard without a lawyer and received no further response.

2.6

On 3 June 2020, the juvenile court judge extended K.E.’s placement by a further year.

Following difficulties experienced by the child welfare services during the supervised visits,

the juvenile court judge decided to suspend the author’s right to visit her daughter by means

of a decision dated 9 December 2020. On 18 March 2021, the Toulouse Court of Appeal,

which had received applications to review these two decisions from the author, upheld them

in their entirety.

Complaint

3.1

The author claims that K.E.’s rights under articles 2, 3, 5–9, 19, 24, 25, 27, 30, 35–37,

41, 42 and 45 of the Convention have been violated by the State party because K.E. was

placed with the children’s welfare services and because the author’s supervised access rights

were suspended.

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3.2

The author considers that the State party has violated K.E.’s rights under articles 5–7

and 24 of the Convention. In this respect, she points out that the public prosecutor in Toulouse

requested the emergency placement in a children’s home of a premature infant who needed

to be kept in an incubator under enhanced medical supervision on the sole grounds that the

author was distressed and was therefore taking up the time of hospital staff. She claims that

this decision directly endangered the infant’s life, and that her daughter’s developmental

delays are likely to be linked to this premature interruption of her care. The author believes

that K.E. should be examined by an independent practitioner but the child welfare services

are opposed to this. She points out that the hospital staff should have had the patience to

guide, advise and reassure her, given that she was traumatized by her delivery and the birth

of her daughter, in order to ensure K.E.’s right to know and be raised by her parents. The

author also claims that the “enforced disappearance” of K.E. is a wilful act of abduction

perpetrated by a State institution that refuses to admit that K.E. is being deprived of her

fundamental human rights and refuses to provide information on her fate, with the sole

intention of removing her from the protection of the law for a prolonged period, which is

particularly contrary to K.E.’s best interests under article 3 of the Convention. The author

also points out that the refusal of the Court of Cassation to hear her case, with the aim of

removing French children from the protection of the law, must be interpreted as a violation

of article 6 of the Convention, which is also flouted, violated, ignored and disregarded, in

view of the physical interactions that such psychological treatment entails for such a young

child.

3.3

The author also claims that the suspension of the supervised visits, depriving K.E. of

any contact with her mother when she was barely 2 years old, unquestionably constitutes a

violation of article 9 of the Convention.

3.4

The author adds that the State party has violated her daughter’s rights under articles 8,

19, 25, 27 and 37 of the Convention. She points out that K.E. has been in the care of the child

welfare services since birth on the grounds that her parents – and particularly the author –

would be dangerous for the child, whereas these accusations are ill-founded since they were

first-time parents, so there was no precedent that would justify the belief that K.E. was in

danger. K.E. never returned to her family home. Consequently, there is no evidence to

suggest that her parents posed a danger to her. On the contrary, the author notes that her

daughter has been subjected to physical abuse and neglect of all kinds in the foster homes to

which she was entrusted by the child welfare services. She claims that her daughter was

placed in a succession of foster homes owing to their serious shortcomings. The author refers

to the large number of photos that she took during her supervised visits, which reveal the

mistreatment of her daughter by the foster families and neglect that amounts to inhuman and

degrading treatment. She claims that other photos directly show marks caused by wilful

violence; for instance, one photo shows traces of ties, suggesting that K.E. was tied up

regularly. Another series of photos shows bruises that appear and disappear with each

supervised visit and that no one can explain, while the author is described as suffering from

mental disorders accompanied by bouts of delusional paranoia. The author also refers to

photos of pimples reminiscent of flea bites. She reiterates that her daughter has been deprived

of her maternal ties since birth for no valid, real or serious reason; that her daughter is

subjected to violence within the designated foster families; and that she lives in inhuman

hygienic conditions that jeopardize her physical health. The author states that she has the

means to give her daughter a standard of living that guarantees the necessary levels of hygiene,

love, attention and security. She claims that, in order to keep their subsidies, the child welfare

services blatantly lie to the consenting juvenile court judge who, at each hearing, excludes

the evidence proving that the author’s daughter is being mistreated as well as all the evidence

proving that the author is a woman capable of taking in and caring for her daughter.

3.5

Lastly, the author states that articles 35 and 36 of the Convention have been violated

since the purpose of the proceedings was to serve, not the best interests of the child, but

“deep-seated corruption based on the trafficking of children living in the national territory of

France”, which is strictly prohibited by the Convention.

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State party’s observations on admissibility and the merits

4.1

In its observations dated 27 September 2021, the State party submits that the

communication is inadmissible under article 7 (e) of the Optional Protocol, since the author

has failed to exhaust domestic remedies.

4.2

The State party affirms that several legal proceedings before the Toulouse Juvenile

Court and the Toulouse Court of Appeal, which are criticized in the present communication,

are still under way. Firstly, the author filed an appeal with the Toulouse Court of Appeal

against the ruling issued by the judge of the Toulouse Juvenile Court on 11 September 2019,

renewing K.E.’s placement. The Toulouse Court of Appeal issued a decision upholding the

ruling on 15 May 2020. The author filed an appeal against this decision with the Court of

Cassation. On 17 July 2020, she received a letter from the office of the clerk of the Court

informing her that, in order to file an appeal with the Court, it was mandatory to have

representation and that it was up to her, within the legal time limit, to apply directly to a

lawyer accredited by the Council of State and the Court of Cassation, who was solely

authorized to sign the notice of appeal that would be filed with the office of the clerk of the

Court, or to apply to the Court’s legal aid office for legal aid. The author clearly did not do

so, since she replied by sending a letter requesting that her case be heard without a lawyer,

which was not possible under the Code of Civil Procedure, in particular article 973, which

states that “the parties are required, unless otherwise indicated, to appoint a lawyer accredited

by the Council of State and the Court of Cassation.” Secondly, the author has never filed an

appeal against the decision of the Toulouse Court of Appeal dated 18 March 2021.

4.3

The State party explains that the Court of Cassation carefully examines the reasoning

behind decisions justifying the continuation of child placement. It carries out individualized

assessments of judicial investigation measures relating to education. In addition, any decision

to reduce the number of meetings between parents and their child in care, or to put an end to

such meetings, must be justified in a specific ruling, the quality of whose reasoning is

monitored by the Court of Cassation With regard to the time frame for the examination of

appeals before the Court of Cassation, it is possible to shorten the time frames for transmitting

written submissions to the Court by making a request on the basis of article 1001 of the Code

of Civil Procedure.

4.4

The State party also considers that the articles alleged to have been violated in the

present communication have not been invoked in the author’s submissions to the domestic

courts, with the exception of articles 19 and 37 of the Convention.

4.5

With regard to the alleged violations of articles 7, 8, 19, 24, 25, 27 and 37 of the

Convention, the State party concludes that there has been no violation. The State party wishes

to recall the context in which the national courts have taken steps to protect and guarantee

the best interests of the child. In particular, the staff of the neonatal ward noted that the

author’s behaviour is characterized by unusual conduct towards others, a loosening of

associations in speech and delusions of persecution with regard to the obstetrician. The author

refused to follow up with the maternal and child protection service, whose nursery nurse had

been in contact with this doctor. The neonatal team also had to intervene twice during the

night as the author had shouted at the child’s father in the presence of K.E., accusing him of

handling her wrongly and endangering her. It was also noted that the author appeared to have

little connection with her baby, as her focus was very much on the medical problems resulting

from the delivery. She also showed signs of great anxiety that prevented her from providing

her child with basic care (nutrition, sleep, meeting the child’s need to be held).

4.6

In a ruling handed down on 11 March 2019, the juvenile court judge ordered that K.E.

remain in care for a period of six months on the grounds that, during two supervised visits

that had been organized, it had been noted that M.E. appeared to be behaving appropriately

towards K.E., and that he was able to establish an emotional bond with his baby, but that the

author’s speech showed that she was still very confused, at odds with reality and

overwhelmed by her anxieties, which prevented her from identifying K.E.’s needs and

responding to them independently. At the hearing, the author submitted a medical certificate

stating that she did not have any psychopathological disorders requiring regular follow-up.

However, the hearing confirmed that the author has difficulty relating to other people and

finds it hard to focus on K.E.’s needs. The judge found that the author’s difficulties, which

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were not sufficiently counterbalanced by M.E.’s support, were such as to endanger the

fulfilment of the infant’s basic needs and her emotional and psychological needs.

4.7

The State party considers that it was only after a scrupulous examination of the

evidence available to the juvenile court judge, and after a hearing attended by the parents

(assisted by a lawyer), a representative of the child welfare services and a representative of

the Departmental Centre for Children and Families, that the judge decided to order that K.E.

be placed with the child welfare services for a period of six months. This demonstrates the

judge’s willingness to take a protective measure in the best interests of the child – a measure

that is justified and proportionate in view of the danger to her – while still providing for

supervised visitation rights in order to preserve and maintain the bonds between the parents

and the child.

4.8

The Toulouse Court of Appeal issued a decision upholding the ruling on 5 July 2019,

noting, among other things, that the author remained highly anxious and needed ongoing

support, including from a psychomotor specialist, so that she could engage with K.E. without

overwhelming her, maintaining the right distance. M.E. managed to adapt successfully to the

supervised setting, but it was still too early to envisage a return to the family when he was

working and would be the sole person available to compensate for the mother’s difficulties

and reassure her. The court thus considered that it was still very early to envisage a return to

the family and to grant traditional visitation and custody rights.

4.9

The State party points out that the Court of Appeal relied in particular on hearing the

parties present at the hearing and on reports recently issued by the child welfare services,

which tended to confirm that there was still a risk for the child and that the placement should

be maintained in the child’s best interests.

4.10

On 11 September 2019, the juvenile court judge renewed K.E.’s placement for a

period of eight months. This decision was also made in light of the psychiatric evaluation

reports on the author, dated 10 April 2019, and M.E., dated 19 April 2019, as well as on the

report issued by the child welfare services on 6 September 2019, which indicated that the

author had significant difficulty behaving in a manner that was reassuring and in line with

K.E.’s needs. The report explained that the author, who suffered from anxiety, appeared

agitated, moved jerkily and made intrusive physical contact, causing K.E. to avert her gaze

and become highly agitated and unsettled during visits.

4.11

The ruling of 11 September 2019 was upheld on appeal on 15 May 2020, with the

Toulouse Court of Appeal stating in its reasoning that the principle underpinning the

placement was not in dispute. It noted that the parents were now separated and that M.E. had

recently been granted the right to home visits. However, it was noted that, during the hearing,

the author remained very distrustful, suspecting a plot against her, and that she had difficulty

recognizing her daughter’s needs. The court therefore maintained the author’s right to

undertake supervised visits; this arrangement remained necessary for safety reasons while

the author continued to make progress in establishing a bond with her daughter.

4.12

The placement measure was extended for a further year by a decision of the judge of

the Toulouse Juvenile Court, issued on 3 June 2020, with the judge deeming that the

placement remained necessary in order to ensure that K.E. benefited from a stable living

environment and received care suited to her physical and psychological needs. The placement

measure was also intended to support K.E. and her two parents in creating a secure attachment

bond, to provide individual support to T.X. and M.E. in their role as parents and to help them

reflect on their joint parental role in the light of their recent separation. The judge also

renewed the author’s right to undertake supervised visits.

4.13

However, the State party points out that the educational services monitoring the visits

reported to the juvenile court judge that the author appeared to be finding the situation

increasingly difficult and was acting very aggressively towards the staff and resisting any

constructive exchange both during and outside the supervised visiting times. The educational

services also noted that the author was clinging to K.E. and forcing her to eat and that the

child reacted to this approach by rebuffing her and becoming tense. On 9 December 2020,

the juvenile court judge decided to suspend the visits as it was no longer possible to ensure

K.E.’s physical and psychological safety during them.

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4.14

On 18 March 2021, the Toulouse Court of Appeal upheld the two most recent

decisions of the juvenile court in their entirety. It noted in particular that, when K.E. was

exposed to the pathological behaviour and elevated levels of anxiety of the author, who,

during supervised visits, made intrusive physical contact with K.E. and forced her to eat, K.E.

showed clear signs of distress, becoming tense and screaming and pushing her mother. The

child subsequently had difficulty eating and sleeping in the home of the foster family. Given

the danger facing the child, the court considered that the judge had made a fair assessment of

the situation by suspending the author’s visiting rights and organizing an expert appraisal in

conditions specially designed to enable K.E.’s bond with her mother to be assessed.

4.15

The State party claims that all the decisions taken, each of which was based on

up-to-date information, justify the decision to maintain the placement, which appears to be

the only measure that allows the child’s best interests to be protected. The fact that the

decisions do not favour the author does not make it possible to conclude that the courts have

incorrectly assessed the situation, or that K.E.’s placement amounts to inhuman and

degrading treatment within the meaning of article 37 of the Convention, or that the decisions

have deprived K.E. of the right to know her parents within the meaning of articles 7 and 8 of

the Convention.

4.16

In considering the decisions taken as a whole, the State party points out that the child’s

health, safety and well-being are being safeguarded by the care services, that she is attending

the medical appointments and receiving the care that she requires and that the domestic courts

have reiterated in each of their decisions that the child is developing harmoniously and safely,

in accordance with articles 19, 24, 25 and 27 of the Convention. The author has not submitted

evidence of any ill-treatment or lack of medical care and no assessment carried out by the

child welfare services indicates that there may be a problem in this regard.

4.17

The State party notes that the placement measure has been reassessed periodically

each time that the deadline set by the juvenile court judge has elapsed, that the Court of

Appeal has also reassessed the situation, and that the domestic courts have based their

decisions on objective evidence reported by the educational services, after having heard all

the interested parties.

4.18

With regard to the alleged violations of articles 3, 5, 9, 35 and 36 of the Convention,

the State party concludes that there has been no violation. It states that the placement was in

full compliance with the Convention, including article 9. The Committee has already stated

that States parties are encouraged to recognize that young children enjoy all the rights

guaranteed by the Convention and that early childhood is a crucial period for the realization

of these rights, making particular reference to the best interests of the child.1 The State party

also refers to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which has recalled that

“in cases involving the care of children and contact restrictions, the child’s interests must

come before all other considerations”.2

4.19

The State party affirms that, while a placement was carried out, the judicial authorities

have endeavoured to preserve the best interests of the child and ensure that family ties are

maintained with the author and father, in the light of the numerous detailed pieces of evidence

on which their decision was based. The placement was justified by the danger that K.E. would

have faced if she had been left with her mother, who failed to comprehend that her behaviour

– in particular her denial of the child’s basic needs, her lack of empathy and her systematic

questioning of the help that could be given to her – necessitated such a measure, in the

absence of which the child’s health and safety would have been compromised.

4.20

The State party maintains that under no circumstances can K.E’s placement and the

organization of visitation rights be legitimately equated with the abduction or enforced

disappearance of a child or with any form of child exploitation. This measure is strictly

regulated by French law and subject to the oversight of an independent judge, who issues

decisions after holding hearings which the author had the opportunity to attend and at which

1 Committee on the Rights of the Child, general comment No. 7 (2005), para. 13.

2 European Court of Human Rights, Strand Lobben et. al. v. Norway, application No. 37283/13,

judgment, 10 September 2019, Grand Chamber, para. 204.

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she could be heard and advised by a lawyer. The State party therefore considers that the

complaints of a violation of articles 35 and 36 of the Convention cannot be admitted.

4.21

The State party also notes that every decision taken by the juvenile court judge was

aimed at preserving not only the interests of the child but also her bond with each parent. For

this reason, in order to gain an understanding of the parents’ personalities before taking any

decision to extend visitation rights, the judge ordered a psychiatric examination of the author

and M.E.

4.22

The State party points out that the national courts have safeguarded the child’s

interests in respect of her relationship with her father, M.E., who has never contested the

court decisions and has worked to develop his relationship with his daughter in a positive and

peaceful manner, demonstrating his ability to play his role as a father, as a result of which he

has enjoyed the right to home visits, in accordance with article 5 of the Convention.

4.23

The State party considers that the author cannot blame the national authorities because

she has had difficulty maintaining contact with her child, since the decision to suspend

visitation rights was taken in the child’s best interests, in particular to ensure her physical and

psychological safety in accordance with articles 3 and 9 of the Convention.

4.24

The State party considers that the author’s photographs and other documents in no

way indicate that the child’s care is likely to endanger her, or that her behaviour has been

wrongly assessed, or that there is any intention of keeping the mother away from the child.

This is a further sign that the author has difficulty grasping the reality of the situation.

4.25

The State party also notes that the claim of a violation of article 6 of the Convention

cannot be admitted as it stands, insofar as the author considers that her appeal was dismissed

because of a position deliberately adopted by the highest court in France, the sole aim of

which, in her view, was to remove minors from the protection of the law, impacting her

daughter’s mental health.

Author’s comments on the State party’s observations

5.1

In her comments of 3 December 2021, the author states that it is impossible to exhaust

domestic remedies relating to child placement measures. She considers that filing an appeal

with the Court of Cassation is not an effective remedy as the Court does not issue rulings

within a reasonable time frame. She points out that to claim that the Court of Cassation would

have been able to settle the dispute by issuing a decision on the ruling of 5 July 2019 of the

Toulouse Court of Appeal before the hearing on the extension set for 11 September 2019,

when the French courts were in summer recess throughout the month of August, is not serious

as it is simply materially impossible. Consequently, filing an appeal with the Court of

Cassation would be tantamount to requesting a review of a decision that is no longer in force.

5.2

The author also points out that she was under no obligation to raise all the articles of

the Convention violated by the State party before the French courts since, according to the

French Constitution and the Court of Cassation, the Convention is binding in matters on

which the law is silent. The author also notes that the domestic courts did not respond to the

complaints made under articles 19 and 37 of the Convention that were raised before them.

The allegations of acts of violence, ill-treatment and neglect raised before the domestic courts

have not been addressed, since the judges made no mention of them in their decisions.

5.3

The author reiterates her allegations on the merits. She adds that K.E. is being used as

a tool by the State party, which sees K.E.’s detention as a means of ensuring that the author

remains in France and does not escape the financial authorities by leaving the country for

China.

5.4

The author also points out that the State party has violated article 42 of the Convention,

since the training provided by the National School for the Judiciary has a serious influence

on the judicial decisions taken by the juvenile court, which routinely violate article 9 of the

Convention. In her case, the judges ignored the Convention, even though it is binding in

matters on which the law is silent.

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Additional information submitted by the author

6.

The author, without being represented by a lawyer, submitted additional information

on 17 October 2021, 24 August 2022, 6 January 2023, 24 February 2023, 2 March 2023 and

23 March 2023, including a document attesting that she had volunteered for an association,

copies of emails that she had sent to the national authorities concerning her daughter’s

situation, a copy of a document dated 8 June 2022 in which she contested the decision of the

Toulouse Juvenile Court of 25 May 2022, a copy of a summons to appear before the Toulouse

Court of Appeal on 27 January 2023, and a copy of a bailiff’s report dated 24 March 2021.

Issues and proceedings before the Committee

Consideration of admissibility

7.1

Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must

decide, in accordance with rule 20 of the rules of procedure under the Optional Protocol,

whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol.

7.2

The Committee notes the State party’s argument that, following the issuance of a

ruling renewing K.E.’s placement, handed down by the judge of the Toulouse Juvenile Court

on 11 September 2019, the author filed an appeal against the ruling with the Toulouse Court

of Appeal, which decided to uphold the ruling on 15 May 2020. She subsequently filed an

appeal against this decision with the Court of Cassation. The Committee notes that, on

17 July 2020, the author received a letter from the office of the clerk of the Court of Cassation

informing her that, in order to file an appeal with the Court, it was mandatory to have

representation and that it was up to her, within the legal time limit, to apply directly to a

lawyer accredited by the Council of State and the Court of Cassation, who was solely

authorized to sign the notice of appeal that would be filed with the office of the clerk, or to

apply to the Court’s legal aid office for legal aid. The author failed to do so. The Committee

also notes the State party’s argument that the author never filed an appeal against the decision

of the Toulouse Court of Appeal dated 18 March 2021.

7.3

The Committee also notes the State party’s claim that the Court of Cassation carefully

examines the reasoning behind decisions justifying the continuation of child placement and

carries out individualized assessments of judicial investigation measures relating to education.

It also notes the State party’s claim that any decision to reduce the number of meetings

between parents and their child in care, or to put an end to such meetings, must be justified

in a specific judgment, the quality of whose reasoning is monitored by the Court of Cassation.

Lastly, the Committee notes the State party’s argument concerning the time frame for the

examination of appeals before the Court of Cassation, according to which the State party

affirms that it is possible to shorten the time frames for transmitting written submissions to

the Court by making a request on the basis of article 1001 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

7.4

The Committee recalls that authors of a communication must have exhausted all

judicial or administrative avenues that may offer them a reasonable prospect of redress. The

Committee is of the view that domestic remedies need not be exhausted if, objectively, they

have no prospect of success, for example in cases where the claim would inevitably be

dismissed under applicable national laws or where established jurisprudence of the highest

domestic courts would preclude a positive result. Nevertheless, the Committee notes that

mere doubts or assumptions about the success or effectiveness of remedies do not absolve

authors from exhausting them.3

7.5

In the present case, the Committee notes that the author has not filed an appeal with

the Court of Cassation against the rulings issued by the Toulouse Court of Appeal on 15 May

2020 and 18 March 2021. It notes the author’s argument that the Court of Cassation would

take too long to issue any decisions and that the decisions of the juvenile court judge would

3 D.C. v. Germany (CRC/C/83/D/60/2018), para. 6.5; W.W. and S.W. v. Ireland

(CRC/C/91/D/94/2019), para. 11.4; Sacchi et al. v. Argentina (CRC/C/88/D/104/2019), para. 10.17;

Sacchi et al. v. Brazil (CRC/C/88/D/105/2019)), para. 10.17; Sacchi et al. v. France

(CRC/C/88/D/106/2019)), para. 10.16; Sacchi et al. v. Germany (CRC/C/88/D/107/2019), para. 9.16;

Sacchi et al. v. Turkey (CRC/C/88/D/108/2019)), para. 9.16.

CRC/C/97/D/137/2021

GE.24-18852

9

no longer be in force. However, the Committee considers, firstly, that the author has not

justified to what extent this remedy, which was available to her, would not have been

effective in remedying the legal and procedural violations that she invoked before the

Committee and, secondly, that she has not justified why a request to expedite the procedure

provided for by law was not worth pursuing. Therefore, the Committee considers that

available domestic remedies have not all been exhausted and concludes that article 7 (e) of

the Optional Protocol constitutes an obstacle to the admissibility of the communication.

7.6

Consequently, the Committee finds the communication inadmissible for failure to

exhaust domestic remedies under article 7 (e) of the Optional Protocol.

8.

The Committee therefore decides:

(a)

That the communication is inadmissible under article 7 (e) of the Optional

Protocol;

(b)

That the present decision shall be transmitted to the author of the

communication and, for information, to the State party.