Decision on merits; Subjects: RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, GEORGIA; [CRC: Kinderrechtskonvention, Übereinkommen über die Rechte des Kindes; Convention relative aux droits de l'enfant; Convenzione sui diritti del fanciullo]
Erwägungen (14 Absätze)
E. 1 While we agree with the conclusion reached by the Committee in this case, we dissent from the majority decision that the communication is inadmissible under article 5 (2) of the Optional Protocol regarding the other 36 victims who were also residing at the Ninotsminda Saint Nino orphanage at the time of the submission of the present communication. In addition, we believe that the Committee should have gone further concerning the State party’s obligations and the modalities for providing effective reparations to the victims. A On admissibility
E. 2 The author of the communication acted on behalf of the 57 children residing at the orphanage on 5 May 2021. The Committee considered that the author had failed to justify why she was acting without the consent of the other 36 victims who were transferred from the orphanage in 2021 (see para. 10.6). The Committee therefore considered the communication to be inadmissible regarding those 36 victims. The Committee decided that the author adequately justified that she was acting on behalf of, but without the consent of, the 15 children still residing at the orphanage on 22 November 2021, the 4 children (V.K., L.Ku., Z.J. and M.B) placed in the SOS Children’s Village, and M.L. and L.Ko., who gave their express consent to the author (see paras. 7.2 and 10.5).
E. 3 However, in our view, the Committee should have considered the communication admissible regarding all 57 children who were residing at the orphanage at the time of the submission of the communication.
E. 4 Article 5 (2) of the Optional Protocol establishes that, when a communication is submitted on behalf of a group of individuals, this should be with their consent unless the author can justify acting on their behalf without such consent. Rule 13 (3) of the rules of procedure under the Optional Protocol indicates that communications may be submitted on behalf of alleged victims without such express consent, provided that the author can justify his or her action and the Committee deems it to be in the best interests of the children concerned.
E. 5 While we value the importance of children’s consent and of seeking their agreement to act on their behalf as far as possible throughout the procedure, we believe that this obligation must be assessed on a reasonable basis, having regard to the circumstances of the case. Similar to the Committee’s decision in S.N. et al. v. Finland,1 we believe that, in the particular circumstances of the present case, the author had limited communication with the victims, depriving the author of a realistic possibility of obtaining their consent. The Committee took note of the author’s repeated claim that it was impossible to obtain the children’s consent and that there was no other opportunity to serve justice (see para. 7.2). The author argued that, by the time the communication was submitted, neither the author nor the Office of the Public Defender nor any other relevant actor was allowed to meet with the children and obtain their views (see para. 5.1). In addition, the State party affirmed that, between June 2021 and May 2022, 32 beneficiaries had been discharged from the orphanage, 25 of whom remain under State care (see para. 6.1). In September 2021, the author asked the Agency for State Care for a meeting with the children who remained in the orphanage and the ones who had already left, but no response was received (see para. 5.2). We therefore 1 S.N. et al. v. Finland (CRC/C/91/D/100/2019), para. 10.3. CRC/C/96/D/144/2021 GE.24-11203 19 believe that the author adequately justified acting on behalf of all 57 victims and we would have found the present communication admissible regarding all of them. B. On the merits
E. 6 In our view, all 57 children who were residing at the orphanage at the time of the submission of the communication were victims of violations by the State party.
E. 7 The Committee took note of the author’s allegations that the State party failed to protect the victims against violence, abuse and ill-treatment at the orphanage and to investigate such alleged violations and ensure accountability (see para. 11.2). The Committee also took note of the author’s argument, under article 19 (2) of the Convention, regarding the alleged lack of an effective criminal investigation into the author’s claims of corporal punishment (see para. 11.8).
E. 8 The Committee noted that rigorous but child-sensitive investigation procedures helped to ensure that violence was correctly identified. The Committee also observed that investigations into instances of child maltreatment should be effective, in the sense that they should be capable of leading to a determination as to whether the child concerned suffered corporal punishment at the institution and to the identification of those responsible (see para. 11.8).
E. 9 In this regard, the Committee observed that, during the criminal proceedings, only one child had been granted victim status and the others were considered witnesses. Since 2015, very few investigations have been initiated and all of them are ongoing (see para. 11.9). The Committee noted that only one child had been granted victim status, as the results of the other children’s psychological examinations had not yet been released, making it impossible to determine the extent of the psychological damage and harm caused to them (see para. 11.10).
E. 10 The Committee therefore concluded that the State party’s national authorities had not shown due diligence in investigating the numerous allegations of violence, abuse and ill- treatment promptly and effectively (see para. 11.11). The analysis of the case led the Committee to conclude that the State party was under the obligation to provide effective reparation to the victims, including adequate, comprehensive and timely compensation and rehabilitation. The State party is also under the obligation to conduct, with due diligence, investigations into every allegation of a violation of the rights of a child (see para. 13).
E. 11 We fully support the Committee’s conclusion. Nevertheless, we believe that the Committee should have provided a more precise determination of the steps that the State party should take to ensure effective reparation to the victims.
E. 12 The Committee has already established that States parties’ special obligations regarding violence against children include due diligence, the obligation to prevent violence and violations of human rights, the obligation to investigate and to punish those responsible and the obligation to provide access to redress for human rights violations. It has also ascertained that effective remedies include compensation to victims and access to redress mechanisms.2
E. 13 Children’s right to reparation is also recalled in the Guidelines on Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime,3 in which the necessity for children who are victims of violations to receive reparation to achieve full redress, reintegration and recovery is also noted. In the Guidelines, it is also stated that procedures for obtaining and enforcing reparation should be readily accessible and child-sensitive and that: Reparation may include restitution from the offender ordered in the criminal court, aid from victim compensation programmes administered by the State and damages ordered to be paid in civil proceedings. Where possible, costs of social and educational reintegration, medical treatment, mental health care and legal services should be 2 General comment No. 13 (2011), paras. 5 and 56. 3 Economic and Social Council Resolution 2005/20, paras. 35–37. CRC/C/96/D/144/2021 20 GE.24-11203 addressed. Procedures should be instituted to ensure enforcement of reparation orders and payment of reparation before fines.
E. 14 In the light of the above, and in view of the State party’s lack of action to date, it is our view that the remedy should include more specificity to ensure effective reparation to the victims. We would have requested the State party to set up a procedural mechanism to develop an effective reparation road map in order to proactively identify the victims of violations of children’s rights, conduct individual assessments of each victim, establish the quantum of damages, which may differ with respect to each child, define the corresponding reparation and ensure the payment of financial compensation to the victims, including measures to ensure that they have independent control of the funds if paid out during childhood or that the funds are held securely for children until they reach adulthood, where needed.
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.24-11203 (E) 100924 110924
Committee on the Rights of the Child
Views adopted by the Committee under the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a
communications procedure, concerning communication
No. 144/2021*, **, ***, ****
Communication submitted by:
Anna Arganashvili, Executive Director of
Partnership for Human Rights (not represented
by counsel)
Alleged victims:
M.L., L.Ko., V.K., L.Ku., Z.J., M.B, G.L., G.Ko.
and 49 other children residing at the
Ninotsminda Saint Nino orphanage
State party:
Georgia
Date of communication:
5 May 2021 (initial submission)
Date of adoption of Views:
24 May 2024
Subject matter:
State party’s failure to protect the rights of
children residing at a closed church-run
orphanage, including against physical and
psychological violence
Procedural issues:
Ius standi; victim status; exhaustion of domestic
remedies; substantiation of claims
Substantive issues:
Best interests of the child; non-discrimination;
right to be heard; freedom of expression;
freedom of association; freedom of religion;
arbitrary or unlawful interference with private
life; prevention of physical and mental violence;
prevention of torture and ill-treatment; rights of
children with disabilities
* Adopted by the Committee at its ninety-sixth session (6–24 May 2024).
** The following Committee members participated in the examination of the communication: Suzanne
Aho, Thuwayba Al Barwani, Aïssatou Alassane Sidiku, Hynd Ayoubi Idrissi, Mary Beloff, Rinchen
Chophel, Rosaria Correa, Bragi Gudbrandsson, Philip Jaffé, Otani Mikiko, Luis Ernesto Pedernera
Reyna, Ann Skelton, Velina Todorova, Benoit Van Keirsbilck and Ratou Zara.
*** Pursuant to rule 8 (1) (a) of the Committee’s rules of procedure under the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, Sopio Kiladze did not
participate in the consideration of the communication.
**** A joint opinion by Committee members Luis Ernesto Pedernera, Ann Skelton and Benoit Van
Keirsbilck (partially dissenting) is annexed to the present Views.
United Nations
CRC/C/96/D/144/2021
Convention on the
Rights of the Child
Distr.: General
12 September 2024
Original: English
CRC/C/96/D/144/2021
2
GE.24-11203
Articles of the Convention:
2, 3, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, read in conjunction with
37 (a), 20, 23 and 25
Articles of the Optional Protocol:
5 (2) and 7 (e) and (f)
1.1
The author of the communication is Anna Arganashvili, a national of Georgia born in
1979. She submits the communication on behalf of the 57 children who were residing at the
Ninotsminda Saint Nino orphanage at the time of submission of the present communication.
The author claims that these children are victims of violations by the State party of articles 2,
3, 12, 14, 15 and 16, article 19, read in conjunction with article 37 (a), and articles 20 and 23
of the Convention. The author is not represented by counsel. The Optional Protocol entered
into force for the State party on 19 September 2016.
1.2
On 7 May 2021, pursuant to article 6 of the Optional Protocol, the working group on
communications, acting on behalf of the Committee, requested that the State party ensure
immediate access to the orphanage by the relevant monitoring institutions of the State party
in order to verify the conditions and treatment of the children. On 28 June 2021, the Office
of the Public Defender was granted access to, and visited, the orphanage.
1.3
On 7 September 2021, the State party requested that the Committee discontinue the
consideration of the present communication and consider the admissibility of the
communication separately from the merits. On 4 January 2022, the Committee rejected the
State party’s request.
Factual background
2.1
In 2015, the Office of the Public Defender published a report on children’s rights in
orphanages run by the Georgian Orthodox Church and the Muslim confession,1 in which it
identified several violations of the rights of children placed in the Ninotsminda Saint Nino
orphanage, including: frequent physical and psychological bullying among the children;
frequent physical and psychological abuse by caregivers through punishments such as
prostrations, denying meals, locking children in their rooms and forcing them to crawl in
front of other children; and a lack of psychiatric evaluation and assistance despite the high
prevalence of behavioural and emotional disorders at the orphanage. In 2016, the orphanage
was granted a care licence pursuant to the Law on Licensing of Educational Activities. In
2018,2 the Office of the Public Defender published a report on the child welfare system and
the effectiveness of alternative care, in which it further identified the following issues
regarding the orphanage: a lack of sport and other recreational activities; constant supervision
by the staff, not allowing the children any private space; and no possibility of leaving the
premises of the orphanage, which is enclosed by a high fence, without a caregiver.
2.2
M.L. was born on 27 September 2008 and was placed in the orphanage at the age of 3.
M.L. was frequently punished if she urinated in bed and forced to sit with her back to the
television, facing the other children, who were instructed to mock her and call her a
“bedwetter”. Caregivers would often call on older children to “discipline” M.L. and other
children by hitting them with sticks, combs or their hands. On one occasion, a caregiver hit
M.L. with a stick on the forehead and then cut her hair to hide the wound. When M.L. was
around 8 years of age, she was forced to kneel on the floor with a chair in her hands for half
an hour. At the age of 11, M.L. was prescribed psychotic medicines that made her feel sleepy
and drowsy all the time. On 3 June 2021, social workers informed the Agency for State Care
and Assistance for the Victims of Human Trafficking that M.L. and her brother, G.L., wanted
to leave the orphanage, and the Agency for State Care decided to transfer them to a small
group home. They were transferred there on 4 June 2021.
2.3
L.Ko. was born on 10 June 2003. In 2010, she was placed in Zestaponi orphanage
together with her brother, G.Ko., who has a disability. In 2011, they were transferred to the
Ninotsminda Saint Nino orphanage, where they lived for 10 years. Allegedly, during this
1 Office of the Public Defender of Georgia, “Children’s rights monitoring in boarding houses run by the
Georgian Orthodox Church and the Muslim confession”, 2015.
2 Office of the Public Defender of Georgia, “Monitoring of Child Care System – Effectiveness of
Alternative Care”, Tbilisi, 2019.
CRC/C/96/D/144/2021
GE.24-11203
3
time, they had insufficient food, no bed linen, no hygiene products and no access to warm
water or the Internet. Girls were not allowed to wear trousers or leave the building. When
they went outside, it was only ever for a short period of time or to go to school, and the
children were always accompanied by caregivers. According to L.Ko.’s statement, the
caregivers would punish her brother whenever he defecated in his clothes, leaving him in his
soiled clothes and without food for long periods. On 10 June 2021, she left the orphanage,
and her brother was transferred to Saguramo orphanage and subsequently taken to a
psychiatric hospital. L.Ko. stated that, because of the isolation she suffered while at the
orphanage, she is still learning how to be around other people and to communicate with them.
2.4
The author notes that the children at the orphanage had not been monitored by the
official authority since June 2020 and that, on 15 April 2021, the Office of the Public
Defender was denied access to the school to conduct a monitoring visit. On 17 April 2021,
the head of the orphanage publicly stated that he would not allow representatives from the
Office of the Public Defender to enter the school because of the Office’s official support for
the legalization of gay marriage. On 19 May 2021, the Office of the Public Defender was
again denied access to the orphanage.
2.5
On 19 April 2021, the author requested interim measures before the Tbilisi City Court
to ensure that the Office of the Public Defender was granted immediate and unhindered
access to the orphanage in order to carry out effective monitoring activities and examine the
living conditions and treatment of the children. The author alleged that physical and
psychological abuse against the children had been occurring and that there had been
systematic violations of the rights of children with disabilities, who were in an extremely
severe situation. The author specifically referred to violations documented in 2015 and 2018
by the Office of the Public Defender. The author stated that the children were unable to seek
protection through the relevant agencies, were isolated from society and were subject to
continuous surveillance. On 26 April 2021, the author’s request was denied on the grounds
that she had limited authority, as the special status of her non-governmental organization, as
granted by the Ministry of Justice, authorized her to act only on behalf of persons with
disabilities and she had not provided any evidence that any of the children in the facility had
disabilities. The Court further ruled that the violations of the children’s rights had not been
sufficiently substantiated. On 28 April 2021, the author appealed the decision before the
Tbilisi Appeals Court. According to the author, the proceedings before the Appeals Court
were expected to be delayed by several months as a result of the coronavirus disease
(COVID-19) pandemic, during which time the children would remain unprotected in the
absence of any monitoring mechanism.
2.6
On 30 April 2021, the author filed a request with the Agency for State Care to be
allowed to meet with the children residing at the orphanage and provide them with
independent legal assistance, but she received no response from the Agency.
2.7
On 17 May 2021, the Tbilisi Appeals Court dismissed the author’s appeal based on
procedural errors. On 3 June 2021, a criminal investigation was initiated into the alleged
coercion committed against one child at the orphanage. On 4 June 2021, the author lodged
another complaint with the Tbilisi City Court and again requested interim measures for the
transfer of all children at the orphanage, including children with disabilities, to other, State-
run facilities, arguing that no monitoring had been carried out since June 2020 and that the
children’s rights to life, health and protection from violence could be irreversibly violated.
On 5 June 2021, the Court partially upheld the petition, considering that there was a high
probability that the interests of the children might be harmed. It ordered the State authorities
to ensure that the children with disabilities were transferred from the orphanage to other care
facilities. The Court considered that the author was not authorized to lodge the petition on
behalf of the children with no disabilities.
2.8
On 11 June 2021, the author filed another complaint before the Tbilisi City Court
requesting that all children living in orphanages in the State party be deinstitutionalized and
that alternative care solutions be guaranteed, basing her complaint on the living conditions
documented in several institutions, in particular the Ninotsminda Saint Nino orphanage. On
14 June 2021, the Court admitted the complaint, which is still pending.
CRC/C/96/D/144/2021
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GE.24-11203
2.9
On 28 June 2021, the Office of the Public Defender was granted access to, and visited,
the orphanage, conducting a comprehensive assessment and monitoring activities. By that
time, 27 children, including 7 children with disabilities, had been discharged from the
orphanage, 6 of whom had been reintegrated into their biological families and 21 placed in
alternative State care facilities (e.g. small family-type homes or foster care). In November
2021, the Office of the Public Defender published a report on the situation at the Ninotsminda
Saint Nino orphanage, in which it found: that the children’s individual needs, in particular
their psychosocial needs, were not properly assessed; that there was a lack of qualified staff;
that the children’s special educational needs were not met; that the children were not
socialized or integrated into the outside world, hampering the developmental skills needed
for independent living; that there was a lack of communication with the legal representatives
of children with special needs; that the children were not given adequate food for their
development; that degrading and traumatic forms of punishment were integrated into child-
rearing methods; and that alleged acts of violence were not adequately documented or
investigated. In terms of criminal cases, the Office of the Public Defender found that no
appropriate measures had been taken to protect the children and no investigative activities or
forensic examinations had been conducted for years. Testimonies from children who were
still residing at the orphanage indicated that they were unable to speak freely. On
22 November 2021, there were still 15 children residing at the orphanage, including at least
one child with disability status, granted in 2015.
Complaint
3.1
The author claims to have the authority to lodge the present communication on behalf
of the victims living in the Ninotsminda Saint Nino orphanage at the time of submission. She
argues that the non-governmental organization that she works for, Partnership for Human
Rights, holds the status of special plaintiff granted by the Ministry of Justice.
3.2
The author claims that all domestic remedies have been exhausted, as the Appeals
Court is not expected to hand down its decision for at least three months, during which time
the victims remain unprotected without monitoring by the Office of the Public Defender or
any other government authorities.
3.3
The author claims that the State party has violated article 2 of the Convention, as it
has not reacted in the same way to the claims of violations of the human rights of the children,
including children with disabilities, who are isolated in an institution as it would have reacted
to claims of violations of the human rights of adults isolated in institutions or places of
detention, resulting in age-based discrimination.
3.4
The author further claims that the State party has violated article 3 of the Convention,
as the victims’ situation has not been adequately monitored to ensure an appropriate standard
of care since at least 2015.
3.5
The author claims that the State party has violated article 12 of the Convention by not
ensuring that the views of the victims were heard, considered and given due weight.
3.6
The author contends that the State party has violated article 14 of the Convention for
failing to protect the victims from participation in religious rituals against their will.
3.7
The author claims that the State party has violated article 15 of the Convention by not
ensuring the victims their right to freely meet with their friends outside the institution or
without the constant supervision of their caregivers.
3.8
The author claims that the State party has violated article 16 of the Convention by not
protecting the rights of the children to have private communications with child rights
defenders, in particular the Office of the Public Defender.
3.9
The author claims that the State party has violated article 19, read in conjunction with
article 37 (a), of the Convention, by not protecting the victims against severe forms of
physical and psychological violence, punishment and bullying and by not ensuring that the
children have access to accountability mechanisms, including established procedures for
prevention, identification, referral, investigation, treatment and follow-up in religious
institutions.
CRC/C/96/D/144/2021
GE.24-11203
5
3.10
The author further claims that the State party has violated article 20 of the Convention
by not ensuring special protection to the victims as children temporarily or permanently
deprived of their biological families, and by not ensuring appropriate legal procedures and
safeguards.
3.11
The author claims that the State party has violated article 23 of the Convention by not
ensuring the provision of proper treatment and psychosocial rehabilitation and support for
the victims with disabilities.
3.12
The author requests the Committee to call upon the State party to ensure that the rights
of children, including children with disabilities, are protected in religious institutions, that
institutions meet all the standards required by domestic and international law and that a
deinstitutionalization plan is developed for all children living in large institutions.
State party’s observations on admissibility
4.1
In its observations of 7 September 2021, the State party claimed that the
communication was inadmissible under articles 5 (2) and 7 (e) of the Optional Protocol.
According to the State party, the author’s claim lacks victim status, as the communication
was lodged on behalf of 57 children without their or their parents’ express consent, and the
author has failed to present any evidence demonstrating that there was an attempt to obtain
their consent or a justification as to why it was not possible to obtain such consent. As a
special plaintiff, the author is entitled to represent only the interests of the children with
disabilities before domestic administrative bodies and not the interests of all children placed
in the orphanage. The State party further alleges that the status of special plaintiff was granted
only domestically and does not authorize the author to lodge a communication before the
Committee. The State party argues that the author lodged the communication in a personal
capacity and not as a representative of Partnership for Human Rights.
4.2
According to the State party, the substantive issues raised by the author have been
fully resolved at the domestic level. On 28 June 2021, the Office of the Public Defender was
granted access to, and visited, the orphanage and obtained access to all related criminal
investigations. By June 2021, 27 children, including 7 children with disabilities, had been
taken out of the orphanage. Of those 27 children, 6 were reintegrated into their families and
21 were placed in other, State-run care facilities. A further 11 children had been taken out of
the orphanage by the time of the State party’s observations, and only 15 children remain in
the facility, most of whom have never had any contact with their biological families. The
children still residing at the orphanage have been constantly monitored and provided with
multidisciplinary support by social workers. Following criminal investigations into the
alleged abuse and coercion, 19 caregivers were dismissed, 31 were suspended and only
7 remained employed at the orphanage.
4.3
The State party submits that, since December 2016, the authorities have carried out
several criminal investigations into the alleged physical abuse, rape and coercion committed
against the children at the orphanage and that those investigations are ongoing. The State
party further alleges that, during the investigation process, children were interviewed by the
authorities in the presence of their lawful representatives. These investigations involve
hundreds of procedural and investigative measures to collect the relevant evidence, and the
results of several forensic medical and psychological examinations are pending. According
to the State party, the author therefore failed to await completion of the ongoing
investigations in violation of the requirements established in article 7 (e) of the Optional
Protocol.
4.4
The State party also argues that the author has failed to exhaust domestic remedies.3
On 19 April 2021, the author filed a request for an interim measure before the Tbilisi City
Court, which was rejected on 26 April 2021. On 28 April 2021, the author lodged an appeal
3 Human Rights Committee, R.T. v. France (CCPR/C/35/D/262/1987); and G.J. v. Lithuania
(CCPR/C/110/D/1894/2009); European Court of Human Rights, Mifsud v. France, Application
No. 57220/00, Decision, 11 September 2002, para. 15; İçyer v. Turkey, Application No. 18888/02,
Decision, 12 January 2006, paras. 69–72; and Kudła v. Poland, Application No. 30210/96, Judgment,
26 October 2000, para. 152.
CRC/C/96/D/144/2021
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GE.24-11203
before the Tbilisi Appeals Court and, on 5 May 2021, without waiting for the Appeals Court
to examine the request, submitted the present communication, claiming that the Appeals
Court would take at least three months to examine the request, without giving the State party
any chance to prove the effectiveness of the domestic judicial system. The State party states
that, on 5 June 2021, the City Court partially upheld the author’s request and issued the
interim measure ordering the transfer of children with disabilities. Therefore, the State party
argues that, by not waiting for the Appeals Court to examine the case and render a decision,
the author failed to comply with the exhaustion requirement under article 7 (e) of the Optional
Protocol.
Author’s comments on the State party’s observations on admissibility
5.1
In her comments of 15 October 2021, the author noted that, as Executive Director of
Partnership for Human Rights, she was entitled to submit applications before national and
international proceedings. Concerning the State party’s argument that the communication did
not contain the views of the children or their parents, the author argues that, at the time the
communication was submitted, neither the author nor the Office of the Public Defender nor
any other relevant actor was allowed to meet with the children and obtain their views.
5.2
The author claims to have applied to the relevant institutions of the State party
multiple times to set up meetings with the victims. On 30 April 2021, the author applied to
the Agency for State Care. On 18 May 2021, she applied to both the Agency’s central and
regional offices requesting permission and assistance to meet individually with every child
to provide legal aid. On 8 September 2021, the author again applied to the Agency, requesting
meetings with both the children who remained at the orphanage and those who had already
left, in order to provide legal aid. No response was received. The author further alleges that
the parents of the children did not have the capacity to make decisions concerning their lives,
since the children were under State guardianship.4
5.3
The author reiterates that the Agency for State Care refused to file a complaint against
the orphanage, that the Tbilisi City Court had declared that the children’s rights had not been
violated and that the Appeals Court had not yet rendered a judgment. The author maintains
that all those means were ineffective in protecting the children’s rights and that the request
for interim measures to the Committee was their last resort.
5.4
Concerning the State party’s argument that all the substantive issues had been resolved,
the author alleges that, while the Office of the Public Defender was granted access to the
school, such access was a prerogative set by law and previously denied by the orphanage,
and yet no investigation has been initiated in that regard. On 28 June 2021, representatives
from the Office of the Public Defender visited the orphanage and issued a series of
recommendations.5 They stated that the children still residing at the orphanage needed the
continuous involvement of specialists and that the Agency for State Care had failed to meet
the children’s psychological and psychiatric needs. During a subsequent visit on
13 September 2021, the Office of the Public Defender raised further concerns about the lack
of documentation, investigation and referral of cases of abuse.
5.5
The author argues that the issuance of an interim measure by the City Court confirms
that there was a real risk of violence against all the children, not only those with disabilities.
Furthermore, 15 children remain institutionalized, those who were transferred were not
properly assessed, and several cases of special educational needs still need to be properly
evaluated. According to the author, the measures taken by the State party were insufficient.
5.6
The author also argues that the criminal investigations have not been effective. The
author states that criminal complaints were filed after the children had left the orphanage, as
the children did not feel safe while they were at the orphanage. The social workers – some of
whom were among the alleged abusers – also represented the children’s interests, creating a
conflict of interest. Although the State party is required to provide independent legal aid,6 the
4 Article 1205 of the Civil Code of Georgia.
5 Office of the Public Defender of Georgia, “Special Report on the Rights of Children in NNLE
Javakheti Ninotsminda St. Nino Boarding School”, 2021.
6 Articles 3, 10 and 15 of the Juvenile Justice Code of Georgia.
CRC/C/96/D/144/2021
GE.24-11203
7
author was denied the possibility of providing such aid, and the children were interviewed
without the presence of a lawyer. The author further argues that there have been numerous
shortcomings in the investigation process, such as delays in initiating the investigation and
in issuing the results of forensic examinations and ineffective and protracted communication,
and several recommendations of the Office of the Public Defender have not yet been
implemented.
5.7
Concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the author argues that the
communication was submitted after an unreasonably prolonged period in which legal
remedies had been applied with no effective relief. The domestic courts initially denied the
interim measure requested by the author in April 2021, and the application submitted to the
Tbilisi City Court on 14 June 2021 remains pending. The author states that undue judicial
delays are a systematic problem in the State party, providing examples of several cases in
which the courts have not rendered any decision. In addition, the Appeals Court did not
render its decision until 15 October 2021, with a delay of six months. Waiting for that
decision before submitting the communication would have meant six more months without
the Office of the Public Defender having access to 57 children who were at risk of violence,
ill-treatment, torture, isolation and other violations of their rights.
State party’s additional observations on admissibility and the merits
6.1
In its observations of 5 May 2022, the State party argued that the author had not
contested that the communication had been lodged without the consent of the victims or their
parents and did not reflect the children’s views. According to the State party, the Agency for
State Care was ready to involve the author had the children expressed their wish to meet with
her. In addition, 25 of the children discharged from the orphanage remain under State care.
Since their discharge from the orphanage, the author has been free to contact the children or
their families, but has failed to do so.
6.2
The State party reiterates that the substantive issues have been fully resolved and adds
that the only child with disabilities who remains at the orphanage has two siblings who
refused to be discharged. The State party adds that several measures have been taken to
deinstitutionalize the children’s care.
6.3
The State party reiterates that not all available domestic remedies have been exhausted,
since the subject matter of the communication is still pending at the domestic level. The State
party recalls that, on 14 June 2021, the Tbilisi City Court admitted the author’s complaint
requesting the deinstitutionalization of all orphanages in the State party.
6.4
The State party further argues that the author’s communication is inadmissible under
article 7 (f), as manifestly ill-founded, as it is based on mere statements and an interpretation
of the factual circumstances, mostly based on the reports of the Office of the Public Defender
and not supported by further evidence.
6.5
Concerning the merits, the State party argues that the orphanage was granted a licence
in accordance with domestic law, and the Agency for State Care had subsequently carried
out constant monitoring, taking all measures necessary to ensure the protection of the rights
of the victims. The State party asserts that every decision was made with the involvement of
multidisciplinary teams and in consideration of the children’s best interests, ensuring their
right to be heard. It argues that the decision to transfer the children was made with due
consideration of their opinions. The Office of the Public Defender enjoys unrestricted access
to the orphanage, and the children have not expressed the desire to meet and/or communicate
with any child rights organization.
6.6
The State party further submits that the social workers reported the alleged violence
against the children to the law enforcement authorities and that, in some cases, the victims
themselves had requested compensation for the non-pecuniary damages resulting from the
alleged discriminatory treatment and damage to their health. The criminal investigations into
the alleged violence against the children were ongoing, and the investigation met the
requirements of effectiveness, promptness, independence and impartiality.
CRC/C/96/D/144/2021
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6.7
In line with the decision of the Tbilisi City Court of 5 June 2021, seven children with
disabilities had been assessed and their specific needs identified: three had been transferred
to small family-type homes and four had been placed in foster care.
Author’s comments on the State party’s additional observations on admissibility and
the merits
7.1
In her comments of 22 August 2022, the author alleged that she had experienced
extensive harassment, aggression and assault from extremist far-right groups and claimed
that the State party had not reacted accordingly.
7.2
The author reiterates that it was impossible to obtain the children’s consent and that
there was no other opportunity to serve justice. She adds that the children who were
discharged have not received adequate psychological rehabilitation upon their
deinstitutionalization and are at risk of secondary trauma. The author obtained the express
consent of M.L. and L.Ko., who had left the orphanage in June 2021 and who were
interviewed in the context of the criminal investigations without the presence of a lawyer.
7.3
According to the Georgian Centre for Psychosocial and Medical Rehabilitation of
Torture Victims, M.L.’s current condition and symptoms are consistent with having endured
traumatic experiences. On 23 March 2022, the author asked the Javakheti District Prosecutor
for information on the status of the investigation, as M.L. had been questioned on 5 June
2021 without the presence of a lawyer. The prosecutor informed the author that M.L. had not
been granted victim status in the investigation and that the author had therefore not been
provided with access to the relevant investigative material. On 1 June 2022, the author
requested the prosecutor to grant victim status to, and to interview, M.L. in accordance with
the Investigative Interview Protocol of the United States National Institute of Child Health
and Human Development. On 28 June 2022, the prosecutor rejected the author’s request and,
on 2 July 2022, again denied M.L. victim status arguing that, according to the conclusions of
the Levan Samkharauli National Forensic Bureau of 7 April 2022, M.L.’s current condition
could not be assessed as being a state of psychological suffering. On 7 July 2022, the author
appealed this decision, and, on 8 July 2022, the superior prosecutor rejected the appeal. On
18 July 2022, the author filed an appeal against the superior prosecutor’s decision before the
Akhaltsikhe District Court. On 1 August 2022, the District Court rejected the appeal, arguing
that the witness statements had been somewhat contradictory and that there was no
convincing and sufficient information that would indicate that a criminal act had been
committed against M.L. by a specific person or persons.
7.4
Concerning the status of the criminal investigations, the author claims that the State
party did not conduct an ex officio criminal investigation into the circumstances described
by the Office of the Public Defender in its reports from 2015 and 2018, failing to fulfil its
positive obligation to protect the rights of the children living in the orphanage. The author
claims that lawyers for the children have been unable to analyse the ongoing investigation
and procedures, as they do not have access to the criminal case materials. Reportedly, the
Prosecutor’s Office has granted victim status to only one child, because the results of the
other children’s psychological examinations have not yet been released, making it impossible
to determine the extent of the psychological damage and harm caused to the children, which
is the legal basis for being declared a victim. The author alleges that the assumption of
committing a crime and inflicting harm should suffice to recognize a person as a victim.7 In
addition, since the prosecutor is investigating allegations of violence and not torture or
degrading and inhuman treatment, the statute of limitations for such crimes has expired.
According to the author, while the State party argues that the civil remedies have been
effective, such remedies are not a substitute for criminal remedies.
7.5
The author argues that, if most of the children were ready for reintegration and/or
deinstitutionalization, the State should have acted promptly and that the current process of
7 Joint statement by the non-governmental organizations Partnership for Human Rights, Sapari and
Social Justice Center, 1 June 2022. Available at https://socialjustice.org.ge/en/products/ninotsmindis-
pansionshi-bavshvta-sistemuri-dzaladobis-faktebze-datsqebuli-gamodzieba-ashkarad-araefektiania.
CRC/C/96/D/144/2021
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deinstitutionalization has been overly simplified, with the children removed and placed in
different settings without proper consideration of their needs.
7.6
The author also argues that the children continue to be denied access to health care.
Moreover, during the visit by the Office of the Public Defender in September 2021, one child
with a physical disability was still living in the orphanage and, in November 2021, during
another visit, it was revealed that yet another child, who had been granted disability status in
2015, remained in the facility, in violation of the Tbilisi Court ruling.
7.7
With respect to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the author reiterates that the
Tbilisi City Court prevented the Office of the Public Defender from carrying out its
constitutional mandate to monitor care institutions and that domestic remedies were not
explicitly available, effective or sufficient at the time the communication was submitted. The
author further claims that, more than a year after the initial submission to the Committee, no
judicial action has been taken, and most of the children have not been granted victim status.
7.8
With regard to the merits, the author submits that L.Ko. was not allowed to wear
trousers as a form of gender-based discrimination and that both L.Ko. and M.L. were
prevented from expressing themselves and were discriminated against. In these testimonies,
the children also indicated that they had to obey the rules set by caregivers and never
participated in decision-making processes. The victims experienced brutal forms of
punishment while trying to protect each other,8 were prohibited from communicating with
the outside world and were afraid to communicate privately with their parents or any other
external audience or to report violence.
State party’s additional observations
8.1
On 9 December 2022, the State party noted that the author’s alleged claims of
harassment, aggression and assault by extremist far-right groups fell outside the scope of the
present communication. According to the State party, the author failed to demonstrate that
Partnership for Human Rights was the target of the alleged campaigns or suffered any damage
in that regard. Furthermore, the author failed to demonstrate that she had applied to the
relevant authorities concerning such allegations or that they did not respond.
8.2
The State party further argues that M.L. and L.Ko. left the orphanage on 3 June and
9 August 2021, respectively, meaning that the author had the possibility of contacting them
before submitting the communication.
8.3
According to the State party, the children who remain at the orphanage expressed their
preference to stay there; they go to school by themselves and are involved in various activities.
8.4
The State party reiterates its position on the availability and effectiveness of domestic
civil remedies and submits that, while they are not a substitute for criminal investigations,
those remedies largely cover the issues that constitute the basis for the present
communication and that any delay in the criminal investigations has been caused by the fact
that social workers and the investigative authorities learned of the incidents several years
after they had occurred as well as by restrictions linked to the COVID-19 pandemic.
8.5
Concerning the individual cases raised by the author, the State party submits that, on
3 June 2021, M.L. was placed in alternative State care and receives psychological and
psychiatric support, that the relevant investigations are being conducted and that, in its
decision not to grant victim status, the Court stated that the evidence collected thus far did
not satisfy the threshold for reasoned suspicion that damage had been inflicted on the
individual as a result of unlawful conduct. Furthermore, according to the medical
examination report, no signs of mechanical injuries had been identified and no suffering
could be identified based on the psychological examination. On 9 August 2021, L.Ko. was
placed in a small family-type house with her brother G.Ko.; they both attend school and
receive support.
8 Ibid.
CRC/C/96/D/144/2021
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Author’s comments on the State party’s additional observations
9.1
On 3 January 2023, the author noted that, since 2021, the Agency for State Care had
intentionally denied the children access to legal aid or delayed such access. The author claims
that the Agency has continuously stated that it would have allowed access if the children had
expressed such a desire. The author argues, however, that she could not verify that, since she
was not allowed to meet with the children. In addition, the author has been unable to obtain
official information on the whereabouts of the children who have left the orphanage.
9.2
On 1 November 2022, the author applied to the non-governmental organization, SOS
Children’s Village, which provides alternative care to some of the children with disabilities
transferred from the orphanage. On 9 November 2022, the non-governmental organization
reported that four9 of the children had expressed their verbal consent to meet with the author,
but that the Agency for State Care had to grant permission before such a meeting could take
place. After several exchanges, on 16 December 2022, the Agency replied that they would
discuss the issue, without granting permission.
Issues and proceedings before the Committee
Consideration of admissibility
10.1
Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must
decide, in accordance with rule 20 of its rules of procedure under the Optional Protocol,
whether the claim is admissible under the Optional Protocol.
10.2
The Committee takes note of the fact that the present communication was submitted
on behalf of a group of 57 children who were residing at the Ninotsminda Saint Nino
orphanage under State custody and in isolation at the time of submission, with the author
alleging several violations of the children’s rights under the Convention while they were at
the orphanage. Although not all of the children’s names have been provided by the author,
the Committee considers that, in the light of the circumstances of the case, the victims are a
group of individuals who are identifiable to the State party and who have victim status for
the purposes of article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol.
10.3
The Committee takes note of the State party’s argument that the communication is
inadmissible under article 5 (2) of the Optional Protocol, as it was lodged without the victims’
express consent and the author has failed to present any evidence that she attempted to obtain
such consent or that of the parents, or to justify why that was not possible, in particular since
most of the children were discharged and transferred to family-type homes or reintegrated
into their biological families following the Committee’s interim measure request. The
Committee also takes note of the State party’s argument that, as a special plaintiff at the
domestic level, the author has the right to represent only the children with disabilities residing
at the orphanage and that she submitted the communication in a personal capacity and not as
a representative of Partnership for Human Rights.
10.4
The Committee observes that the State party’s arguments relate to an alleged lack of
locus standi or legitimacy on the part of the author to represent the victims before the
Committee. Regarding the author’s alleged inability to represent the children without
disabilities given her special plaintiff status at the domestic level, the Committee considers
that article 5 (2) of the Optional Protocol does not impose any specific formal requirement in
terms of who can file an individual communication before the Committee on behalf of alleged
victims. The Committee therefore considers that the author’s domestic status does not
constitute an obstacle to act on the children’s behalf before the Committee.
10.5
Regarding the victims’ alleged lack of consent, the Committee recalls that, under
article 5 (2) of the Optional Protocol, when communications are submitted on behalf of
individuals or groups of individuals, they must be submitted with the victims’ consent, unless
the author can justify acting on their behalf without such consent. In the present case, the
Committee takes note of the author’s undisputed statement that, at the time of submitting the
present communication, she had repeatedly requested to meet the victims, that her requests
9 V.K., L.Ku., Z.J. and M.B.
CRC/C/96/D/144/2021
GE.24-11203
11
had all been denied by the Agency for State Care as the children’s guardian and that there
had been no other possibility to obtain the children’s consent, as all access to the orphanage
had been suspended. While the State party has noted that the children did not express an
interest in obtaining legal aid from the author, the Committee considers that this is not a
justification for denying them the opportunity of meeting with the author to understand the
importance of legal aid, form their opinion and eventually give their informed consent. The
Committee also notes that the author subsequently provided a power of attorney for M.L. and
L.Ko. and, on several occasions, but to no avail, requested access to the children who
remained at the orphanage and to the four children residing at SOS Children’s Village who
had verbally expressed their interest in being legally represented by the author. The
Committee further notes that the author, in her capacity as Executive Director of a human
rights organization in the State party, had filed several complaints on behalf of the victims at
the domestic level, one of which had been admitted, and that she had also requested interim
measures, which were partially granted. In the light of the above, the Committee considers
that the author has adequately justified that she had a legitimate interest in acting on behalf
of the victims and that she could not reasonably obtain access to the 15 victims who remained
at the orphanage on 22 November 2021 and to V.K., L.Ku., Z.J. and M.B, placed in the SOS
Children’s village, all of whom currently remain under State guardianship and access to
whom has been denied to the author. The Committee therefore concludes that the author has
justified, for the purposes of article 5 (2) of the Optional Protocol, that she is acting on behalf
of M.L., L.Ko., V.K., L.Ku., Z.J., M.B. and the 15 children still residing at the orphanage in
November 2021 without their consent.
10.6
The Committee considers, however, that the author has failed to justify that she
attempted to contact the other 36 victims who were transferred from the orphanage in 2021
to seek their consent to be represented before the Committee or that such contact was not
possible. Therefore, the Committee considers that the communication regarding these
36 children is inadmissible under article 5 (2) of the Optional Protocol.
10.7
The Committee takes note of the State party’s argument that the author has failed to
exhaust domestic remedies, given that, on 5 June 2021, the Tbilisi City Court partially upheld
the author’s request and issued the interim measure ordering the transfer of the children with
disabilities to other care facilities and, on 14 June 2021, the Tbilisi City Court admitted the
author’s second complaint requesting that all functioning orphanages in the State party be
deinstitutionalized and that alternative care solutions be guaranteed for the children residing
therein, with a decision on that complaint pending. However, the Committee also takes note
of the author’s argument that these remedies were unreasonably prolonged and ineffective.
In the light of the context and the fact that the courts have still not taken a final decision on
the author’s complaints after almost three years, without any reasonable justification, the
Committee considers that the domestic judicial proceedings were unreasonably prolonged.
10.8
Regarding the State party’s argument that the author has failed to exhaust domestic
remedies because she failed to await the outcome of the pending investigations into the
alleged physical abuse, rape and coercion committed against the children at the orphanage,
the Committee takes note of the author’s uncontested statement that all but one of the children
have been denied victim status in these proceedings and, as a result, they have not been given
access to criminal case files, thus impeding their access to justice,10 and that some of these
proceedings have become statute barred. Therefore, the Committee considers that these
proceedings were ineffective.
10.9
In the light of the above, the Committee considers that there is no obstacle to the
admissibility of the communication under article 7 (e) of the Optional Protocol.
10.10 The Committee considers that the author has failed to substantiate her allegations
under articles 2, 14, 15 and 16 of the Convention concerning alleged age-based
discrimination against the children when compared with adults placed in closed institutions,
their freedom of religion, their right to peaceful assembly and interference with their privacy,
respectively.
10 A.B.A. et al. v. Spain (CRC/C/91/D/114/2020, CRC/C/91/D/116/2020, CRC/C/91/D/117/2020 and
CRC/C/91/D/118/2020), para. 9.2.
CRC/C/96/D/144/2021
12
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10.11 The Committee considers, however, that the author has sufficiently substantiated, for
the purposes of admissibility, her claims that the rights under articles 3, 12, 19, 20, 23 and
37 (a) of the Convention of the 21 victims for whom the communication is deemed
admissible have been violated in relation to the State party’s alleged failure to protect them
against violence and provide accountability for such treatment. The Committee also
considers that the author’s allegations concerning the lack of adequate monitoring of the
treatment of those victims while at the orphanage raises, in substance, issues under article 25
of the Convention. The Committee declares this part of the communication admissible and
proceeds with its examination of the merits.
Consideration of the merits
11.1
The Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the
information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 10 (1) of the
Optional Protocol.
11.2
The Committee takes note of the author’s allegations that the State party failed to
protect the 21 victims for whom the communication is deemed admissible against violence,
abuse and ill-treatment at the orphanage, to monitor the situation of the children residing
therein and to investigate such alleged violations and ensure accountability.
11.3
The Committee must first determine whether, by allegedly failing to protect against
violence and abuse the 21 victims for whom the communication is deemed admissible, the
State party breached its obligations under the Convention. The Committee recalls that
article 37 (a) of the Convention requires States parties to ensure that no child should be
subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This is
complemented and extended by article 19, which requires States parties to take all appropriate
legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect children from all forms
of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment
or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or
any other person who has the care of a child.11 Under article 20, children deprived of their
family environment are entitled to special State protection and assistance. The Committee
notes that article 19 is phrased in both substantive and procedural terms. Concerning the
substantive element, the Committee takes note of the author’s allegations relating to physical
and psychological violence and corporal punishment against those 21 victims, as documented
in the reports of the Office of the Public Defender and by the children’s testimonies, including
beatings, food restrictions, forcing children to stay in wet beds or wet clothes, covering their
eyes with clothing, spilling cold water on them in the winter, forcing them to stay in certain
positions without moving and to carry heavy objects and leaving them naked on the tiled
floor. Testimonies also refer to children being medicated to keep them calm and being abused
by caregivers, who would threaten the children with more punishment if they reported the
incidents. The Committee observes that these types of incidents have occurred systematically
since at least 2015. It was also revealed in the reports of the Office of the Public Defender of
2015 and 2018 that the children had experienced bullying, that children with psychosocial
issues or challenging behaviour had been subjected to violence as a form of discipline and
that children with disabilities and certain children with psychiatric conditions had received
improper medical care. The Committee recalls that the State’s positive obligation of
protection assumes particular importance in the context of a public service with a duty to
protect the health and well-being of children, especially where those children are particularly
vulnerable and are under the exclusive control of the authorities.12 The Committee further
recalls that it has defined “corporal” or “physical” punishment as any punishment in which
physical force is used and is intended to cause some degree of pain or discomfort, however
light. In the view of the Committee, corporal punishment is invariably degrading. In addition,
there are other non-physical forms of punishment that are also cruel and degrading and thus
incompatible with the Convention, including, for example, punishment that belittles,
11 General comment No. 8 (2006) on the right of the child to protection from corporal punishment and
other cruel or degrading forms of punishment, para. 18.
12 European Court of Human Rights, Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, Application No. 48609/06,
Judgment, 18 June 2013, paras. 106–116 and 119–20; and X. and Others v. Bulgaria, Application
No. 22457/16, Judgment, 2 February 2021, para. 180.
CRC/C/96/D/144/2021
GE.24-11203
13
humiliates, denigrates, scapegoats, threatens, scares or ridicules a child.13 The Committee
further recalls that the burden of proof cannot rest solely on the author of the communication,
especially considering that the author and the State party do not always have equal access to
evidence and that frequently the State party alone has access to the relevant information.14
11.4
Where, despite prohibition and positive education and training programmes, cases of
corporal punishment come to light outside the family home – in schools, other institutions
and forms of alternative care, for example – prosecution may be a reasonable response.
Children and their representatives in all such placements must have immediate and
confidential access to child-sensitive advice, advocacy and complaint procedures and,
ultimately, to the courts, with necessary legal and other assistance. In institutions, there
should be a requirement to report and to review any violent incidents.15
11.5
The Committee observes that the State party has not contested the treatment alleged
by the author but rather noted that the victims were under constant monitoring, that most of
them had been deinstitutionalized by 2021 and that every decision affecting the children was
made with the involvement of multidisciplinary teams and in consideration of the children’s
best interests. However, the Committee takes note of the author’s uncontested allegations
that monitoring visits were suspended from 20 June 2020 to the end of April 2021. It takes
further note of her allegations, as confirmed by the testimonies of former residents of the
orphanage and in the reports of the Office of the Public Defender since 2015, that children
were transferred to other alternative care facilities without properly considering their needs
and/or views, that access to lawyers was not granted and that the monitoring visits of the
Office of the Public Defender resumed in 2021 but without the children being given a safe
space to communicate with the monitoring teams. The Committee further observes that
access to lawyers and other legal representatives continues to be restricted for children under
State care.
11.6
The Committee notes that there were at least eight children with disabilities residing
at the orphanage, two of whom reportedly still reside therein. The Committee also notes that,
after the communication was submitted, seven children were assessed, with particular needs
identified, three were transferred to small family-type homes and four were placed in foster
care. The Committee notes that children with disabilities who were transferred to SOS
Children’s Village expressed their verbal consent to meet with the author. The Committee
has often expressed its concern at the high number of children with disabilities placed in
institutions. The quality of care provided, whether educational, medical or rehabilitative, is
often much inferior to the standards necessary for the care of children with disabilities
because of a lack either of identified standards or of implementation and monitoring of these
standards. Institutions also represent a specific setting in which children with disabilities are
more vulnerable to mental, physical, sexual and other forms of abuse and to neglect and
negligent treatment.16 Moreover, the Committee recalls that, during consideration of the State
party’s fourth periodic report, 17 the Committee urged the State party to accelerate the
deinstitutionalization process, ensure sufficient alternative family- and community-based
care options for children deprived of a family environment, in particular for children with
disabilities, and reinforce reintegration services. The Committee observes that children with
disabilities were subjected to physical and psychological abuse and further observes the
numerous reports of the Office of the Public Defender documenting the lack of access to
special educational and psychological support for children with disabilities. The Committee
further notes that children with disabilities have not been granted access to independent
lawyers despite their expression of interest and that the State party did not provide
information about how such children are being heard or how they are indeed participating in
the protection measure process or the criminal investigations. The welfare of children with
disabilities should involve a clear statutory dimension so that incumbent public authorities
13 General comment No. 8 (2006), para. 11; N.B. v Georgia (CRC/C/90/D/84/2019), para. 7.2; and
CRC/C/GEO/CO/4, para. 21.
14 See, for example, D.D. v. Spain (CRC/C/80/D/4/2016), para. 13.3.
15 General comment No. 8 (2006), para. 43.
16 General comment No. 9 (2006), para. 47.
17 CRC/C/GEO/CO/4,, para. 30.
CRC/C/96/D/144/2021
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are fully aware of their obligations and are thus able to ensure adequate, disability-sensitive
care.18
11.7
In the light of the above, the Committee concludes that the State party failed to protect
the rights of the 21 victims for whom the communication is deemed admissible, who were
deprived of their family environment and some of whom had disabilities, in violation of their
rights under article 19 (1), read in conjunction with article 37 (a), and articles 20 and 23 of
the Convention.
11.8
As to the procedural element contained in article 19 (2) of the Convention, the
Committee takes note of the author’s argument regarding the alleged lack of an effective
criminal investigation into the author’s claims of corporal punishment. The Committee
recalls that the investigation of instances of violence, whether reported by a child, a
representative or an external party, must be undertaken by qualified professionals who have
received role-specific and comprehensive training and requires a child rights-based and child-
sensitive approach. Rigorous but child-sensitive investigation procedures help to ensure that
violence is correctly identified and to provide evidence for administrative, civil, child-
protection and criminal proceedings. The Committee notes that investigations into such
instances of child maltreatment should be effective, in the sense that they should be capable
of leading to a determination as to whether the alleged victim suffered corporal punishment
at the institution and to the identification of those responsible. The Committee recalls that
this is not an obligation of result, but of means. The authorities must take the reasonable steps
available to them to secure evidence concerning the incidents. Furthermore, the
investigations should also be conducted with promptness and reasonable expedition.19
11.9
In the present case, the Committee observes that, in the criminal proceedings, only
one child has been granted victim status and the others are considered witnesses and their
testimonies were taken without the presence of a lawyer, and that these children and their
lawyers have not had access to the relevant investigative materials. The Committee also notes
that most alleged offences have become statute barred. The Committee observes that, since
2015, very few investigations have been initiated and those that have are ongoing. Although
one child has been recognized as a victim, forensic examinations of that child did not
recognize the harm suffered during childhood, and specialized protocols to conduct
psychological assessments have not been considered. The Committee recalls that children
who are victims of, or witnesses to, a crime must be given an opportunity to fully exercise
their right to freely express their view in accordance with the Guidelines on Justice in Matters
involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime.20 In particular, this means that every effort
must be made to ensure that children who are victims or witnesses are consulted on the
relevant matters with regard to involvement in the case under scrutiny, and able to express
freely, and in their own manner, views and concerns regarding their involvement in the
judicial process.21
11.10 The Committee observes that, in the present case, the children did not have legal aid
during the questioning by the police or during the forensic examinations and that the forensic
examinations were conducted without using the Investigative Interview Protocol of the
United States National Institute of Child Health and Human Development . The Committee
also notes that, according to the information provided by the State party, only one child has
been granted victim status, as the results of the other children’s psychological examinations
have not been released, making it impossible to determine the extent of the psychological
damage and harm caused to them. The Committee notes that, at least in the case of M.L., the
District Court established that, in the criminal case materials, there was not sufficient,
convincing information that would indicate that a criminal act had been committed against
M.L. by a specific person or persons or that met the threshold for reasonable presumption
under the Criminal Code. The Committee further observes that none of the other children nor
their lawyers have been granted access to the relevant investigative materials and that most
18 CRPD/C/GBR/CO/1, paras. 20 (d) and 21 (d).
19 N.B. v. Georgia, para. 7.6; and European Court of Human Rights, V.K. v. Russia, Application
No. 68059/13, Judgment, 7 March 2017, paras. 168–184.
20 Economic and Social Council resolution 2005/20, paras. 8, 19 and 20.
21 General comment No. 12 (2009) on the right of the child to be heard, paras. 62–63.
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15
alleged crimes in the joint criminal investigation are time barred. The Committee recalls that,
in all proceedings involving children who are victims of violence, the celerity principle must
be applied, while respecting the rule of law, and that criminal law procedures must be strictly
applied in order to abolish the widespread practice of de jure or de facto impunity, in
particular of State actors. The Committee also recalls that rigorous but child-sensitive
investigation procedures are needed to ensure that violence is correctly identified and to help
to provide evidence for administrative, civil, child-protection and criminal proceedings.22
The Committee notes that the State party has not provided enough information about such a
rigorous investigation approach and that, on the contrary, the investigative authorities have
not given due weight to the children’s testimonies and have not taken into account the context
of systematic violence documented by the Office of the Public Defender. The Committee
notes that, almost 10 years after the first complaint was lodged with the prosecutor, the
investigations are still ongoing, without any significant developments.
11.11 In the light of the foregoing, the Committee concludes that the national authorities
have not shown due diligence in investigating the numerous allegations of violence, abuse
and ill-treatment promptly and effectively, in violation of the State party’s obligations under
articles 3 (1) and 3 (2) and article 19, read in conjunction with article 37 (a), of the Convention.
11.12 The Committee observes that the State party has provided general information about
the subsequent transfer of the children and the ongoing criminal investigations but that it has
failed to provide detailed information to explain how the best interests of the 21 victims for
whom the communication is deemed admissible were a primary consideration during the
placement and/or transfer to alternative care and the investigation process23 and how their
right to be heard has been ensured. The Committee also notes that the State party did not
specify the type of special needs assessment conducted for the children with disabilities,
where the children were taken or the type of support being provided to each child. The
Committee takes note of the author’s allegations that children at the orphanage were not
allowed to freely meet with the Office of the Public Defender, lawyers, non-governmental
organizations or even family members, which directly affected their ability to freely express
their views or submit complaints about any possible violation of their rights. The Committee
observes that the victims did not have access to any type of complaint mechanism and that
the few children who submitted a criminal complaint did so after they had left the institution.
Moreover, children who expressed an interest in meeting with a lawyer have not been given
the possibility to meet with one. Furthermore, the Committee considers that the State party
has not provided sufficient evidence about how the children have been heard during the
criminal proceedings. The Committee therefore considers that the State party did not provide
information on how the children were informed about their right to ask for legal aid, the
relevance of such aid and its consequences within the criminal proceedings, in order to make
an informed decision on whether they wanted such aid, or about their role as witnesses and
how this could affect them.
11.13 The Committee recalls that article 12 (2) of the Convention specifies that opportunities
to be heard have to be provided, in particular, in any judicial and administrative proceedings
affecting a child, such as decisions about his or her education, health, environment, living
conditions or protection, and that a child cannot be heard effectively where the environment
is intimidating, hostile, insensitive or inappropriate for his or her age. The Committee also
recalls that the purpose of article 3 of the Convention is to ensure that, in all actions
undertaken concerning children by a public or private welfare institution, courts,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the children concerned
are a primary consideration. States parties are consequently under an obligation to consider
not only the individual situation of each child when identifying their best interests, but also
the interests of children as a group. Moreover, States parties must examine the actions of
private and public institutions, authorities and legislative bodies. Mechanisms must be
introduced to ensure that children in all forms of alternative care, including institutions, are
able to express their views and that those views are given due weight in matters of their
22 General comment No. 13 (2011) on the right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence,
paras. 51 and 54.
23 A.E. v. Spain (CRC/C/87/D/115/2020), para. 12.9; and general comment No. 14 on the right of the
child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration, para. 30.
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16
GE.24-11203
placement, the regulations of care in foster families or homes and their daily lives.24 The
Committee further recalls that children with disabilities are not often heard in separation and
placement processes. It is essential that children with disabilities are heard in all procedures
affecting them and that their views are respected in accordance with their evolving capacities.
Moreover, children with disabilities should be provided with whatever mode of
communication they need to help them to express their views.25
11.14 In the light of the foregoing, the Committee concludes that the State party has failed
to ensure the rights of the 21 victims for whom the communication is deemed admissible to
be heard and to express their views with regard to their placement in institutions, alternative
care or foster care, as well in the context of criminal proceedings, in violation of the State
party’s obligations under articles 3, 12 and 23 of the Convention.
11.15 The Committee takes note of the author’s uncontested allegations that monitoring
visits were suspended from June 2020 to the end of April 2021 and that the Office of the
Public Defender was denied access to the orphanage at least twice in 2021, preventing it from
adequately monitoring the victims’ human rights situation and ensuring appropriate care
standards. It further notes that, after visits resumed, confidential meetings between the
children and the monitoring authorities were not allowed. The Committee also takes note of
the author’s allegations that the children were transferred from the orphanage to other, State-
run care facilities without proper assessment of their needs and that the State party did not
provide detailed information in this regard. The Committee recalls that all decisions on care,
treatment, placement and other measures concerning a child must be reviewed periodically
in terms of his or her perception of time, and his or her evolving capacities and development,26
and that competent authorities should be able to, independently and effectively, monitor,
promote and protect children’s rights27 to ensure placement and care standards. In the light
of the above, the Committee concludes that the State party failed to ensure a periodic review
of the treatment provided to the 21 victims for whom the communication is deemed
admissible as children in State care, in violation of articles 3 (3) and 25 of the Convention.
12.
The Committee, acting under article 10 (5) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view
that the facts before it disclose violations by the State party of articles 3, 12, 20, 23 and 25
and article 19, read in conjunction with article 37 (a), of the Convention.
13.
The State party is under an obligation to provide effective reparation to the victims,
including by: providing adequate, comprehensive and timely compensation and rehabilitation
for the violations suffered; issuing a public apology to the victims; reassessing the situation
of those still under State care in line with the Convention; and conducting an effective,
independent and prompt investigation of all criminal cases and prosecuting those found
responsible. Reparation measures should be determined in coordination with the victims to
ensure that their views and opinions are taken into consideration. The State party is also under
an obligation to take all steps necessary to prevent similar violations from occurring in any
private or public institution, in particular by: ensuring the regular independent monitoring of
such centres in the State party; guaranteeing that the entity responsible for the independent
monitoring of such centres in the State party can effectively exercise its mandate, with the
possibility of visiting such places at any time and conducting confidential interviews with the
children; ensuring that there is an effective child-centred complaint system in all kinds of
care institutions that is confidential, accessible, gender-sensitive and child-friendly;
guaranteeing access to legal aid and appropriate legal representation for all children who need
support in exercising their rights or who have to appear in court; and ensuring that
investigations into every allegation of a violation of the rights of a child are conducted with
due diligence and that such a procedure is followed each time a child is the victim of a crime
or offence.
24 General comment No. 12 (2009), paras. 32, 34, 70, 72 and 97.
25 General comment No. 9 (2006) on the rights of children with disabilities, paras. 32 and 48.
26 General comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a
primary consideration, para. 93.
27 General comment No. 2 (2002) on the role of independent national human rights institutions in the
promotion and protection of the rights of the child, para. 7.
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GE.24-11203
17
14.
In accordance with article 11 of the Optional Protocol, the Committee wishes to
receive from the State party, as soon as possible and within 180 days, information about the
measures it has taken to give effect to the Committee’s Views. The State party is requested
to include information about any such measures in its reports to the Committee under
article 44 of the Convention. The State party is also requested to publish the present Views
and to disseminate them widely in the official and the regional language of the State party.
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GE.24-11203
Annex
[English only]
Joint opinion of Committee members Luis Ernesto
Pedernera, Ann Skelton and Benoit Van Keirsbilck
(partially dissenting)
1.
While we agree with the conclusion reached by the Committee in this case, we dissent
from the majority decision that the communication is inadmissible under article 5 (2) of the
Optional Protocol regarding the other 36 victims who were also residing at the Ninotsminda
Saint Nino orphanage at the time of the submission of the present communication. In addition,
we believe that the Committee should have gone further concerning the State party’s
obligations and the modalities for providing effective reparations to the victims.
A
On admissibility
2.
The author of the communication acted on behalf of the 57 children residing at the
orphanage on 5 May 2021. The Committee considered that the author had failed to justify
why she was acting without the consent of the other 36 victims who were transferred from
the orphanage in 2021 (see para. 10.6). The Committee therefore considered the
communication to be inadmissible regarding those 36 victims. The Committee decided that
the author adequately justified that she was acting on behalf of, but without the consent of,
the 15 children still residing at the orphanage on 22 November 2021, the 4 children (V.K.,
L.Ku., Z.J. and M.B) placed in the SOS Children’s Village, and M.L. and L.Ko., who gave
their express consent to the author (see paras. 7.2 and 10.5).
3.
However, in our view, the Committee should have considered the communication
admissible regarding all 57 children who were residing at the orphanage at the time of the
submission of the communication.
4.
Article 5 (2) of the Optional Protocol establishes that, when a communication is
submitted on behalf of a group of individuals, this should be with their consent unless the
author can justify acting on their behalf without such consent. Rule 13 (3) of the rules of
procedure under the Optional Protocol indicates that communications may be submitted on
behalf of alleged victims without such express consent, provided that the author can justify
his or her action and the Committee deems it to be in the best interests of the children
concerned.
5.
While we value the importance of children’s consent and of seeking their agreement
to act on their behalf as far as possible throughout the procedure, we believe that this
obligation must be assessed on a reasonable basis, having regard to the circumstances of the
case. Similar to the Committee’s decision in S.N. et al. v. Finland,1 we believe that, in the
particular circumstances of the present case, the author had limited communication with the
victims, depriving the author of a realistic possibility of obtaining their consent. The
Committee took note of the author’s repeated claim that it was impossible to obtain the
children’s consent and that there was no other opportunity to serve justice (see para. 7.2).
The author argued that, by the time the communication was submitted, neither the author nor
the Office of the Public Defender nor any other relevant actor was allowed to meet with the
children and obtain their views (see para. 5.1). In addition, the State party affirmed that,
between June 2021 and May 2022, 32 beneficiaries had been discharged from the orphanage,
25 of whom remain under State care (see para. 6.1). In September 2021, the author asked the
Agency for State Care for a meeting with the children who remained in the orphanage and
the ones who had already left, but no response was received (see para. 5.2). We therefore
1 S.N. et al. v. Finland (CRC/C/91/D/100/2019), para. 10.3.
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GE.24-11203
19
believe that the author adequately justified acting on behalf of all 57 victims and we would
have found the present communication admissible regarding all of them.
B.
On the merits
6.
In our view, all 57 children who were residing at the orphanage at the time of the
submission of the communication were victims of violations by the State party.
7.
The Committee took note of the author’s allegations that the State party failed to
protect the victims against violence, abuse and ill-treatment at the orphanage and to
investigate such alleged violations and ensure accountability (see para. 11.2). The Committee
also took note of the author’s argument, under article 19 (2) of the Convention, regarding the
alleged lack of an effective criminal investigation into the author’s claims of corporal
punishment (see para. 11.8).
8.
The Committee noted that rigorous but child-sensitive investigation procedures
helped to ensure that violence was correctly identified. The Committee also observed that
investigations into instances of child maltreatment should be effective, in the sense that they
should be capable of leading to a determination as to whether the child concerned suffered
corporal punishment at the institution and to the identification of those responsible (see
para. 11.8).
9.
In this regard, the Committee observed that, during the criminal proceedings, only one
child had been granted victim status and the others were considered witnesses. Since 2015,
very few investigations have been initiated and all of them are ongoing (see para. 11.9). The
Committee noted that only one child had been granted victim status, as the results of the other
children’s psychological examinations had not yet been released, making it impossible to
determine the extent of the psychological damage and harm caused to them (see para. 11.10).
10.
The Committee therefore concluded that the State party’s national authorities had not
shown due diligence in investigating the numerous allegations of violence, abuse and ill-
treatment promptly and effectively (see para. 11.11). The analysis of the case led the
Committee to conclude that the State party was under the obligation to provide effective
reparation to the victims, including adequate, comprehensive and timely compensation and
rehabilitation. The State party is also under the obligation to conduct, with due diligence,
investigations into every allegation of a violation of the rights of a child (see para. 13).
11.
We fully support the Committee’s conclusion. Nevertheless, we believe that the
Committee should have provided a more precise determination of the steps that the State
party should take to ensure effective reparation to the victims.
12.
The Committee has already established that States parties’ special obligations
regarding violence against children include due diligence, the obligation to prevent violence
and violations of human rights, the obligation to investigate and to punish those responsible
and the obligation to provide access to redress for human rights violations. It has also
ascertained that effective remedies include compensation to victims and access to redress
mechanisms.2
13.
Children’s right to reparation is also recalled in the Guidelines on Justice in Matters
involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime,3 in which the necessity for children who
are victims of violations to receive reparation to achieve full redress, reintegration and
recovery is also noted. In the Guidelines, it is also stated that procedures for obtaining and
enforcing reparation should be readily accessible and child-sensitive and that:
Reparation may include restitution from the offender ordered in the criminal court,
aid from victim compensation programmes administered by the State and damages
ordered to be paid in civil proceedings. Where possible, costs of social and educational
reintegration, medical treatment, mental health care and legal services should be
2 General comment No. 13 (2011), paras. 5 and 56.
3 Economic and Social Council Resolution 2005/20, paras. 35–37.
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addressed. Procedures should be instituted to ensure enforcement of reparation orders
and payment of reparation before fines.
14.
In the light of the above, and in view of the State party’s lack of action to date, it is
our view that the remedy should include more specificity to ensure effective reparation to the
victims. We would have requested the State party to set up a procedural mechanism to
develop an effective reparation road map in order to proactively identify the victims of
violations of children’s rights, conduct individual assessments of each victim, establish the
quantum of damages, which may differ with respect to each child, define the corresponding
reparation and ensure the payment of financial compensation to the victims, including
measures to ensure that they have independent control of the funds if paid out during
childhood or that the funds are held securely for children until they reach adulthood, where
needed.