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CRC/C/101/D/193/2022

Jas.K.B., C.K.B., M.S.B. and J.K.B. v. Czechia

UNO-Kinderrechtsausschuss (CRC) · 2026-09-14 · en UN

Decision on merits; Subjects: RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, CZECHIA; [CRC: Kinderrechtskonvention, Übereinkommen über die Rechte des Kindes; Convention relative aux droits de l'enfant; Convenzione sui diritti del fanciullo]

Erwägungen (59 Absätze)

E. 1 The authors of the communication are Jas.K.B. (first author), born in 2008, her parents, C.K.B. (second author) and M.S.B. (third author), and her older sister J.K.B. (fourth author), born in 2001, all Afghan nationals belonging to the Sikh religion. The authors claim a violation by the State Party of the first and fourth authors’ rights under articles 3, 5, 6 (2), 12, 16 and 37 (a) and (b) of the Convention. The authors are represented by counsel. The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State Party on 2 March 2016. Facts as submitted by the authors

E. 2.1 In January 2016, the authors fled Afghanistan due to Taliban attacks and threats of forced conversion and of kidnapping against the children. On an unspecified date in January 2016, the family claimed asylum in Austria. Pending a decision on their application for asylum, the family was housed in a metal container. Dissatisfied with this situation, the

* Adopted by the Committee at its 101st session (1–28 September 2026). ** The following members of the Committee participated in the consideration of the communication: Suzanne Aho, Thuwayba Al Barwani, Hynd Ayoubi Idrissi, Mary Beloff, Timothy Ekesa, Bragi Gudbrandsson, Mariana Ianachevici, Philip Jaffé, Sophie Kiladze, Cephas Lumina, Benyam Dawit Mezmur, Juliana Scerri Ferrante, Aïssatou Alassane Sidikou, Zeinebou Taleb Moussa and Benoit Van Keirsbilck. United Nations CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 Convention on the Rights of the Child Distr.: General 3 November 2026 Original: English CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 2 GE.26-14839 family left Austria to travel to Germany on 16 March 2019, with the help of smugglers. On 17 March 2019, the family arrived in Czechia, where the smugglers kept them locked in a cottage located near the German border. On 20 March 2019, the family was found by the Czech police.

E. 2.2 On 21 March 2019, the adult authors were detained for 30 days, on the basis of decisions of the Regional Police Directorate of the Ústí Region, for the purpose of preparing their transfer to Austria, which was designated as the responsible State to assess their application for asylum under the Dublin III Regulation. The family was not presented with any feasible alternative to detention or with accommodation in the semi-open facility for asylum-seekers. The first author was not formally detained but was accommodated in the Bělá-Jezová detention facility with her family.

E. 2.3 The police recorded 1 January as the date of birth for each family member in their respective birth year, the effect of which was to recognize the author’s sister, who was born in 2001, as having attained the age of majority, and thereby denying the rights guaranteed to her under the Convention.

E. 2.4 On 9 April 2019, the Ministry of the Interior issued a decision on the family’s return to Austria. The authorities extended the family’s detention by an additional 20 days. On 24 April 2019, the family was returned to Austria. Prior to being returned, the authority operating the detention centre extracted partial payment from the family for costs incurred during their detention, in the amount of 34,684 korunas (CZK) (approximately $1,500), with an outstanding debt of CZK 8,228 (approximately $350).

E. 2.5 On 3 April 2019, the authors challenged the detention decisions in a joint action before the Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem, arguing that the first author should not have been detained. The authors maintained that their deprivation of liberty did not meet the conditions laid down by law, in particular regarding their conduct (there was no serious risk of absconding arising from their conduct, as they had cooperated with authorities, had not resisted transfer and had even expressed willingness to return to Austria), and the available alternatives to detention (the authorities should have considered less coercive measures, such as placement in a reception centre, instead of detention), and noted the incompatibility of detaining a family for immigration reasons with the best interests of the child (de facto detention of a child and failure to prioritize child protection). On 15 April 2019, the Regional Court dismissed their action.

E. 2.6 On 7 May 2019, the authors filed an appeal against this decision, which they supplemented on 7 February 2020. In their appeal (complaint in cassation) to the Supreme Administrative Court, the authors reiterated and developed the arguments they had already raised, focusing mainly on family life (the decision interfered with their right to a family life, given that it involved a family with children), detention conditions (conditions in the Bělá-Jezová detention facility were inappropriate, especially for children), the suitability of detention (the detention facility was not an appropriate place for a family with a minor child) and the failure to use an alternative (the reception centre). The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal on 17 April 2020, finding that the authors raised general and hypothetical objections about their detention and had failed to sufficiently substantiate individual harm.

E. 2.7 The authors appealed further to the Constitutional Court on 22 June 2020, which dismissed the appeal on 22 June 2021. At this stage of the proceedings, the authors also brought the specific claim that the older daughter was legally still a minor (17 years old) at the time of the detention. Complaint

E. 3 genuine evaluation of the impact of detention on her physical, psychological and emotional well-being, development and rights. They further failed to consider non-custodial alternatives, such as voluntary return, financial guarantees or placement in an open reception facility, resorting instead to the most restrictive measure.

E. 3.1 The first author maintains that the State Party has violated her rights under articles 3, 5, 6 (2), 12, 16 and 37 (a) and (b) of the Convention by detaining her for 34 days and by failing to consider alternatives to closed detention. She claims that detention was imposed solely based on the family’s migration status and for the purpose of a transfer under the Dublin III Regulation, without being motivated by, or compatible with, the best interests of the child. The authorities failed to treat her best interests as a primary consideration, limiting their assessment to the detention conditions and the preservation of family unity, without a CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 GE.26-14839

E. 3.2 The first author argues that her detention amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of article 37 (a) of the Convention, given the inherent harm caused by the deprivation of liberty of children, the length of the detention and the prison-like environment. She submits that immigration detention of children is incompatible per se with the Convention, regardless of accompanying conditions, and that her detention caused her distress, fear and harm exceeding the minimum threshold of severity. She also claims a violation of article 37 (b), arguing that her deprivation of liberty was arbitrary and excessively long and was not used as a measure of last resort or carried out with due diligence, particularly given the family’s cooperation and willingness to return to Austria. Once there was no risk of absconding, the continued detention amounted to detention in bad faith.

E. 3.3 The first author further claims that she was subjected to violations of her rights to liberty, family life and development and that her views were never sought, contrary to article 12 of the Convention. The judicial review of her detention was procedurally deficient due to a limited and formalistic assessment of the best interests of the child and the absence of any meaningful opportunity for her to express her views. The detention can also be considered punitive in nature, including due to the costs incurred by the family. Lastly, she argues that her case reflects the systemic issue of the routine detention of migrant families with children in the State Party.

E. 3.4 In addition, the authors argue a violation of the elder sister’s (fourth author’s) right to benefit from the guarantees of the Convention. They submit that she was wrongly treated as an adult due to an inadequate and inaccurate age determination process, notwithstanding her proximity to the age of majority and the possibility that she was a minor. As a result, she was excluded from child-specific safeguards, including the assessment of her best interests and the right to be heard. The authors contend that, given her vulnerability, dependency on her parents and transitional stage of development, she should have been afforded protection equivalent to that granted to children and that her detention also gave rise to the same violations of articles 3, 5, 6 (2), 12, 16 and 37 of the Convention. State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits

E. 4 GE.26-14839 submits that the authorities acted lawfully, proportionately and in compliance with the child’s best interests as interpreted in international jurisprudence.1

E. 4.1 On 2 February 2023, the State Party explained that the authors were apprehended on its territory in March 2019 without valid travel documents or residency permits, despite having pending asylum claims in Austria. Their statements confirmed that they had voluntarily left Austria, where they had lived in a reception centre and were receiving schooling and social benefits, intending to travel irregularly to Germany with the help of smugglers. On this basis, the police initiated the transfer procedure under the Dublin III Regulation and ordered the detention of the adult family members under the Act on the Residence of Foreign Nationals, citing a well-founded risk of absconding given their previous disregard of asylum-related obligations and their attempts to transit illegally. The authorities found that no less coercive measures (e.g. reporting duties or financial guarantees) could be effectively applied because the family had no place of residence in Czechia and no intention of remaining there. The minor child was not formally detained, but the parents requested her placement with them; therefore, the family was accommodated together in the Bělá-Jezová detention centre, the only closed facility suitable for families with children.

E. 4.2 The Regional Court upheld the detention, finding that the decisions had adequately considered the best interests of the child, primarily by preserving family unity, and that the Bělá-Jezová facility offered tailored conditions, including access to schooling, medical care and psychological assistance, and reduced security elements. The Regional Court found that the reception centre was not a realistic alternative because its use for detained families had been only an emergency response during the migration crisis, which was no longer relevant and therefore the exceptional practice should not continue, and standard detention in Bělá-Jezová was considered sufficient and appropriate. The detention was extended to allow completion of the transfer procedure and lasted a total of 34 days, after which the family was transferred to Austria, where they were later granted international protection. The State Party CRC/C/101/D/193/2022

E. 4.3 As to the cassation and constitutional proceedings, the State Party submits that the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the authors’ complaint in cassation after finding that the authorities had duly established that no less restrictive measure than detention could ensure the family’s availability for their transfer to Austria under the Dublin III Regulation. Although acknowledging that the minor child had de facto been deprived of liberty, the Court held that this resulted inevitably from the detention of her parents, as no lawful alternative accommodation existed for a child in their situation. The Court endorsed the reasoning that placement in an open reception centre was legally impossible because the family were not asylum-seekers in Czechia and deemed the authors’ objections regarding the facility’s security features unsubstantiated. It upheld the finding that the Bělá-Jezová centre was the only facility suitable for families with children and that the authorities had complied with the strict requirements governing the detention of minors, examining their best interests and concluding that family unity and the lack of viable alternatives justified their placement.2

E. 4.4 The Constitutional Court subsequently dismissed the authors’ constitutional appeal as manifestly unfounded, determining that the detention was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate. It affirmed that the serious risk of absconding had been sufficiently demonstrated by the authors’ prior conduct – leaving Austria where they had stable reception conditions and attempting to reach Germany irregularly – and that this justified detention as a last resort. The Court accepted that the best interests of the child had been adequately considered, including by maintaining family unity and placing the family in a facility specifically adapted to children. It found no incompatibility with European Court of Human Rights case law, distinguishing the present case from precedents where violations were linked to prolonged detention or grossly inadequate conditions and concluding that the relatively short duration and suitable environment at Bělá-Jezová did not meet that threshold.3

E. 4.5 The State Party has provided an overview of the relevant domestic law. Czech law empowers the police to detain foreign nationals who have entered or remained in the country irregularly, though initial police detention cannot exceed 48 hours. The Act on the Residence of Foreign Nationals sets conditions for lawful stay, provides for alternatives to detention, such as reporting duties or financial guarantees, and restricts their use where the individual intends to abscond or cannot provide an address. Detention for persons subject to transfer under the Dublin III Regulation requires a serious risk of absconding, defined with reference to prior conduct, illegal stay, attempts to evade transfer or incapacity to depart voluntarily; families with children may be detained for up to 90 days. The law also regulates material standards in detention centres, including accommodation, medical care, schooling and child-specific activities.

E. 4.6 Domestic jurisprudence confirms that minors may exceptionally be detained with their parents in migration contexts when no adequate alternative exists and when family unity and the child’s best interests are duly considered. In particular, the Constitutional Court, in a 2017 judgment, upheld the placement of young children at Bělá-Jezová, finding that the facility was suitable for families, that conditions there did not amount to ill-treatment and 1 See, for example, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, in which the European Court of Human Rights emphasized the need for individualized assessment of risks to children and the adequacy of reception conditions in transfer or detention contexts (Application No. 29217/12, Judgment, 4 November 2014, paras. 118– 122). 2 For example, in its general comment No. 6 (2005), the Committee required a demonstration that a child’s detention was a measure of last resort and that suitable care arrangements had been duly considered (paras. 61–63). 3 In Kanagaratnam and Others v. Belgium, the European Court of Human Rights found distinct violations arising from poor conditions, family separation and extended detention periods (Application No. 15297/09, Judgment, 13 December 2011, paras. 64–69), and, in Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, it emphasized that violations typically arose from either excessive duration or clearly inadequate conditions in facilities unsuited to children (Applications No. 25794/13 and No. 28151/13, Judgment, 22 November 2016, paras. 107–110). CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 GE.26-14839 5 that detention, though not ideal, did not violate constitutional or international prohibitions on degrading treatment in such circumstances.4

E. 4.7 The State Party maintains that the Convention does not apply to the fourth author as she was already 18 at the time of detention, a fact consistently confirmed by official documents, the authors’ own statements and uncontested domestic proceedings.

E. 4.8 As regards the first author, the State Party submits that her 34-day detention complied with article 37 of the Convention, as it was lawful, non-arbitrary, strictly necessary to prevent absconding under the Dublin procedure, and imposed only after an assessment of alternatives, none of which were feasible. The detention took place in a facility specifically adapted for families with children, offering education, healthcare, leisure activities and reduced security features. The authorities and domestic courts explicitly assessed the best interests of the child, prioritizing family unity and limiting detention to the shortest period required. Distinguishing the case from relevant jurisprudence of the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the European Court of Human Rights regarding younger children, longer detention, substandard conditions and viable alternatives, the State Party submits that there was no violation of article 37, read alone or in conjunction with article 3, of the Convention.

E. 4.9 As regards the claims under article 16 of the Convention, the State Party first argues that the complaint about interference with family life does not raise any issues distinct from the claims raised under article 37 and therefore does not require separate examination. Nevertheless, it submits that there was no violation of article 16. The family remained together throughout the period of detention and was housed in the same accommodation, and family unity was expressly preserved. Even assuming that detention constituted interference with family life, the Government maintains that it was lawful, pursued the legitimate aim of preventing irregular migration and ensuring the execution of the transfer under the Dublin III Regulation, and was proportionate in light of the conditions and limited duration of detention.

E. 4.10 Concerning the claims under articles 5, 6 (2) and 12 of the Convention, the State Party submits that they were never raised before the domestic courts, either expressly or in substance. It therefore argues that these parts of the communication should be declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. In the alternative, it contends that they do not raise any issues separate from those already examined under articles 3 and 37 and do not, in any event, disclose any violation. Authors’ comments on the State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits

E. 5.1 On 2 December 2024, the authors submitted their comments on the State Party’s observations regarding the admissibility and merits of the communication.

E. 5.2 The authors emphasize that they cooperated fully with the authorities of the State Party at all stages. The parents consistently expressed regret for leaving Austria, willingness to return immediately and acceptance of the transfer under the Dublin III Regulation, even refraining from appealing the transfer decision. They provided information about the smuggler and offered material assistance to the police. In their view, nothing in their conduct justified the finding that they posed a risk of absconding. They also strongly contest the State Party’s portrayal of Bělá-Jezová as a child-appropriate facility, describing it instead as a remote, prison-like detention centre where there is fencing, razor wire, constant surveillance, restricted movement, confiscation of phones and money, limited communication with the outside world and little privacy. Families with children were not fully separated from other detainees, could not cook independently and remained subject to strict security regimes, which the authors argue created fear and distress, particularly for children.

E. 5.3 Regarding their own detention, the authors note that, for the first days, they were held in a building without access to the children’s centre or social support and that the first author, then aged 11, did not meaningfully attend school despite compulsory education requirements. Leisure activities outside the centre never occurred, and the possibility of outings was illusory. 4 See Constitutional Court, judgment III. ÚS 3289/14 of 10 May 2017, in which the Court assessed detention conditions for children at Bělá Jezová (paras. 58–60), and the Committee’s general comment No. 6 (2005) for exceptional circumstances permitting the deprivation of liberty of children in migration contexts (paras. 61–63). CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 6 GE.26-14839 The family was required to pay for its detention, resulting in significant expenses and ongoing debt, which the authors describe as humiliating. The detention had a serious emotional impact on all the family members: both daughters cried frequently, the minor daughter struggled to adapt and showed signs of distress, and the parents, who are illiterate, traumatized and unfamiliar with European systems, were unable to support their children adequately. The older daughter assumed an adult role as the family’s main communicator, adding further strain. The detention aggravated pre-existing trauma from Taliban persecution and their flight, causing anxiety, fear and helplessness incompatible with the rights and best interests of children under the Convention.

E. 5.4 The authors argue that there is a clear normative divide in international human rights law with respect to immigration detention of children. While United Nations treaty bodies, led by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, have consistently affirmed that immigration detention of children is inherently incompatible with the Convention and violates the best interests principle, European frameworks still formally permit child detention in narrowly defined exceptional circumstances. 5 States frequently rely on this lower threshold to normalize detention and dilute safeguards, such as the principle of last resort, the requirement that detention be of the shortest appropriate duration and the provision of genuinely child-friendly conditions.

E. 5.5 Relying on the Committee’s general comments, its joint general comments with the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families and its recent Views, the authors maintain that immigration detention of children is never permissible, not even as a measure of last resort, and that detention with parents for reasons of family unity remains incompatible with article 37 of the Convention.6 Detention is said to inherently harm children’s physical, mental and developmental well-being and therefore violates the best interests principle.

E. 5.6 The authors further argue that the Czech Republic knew or ought to have known of this standard well before the events at issue. Since at least 2011, multiple United Nations treaty bodies have repeatedly called on the State Party to end immigration detention of children, prohibit de facto detention with parents and ensure non-custodial alternatives.7 Despite this, detention of children continues as a routine practice rather than as an exceptional measure.

E. 5.7 The authors submit that the elder daughter should be recognized as a victim under the Convention because the Czech authorities failed to properly assess her age and wrongly treated her as an adult during detention. Although her Austrian identification card recorded her date of birth as 1 January 2001, the authors contend that this date was merely indicative. In the absence of precise information and official documentation, the Austrian authorities administratively recorded the date of birth as 1 January, a common practice in asylum procedures that may artificially increase a person’s recorded age. Given this context and her proximity to the age of majority, there was a real possibility that the elder daughter was still a minor at the time of detention, which should have triggered child-specific safeguards.8 5 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Report of the 2012 Day of General Discussion on the rights of all children in the context of international migration, para. 78; and European Court of Human Rights, A.M. and Others v. France, Application No. 24587/12, Judgment, 12 July 2016. 6 Joint general comment No. 3 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 22 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), paras. 5 and 11; joint general comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), paras. 7–12; E.H. et al. v. Belgium (CRC/C/89/D/55/2018), paras. 13.9–13.12. 7 CRC/C/CZE/CO/3-4, para. 66; CAT/C/CZE/CO/6, paras. 20 and 21; and CCPR/C/CZE/CO/4, paras. 28 and 29. 8 Joint general comment No. 3 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 22 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), paras. 5 and 11 (obligation to identify children promptly in migration procedures); and joint general comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), para. 3 (risk of diminished protection for children aged 15–18). CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 GE.26-14839 7

E. 5.8 The authors contend that the authorities should have conducted an age assessment ex officio, particularly in the light of strong indications that the recorded date of birth was approximate. By relying uncritically on the Austrian document and making no further inquiries, the authorities failed to apply international standards governing age determination, including the presumption of minority and the benefit of the doubt. This resulted in the fourth author being questioned, searched and detained under adult procedures, thereby depriving her of protection under the Convention.9

E. 5.9 In response to the State Party’s argument that the fourth author confirmed her age and raised the issue only at the constitutional stage, the authors stress their extreme vulnerability as undocumented asylum-seekers, their lack of legal awareness, language barriers and limited access to effective legal assistance during earlier proceedings. They submit that the duty to assess age rested with the authorities, particularly in migration-control contexts involving adolescents close to adulthood. By raising the issue before the Constitutional Court, the authors maintain that domestic remedies were sufficiently exhausted, in line with the Committee’s case law on the purpose of admissibility requirements.10

E. 5.10 The authors emphasize that children aged 15 to 18 are particularly at risk of misidentification and underprotection in migration contexts and that States must ensure prompt, child-friendly and culturally sensitive age-assessment procedures. In situations of residual uncertainty, individuals must be presumed to be minors and treated accordingly.11 The fourth author was, or should have been presumed to be, a minor at the time of detention and therefore qualifies as a victim of the alleged violations, rendering her complaints admissible.

E. 5.11 The authors dispute the relevance of the State Party’s argument that the conditions of detention were suitable for children. They submit that, as a matter of principle, no closed immigration detention centre can ever be appropriate for children, since such facilities are designed to deprive individuals of liberty. In their view, investing in the humanization of detention centres cannot substitute for the obligation to develop community-based, non-custodial alternatives. In any event, the authors reiterate that the actual conditions of detention and the restrictive regime aggravated the distress suffered by the first and fourth authors, contributing to anxiety, fear and humiliation. Third-party intervention

E. 6.1 On 5 October 2023, the International Commission of Jurists, the AIRE Centre, the Dutch Council for Refugees and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles submitted a third-party intervention, following the leave to intervene granted on 15 September 2023.

E. 6.2 The interveners argue that international law establishes an absolute prohibition on immigration detention of children, including when they are accompanied by their families, grounded in articles 3 and 37 of the Convention. Drawing on joint general comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), they stress that the “last resort” exception in article 37 (b) cannot apply in migration contexts, as detention is inherently incompatible with the child’s best interests. This position is reinforced by the Committee’s jurisprudence in the cases E.H. et al. v. Belgium and K.K. and R.H. v. Belgium,12 in which the Committee found violations of article 37, read alone and in conjunction with article 3 of the Convention, in cases involving the detention of children with their families. 9 Committee on the Rights of the Child, general comments No. 6 (2005), paras. 31 and 33 (duty to identify and protect children in migration contexts); and No. 7 (2005), para. 36 (benefit of the doubt and presumption of minority in age assessment). 10 Y.M. v. Spain (CRC/C/78/D/8/2016), paras. 8.2 and 8.3 (purposes of admissibility and exhaustion of domestic remedies). 11 Committee on the Rights of the Child, general comment No. 14 (2013), paras. 6 and 39 (best interests as a primary consideration, including in procedural decisions); and joint general comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), paras. 3 and 10 (age assessment, presumption of childhood, and heightened vulnerability). 12 See E.H. et al. v. Belgium and A.M.K. and S.K. v. Belgium (CRC/C/89/D/73/2019). CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 8 GE.26-14839

E. 6.3 The interveners situate this approach within broader international and regional standards, including the findings of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment13 that such detention is never necessary and may amount to ill-treatment, and the consistent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which has emphasized the extreme vulnerability of child migrants and has found that their detention often breaches article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights).14 The Court has further clarified that children’s best interests must prevail over migration control objectives, that detention is arbitrary where alternatives are not considered and that family unity cannot justify detention but instead requires non-custodial solutions for the entire family.15

E. 6.4 In parallel, the interveners emphasize that States are under a positive obligation to implement non-custodial, community-based alternatives to detention, consistent with the Committee’s standards, guarantees under the European Convention on Human Rights (arts. 3, 5 and 8) and European Union law requirements on necessity, proportionality and prior consideration of alternatives, as reflected in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.16 They also underline the centrality of procedural guarantees, including the child’s right to be heard under article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, access to information, and legal representation as essential components of any best interests determination and migration procedure.

E. 6.5 With respect to age assessment, the interveners submit that it must be strictly regulated, non-routine and guided by the presumption of minority and the benefit of the doubt, as affirmed in joint general comments No. 3 and No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 22 and No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017) and in the Committee’s jurisprudence involving Spain.17 They stress that age assessment should be undertaken where serious doubt persists, and must follow a holistic, multidisciplinary approach, rather than relying on intrusive and unreliable medical methods with wide margins of error. They cite the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Darboe and Camara v. Italy (2022) to confirm that the presumption of minority forms an integral part of the protection of private life under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and must be accompanied by robust procedural safeguards, including legal assistance and informed participation. The interveners also argue that flawed or unnecessary age assessments risk depriving children of their rights and exposing them to detention and other harm, thereby potentially resulting in violations of articles 3 and 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. State Party’s comments on the third-party intervention

E. 7.1 The State Party rejects the interveners’ assertion of an absolute prohibition on immigration detention of children, maintaining instead that article 37 of the Convention does not impose a categorical ban. It argues that the Committee’s own jurisprudence demonstrates the need for detention to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account factors such as the child’s age, the duration and conditions of the detention, the circumstances of the case and whether alternatives were considered. In the State Party’s view, detention may be compatible with the Convention if it is lawful, non-arbitrary, necessary, proportionate, limited in time and attentive to the child’s best interests. This interpretation, it submits, is consistent with broader international and regional law, including the jurisprudence of the 13 See A/HRC/28/68 and A/HRC/37/50. 14 European Court of Human Rights, Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, Application No. 13178/03, Judgment, 12 October 2006; Popov v. France, Applications No. 39472/07 and No. 39474/07, Judgment, 19 January 2012; Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, Application No. 41442/07, Judgment, 19 January 2010; and M.D. and A.D. v. France, Application No. 57035/18, Judgment, 22 July 2021. 15 European Court of Human Rights, Rahimi v. Greece, Application No. 8687/08, Judgment, 5 April 2011; and Popov v. France, paras. 140 and 141. 16 See, for example, Court of Justice of the European Union, C-528/15, Al Chodor. 17 See N.B.F. v. Spain (CRC/C/79/D/11/2017), A.L. v. Spain (CRC/C/81/D/16/2017), J.A.B. v. Spain (CRC/C/81/D/22/2017) and R.K. v. Spain (CRC/C/81/D/22/2017). CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 GE.26-14839 9 European Court of Human Rights and European Union standards, which also permit detention under strict safeguards rather than prohibiting it outright.

E. 7.2 Regarding alternatives to detention, the State Party accepts that States are obliged to consider non-custodial measures but contends that this obligation was fulfilled in the present case. It emphasizes that domestic courts do assess alternatives and may overturn detention decisions where this has not been done. However, in the authors’ situation, the authorities concluded, on the basis of their conduct and risk of absconding, that no less coercive measure would have been effective and that detention was therefore justified.

E. 7.3 On procedural rights, the State Party again challenges the admissibility of the claim under article 12 of the Convention, arguing non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and lack of substantiation. In any event, it submits that the right to be heard was respected: the adult authors were interviewed with interpretation services, the minor’s interests were represented by her father, the authors were legally represented throughout and they consented to written court proceedings.

E. 7.4 Lastly, on age assessment, the State Party broadly accepts the interveners’ general principles – that such procedures should not be routine and should only occur where doubts arise – but argues that these principles are irrelevant to the facts. It maintains that no age assessment was required because the fourth author consistently identified herself as being 18 years of age, and this was supported by the available documentation. Since no doubt existed as to her majority, the authorities had no obligation to apply the presumption of minority or conduct further verifications. The State Party therefore concludes that its approach was consistent with applicable standards and reiterates its position that the communication should be found inadmissible or, alternatively, be dismissed on the merits. Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility

E. 8.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 20 of its rules of procedure under the Optional Protocol, whether the claim is admissible under the Optional Protocol.

E. 8.2 The Committee notes the State Party’s argument that the fourth author cannot be considered a victim within the meaning of the Convention, as she had allegedly reached the age of majority at the time of the events. At the same time, the Committee notes the authors’ submission that, given the absence of reliable documentation, the identical recording of dates of birth for all the family members and their specific cultural background, the State Party should have conducted an age assessment ex officio and have applied the presumption of minority. The Committee also notes the authors’ argument that, given their vulnerability, language barriers and limited access to legal assistance, the issue of age determination could only be raised effectively at the constitutional stage. In these circumstances, and in the absence of any challenge by the State Party concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies in relation to this part of the complaint, the Committee considers that article 7 (e) does not constitute an obstacle to the admissibility of the authors’ claim regarding the fourth author.

E. 8.3 Regarding the authors’ claims under article 12 of the Convention relating to the fact that the first author has not been heard, the Committee notes that the authors challenged the detention decisions before the Regional Court, subsequently lodged a complaint in cassation with the Supreme Administrative Court and ultimately submitted a constitutional appeal before the Constitutional Court, which was dismissed. However, it also notes the State Party’s contention that the authors have not raised this allegation before the domestic courts, either expressly or in substance. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the authors have not exhausted available and effective domestic remedies within the meaning of article 7 (e) of the Optional Protocol in relation to this part of the complaint.

E. 8.4 The Committee notes the authors’ claims under articles 5, 6 (2) and 16 of the Convention. However, on the basis of the information before it, the Committee considers that the authors have not provided sufficient arguments or evidence to substantiate, for the purposes of admissibility, how the facts of the case would give rise to distinct violations of these provisions, beyond the claims already raised under articles 3, 12 and 37 of the CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 10 GE.26-14839 Convention. In particular, the Committee observes that the authors have failed to demonstrate how the family’s detention for 34 days would, in itself, have violated the first and fourth authors’ rights to development and family life. The authors have also failed to indicate how this detention would have amounted to a violation of the general provisions contained in article 5 of the Convention regarding the State Party’s duty to respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents. Accordingly, the Committee declares this part of the communication inadmissible under article 7 (f) of the Optional Protocol for lack of sufficient substantiation.

E. 8.5 However, the Committee considers that the authors’ claims under articles 3 and 37 (a) and (b) of the Convention, in relation to the de facto detention of the first and fourth authors for reasons related to their migration status and the decisions issued ordering the parents’ detention, have been sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility. Accordingly, it declares these claims admissible and proceeds to their consideration on the merits. Consideration of merits

E. 9.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 10 (1) of the Optional Protocol.

E. 9.2 The Committee notes the authors’ claims that the first and fourth authors were detained for 34 days in the Bělá-Jezová detention centre because of their and their parents’ migration status, in conditions incompatible with their needs and best interests, and that this detention caused them significant psychological harm. It further notes the State Party’s argument that the detention was lawful, necessary to prevent absconding and carried out in a facility suitable for families with children.

E. 9.3 The Committee recalls its jurisprudence according to which the detention of children because of their or their parents’ migration status constitutes a violation of children’s rights and is contrary to the principle of the best interests of the child, given the harm inherent in any deprivation of liberty and the negative impact that immigration detention can have on children’s physical and mental health and on their development. It also recalls that, in the context of migration, the possibility of deprivation of liberty as a measure of last resort is not applicable and that such deprivation of liberty is generally disproportionate and therefore arbitrary within the meaning of article 37 (b) of the Convention.18 In this light, the Committee has affirmed that children should never be detained for reasons related to their or their parents’ migration status and States should expeditiously and completely cease or eradicate the immigration detention of children and that any kind of child immigration detention should be forbidden by law and such prohibition should be fully implemented in practice.19

E. 9.4 In the present case, the Committee observes that the detention of the first and fourth authors was imposed on them de facto for the purpose of their transfer under the Dublin procedure and was thus based solely on their migration status. The Committee notes that, while the first author was not herself subject to a formal detention order, she and the fourth author were placed in a closed detention centre and faced the same restrictions as the adults held there, including restrictions on their movement. It further observes that their detention lasted 34 days and that the authors expressed their willingness to return voluntarily to Austria. The Committee notes that the assessment conducted by the domestic authorities focused primarily on the preservation of family unity and the alleged suitability of detention conditions. However, the Committee recalls that, where the best interests of the child require maintaining family unity, this does not justify the detention of the child but rather requires the adoption of non-custodial solutions applicable to the family as a whole.20

E. 9.5 The Committee notes that the authorities’ assessment of the best interests of the child was limited and did not address the inherent harm of detention on children or meaningfully 18 E.H. et al. v. Belgium, paras. 13.9–13.12; and A.M.K. and S.K. v. Belgium, paras. 10.9–10.11. 19 Joint general comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017) on State obligations regarding the human rights of children in the context of international migration in countries of origin, transit, destination and return, para. 5. 20 Ibid., para. 11. CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 GE.26-14839 11 consider non-custodial measures that could also preserve family unity or demonstrate how the children’s interests were weighed against other considerations, as required under article 3 of the Convention.

E. 9.6 In these circumstances, the Committee finds that the children’s deprivation of liberty amounted to arbitrary detention in violation of article 37 (b) of the Convention, read alone and in conjunction with article 3. Taking into account the harm inherent in the deprivation of liberty of children and its negative impact on their physical and mental well-being and development, the Committee further considers that such detention, in the circumstances of the present case, is incompatible with article 37 (a) of the Convention.

E. 9.7 The Committee notes the authors’ claim that the State Party failed to properly assess the age of the fourth author, treating her as an adult without conducting an age assessment procedure despite indications that she may have been a child, as her date of birth was approximate. It recalls that States Parties have an obligation to promptly identify children in migration contexts and to ensure that, where there is reasonable doubt as to age, the individual is afforded the benefit of the doubt and treated as a minor pending appropriate assessment. The Committee observes that the entire family’s dates of birth were recorded identically and that no additional steps were taken to verify the age of the fourth author. It considers that these circumstances should have prompted the authorities to conduct a more thorough and culturally sensitive age assessment. By failing to do so and apply the presumption of minority, the State Party deprived the fourth author of the protection measures guaranteed to children under the Convention, including safeguards related to deprivation of liberty and the assessment of her best interests. The Committee therefore concludes that the State Party violated the rights of the fourth author under article 3 of the Convention, read in conjunction with article 37.

E. 9.8 The Committee, acting under article 10 (5) of the Optional Protocol on a communications procedure, finds that the facts before it disclose a violation of articles 3 and 37 (a) and (b) of the Convention with regard to the first and fourth authors.

E. 10 The State Party should therefore provide the first and fourth authors with effective reparation for the violations suffered, including by reimbursing the cost of their detention. The State Party is also under an obligation to prevent similar violations in the future. The State Party should: (a) Ensure that children are not deprived of their liberty due to their or their parents’ migration status and that non-custodial solutions are available to preserve family unity; (b) Ensure that, when there is reasonable doubt about a person’s age, a prompt, child-sensitive and culturally appropriate age assessment is conducted, with the benefit of the doubt and the presumption of minority applied pending its outcome.

E. 11 In accordance with article 11 of the Optional Protocol, the Committee wishes to receive from the State Party, as soon as possible and within 180 days, information about the measures it has taken to give effect to the Committee’s Views. The State Party is requested to include information about such measures in its reports to the Committee under article 44 of the Convention. The State Party is also requested to publish the present Views and to disseminate them widely.

Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)

GE.26-14839 (E) 011126 031126

Committee on the Rights of the Child

Views adopted by the Committee under the Optional

Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a

communications procedure, concerning communication

No. 193/2022*, **

Communication submitted by:

Jas.K.B., C.K.B., M.S.B. and J.K.B. (represented

by counsel Maroš Matiaško, Zuzana Pavelková

and Alexandra Dubová)

Alleged victims:

Jas.K.B and J.K.B.

State Party:

Czechia

Date of communication:

22 June 2022 (initial submission)

Date of adoption of Views

14 September 2026

Subject matter:

Child held with her parents and older sister in an

immigration detention centre instead of an open

reception facility for asylum-seekers

Procedural issue:

Lack of substantiation

Substantive issues:

Best interests of the child; deprivation of liberty

Articles of the Convention:

3, 5, 6 (2), 12, 16 and 37 (a) and (b)

Articles of the Optional Protocol:

7 (e) and (f)

1.

The authors of the communication are Jas.K.B. (first author), born in 2008, her parents,

C.K.B. (second author) and M.S.B. (third author), and her older sister J.K.B. (fourth author),

born in 2001, all Afghan nationals belonging to the Sikh religion. The authors claim a

violation by the State Party of the first and fourth authors’ rights under articles 3, 5, 6 (2), 12,

16 and 37 (a) and (b) of the Convention. The authors are represented by counsel. The Optional

Protocol entered into force for the State Party on 2 March 2016.

Facts as submitted by the authors

2.1

In January 2016, the authors fled Afghanistan due to Taliban attacks and threats of

forced conversion and of kidnapping against the children. On an unspecified date in

January 2016, the family claimed asylum in Austria. Pending a decision on their application

for asylum, the family was housed in a metal container. Dissatisfied with this situation, the

* Adopted by the Committee at its 101st session (1–28 September 2026).

** The following members of the Committee participated in the consideration of the communication:

Suzanne Aho, Thuwayba Al Barwani, Hynd Ayoubi Idrissi, Mary Beloff, Timothy Ekesa,

Bragi Gudbrandsson, Mariana Ianachevici, Philip Jaffé, Sophie Kiladze, Cephas Lumina, Benyam

Dawit Mezmur, Juliana Scerri Ferrante, Aïssatou Alassane Sidikou, Zeinebou Taleb Moussa and

Benoit Van Keirsbilck.

United Nations

CRC/C/101/D/193/2022

Convention on the

Rights of the Child

Distr.: General

3 November 2026

Original: English

CRC/C/101/D/193/2022

2

GE.26-14839

family left Austria to travel to Germany on 16 March 2019, with the help of smugglers. On

17 March 2019, the family arrived in Czechia, where the smugglers kept them locked in a

cottage located near the German border. On 20 March 2019, the family was found by the

Czech police.

2.2

On 21 March 2019, the adult authors were detained for 30 days, on the basis of

decisions of the Regional Police Directorate of the Ústí Region, for the purpose of preparing

their transfer to Austria, which was designated as the responsible State to assess their

application for asylum under the Dublin III Regulation. The family was not presented with

any feasible alternative to detention or with accommodation in the semi-open facility for

asylum-seekers. The first author was not formally detained but was accommodated in the

Bělá-Jezová detention facility with her family.

2.3

The police recorded 1 January as the date of birth for each family member in their

respective birth year, the effect of which was to recognize the author’s sister, who was born

in 2001, as having attained the age of majority, and thereby denying the rights guaranteed to

her under the Convention.

2.4

On 9 April 2019, the Ministry of the Interior issued a decision on the family’s return

to Austria. The authorities extended the family’s detention by an additional 20 days. On

24 April 2019, the family was returned to Austria. Prior to being returned, the authority

operating the detention centre extracted partial payment from the family for costs incurred

during their detention, in the amount of 34,684 korunas (CZK) (approximately $1,500), with

an outstanding debt of CZK 8,228 (approximately $350).

2.5

On 3 April 2019, the authors challenged the detention decisions in a joint action before

the Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem, arguing that the first author should not have been

detained. The authors maintained that their deprivation of liberty did not meet the conditions

laid down by law, in particular regarding their conduct (there was no serious risk of

absconding arising from their conduct, as they had cooperated with authorities, had not

resisted transfer and had even expressed willingness to return to Austria), and the available

alternatives to detention (the authorities should have considered less coercive measures, such

as placement in a reception centre, instead of detention), and noted the incompatibility of

detaining a family for immigration reasons with the best interests of the child (de facto

detention of a child and failure to prioritize child protection). On 15 April 2019, the Regional

Court dismissed their action.

2.6

On 7 May 2019, the authors filed an appeal against this decision, which they

supplemented on 7 February 2020. In their appeal (complaint in cassation) to the Supreme

Administrative Court, the authors reiterated and developed the arguments they had already

raised, focusing mainly on family life (the decision interfered with their right to a family life,

given that it involved a family with children), detention conditions (conditions in the

Bělá-Jezová detention facility were inappropriate, especially for children), the suitability of

detention (the detention facility was not an appropriate place for a family with a minor child)

and the failure to use an alternative (the reception centre). The Supreme Administrative Court

dismissed the appeal on 17 April 2020, finding that the authors raised general and

hypothetical objections about their detention and had failed to sufficiently substantiate

individual harm.

2.7

The authors appealed further to the Constitutional Court on 22 June 2020, which

dismissed the appeal on 22 June 2021. At this stage of the proceedings, the authors also

brought the specific claim that the older daughter was legally still a minor (17 years old) at

the time of the detention.

Complaint

3.1

The first author maintains that the State Party has violated her rights under articles 3,

5, 6 (2), 12, 16 and 37 (a) and (b) of the Convention by detaining her for 34 days and by

failing to consider alternatives to closed detention. She claims that detention was imposed

solely based on the family’s migration status and for the purpose of a transfer under the

Dublin III Regulation, without being motivated by, or compatible with, the best interests of

the child. The authorities failed to treat her best interests as a primary consideration, limiting

their assessment to the detention conditions and the preservation of family unity, without a

CRC/C/101/D/193/2022

GE.26-14839

3

genuine evaluation of the impact of detention on her physical, psychological and emotional

well-being, development and rights. They further failed to consider non-custodial alternatives,

such as voluntary return, financial guarantees or placement in an open reception facility,

resorting instead to the most restrictive measure.

3.2

The first author argues that her detention amounted to inhuman and degrading

treatment within the meaning of article 37 (a) of the Convention, given the inherent harm

caused by the deprivation of liberty of children, the length of the detention and the prison-like

environment. She submits that immigration detention of children is incompatible per se with

the Convention, regardless of accompanying conditions, and that her detention caused her

distress, fear and harm exceeding the minimum threshold of severity. She also claims a

violation of article 37 (b), arguing that her deprivation of liberty was arbitrary and excessively

long and was not used as a measure of last resort or carried out with due diligence, particularly

given the family’s cooperation and willingness to return to Austria. Once there was no risk

of absconding, the continued detention amounted to detention in bad faith.

3.3

The first author further claims that she was subjected to violations of her rights to

liberty, family life and development and that her views were never sought, contrary to

article 12 of the Convention. The judicial review of her detention was procedurally deficient

due to a limited and formalistic assessment of the best interests of the child and the absence

of any meaningful opportunity for her to express her views. The detention can also be

considered punitive in nature, including due to the costs incurred by the family. Lastly, she

argues that her case reflects the systemic issue of the routine detention of migrant families

with children in the State Party.

3.4

In addition, the authors argue a violation of the elder sister’s (fourth author’s) right to

benefit from the guarantees of the Convention. They submit that she was wrongly treated as

an adult due to an inadequate and inaccurate age determination process, notwithstanding her

proximity to the age of majority and the possibility that she was a minor. As a result, she was

excluded from child-specific safeguards, including the assessment of her best interests and

the right to be heard. The authors contend that, given her vulnerability, dependency on her

parents and transitional stage of development, she should have been afforded protection

equivalent to that granted to children and that her detention also gave rise to the same

violations of articles 3, 5, 6 (2), 12, 16 and 37 of the Convention.

State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits

4.1

On 2 February 2023, the State Party explained that the authors were apprehended on

its territory in March 2019 without valid travel documents or residency permits, despite

having pending asylum claims in Austria. Their statements confirmed that they had

voluntarily left Austria, where they had lived in a reception centre and were receiving

schooling and social benefits, intending to travel irregularly to Germany with the help of

smugglers. On this basis, the police initiated the transfer procedure under the Dublin III

Regulation and ordered the detention of the adult family members under the Act on the

Residence of Foreign Nationals, citing a well-founded risk of absconding given their previous

disregard of asylum-related obligations and their attempts to transit illegally. The authorities

found that no less coercive measures (e.g. reporting duties or financial guarantees) could be

effectively applied because the family had no place of residence in Czechia and no intention

of remaining there. The minor child was not formally detained, but the parents requested her

placement with them; therefore, the family was accommodated together in the Bělá-Jezová

detention centre, the only closed facility suitable for families with children.

4.2

The Regional Court upheld the detention, finding that the decisions had adequately

considered the best interests of the child, primarily by preserving family unity, and that the

Bělá-Jezová facility offered tailored conditions, including access to schooling, medical care

and psychological assistance, and reduced security elements. The Regional Court found that

the reception centre was not a realistic alternative because its use for detained families had

been only an emergency response during the migration crisis, which was no longer relevant

and therefore the exceptional practice should not continue, and standard detention in

Bělá-Jezová was considered sufficient and appropriate. The detention was extended to allow

completion of the transfer procedure and lasted a total of 34 days, after which the family was

transferred to Austria, where they were later granted international protection. The State Party

CRC/C/101/D/193/2022

4

GE.26-14839

submits that the authorities acted lawfully, proportionately and in compliance with the child’s

best interests as interpreted in international jurisprudence.1

4.3

As to the cassation and constitutional proceedings, the State Party submits that the

Supreme Administrative Court rejected the authors’ complaint in cassation after finding that

the authorities had duly established that no less restrictive measure than detention could

ensure the family’s availability for their transfer to Austria under the Dublin III Regulation.

Although acknowledging that the minor child had de facto been deprived of liberty, the Court

held that this resulted inevitably from the detention of her parents, as no lawful alternative

accommodation existed for a child in their situation. The Court endorsed the reasoning that

placement in an open reception centre was legally impossible because the family were not

asylum-seekers in Czechia and deemed the authors’ objections regarding the facility’s

security features unsubstantiated. It upheld the finding that the Bělá-Jezová centre was the

only facility suitable for families with children and that the authorities had complied with the

strict requirements governing the detention of minors, examining their best interests and

concluding that family unity and the lack of viable alternatives justified their placement.2

4.4

The Constitutional Court subsequently dismissed the authors’ constitutional appeal as

manifestly unfounded, determining that the detention was neither arbitrary nor

disproportionate. It affirmed that the serious risk of absconding had been sufficiently

demonstrated by the authors’ prior conduct – leaving Austria where they had stable reception

conditions and attempting to reach Germany irregularly – and that this justified detention as

a last resort. The Court accepted that the best interests of the child had been adequately

considered, including by maintaining family unity and placing the family in a facility

specifically adapted to children. It found no incompatibility with European Court of Human

Rights case law, distinguishing the present case from precedents where violations were linked

to prolonged detention or grossly inadequate conditions and concluding that the relatively

short duration and suitable environment at Bělá-Jezová did not meet that threshold.3

4.5

The State Party has provided an overview of the relevant domestic law. Czech law

empowers the police to detain foreign nationals who have entered or remained in the country

irregularly, though initial police detention cannot exceed 48 hours. The Act on the Residence

of Foreign Nationals sets conditions for lawful stay, provides for alternatives to detention,

such as reporting duties or financial guarantees, and restricts their use where the individual

intends to abscond or cannot provide an address. Detention for persons subject to transfer

under the Dublin III Regulation requires a serious risk of absconding, defined with reference

to prior conduct, illegal stay, attempts to evade transfer or incapacity to depart voluntarily;

families with children may be detained for up to 90 days. The law also regulates material

standards in detention centres, including accommodation, medical care, schooling and

child-specific activities.

4.6

Domestic jurisprudence confirms that minors may exceptionally be detained with

their parents in migration contexts when no adequate alternative exists and when family unity

and the child’s best interests are duly considered. In particular, the Constitutional Court, in a

2017 judgment, upheld the placement of young children at Bělá-Jezová, finding that the

facility was suitable for families, that conditions there did not amount to ill-treatment and

1 See, for example, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, in which the European Court of Human Rights emphasized

the need for individualized assessment of risks to children and the adequacy of reception conditions in

transfer or detention contexts (Application No. 29217/12, Judgment, 4 November 2014, paras. 118–

122).

2 For example, in its general comment No. 6 (2005), the Committee required a demonstration that a

child’s detention was a measure of last resort and that suitable care arrangements had been duly

considered (paras. 61–63).

3 In Kanagaratnam and Others v. Belgium, the European Court of Human Rights found distinct

violations arising from poor conditions, family separation and extended detention periods

(Application No. 15297/09, Judgment, 13 December 2011, paras. 64–69), and, in Abdullahi Elmi and

Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, it emphasized that violations typically arose from either excessive duration

or clearly inadequate conditions in facilities unsuited to children (Applications No. 25794/13 and

No. 28151/13, Judgment, 22 November 2016, paras. 107–110).

CRC/C/101/D/193/2022

GE.26-14839

5

that detention, though not ideal, did not violate constitutional or international prohibitions on

degrading treatment in such circumstances.4

4.7

The State Party maintains that the Convention does not apply to the fourth author as

she was already 18 at the time of detention, a fact consistently confirmed by official

documents, the authors’ own statements and uncontested domestic proceedings.

4.8

As regards the first author, the State Party submits that her 34-day detention complied

with article 37 of the Convention, as it was lawful, non-arbitrary, strictly necessary to prevent

absconding under the Dublin procedure, and imposed only after an assessment of alternatives,

none of which were feasible. The detention took place in a facility specifically adapted for

families with children, offering education, healthcare, leisure activities and reduced security

features. The authorities and domestic courts explicitly assessed the best interests of the child,

prioritizing family unity and limiting detention to the shortest period required. Distinguishing

the case from relevant jurisprudence of the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the

European Court of Human Rights regarding younger children, longer detention, substandard

conditions and viable alternatives, the State Party submits that there was no violation of

article 37, read alone or in conjunction with article 3, of the Convention.

4.9

As regards the claims under article 16 of the Convention, the State Party first argues

that the complaint about interference with family life does not raise any issues distinct from

the claims raised under article 37 and therefore does not require separate examination.

Nevertheless, it submits that there was no violation of article 16. The family remained

together throughout the period of detention and was housed in the same accommodation, and

family unity was expressly preserved. Even assuming that detention constituted interference

with family life, the Government maintains that it was lawful, pursued the legitimate aim of

preventing irregular migration and ensuring the execution of the transfer under the Dublin III

Regulation, and was proportionate in light of the conditions and limited duration of detention.

4.10

Concerning the claims under articles 5, 6 (2) and 12 of the Convention, the State Party

submits that they were never raised before the domestic courts, either expressly or in

substance. It therefore argues that these parts of the communication should be declared

inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. In the alternative, it contends that they

do not raise any issues separate from those already examined under articles 3 and 37 and do

not, in any event, disclose any violation.

Authors’ comments on the State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits

5.1

On 2 December 2024, the authors submitted their comments on the State Party’s

observations regarding the admissibility and merits of the communication.

5.2

The authors emphasize that they cooperated fully with the authorities of the State

Party at all stages. The parents consistently expressed regret for leaving Austria, willingness

to return immediately and acceptance of the transfer under the Dublin III Regulation, even

refraining from appealing the transfer decision. They provided information about the

smuggler and offered material assistance to the police. In their view, nothing in their conduct

justified the finding that they posed a risk of absconding. They also strongly contest the State

Party’s portrayal of Bělá-Jezová as a child-appropriate facility, describing it instead as a

remote, prison-like detention centre where there is fencing, razor wire, constant surveillance,

restricted movement, confiscation of phones and money, limited communication with the

outside world and little privacy. Families with children were not fully separated from other

detainees, could not cook independently and remained subject to strict security regimes,

which the authors argue created fear and distress, particularly for children.

5.3

Regarding their own detention, the authors note that, for the first days, they were held

in a building without access to the children’s centre or social support and that the first author,

then aged 11, did not meaningfully attend school despite compulsory education requirements.

Leisure activities outside the centre never occurred, and the possibility of outings was illusory.

4 See Constitutional Court, judgment III. ÚS 3289/14 of 10 May 2017, in which the Court assessed

detention conditions for children at Bělá Jezová (paras. 58–60), and the Committee’s general

comment No. 6 (2005) for exceptional circumstances permitting the deprivation of liberty of children

in migration contexts (paras. 61–63).

CRC/C/101/D/193/2022

6

GE.26-14839

The family was required to pay for its detention, resulting in significant expenses and ongoing

debt, which the authors describe as humiliating. The detention had a serious emotional impact

on all the family members: both daughters cried frequently, the minor daughter struggled to

adapt and showed signs of distress, and the parents, who are illiterate, traumatized and

unfamiliar with European systems, were unable to support their children adequately. The

older daughter assumed an adult role as the family’s main communicator, adding further

strain. The detention aggravated pre-existing trauma from Taliban persecution and their flight,

causing anxiety, fear and helplessness incompatible with the rights and best interests of

children under the Convention.

5.4

The authors argue that there is a clear normative divide in international human rights

law with respect to immigration detention of children. While United Nations treaty bodies,

led by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, have consistently affirmed that immigration

detention of children is inherently incompatible with the Convention and violates the best

interests principle, European frameworks still formally permit child detention in narrowly

defined exceptional circumstances. 5 States frequently rely on this lower threshold to

normalize detention and dilute safeguards, such as the principle of last resort, the requirement

that detention be of the shortest appropriate duration and the provision of genuinely

child-friendly conditions.

5.5

Relying on the Committee’s general comments, its joint general comments with the

Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their

Families and its recent Views, the authors maintain that immigration detention of children is

never permissible, not even as a measure of last resort, and that detention with parents for

reasons of family unity remains incompatible with article 37 of the Convention.6 Detention

is said to inherently harm children’s physical, mental and developmental well-being and

therefore violates the best interests principle.

5.6

The authors further argue that the Czech Republic knew or ought to have known of

this standard well before the events at issue. Since at least 2011, multiple United Nations

treaty bodies have repeatedly called on the State Party to end immigration detention of

children, prohibit de facto detention with parents and ensure non-custodial alternatives.7

Despite this, detention of children continues as a routine practice rather than as an exceptional

measure.

5.7

The authors submit that the elder daughter should be recognized as a victim under the

Convention because the Czech authorities failed to properly assess her age and wrongly

treated her as an adult during detention. Although her Austrian identification card recorded

her date of birth as 1 January 2001, the authors contend that this date was merely indicative.

In the absence of precise information and official documentation, the Austrian authorities

administratively recorded the date of birth as 1 January, a common practice in asylum

procedures that may artificially increase a person’s recorded age. Given this context and her

proximity to the age of majority, there was a real possibility that the elder daughter was still

a minor at the time of detention, which should have triggered child-specific safeguards.8

5 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Report of the 2012 Day of General Discussion on the rights of

all children in the context of international migration, para. 78; and European Court of Human Rights,

A.M. and Others v. France, Application No. 24587/12, Judgment, 12 July 2016.

6 Joint general comment No. 3 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant

Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 22 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017),

paras. 5 and 11; joint general comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All

Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child

(2017), paras. 7–12; E.H. et al. v. Belgium (CRC/C/89/D/55/2018), paras. 13.9–13.12.

7 CRC/C/CZE/CO/3-4, para. 66; CAT/C/CZE/CO/6, paras. 20 and 21; and CCPR/C/CZE/CO/4,

paras. 28 and 29.

8 Joint general comment No. 3 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant

Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 22 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017),

paras. 5 and 11 (obligation to identify children promptly in migration procedures); and joint general

comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and

Members of Their Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), para. 3 (risk

of diminished protection for children aged 15–18).

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5.8

The authors contend that the authorities should have conducted an age assessment ex

officio, particularly in the light of strong indications that the recorded date of birth was

approximate. By relying uncritically on the Austrian document and making no further

inquiries, the authorities failed to apply international standards governing age determination,

including the presumption of minority and the benefit of the doubt. This resulted in the fourth

author being questioned, searched and detained under adult procedures, thereby depriving

her of protection under the Convention.9

5.9

In response to the State Party’s argument that the fourth author confirmed her age and

raised the issue only at the constitutional stage, the authors stress their extreme vulnerability

as undocumented asylum-seekers, their lack of legal awareness, language barriers and limited

access to effective legal assistance during earlier proceedings. They submit that the duty to

assess age rested with the authorities, particularly in migration-control contexts involving

adolescents close to adulthood. By raising the issue before the Constitutional Court, the

authors maintain that domestic remedies were sufficiently exhausted, in line with the

Committee’s case law on the purpose of admissibility requirements.10

5.10

The authors emphasize that children aged 15 to 18 are particularly at risk of

misidentification and underprotection in migration contexts and that States must ensure

prompt, child-friendly and culturally sensitive age-assessment procedures. In situations of

residual uncertainty, individuals must be presumed to be minors and treated accordingly.11

The fourth author was, or should have been presumed to be, a minor at the time of detention

and therefore qualifies as a victim of the alleged violations, rendering her complaints

admissible.

5.11

The authors dispute the relevance of the State Party’s argument that the conditions of

detention were suitable for children. They submit that, as a matter of principle, no closed

immigration detention centre can ever be appropriate for children, since such facilities are

designed to deprive individuals of liberty. In their view, investing in the humanization of

detention centres cannot substitute for the obligation to develop community-based,

non-custodial alternatives. In any event, the authors reiterate that the actual conditions of

detention and the restrictive regime aggravated the distress suffered by the first and fourth

authors, contributing to anxiety, fear and humiliation.

Third-party intervention

6.1

On 5 October 2023, the International Commission of Jurists, the AIRE Centre, the

Dutch Council for Refugees and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles submitted a

third-party intervention, following the leave to intervene granted on 15 September 2023.

6.2

The interveners argue that international law establishes an absolute prohibition on

immigration detention of children, including when they are accompanied by their families,

grounded in articles 3 and 37 of the Convention. Drawing on joint general comment No. 4 of

the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their

Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), they stress that the “last

resort” exception in article 37 (b) cannot apply in migration contexts, as detention is

inherently incompatible with the child’s best interests. This position is reinforced by the

Committee’s jurisprudence in the cases E.H. et al. v. Belgium and K.K. and R.H. v. Belgium,12

in which the Committee found violations of article 37, read alone and in conjunction with

article 3 of the Convention, in cases involving the detention of children with their families.

9 Committee on the Rights of the Child, general comments No. 6 (2005), paras. 31 and 33 (duty to

identify and protect children in migration contexts); and No. 7 (2005), para. 36 (benefit of the doubt

and presumption of minority in age assessment).

10 Y.M. v. Spain (CRC/C/78/D/8/2016), paras. 8.2 and 8.3 (purposes of admissibility and exhaustion of

domestic remedies).

11 Committee on the Rights of the Child, general comment No. 14 (2013), paras. 6 and 39 (best interests

as a primary consideration, including in procedural decisions); and joint general comment No. 4 of

the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their

Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), paras. 3 and 10 (age assessment,

presumption of childhood, and heightened vulnerability).

12 See E.H. et al. v. Belgium and A.M.K. and S.K. v. Belgium (CRC/C/89/D/73/2019).

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6.3

The interveners situate this approach within broader international and regional

standards, including the findings of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel,

inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment13 that such detention is never necessary and

may amount to ill-treatment, and the consistent jurisprudence of the European Court of

Human Rights, which has emphasized the extreme vulnerability of child migrants and has

found that their detention often breaches article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights).14 The

Court has further clarified that children’s best interests must prevail over migration control

objectives, that detention is arbitrary where alternatives are not considered and that family

unity cannot justify detention but instead requires non-custodial solutions for the entire

family.15

6.4

In parallel, the interveners emphasize that States are under a positive obligation to

implement non-custodial, community-based alternatives to detention, consistent with the

Committee’s standards, guarantees under the European Convention on Human Rights (arts. 3,

5 and 8) and European Union law requirements on necessity, proportionality and prior

consideration of alternatives, as reflected in the case law of the Court of Justice of the

European Union.16 They also underline the centrality of procedural guarantees, including the

child’s right to be heard under article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, access

to information, and legal representation as essential components of any best interests

determination and migration procedure.

6.5

With respect to age assessment, the interveners submit that it must be strictly regulated,

non-routine and guided by the presumption of minority and the benefit of the doubt, as

affirmed in joint general comments No. 3 and No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of

the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 22 and No. 23 of the

Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017) and in the Committee’s jurisprudence involving

Spain.17 They stress that age assessment should be undertaken where serious doubt persists,

and must follow a holistic, multidisciplinary approach, rather than relying on intrusive and

unreliable medical methods with wide margins of error. They cite the judgment of the

European Court of Human Rights in Darboe and Camara v. Italy (2022) to confirm that the

presumption of minority forms an integral part of the protection of private life under article 8

of the European Convention on Human Rights and must be accompanied by robust

procedural safeguards, including legal assistance and informed participation. The interveners

also argue that flawed or unnecessary age assessments risk depriving children of their rights

and exposing them to detention and other harm, thereby potentially resulting in violations of

articles 3 and 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

State Party’s comments on the third-party intervention

7.1

The State Party rejects the interveners’ assertion of an absolute prohibition on

immigration detention of children, maintaining instead that article 37 of the Convention does

not impose a categorical ban. It argues that the Committee’s own jurisprudence demonstrates

the need for detention to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account factors such

as the child’s age, the duration and conditions of the detention, the circumstances of the case

and whether alternatives were considered. In the State Party’s view, detention may be

compatible with the Convention if it is lawful, non-arbitrary, necessary, proportionate,

limited in time and attentive to the child’s best interests. This interpretation, it submits, is

consistent with broader international and regional law, including the jurisprudence of the

13 See A/HRC/28/68 and A/HRC/37/50.

14 European Court of Human Rights, Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, Application

No. 13178/03, Judgment, 12 October 2006; Popov v. France, Applications No. 39472/07 and

No. 39474/07, Judgment, 19 January 2012; Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, Application

No. 41442/07, Judgment, 19 January 2010; and M.D. and A.D. v. France, Application No. 57035/18,

Judgment, 22 July 2021.

15 European Court of Human Rights, Rahimi v. Greece, Application No. 8687/08, Judgment, 5 April

2011; and Popov v. France, paras. 140 and 141.

16 See, for example, Court of Justice of the European Union, C-528/15, Al Chodor.

17 See N.B.F. v. Spain (CRC/C/79/D/11/2017), A.L. v. Spain (CRC/C/81/D/16/2017), J.A.B. v. Spain

(CRC/C/81/D/22/2017) and R.K. v. Spain (CRC/C/81/D/22/2017).

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European Court of Human Rights and European Union standards, which also permit

detention under strict safeguards rather than prohibiting it outright.

7.2

Regarding alternatives to detention, the State Party accepts that States are obliged to

consider non-custodial measures but contends that this obligation was fulfilled in the present

case. It emphasizes that domestic courts do assess alternatives and may overturn detention

decisions where this has not been done. However, in the authors’ situation, the authorities

concluded, on the basis of their conduct and risk of absconding, that no less coercive measure

would have been effective and that detention was therefore justified.

7.3

On procedural rights, the State Party again challenges the admissibility of the claim

under article 12 of the Convention, arguing non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and lack of

substantiation. In any event, it submits that the right to be heard was respected: the adult

authors were interviewed with interpretation services, the minor’s interests were represented

by her father, the authors were legally represented throughout and they consented to written

court proceedings.

7.4

Lastly, on age assessment, the State Party broadly accepts the interveners’ general

principles – that such procedures should not be routine and should only occur where doubts

arise – but argues that these principles are irrelevant to the facts. It maintains that no age

assessment was required because the fourth author consistently identified herself as being

18 years of age, and this was supported by the available documentation. Since no doubt

existed as to her majority, the authorities had no obligation to apply the presumption of

minority or conduct further verifications. The State Party therefore concludes that its

approach was consistent with applicable standards and reiterates its position that the

communication should be found inadmissible or, alternatively, be dismissed on the merits.

Issues and proceedings before the Committee

Consideration of admissibility

8.1

Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must

decide, in accordance with rule 20 of its rules of procedure under the Optional Protocol,

whether the claim is admissible under the Optional Protocol.

8.2

The Committee notes the State Party’s argument that the fourth author cannot be

considered a victim within the meaning of the Convention, as she had allegedly reached the

age of majority at the time of the events. At the same time, the Committee notes the authors’

submission that, given the absence of reliable documentation, the identical recording of dates

of birth for all the family members and their specific cultural background, the State Party

should have conducted an age assessment ex officio and have applied the presumption of

minority. The Committee also notes the authors’ argument that, given their vulnerability,

language barriers and limited access to legal assistance, the issue of age determination could

only be raised effectively at the constitutional stage. In these circumstances, and in the

absence of any challenge by the State Party concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies

in relation to this part of the complaint, the Committee considers that article 7 (e) does not

constitute an obstacle to the admissibility of the authors’ claim regarding the fourth author.

8.3

Regarding the authors’ claims under article 12 of the Convention relating to the fact

that the first author has not been heard, the Committee notes that the authors challenged the

detention decisions before the Regional Court, subsequently lodged a complaint in cassation

with the Supreme Administrative Court and ultimately submitted a constitutional appeal

before the Constitutional Court, which was dismissed. However, it also notes the State Party’s

contention that the authors have not raised this allegation before the domestic courts, either

expressly or in substance. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the authors have not

exhausted available and effective domestic remedies within the meaning of article 7 (e) of

the Optional Protocol in relation to this part of the complaint.

8.4

The Committee notes the authors’ claims under articles 5, 6 (2) and 16 of the

Convention. However, on the basis of the information before it, the Committee considers that

the authors have not provided sufficient arguments or evidence to substantiate, for the

purposes of admissibility, how the facts of the case would give rise to distinct violations of

these provisions, beyond the claims already raised under articles 3, 12 and 37 of the

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GE.26-14839

Convention. In particular, the Committee observes that the authors have failed to demonstrate

how the family’s detention for 34 days would, in itself, have violated the first and fourth

authors’ rights to development and family life. The authors have also failed to indicate how

this detention would have amounted to a violation of the general provisions contained in

article 5 of the Convention regarding the State Party’s duty to respect the responsibilities,

rights and duties of parents. Accordingly, the Committee declares this part of the

communication inadmissible under article 7 (f) of the Optional Protocol for lack of sufficient

substantiation.

8.5

However, the Committee considers that the authors’ claims under articles 3 and 37 (a)

and (b) of the Convention, in relation to the de facto detention of the first and fourth authors

for reasons related to their migration status and the decisions issued ordering the parents’

detention, have been sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility. Accordingly,

it declares these claims admissible and proceeds to their consideration on the merits.

Consideration of merits

9.1

The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information

made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 10 (1) of the Optional Protocol.

9.2

The Committee notes the authors’ claims that the first and fourth authors were

detained for 34 days in the Bělá-Jezová detention centre because of their and their parents’

migration status, in conditions incompatible with their needs and best interests, and that this

detention caused them significant psychological harm. It further notes the State Party’s

argument that the detention was lawful, necessary to prevent absconding and carried out in a

facility suitable for families with children.

9.3

The Committee recalls its jurisprudence according to which the detention of children

because of their or their parents’ migration status constitutes a violation of children’s rights

and is contrary to the principle of the best interests of the child, given the harm inherent in

any deprivation of liberty and the negative impact that immigration detention can have on

children’s physical and mental health and on their development. It also recalls that, in the

context of migration, the possibility of deprivation of liberty as a measure of last resort is not

applicable and that such deprivation of liberty is generally disproportionate and therefore

arbitrary within the meaning of article 37 (b) of the Convention.18 In this light, the Committee

has affirmed that children should never be detained for reasons related to their or their parents’

migration status and States should expeditiously and completely cease or eradicate the

immigration detention of children and that any kind of child immigration detention should

be forbidden by law and such prohibition should be fully implemented in practice.19

9.4

In the present case, the Committee observes that the detention of the first and fourth

authors was imposed on them de facto for the purpose of their transfer under the Dublin

procedure and was thus based solely on their migration status. The Committee notes that,

while the first author was not herself subject to a formal detention order, she and the fourth

author were placed in a closed detention centre and faced the same restrictions as the adults

held there, including restrictions on their movement. It further observes that their detention

lasted 34 days and that the authors expressed their willingness to return voluntarily to Austria.

The Committee notes that the assessment conducted by the domestic authorities focused

primarily on the preservation of family unity and the alleged suitability of detention

conditions. However, the Committee recalls that, where the best interests of the child require

maintaining family unity, this does not justify the detention of the child but rather requires

the adoption of non-custodial solutions applicable to the family as a whole.20

9.5

The Committee notes that the authorities’ assessment of the best interests of the child

was limited and did not address the inherent harm of detention on children or meaningfully

18 E.H. et al. v. Belgium, paras. 13.9–13.12; and A.M.K. and S.K. v. Belgium, paras. 10.9–10.11.

19 Joint general comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant

Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017)

on State obligations regarding the human rights of children in the context of international migration in

countries of origin, transit, destination and return, para. 5.

20 Ibid., para. 11.

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GE.26-14839

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consider non-custodial measures that could also preserve family unity or demonstrate how

the children’s interests were weighed against other considerations, as required under article 3

of the Convention.

9.6

In these circumstances, the Committee finds that the children’s deprivation of liberty

amounted to arbitrary detention in violation of article 37 (b) of the Convention, read alone

and in conjunction with article 3. Taking into account the harm inherent in the deprivation of

liberty of children and its negative impact on their physical and mental well-being and

development, the Committee further considers that such detention, in the circumstances of

the present case, is incompatible with article 37 (a) of the Convention.

9.7

The Committee notes the authors’ claim that the State Party failed to properly assess

the age of the fourth author, treating her as an adult without conducting an age assessment

procedure despite indications that she may have been a child, as her date of birth was

approximate. It recalls that States Parties have an obligation to promptly identify children in

migration contexts and to ensure that, where there is reasonable doubt as to age, the individual

is afforded the benefit of the doubt and treated as a minor pending appropriate assessment.

The Committee observes that the entire family’s dates of birth were recorded identically and

that no additional steps were taken to verify the age of the fourth author. It considers that

these circumstances should have prompted the authorities to conduct a more thorough and

culturally sensitive age assessment. By failing to do so and apply the presumption of minority,

the State Party deprived the fourth author of the protection measures guaranteed to children

under the Convention, including safeguards related to deprivation of liberty and the

assessment of her best interests. The Committee therefore concludes that the State Party

violated the rights of the fourth author under article 3 of the Convention, read in conjunction

with article 37.

9.8

The Committee, acting under article 10 (5) of the Optional Protocol on a

communications procedure, finds that the facts before it disclose a violation of articles 3

and 37 (a) and (b) of the Convention with regard to the first and fourth authors.

10.

The State Party should therefore provide the first and fourth authors with effective

reparation for the violations suffered, including by reimbursing the cost of their detention.

The State Party is also under an obligation to prevent similar violations in the future. The

State Party should:

(a)

Ensure that children are not deprived of their liberty due to their or their parents’

migration status and that non-custodial solutions are available to preserve family unity;

(b)

Ensure that, when there is reasonable doubt about a person’s age, a prompt,

child-sensitive and culturally appropriate age assessment is conducted, with the benefit of the

doubt and the presumption of minority applied pending its outcome.

11.

In accordance with article 11 of the Optional Protocol, the Committee wishes to

receive from the State Party, as soon as possible and within 180 days, information about the

measures it has taken to give effect to the Committee’s Views. The State Party is requested

to include information about such measures in its reports to the Committee under article 44

of the Convention. The State Party is also requested to publish the present Views and to

disseminate them widely.