Decision on merits; Subjects: RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, CZECHIA; [CRC: Kinderrechtskonvention, Übereinkommen über die Rechte des Kindes; Convention relative aux droits de l'enfant; Convenzione sui diritti del fanciullo]
Erwägungen (59 Absätze)
E. 1 The authors of the communication are Jas.K.B. (first author), born in 2008, her parents, C.K.B. (second author) and M.S.B. (third author), and her older sister J.K.B. (fourth author), born in 2001, all Afghan nationals belonging to the Sikh religion. The authors claim a violation by the State Party of the first and fourth authors’ rights under articles 3, 5, 6 (2), 12, 16 and 37 (a) and (b) of the Convention. The authors are represented by counsel. The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State Party on 2 March 2016. Facts as submitted by the authors
E. 2.1 In January 2016, the authors fled Afghanistan due to Taliban attacks and threats of forced conversion and of kidnapping against the children. On an unspecified date in January 2016, the family claimed asylum in Austria. Pending a decision on their application for asylum, the family was housed in a metal container. Dissatisfied with this situation, the
* Adopted by the Committee at its 101st session (1–28 September 2026). ** The following members of the Committee participated in the consideration of the communication: Suzanne Aho, Thuwayba Al Barwani, Hynd Ayoubi Idrissi, Mary Beloff, Timothy Ekesa, Bragi Gudbrandsson, Mariana Ianachevici, Philip Jaffé, Sophie Kiladze, Cephas Lumina, Benyam Dawit Mezmur, Juliana Scerri Ferrante, Aïssatou Alassane Sidikou, Zeinebou Taleb Moussa and Benoit Van Keirsbilck. United Nations CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 Convention on the Rights of the Child Distr.: General 3 November 2026 Original: English CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 2 GE.26-14839 family left Austria to travel to Germany on 16 March 2019, with the help of smugglers. On 17 March 2019, the family arrived in Czechia, where the smugglers kept them locked in a cottage located near the German border. On 20 March 2019, the family was found by the Czech police.
E. 2.2 On 21 March 2019, the adult authors were detained for 30 days, on the basis of decisions of the Regional Police Directorate of the Ústí Region, for the purpose of preparing their transfer to Austria, which was designated as the responsible State to assess their application for asylum under the Dublin III Regulation. The family was not presented with any feasible alternative to detention or with accommodation in the semi-open facility for asylum-seekers. The first author was not formally detained but was accommodated in the Bělá-Jezová detention facility with her family.
E. 2.3 The police recorded 1 January as the date of birth for each family member in their respective birth year, the effect of which was to recognize the author’s sister, who was born in 2001, as having attained the age of majority, and thereby denying the rights guaranteed to her under the Convention.
E. 2.4 On 9 April 2019, the Ministry of the Interior issued a decision on the family’s return to Austria. The authorities extended the family’s detention by an additional 20 days. On 24 April 2019, the family was returned to Austria. Prior to being returned, the authority operating the detention centre extracted partial payment from the family for costs incurred during their detention, in the amount of 34,684 korunas (CZK) (approximately $1,500), with an outstanding debt of CZK 8,228 (approximately $350).
E. 2.5 On 3 April 2019, the authors challenged the detention decisions in a joint action before the Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem, arguing that the first author should not have been detained. The authors maintained that their deprivation of liberty did not meet the conditions laid down by law, in particular regarding their conduct (there was no serious risk of absconding arising from their conduct, as they had cooperated with authorities, had not resisted transfer and had even expressed willingness to return to Austria), and the available alternatives to detention (the authorities should have considered less coercive measures, such as placement in a reception centre, instead of detention), and noted the incompatibility of detaining a family for immigration reasons with the best interests of the child (de facto detention of a child and failure to prioritize child protection). On 15 April 2019, the Regional Court dismissed their action.
E. 2.6 On 7 May 2019, the authors filed an appeal against this decision, which they supplemented on 7 February 2020. In their appeal (complaint in cassation) to the Supreme Administrative Court, the authors reiterated and developed the arguments they had already raised, focusing mainly on family life (the decision interfered with their right to a family life, given that it involved a family with children), detention conditions (conditions in the Bělá-Jezová detention facility were inappropriate, especially for children), the suitability of detention (the detention facility was not an appropriate place for a family with a minor child) and the failure to use an alternative (the reception centre). The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal on 17 April 2020, finding that the authors raised general and hypothetical objections about their detention and had failed to sufficiently substantiate individual harm.
E. 2.7 The authors appealed further to the Constitutional Court on 22 June 2020, which dismissed the appeal on 22 June 2021. At this stage of the proceedings, the authors also brought the specific claim that the older daughter was legally still a minor (17 years old) at the time of the detention. Complaint
E. 3 genuine evaluation of the impact of detention on her physical, psychological and emotional well-being, development and rights. They further failed to consider non-custodial alternatives, such as voluntary return, financial guarantees or placement in an open reception facility, resorting instead to the most restrictive measure.
E. 3.1 The first author maintains that the State Party has violated her rights under articles 3, 5, 6 (2), 12, 16 and 37 (a) and (b) of the Convention by detaining her for 34 days and by failing to consider alternatives to closed detention. She claims that detention was imposed solely based on the family’s migration status and for the purpose of a transfer under the Dublin III Regulation, without being motivated by, or compatible with, the best interests of the child. The authorities failed to treat her best interests as a primary consideration, limiting their assessment to the detention conditions and the preservation of family unity, without a CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 GE.26-14839
E. 3.2 The first author argues that her detention amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of article 37 (a) of the Convention, given the inherent harm caused by the deprivation of liberty of children, the length of the detention and the prison-like environment. She submits that immigration detention of children is incompatible per se with the Convention, regardless of accompanying conditions, and that her detention caused her distress, fear and harm exceeding the minimum threshold of severity. She also claims a violation of article 37 (b), arguing that her deprivation of liberty was arbitrary and excessively long and was not used as a measure of last resort or carried out with due diligence, particularly given the family’s cooperation and willingness to return to Austria. Once there was no risk of absconding, the continued detention amounted to detention in bad faith.
E. 3.3 The first author further claims that she was subjected to violations of her rights to liberty, family life and development and that her views were never sought, contrary to article 12 of the Convention. The judicial review of her detention was procedurally deficient due to a limited and formalistic assessment of the best interests of the child and the absence of any meaningful opportunity for her to express her views. The detention can also be considered punitive in nature, including due to the costs incurred by the family. Lastly, she argues that her case reflects the systemic issue of the routine detention of migrant families with children in the State Party.
E. 3.4 In addition, the authors argue a violation of the elder sister’s (fourth author’s) right to benefit from the guarantees of the Convention. They submit that she was wrongly treated as an adult due to an inadequate and inaccurate age determination process, notwithstanding her proximity to the age of majority and the possibility that she was a minor. As a result, she was excluded from child-specific safeguards, including the assessment of her best interests and the right to be heard. The authors contend that, given her vulnerability, dependency on her parents and transitional stage of development, she should have been afforded protection equivalent to that granted to children and that her detention also gave rise to the same violations of articles 3, 5, 6 (2), 12, 16 and 37 of the Convention. State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits
E. 4 GE.26-14839 submits that the authorities acted lawfully, proportionately and in compliance with the child’s best interests as interpreted in international jurisprudence.1
E. 4.1 On 2 February 2023, the State Party explained that the authors were apprehended on its territory in March 2019 without valid travel documents or residency permits, despite having pending asylum claims in Austria. Their statements confirmed that they had voluntarily left Austria, where they had lived in a reception centre and were receiving schooling and social benefits, intending to travel irregularly to Germany with the help of smugglers. On this basis, the police initiated the transfer procedure under the Dublin III Regulation and ordered the detention of the adult family members under the Act on the Residence of Foreign Nationals, citing a well-founded risk of absconding given their previous disregard of asylum-related obligations and their attempts to transit illegally. The authorities found that no less coercive measures (e.g. reporting duties or financial guarantees) could be effectively applied because the family had no place of residence in Czechia and no intention of remaining there. The minor child was not formally detained, but the parents requested her placement with them; therefore, the family was accommodated together in the Bělá-Jezová detention centre, the only closed facility suitable for families with children.
E. 4.2 The Regional Court upheld the detention, finding that the decisions had adequately considered the best interests of the child, primarily by preserving family unity, and that the Bělá-Jezová facility offered tailored conditions, including access to schooling, medical care and psychological assistance, and reduced security elements. The Regional Court found that the reception centre was not a realistic alternative because its use for detained families had been only an emergency response during the migration crisis, which was no longer relevant and therefore the exceptional practice should not continue, and standard detention in Bělá-Jezová was considered sufficient and appropriate. The detention was extended to allow completion of the transfer procedure and lasted a total of 34 days, after which the family was transferred to Austria, where they were later granted international protection. The State Party CRC/C/101/D/193/2022
E. 4.3 As to the cassation and constitutional proceedings, the State Party submits that the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the authors’ complaint in cassation after finding that the authorities had duly established that no less restrictive measure than detention could ensure the family’s availability for their transfer to Austria under the Dublin III Regulation. Although acknowledging that the minor child had de facto been deprived of liberty, the Court held that this resulted inevitably from the detention of her parents, as no lawful alternative accommodation existed for a child in their situation. The Court endorsed the reasoning that placement in an open reception centre was legally impossible because the family were not asylum-seekers in Czechia and deemed the authors’ objections regarding the facility’s security features unsubstantiated. It upheld the finding that the Bělá-Jezová centre was the only facility suitable for families with children and that the authorities had complied with the strict requirements governing the detention of minors, examining their best interests and concluding that family unity and the lack of viable alternatives justified their placement.2
E. 4.4 The Constitutional Court subsequently dismissed the authors’ constitutional appeal as manifestly unfounded, determining that the detention was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate. It affirmed that the serious risk of absconding had been sufficiently demonstrated by the authors’ prior conduct – leaving Austria where they had stable reception conditions and attempting to reach Germany irregularly – and that this justified detention as a last resort. The Court accepted that the best interests of the child had been adequately considered, including by maintaining family unity and placing the family in a facility specifically adapted to children. It found no incompatibility with European Court of Human Rights case law, distinguishing the present case from precedents where violations were linked to prolonged detention or grossly inadequate conditions and concluding that the relatively short duration and suitable environment at Bělá-Jezová did not meet that threshold.3
E. 4.5 The State Party has provided an overview of the relevant domestic law. Czech law empowers the police to detain foreign nationals who have entered or remained in the country irregularly, though initial police detention cannot exceed 48 hours. The Act on the Residence of Foreign Nationals sets conditions for lawful stay, provides for alternatives to detention, such as reporting duties or financial guarantees, and restricts their use where the individual intends to abscond or cannot provide an address. Detention for persons subject to transfer under the Dublin III Regulation requires a serious risk of absconding, defined with reference to prior conduct, illegal stay, attempts to evade transfer or incapacity to depart voluntarily; families with children may be detained for up to 90 days. The law also regulates material standards in detention centres, including accommodation, medical care, schooling and child-specific activities.
E. 4.6 Domestic jurisprudence confirms that minors may exceptionally be detained with their parents in migration contexts when no adequate alternative exists and when family unity and the child’s best interests are duly considered. In particular, the Constitutional Court, in a 2017 judgment, upheld the placement of young children at Bělá-Jezová, finding that the facility was suitable for families, that conditions there did not amount to ill-treatment and 1 See, for example, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, in which the European Court of Human Rights emphasized the need for individualized assessment of risks to children and the adequacy of reception conditions in transfer or detention contexts (Application No. 29217/12, Judgment, 4 November 2014, paras. 118– 122). 2 For example, in its general comment No. 6 (2005), the Committee required a demonstration that a child’s detention was a measure of last resort and that suitable care arrangements had been duly considered (paras. 61–63). 3 In Kanagaratnam and Others v. Belgium, the European Court of Human Rights found distinct violations arising from poor conditions, family separation and extended detention periods (Application No. 15297/09, Judgment, 13 December 2011, paras. 64–69), and, in Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, it emphasized that violations typically arose from either excessive duration or clearly inadequate conditions in facilities unsuited to children (Applications No. 25794/13 and No. 28151/13, Judgment, 22 November 2016, paras. 107–110). CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 GE.26-14839 5 that detention, though not ideal, did not violate constitutional or international prohibitions on degrading treatment in such circumstances.4
E. 4.7 The State Party maintains that the Convention does not apply to the fourth author as she was already 18 at the time of detention, a fact consistently confirmed by official documents, the authors’ own statements and uncontested domestic proceedings.
E. 4.8 As regards the first author, the State Party submits that her 34-day detention complied with article 37 of the Convention, as it was lawful, non-arbitrary, strictly necessary to prevent absconding under the Dublin procedure, and imposed only after an assessment of alternatives, none of which were feasible. The detention took place in a facility specifically adapted for families with children, offering education, healthcare, leisure activities and reduced security features. The authorities and domestic courts explicitly assessed the best interests of the child, prioritizing family unity and limiting detention to the shortest period required. Distinguishing the case from relevant jurisprudence of the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the European Court of Human Rights regarding younger children, longer detention, substandard conditions and viable alternatives, the State Party submits that there was no violation of article 37, read alone or in conjunction with article 3, of the Convention.
E. 4.9 As regards the claims under article 16 of the Convention, the State Party first argues that the complaint about interference with family life does not raise any issues distinct from the claims raised under article 37 and therefore does not require separate examination. Nevertheless, it submits that there was no violation of article 16. The family remained together throughout the period of detention and was housed in the same accommodation, and family unity was expressly preserved. Even assuming that detention constituted interference with family life, the Government maintains that it was lawful, pursued the legitimate aim of preventing irregular migration and ensuring the execution of the transfer under the Dublin III Regulation, and was proportionate in light of the conditions and limited duration of detention.
E. 4.10 Concerning the claims under articles 5, 6 (2) and 12 of the Convention, the State Party submits that they were never raised before the domestic courts, either expressly or in substance. It therefore argues that these parts of the communication should be declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. In the alternative, it contends that they do not raise any issues separate from those already examined under articles 3 and 37 and do not, in any event, disclose any violation. Authors’ comments on the State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits
E. 5.1 On 2 December 2024, the authors submitted their comments on the State Party’s observations regarding the admissibility and merits of the communication.
E. 5.2 The authors emphasize that they cooperated fully with the authorities of the State Party at all stages. The parents consistently expressed regret for leaving Austria, willingness to return immediately and acceptance of the transfer under the Dublin III Regulation, even refraining from appealing the transfer decision. They provided information about the smuggler and offered material assistance to the police. In their view, nothing in their conduct justified the finding that they posed a risk of absconding. They also strongly contest the State Party’s portrayal of Bělá-Jezová as a child-appropriate facility, describing it instead as a remote, prison-like detention centre where there is fencing, razor wire, constant surveillance, restricted movement, confiscation of phones and money, limited communication with the outside world and little privacy. Families with children were not fully separated from other detainees, could not cook independently and remained subject to strict security regimes, which the authors argue created fear and distress, particularly for children.
E. 5.3 Regarding their own detention, the authors note that, for the first days, they were held in a building without access to the children’s centre or social support and that the first author, then aged 11, did not meaningfully attend school despite compulsory education requirements. Leisure activities outside the centre never occurred, and the possibility of outings was illusory. 4 See Constitutional Court, judgment III. ÚS 3289/14 of 10 May 2017, in which the Court assessed detention conditions for children at Bělá Jezová (paras. 58–60), and the Committee’s general comment No. 6 (2005) for exceptional circumstances permitting the deprivation of liberty of children in migration contexts (paras. 61–63). CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 6 GE.26-14839 The family was required to pay for its detention, resulting in significant expenses and ongoing debt, which the authors describe as humiliating. The detention had a serious emotional impact on all the family members: both daughters cried frequently, the minor daughter struggled to adapt and showed signs of distress, and the parents, who are illiterate, traumatized and unfamiliar with European systems, were unable to support their children adequately. The older daughter assumed an adult role as the family’s main communicator, adding further strain. The detention aggravated pre-existing trauma from Taliban persecution and their flight, causing anxiety, fear and helplessness incompatible with the rights and best interests of children under the Convention.
E. 5.4 The authors argue that there is a clear normative divide in international human rights law with respect to immigration detention of children. While United Nations treaty bodies, led by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, have consistently affirmed that immigration detention of children is inherently incompatible with the Convention and violates the best interests principle, European frameworks still formally permit child detention in narrowly defined exceptional circumstances. 5 States frequently rely on this lower threshold to normalize detention and dilute safeguards, such as the principle of last resort, the requirement that detention be of the shortest appropriate duration and the provision of genuinely child-friendly conditions.
E. 5.5 Relying on the Committee’s general comments, its joint general comments with the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families and its recent Views, the authors maintain that immigration detention of children is never permissible, not even as a measure of last resort, and that detention with parents for reasons of family unity remains incompatible with article 37 of the Convention.6 Detention is said to inherently harm children’s physical, mental and developmental well-being and therefore violates the best interests principle.
E. 5.6 The authors further argue that the Czech Republic knew or ought to have known of this standard well before the events at issue. Since at least 2011, multiple United Nations treaty bodies have repeatedly called on the State Party to end immigration detention of children, prohibit de facto detention with parents and ensure non-custodial alternatives.7 Despite this, detention of children continues as a routine practice rather than as an exceptional measure.
E. 5.7 The authors submit that the elder daughter should be recognized as a victim under the Convention because the Czech authorities failed to properly assess her age and wrongly treated her as an adult during detention. Although her Austrian identification card recorded her date of birth as 1 January 2001, the authors contend that this date was merely indicative. In the absence of precise information and official documentation, the Austrian authorities administratively recorded the date of birth as 1 January, a common practice in asylum procedures that may artificially increase a person’s recorded age. Given this context and her proximity to the age of majority, there was a real possibility that the elder daughter was still a minor at the time of detention, which should have triggered child-specific safeguards.8 5 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Report of the 2012 Day of General Discussion on the rights of all children in the context of international migration, para. 78; and European Court of Human Rights, A.M. and Others v. France, Application No. 24587/12, Judgment, 12 July 2016. 6 Joint general comment No. 3 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 22 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), paras. 5 and 11; joint general comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), paras. 7–12; E.H. et al. v. Belgium (CRC/C/89/D/55/2018), paras. 13.9–13.12. 7 CRC/C/CZE/CO/3-4, para. 66; CAT/C/CZE/CO/6, paras. 20 and 21; and CCPR/C/CZE/CO/4, paras. 28 and 29. 8 Joint general comment No. 3 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 22 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), paras. 5 and 11 (obligation to identify children promptly in migration procedures); and joint general comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), para. 3 (risk of diminished protection for children aged 15–18). CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 GE.26-14839 7
E. 5.8 The authors contend that the authorities should have conducted an age assessment ex officio, particularly in the light of strong indications that the recorded date of birth was approximate. By relying uncritically on the Austrian document and making no further inquiries, the authorities failed to apply international standards governing age determination, including the presumption of minority and the benefit of the doubt. This resulted in the fourth author being questioned, searched and detained under adult procedures, thereby depriving her of protection under the Convention.9
E. 5.9 In response to the State Party’s argument that the fourth author confirmed her age and raised the issue only at the constitutional stage, the authors stress their extreme vulnerability as undocumented asylum-seekers, their lack of legal awareness, language barriers and limited access to effective legal assistance during earlier proceedings. They submit that the duty to assess age rested with the authorities, particularly in migration-control contexts involving adolescents close to adulthood. By raising the issue before the Constitutional Court, the authors maintain that domestic remedies were sufficiently exhausted, in line with the Committee’s case law on the purpose of admissibility requirements.10
E. 5.10 The authors emphasize that children aged 15 to 18 are particularly at risk of misidentification and underprotection in migration contexts and that States must ensure prompt, child-friendly and culturally sensitive age-assessment procedures. In situations of residual uncertainty, individuals must be presumed to be minors and treated accordingly.11 The fourth author was, or should have been presumed to be, a minor at the time of detention and therefore qualifies as a victim of the alleged violations, rendering her complaints admissible.
E. 5.11 The authors dispute the relevance of the State Party’s argument that the conditions of detention were suitable for children. They submit that, as a matter of principle, no closed immigration detention centre can ever be appropriate for children, since such facilities are designed to deprive individuals of liberty. In their view, investing in the humanization of detention centres cannot substitute for the obligation to develop community-based, non-custodial alternatives. In any event, the authors reiterate that the actual conditions of detention and the restrictive regime aggravated the distress suffered by the first and fourth authors, contributing to anxiety, fear and humiliation. Third-party intervention
E. 6.1 On 5 October 2023, the International Commission of Jurists, the AIRE Centre, the Dutch Council for Refugees and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles submitted a third-party intervention, following the leave to intervene granted on 15 September 2023.
E. 6.2 The interveners argue that international law establishes an absolute prohibition on immigration detention of children, including when they are accompanied by their families, grounded in articles 3 and 37 of the Convention. Drawing on joint general comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), they stress that the “last resort” exception in article 37 (b) cannot apply in migration contexts, as detention is inherently incompatible with the child’s best interests. This position is reinforced by the Committee’s jurisprudence in the cases E.H. et al. v. Belgium and K.K. and R.H. v. Belgium,12 in which the Committee found violations of article 37, read alone and in conjunction with article 3 of the Convention, in cases involving the detention of children with their families. 9 Committee on the Rights of the Child, general comments No. 6 (2005), paras. 31 and 33 (duty to identify and protect children in migration contexts); and No. 7 (2005), para. 36 (benefit of the doubt and presumption of minority in age assessment). 10 Y.M. v. Spain (CRC/C/78/D/8/2016), paras. 8.2 and 8.3 (purposes of admissibility and exhaustion of domestic remedies). 11 Committee on the Rights of the Child, general comment No. 14 (2013), paras. 6 and 39 (best interests as a primary consideration, including in procedural decisions); and joint general comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), paras. 3 and 10 (age assessment, presumption of childhood, and heightened vulnerability). 12 See E.H. et al. v. Belgium and A.M.K. and S.K. v. Belgium (CRC/C/89/D/73/2019). CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 8 GE.26-14839
E. 6.3 The interveners situate this approach within broader international and regional standards, including the findings of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment13 that such detention is never necessary and may amount to ill-treatment, and the consistent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which has emphasized the extreme vulnerability of child migrants and has found that their detention often breaches article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights).14 The Court has further clarified that children’s best interests must prevail over migration control objectives, that detention is arbitrary where alternatives are not considered and that family unity cannot justify detention but instead requires non-custodial solutions for the entire family.15
E. 6.4 In parallel, the interveners emphasize that States are under a positive obligation to implement non-custodial, community-based alternatives to detention, consistent with the Committee’s standards, guarantees under the European Convention on Human Rights (arts. 3, 5 and 8) and European Union law requirements on necessity, proportionality and prior consideration of alternatives, as reflected in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.16 They also underline the centrality of procedural guarantees, including the child’s right to be heard under article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, access to information, and legal representation as essential components of any best interests determination and migration procedure.
E. 6.5 With respect to age assessment, the interveners submit that it must be strictly regulated, non-routine and guided by the presumption of minority and the benefit of the doubt, as affirmed in joint general comments No. 3 and No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 22 and No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017) and in the Committee’s jurisprudence involving Spain.17 They stress that age assessment should be undertaken where serious doubt persists, and must follow a holistic, multidisciplinary approach, rather than relying on intrusive and unreliable medical methods with wide margins of error. They cite the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Darboe and Camara v. Italy (2022) to confirm that the presumption of minority forms an integral part of the protection of private life under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and must be accompanied by robust procedural safeguards, including legal assistance and informed participation. The interveners also argue that flawed or unnecessary age assessments risk depriving children of their rights and exposing them to detention and other harm, thereby potentially resulting in violations of articles 3 and 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. State Party’s comments on the third-party intervention
E. 7.1 The State Party rejects the interveners’ assertion of an absolute prohibition on immigration detention of children, maintaining instead that article 37 of the Convention does not impose a categorical ban. It argues that the Committee’s own jurisprudence demonstrates the need for detention to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account factors such as the child’s age, the duration and conditions of the detention, the circumstances of the case and whether alternatives were considered. In the State Party’s view, detention may be compatible with the Convention if it is lawful, non-arbitrary, necessary, proportionate, limited in time and attentive to the child’s best interests. This interpretation, it submits, is consistent with broader international and regional law, including the jurisprudence of the 13 See A/HRC/28/68 and A/HRC/37/50. 14 European Court of Human Rights, Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, Application No. 13178/03, Judgment, 12 October 2006; Popov v. France, Applications No. 39472/07 and No. 39474/07, Judgment, 19 January 2012; Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, Application No. 41442/07, Judgment, 19 January 2010; and M.D. and A.D. v. France, Application No. 57035/18, Judgment, 22 July 2021. 15 European Court of Human Rights, Rahimi v. Greece, Application No. 8687/08, Judgment, 5 April 2011; and Popov v. France, paras. 140 and 141. 16 See, for example, Court of Justice of the European Union, C-528/15, Al Chodor. 17 See N.B.F. v. Spain (CRC/C/79/D/11/2017), A.L. v. Spain (CRC/C/81/D/16/2017), J.A.B. v. Spain (CRC/C/81/D/22/2017) and R.K. v. Spain (CRC/C/81/D/22/2017). CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 GE.26-14839 9 European Court of Human Rights and European Union standards, which also permit detention under strict safeguards rather than prohibiting it outright.
E. 7.2 Regarding alternatives to detention, the State Party accepts that States are obliged to consider non-custodial measures but contends that this obligation was fulfilled in the present case. It emphasizes that domestic courts do assess alternatives and may overturn detention decisions where this has not been done. However, in the authors’ situation, the authorities concluded, on the basis of their conduct and risk of absconding, that no less coercive measure would have been effective and that detention was therefore justified.
E. 7.3 On procedural rights, the State Party again challenges the admissibility of the claim under article 12 of the Convention, arguing non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and lack of substantiation. In any event, it submits that the right to be heard was respected: the adult authors were interviewed with interpretation services, the minor’s interests were represented by her father, the authors were legally represented throughout and they consented to written court proceedings.
E. 7.4 Lastly, on age assessment, the State Party broadly accepts the interveners’ general principles – that such procedures should not be routine and should only occur where doubts arise – but argues that these principles are irrelevant to the facts. It maintains that no age assessment was required because the fourth author consistently identified herself as being 18 years of age, and this was supported by the available documentation. Since no doubt existed as to her majority, the authorities had no obligation to apply the presumption of minority or conduct further verifications. The State Party therefore concludes that its approach was consistent with applicable standards and reiterates its position that the communication should be found inadmissible or, alternatively, be dismissed on the merits. Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility
E. 8.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 20 of its rules of procedure under the Optional Protocol, whether the claim is admissible under the Optional Protocol.
E. 8.2 The Committee notes the State Party’s argument that the fourth author cannot be considered a victim within the meaning of the Convention, as she had allegedly reached the age of majority at the time of the events. At the same time, the Committee notes the authors’ submission that, given the absence of reliable documentation, the identical recording of dates of birth for all the family members and their specific cultural background, the State Party should have conducted an age assessment ex officio and have applied the presumption of minority. The Committee also notes the authors’ argument that, given their vulnerability, language barriers and limited access to legal assistance, the issue of age determination could only be raised effectively at the constitutional stage. In these circumstances, and in the absence of any challenge by the State Party concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies in relation to this part of the complaint, the Committee considers that article 7 (e) does not constitute an obstacle to the admissibility of the authors’ claim regarding the fourth author.
E. 8.3 Regarding the authors’ claims under article 12 of the Convention relating to the fact that the first author has not been heard, the Committee notes that the authors challenged the detention decisions before the Regional Court, subsequently lodged a complaint in cassation with the Supreme Administrative Court and ultimately submitted a constitutional appeal before the Constitutional Court, which was dismissed. However, it also notes the State Party’s contention that the authors have not raised this allegation before the domestic courts, either expressly or in substance. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the authors have not exhausted available and effective domestic remedies within the meaning of article 7 (e) of the Optional Protocol in relation to this part of the complaint.
E. 8.4 The Committee notes the authors’ claims under articles 5, 6 (2) and 16 of the Convention. However, on the basis of the information before it, the Committee considers that the authors have not provided sufficient arguments or evidence to substantiate, for the purposes of admissibility, how the facts of the case would give rise to distinct violations of these provisions, beyond the claims already raised under articles 3, 12 and 37 of the CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 10 GE.26-14839 Convention. In particular, the Committee observes that the authors have failed to demonstrate how the family’s detention for 34 days would, in itself, have violated the first and fourth authors’ rights to development and family life. The authors have also failed to indicate how this detention would have amounted to a violation of the general provisions contained in article 5 of the Convention regarding the State Party’s duty to respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents. Accordingly, the Committee declares this part of the communication inadmissible under article 7 (f) of the Optional Protocol for lack of sufficient substantiation.
E. 8.5 However, the Committee considers that the authors’ claims under articles 3 and 37 (a) and (b) of the Convention, in relation to the de facto detention of the first and fourth authors for reasons related to their migration status and the decisions issued ordering the parents’ detention, have been sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility. Accordingly, it declares these claims admissible and proceeds to their consideration on the merits. Consideration of merits
E. 9.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 10 (1) of the Optional Protocol.
E. 9.2 The Committee notes the authors’ claims that the first and fourth authors were detained for 34 days in the Bělá-Jezová detention centre because of their and their parents’ migration status, in conditions incompatible with their needs and best interests, and that this detention caused them significant psychological harm. It further notes the State Party’s argument that the detention was lawful, necessary to prevent absconding and carried out in a facility suitable for families with children.
E. 9.3 The Committee recalls its jurisprudence according to which the detention of children because of their or their parents’ migration status constitutes a violation of children’s rights and is contrary to the principle of the best interests of the child, given the harm inherent in any deprivation of liberty and the negative impact that immigration detention can have on children’s physical and mental health and on their development. It also recalls that, in the context of migration, the possibility of deprivation of liberty as a measure of last resort is not applicable and that such deprivation of liberty is generally disproportionate and therefore arbitrary within the meaning of article 37 (b) of the Convention.18 In this light, the Committee has affirmed that children should never be detained for reasons related to their or their parents’ migration status and States should expeditiously and completely cease or eradicate the immigration detention of children and that any kind of child immigration detention should be forbidden by law and such prohibition should be fully implemented in practice.19
E. 9.4 In the present case, the Committee observes that the detention of the first and fourth authors was imposed on them de facto for the purpose of their transfer under the Dublin procedure and was thus based solely on their migration status. The Committee notes that, while the first author was not herself subject to a formal detention order, she and the fourth author were placed in a closed detention centre and faced the same restrictions as the adults held there, including restrictions on their movement. It further observes that their detention lasted 34 days and that the authors expressed their willingness to return voluntarily to Austria. The Committee notes that the assessment conducted by the domestic authorities focused primarily on the preservation of family unity and the alleged suitability of detention conditions. However, the Committee recalls that, where the best interests of the child require maintaining family unity, this does not justify the detention of the child but rather requires the adoption of non-custodial solutions applicable to the family as a whole.20
E. 9.5 The Committee notes that the authorities’ assessment of the best interests of the child was limited and did not address the inherent harm of detention on children or meaningfully 18 E.H. et al. v. Belgium, paras. 13.9–13.12; and A.M.K. and S.K. v. Belgium, paras. 10.9–10.11. 19 Joint general comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017) on State obligations regarding the human rights of children in the context of international migration in countries of origin, transit, destination and return, para. 5. 20 Ibid., para. 11. CRC/C/101/D/193/2022 GE.26-14839 11 consider non-custodial measures that could also preserve family unity or demonstrate how the children’s interests were weighed against other considerations, as required under article 3 of the Convention.
E. 9.6 In these circumstances, the Committee finds that the children’s deprivation of liberty amounted to arbitrary detention in violation of article 37 (b) of the Convention, read alone and in conjunction with article 3. Taking into account the harm inherent in the deprivation of liberty of children and its negative impact on their physical and mental well-being and development, the Committee further considers that such detention, in the circumstances of the present case, is incompatible with article 37 (a) of the Convention.
E. 9.7 The Committee notes the authors’ claim that the State Party failed to properly assess the age of the fourth author, treating her as an adult without conducting an age assessment procedure despite indications that she may have been a child, as her date of birth was approximate. It recalls that States Parties have an obligation to promptly identify children in migration contexts and to ensure that, where there is reasonable doubt as to age, the individual is afforded the benefit of the doubt and treated as a minor pending appropriate assessment. The Committee observes that the entire family’s dates of birth were recorded identically and that no additional steps were taken to verify the age of the fourth author. It considers that these circumstances should have prompted the authorities to conduct a more thorough and culturally sensitive age assessment. By failing to do so and apply the presumption of minority, the State Party deprived the fourth author of the protection measures guaranteed to children under the Convention, including safeguards related to deprivation of liberty and the assessment of her best interests. The Committee therefore concludes that the State Party violated the rights of the fourth author under article 3 of the Convention, read in conjunction with article 37.
E. 9.8 The Committee, acting under article 10 (5) of the Optional Protocol on a communications procedure, finds that the facts before it disclose a violation of articles 3 and 37 (a) and (b) of the Convention with regard to the first and fourth authors.
E. 10 The State Party should therefore provide the first and fourth authors with effective reparation for the violations suffered, including by reimbursing the cost of their detention. The State Party is also under an obligation to prevent similar violations in the future. The State Party should: (a) Ensure that children are not deprived of their liberty due to their or their parents’ migration status and that non-custodial solutions are available to preserve family unity; (b) Ensure that, when there is reasonable doubt about a person’s age, a prompt, child-sensitive and culturally appropriate age assessment is conducted, with the benefit of the doubt and the presumption of minority applied pending its outcome.
E. 11 In accordance with article 11 of the Optional Protocol, the Committee wishes to receive from the State Party, as soon as possible and within 180 days, information about the measures it has taken to give effect to the Committee’s Views. The State Party is requested to include information about such measures in its reports to the Committee under article 44 of the Convention. The State Party is also requested to publish the present Views and to disseminate them widely.
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.26-14839 (E) 011126 031126
Committee on the Rights of the Child
Views adopted by the Committee under the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a
communications procedure, concerning communication
No. 193/2022*, **
Communication submitted by:
Jas.K.B., C.K.B., M.S.B. and J.K.B. (represented
by counsel Maroš Matiaško, Zuzana Pavelková
and Alexandra Dubová)
Alleged victims:
Jas.K.B and J.K.B.
State Party:
Czechia
Date of communication:
22 June 2022 (initial submission)
Date of adoption of Views
14 September 2026
Subject matter:
Child held with her parents and older sister in an
immigration detention centre instead of an open
reception facility for asylum-seekers
Procedural issue:
Lack of substantiation
Substantive issues:
Best interests of the child; deprivation of liberty
Articles of the Convention:
3, 5, 6 (2), 12, 16 and 37 (a) and (b)
Articles of the Optional Protocol:
7 (e) and (f)
1.
The authors of the communication are Jas.K.B. (first author), born in 2008, her parents,
C.K.B. (second author) and M.S.B. (third author), and her older sister J.K.B. (fourth author),
born in 2001, all Afghan nationals belonging to the Sikh religion. The authors claim a
violation by the State Party of the first and fourth authors’ rights under articles 3, 5, 6 (2), 12,
16 and 37 (a) and (b) of the Convention. The authors are represented by counsel. The Optional
Protocol entered into force for the State Party on 2 March 2016.
Facts as submitted by the authors
2.1
In January 2016, the authors fled Afghanistan due to Taliban attacks and threats of
forced conversion and of kidnapping against the children. On an unspecified date in
January 2016, the family claimed asylum in Austria. Pending a decision on their application
for asylum, the family was housed in a metal container. Dissatisfied with this situation, the
* Adopted by the Committee at its 101st session (1–28 September 2026).
** The following members of the Committee participated in the consideration of the communication:
Suzanne Aho, Thuwayba Al Barwani, Hynd Ayoubi Idrissi, Mary Beloff, Timothy Ekesa,
Bragi Gudbrandsson, Mariana Ianachevici, Philip Jaffé, Sophie Kiladze, Cephas Lumina, Benyam
Dawit Mezmur, Juliana Scerri Ferrante, Aïssatou Alassane Sidikou, Zeinebou Taleb Moussa and
Benoit Van Keirsbilck.
United Nations
CRC/C/101/D/193/2022
Convention on the
Rights of the Child
Distr.: General
3 November 2026
Original: English
CRC/C/101/D/193/2022
2
GE.26-14839
family left Austria to travel to Germany on 16 March 2019, with the help of smugglers. On
17 March 2019, the family arrived in Czechia, where the smugglers kept them locked in a
cottage located near the German border. On 20 March 2019, the family was found by the
Czech police.
2.2
On 21 March 2019, the adult authors were detained for 30 days, on the basis of
decisions of the Regional Police Directorate of the Ústí Region, for the purpose of preparing
their transfer to Austria, which was designated as the responsible State to assess their
application for asylum under the Dublin III Regulation. The family was not presented with
any feasible alternative to detention or with accommodation in the semi-open facility for
asylum-seekers. The first author was not formally detained but was accommodated in the
Bělá-Jezová detention facility with her family.
2.3
The police recorded 1 January as the date of birth for each family member in their
respective birth year, the effect of which was to recognize the author’s sister, who was born
in 2001, as having attained the age of majority, and thereby denying the rights guaranteed to
her under the Convention.
2.4
On 9 April 2019, the Ministry of the Interior issued a decision on the family’s return
to Austria. The authorities extended the family’s detention by an additional 20 days. On
24 April 2019, the family was returned to Austria. Prior to being returned, the authority
operating the detention centre extracted partial payment from the family for costs incurred
during their detention, in the amount of 34,684 korunas (CZK) (approximately $1,500), with
an outstanding debt of CZK 8,228 (approximately $350).
2.5
On 3 April 2019, the authors challenged the detention decisions in a joint action before
the Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem, arguing that the first author should not have been
detained. The authors maintained that their deprivation of liberty did not meet the conditions
laid down by law, in particular regarding their conduct (there was no serious risk of
absconding arising from their conduct, as they had cooperated with authorities, had not
resisted transfer and had even expressed willingness to return to Austria), and the available
alternatives to detention (the authorities should have considered less coercive measures, such
as placement in a reception centre, instead of detention), and noted the incompatibility of
detaining a family for immigration reasons with the best interests of the child (de facto
detention of a child and failure to prioritize child protection). On 15 April 2019, the Regional
Court dismissed their action.
2.6
On 7 May 2019, the authors filed an appeal against this decision, which they
supplemented on 7 February 2020. In their appeal (complaint in cassation) to the Supreme
Administrative Court, the authors reiterated and developed the arguments they had already
raised, focusing mainly on family life (the decision interfered with their right to a family life,
given that it involved a family with children), detention conditions (conditions in the
Bělá-Jezová detention facility were inappropriate, especially for children), the suitability of
detention (the detention facility was not an appropriate place for a family with a minor child)
and the failure to use an alternative (the reception centre). The Supreme Administrative Court
dismissed the appeal on 17 April 2020, finding that the authors raised general and
hypothetical objections about their detention and had failed to sufficiently substantiate
individual harm.
2.7
The authors appealed further to the Constitutional Court on 22 June 2020, which
dismissed the appeal on 22 June 2021. At this stage of the proceedings, the authors also
brought the specific claim that the older daughter was legally still a minor (17 years old) at
the time of the detention.
Complaint
3.1
The first author maintains that the State Party has violated her rights under articles 3,
5, 6 (2), 12, 16 and 37 (a) and (b) of the Convention by detaining her for 34 days and by
failing to consider alternatives to closed detention. She claims that detention was imposed
solely based on the family’s migration status and for the purpose of a transfer under the
Dublin III Regulation, without being motivated by, or compatible with, the best interests of
the child. The authorities failed to treat her best interests as a primary consideration, limiting
their assessment to the detention conditions and the preservation of family unity, without a
CRC/C/101/D/193/2022
GE.26-14839
3
genuine evaluation of the impact of detention on her physical, psychological and emotional
well-being, development and rights. They further failed to consider non-custodial alternatives,
such as voluntary return, financial guarantees or placement in an open reception facility,
resorting instead to the most restrictive measure.
3.2
The first author argues that her detention amounted to inhuman and degrading
treatment within the meaning of article 37 (a) of the Convention, given the inherent harm
caused by the deprivation of liberty of children, the length of the detention and the prison-like
environment. She submits that immigration detention of children is incompatible per se with
the Convention, regardless of accompanying conditions, and that her detention caused her
distress, fear and harm exceeding the minimum threshold of severity. She also claims a
violation of article 37 (b), arguing that her deprivation of liberty was arbitrary and excessively
long and was not used as a measure of last resort or carried out with due diligence, particularly
given the family’s cooperation and willingness to return to Austria. Once there was no risk
of absconding, the continued detention amounted to detention in bad faith.
3.3
The first author further claims that she was subjected to violations of her rights to
liberty, family life and development and that her views were never sought, contrary to
article 12 of the Convention. The judicial review of her detention was procedurally deficient
due to a limited and formalistic assessment of the best interests of the child and the absence
of any meaningful opportunity for her to express her views. The detention can also be
considered punitive in nature, including due to the costs incurred by the family. Lastly, she
argues that her case reflects the systemic issue of the routine detention of migrant families
with children in the State Party.
3.4
In addition, the authors argue a violation of the elder sister’s (fourth author’s) right to
benefit from the guarantees of the Convention. They submit that she was wrongly treated as
an adult due to an inadequate and inaccurate age determination process, notwithstanding her
proximity to the age of majority and the possibility that she was a minor. As a result, she was
excluded from child-specific safeguards, including the assessment of her best interests and
the right to be heard. The authors contend that, given her vulnerability, dependency on her
parents and transitional stage of development, she should have been afforded protection
equivalent to that granted to children and that her detention also gave rise to the same
violations of articles 3, 5, 6 (2), 12, 16 and 37 of the Convention.
State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits
4.1
On 2 February 2023, the State Party explained that the authors were apprehended on
its territory in March 2019 without valid travel documents or residency permits, despite
having pending asylum claims in Austria. Their statements confirmed that they had
voluntarily left Austria, where they had lived in a reception centre and were receiving
schooling and social benefits, intending to travel irregularly to Germany with the help of
smugglers. On this basis, the police initiated the transfer procedure under the Dublin III
Regulation and ordered the detention of the adult family members under the Act on the
Residence of Foreign Nationals, citing a well-founded risk of absconding given their previous
disregard of asylum-related obligations and their attempts to transit illegally. The authorities
found that no less coercive measures (e.g. reporting duties or financial guarantees) could be
effectively applied because the family had no place of residence in Czechia and no intention
of remaining there. The minor child was not formally detained, but the parents requested her
placement with them; therefore, the family was accommodated together in the Bělá-Jezová
detention centre, the only closed facility suitable for families with children.
4.2
The Regional Court upheld the detention, finding that the decisions had adequately
considered the best interests of the child, primarily by preserving family unity, and that the
Bělá-Jezová facility offered tailored conditions, including access to schooling, medical care
and psychological assistance, and reduced security elements. The Regional Court found that
the reception centre was not a realistic alternative because its use for detained families had
been only an emergency response during the migration crisis, which was no longer relevant
and therefore the exceptional practice should not continue, and standard detention in
Bělá-Jezová was considered sufficient and appropriate. The detention was extended to allow
completion of the transfer procedure and lasted a total of 34 days, after which the family was
transferred to Austria, where they were later granted international protection. The State Party
CRC/C/101/D/193/2022
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GE.26-14839
submits that the authorities acted lawfully, proportionately and in compliance with the child’s
best interests as interpreted in international jurisprudence.1
4.3
As to the cassation and constitutional proceedings, the State Party submits that the
Supreme Administrative Court rejected the authors’ complaint in cassation after finding that
the authorities had duly established that no less restrictive measure than detention could
ensure the family’s availability for their transfer to Austria under the Dublin III Regulation.
Although acknowledging that the minor child had de facto been deprived of liberty, the Court
held that this resulted inevitably from the detention of her parents, as no lawful alternative
accommodation existed for a child in their situation. The Court endorsed the reasoning that
placement in an open reception centre was legally impossible because the family were not
asylum-seekers in Czechia and deemed the authors’ objections regarding the facility’s
security features unsubstantiated. It upheld the finding that the Bělá-Jezová centre was the
only facility suitable for families with children and that the authorities had complied with the
strict requirements governing the detention of minors, examining their best interests and
concluding that family unity and the lack of viable alternatives justified their placement.2
4.4
The Constitutional Court subsequently dismissed the authors’ constitutional appeal as
manifestly unfounded, determining that the detention was neither arbitrary nor
disproportionate. It affirmed that the serious risk of absconding had been sufficiently
demonstrated by the authors’ prior conduct – leaving Austria where they had stable reception
conditions and attempting to reach Germany irregularly – and that this justified detention as
a last resort. The Court accepted that the best interests of the child had been adequately
considered, including by maintaining family unity and placing the family in a facility
specifically adapted to children. It found no incompatibility with European Court of Human
Rights case law, distinguishing the present case from precedents where violations were linked
to prolonged detention or grossly inadequate conditions and concluding that the relatively
short duration and suitable environment at Bělá-Jezová did not meet that threshold.3
4.5
The State Party has provided an overview of the relevant domestic law. Czech law
empowers the police to detain foreign nationals who have entered or remained in the country
irregularly, though initial police detention cannot exceed 48 hours. The Act on the Residence
of Foreign Nationals sets conditions for lawful stay, provides for alternatives to detention,
such as reporting duties or financial guarantees, and restricts their use where the individual
intends to abscond or cannot provide an address. Detention for persons subject to transfer
under the Dublin III Regulation requires a serious risk of absconding, defined with reference
to prior conduct, illegal stay, attempts to evade transfer or incapacity to depart voluntarily;
families with children may be detained for up to 90 days. The law also regulates material
standards in detention centres, including accommodation, medical care, schooling and
child-specific activities.
4.6
Domestic jurisprudence confirms that minors may exceptionally be detained with
their parents in migration contexts when no adequate alternative exists and when family unity
and the child’s best interests are duly considered. In particular, the Constitutional Court, in a
2017 judgment, upheld the placement of young children at Bělá-Jezová, finding that the
facility was suitable for families, that conditions there did not amount to ill-treatment and
1 See, for example, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, in which the European Court of Human Rights emphasized
the need for individualized assessment of risks to children and the adequacy of reception conditions in
transfer or detention contexts (Application No. 29217/12, Judgment, 4 November 2014, paras. 118–
122).
2 For example, in its general comment No. 6 (2005), the Committee required a demonstration that a
child’s detention was a measure of last resort and that suitable care arrangements had been duly
considered (paras. 61–63).
3 In Kanagaratnam and Others v. Belgium, the European Court of Human Rights found distinct
violations arising from poor conditions, family separation and extended detention periods
(Application No. 15297/09, Judgment, 13 December 2011, paras. 64–69), and, in Abdullahi Elmi and
Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, it emphasized that violations typically arose from either excessive duration
or clearly inadequate conditions in facilities unsuited to children (Applications No. 25794/13 and
No. 28151/13, Judgment, 22 November 2016, paras. 107–110).
CRC/C/101/D/193/2022
GE.26-14839
5
that detention, though not ideal, did not violate constitutional or international prohibitions on
degrading treatment in such circumstances.4
4.7
The State Party maintains that the Convention does not apply to the fourth author as
she was already 18 at the time of detention, a fact consistently confirmed by official
documents, the authors’ own statements and uncontested domestic proceedings.
4.8
As regards the first author, the State Party submits that her 34-day detention complied
with article 37 of the Convention, as it was lawful, non-arbitrary, strictly necessary to prevent
absconding under the Dublin procedure, and imposed only after an assessment of alternatives,
none of which were feasible. The detention took place in a facility specifically adapted for
families with children, offering education, healthcare, leisure activities and reduced security
features. The authorities and domestic courts explicitly assessed the best interests of the child,
prioritizing family unity and limiting detention to the shortest period required. Distinguishing
the case from relevant jurisprudence of the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the
European Court of Human Rights regarding younger children, longer detention, substandard
conditions and viable alternatives, the State Party submits that there was no violation of
article 37, read alone or in conjunction with article 3, of the Convention.
4.9
As regards the claims under article 16 of the Convention, the State Party first argues
that the complaint about interference with family life does not raise any issues distinct from
the claims raised under article 37 and therefore does not require separate examination.
Nevertheless, it submits that there was no violation of article 16. The family remained
together throughout the period of detention and was housed in the same accommodation, and
family unity was expressly preserved. Even assuming that detention constituted interference
with family life, the Government maintains that it was lawful, pursued the legitimate aim of
preventing irregular migration and ensuring the execution of the transfer under the Dublin III
Regulation, and was proportionate in light of the conditions and limited duration of detention.
4.10
Concerning the claims under articles 5, 6 (2) and 12 of the Convention, the State Party
submits that they were never raised before the domestic courts, either expressly or in
substance. It therefore argues that these parts of the communication should be declared
inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. In the alternative, it contends that they
do not raise any issues separate from those already examined under articles 3 and 37 and do
not, in any event, disclose any violation.
Authors’ comments on the State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits
5.1
On 2 December 2024, the authors submitted their comments on the State Party’s
observations regarding the admissibility and merits of the communication.
5.2
The authors emphasize that they cooperated fully with the authorities of the State
Party at all stages. The parents consistently expressed regret for leaving Austria, willingness
to return immediately and acceptance of the transfer under the Dublin III Regulation, even
refraining from appealing the transfer decision. They provided information about the
smuggler and offered material assistance to the police. In their view, nothing in their conduct
justified the finding that they posed a risk of absconding. They also strongly contest the State
Party’s portrayal of Bělá-Jezová as a child-appropriate facility, describing it instead as a
remote, prison-like detention centre where there is fencing, razor wire, constant surveillance,
restricted movement, confiscation of phones and money, limited communication with the
outside world and little privacy. Families with children were not fully separated from other
detainees, could not cook independently and remained subject to strict security regimes,
which the authors argue created fear and distress, particularly for children.
5.3
Regarding their own detention, the authors note that, for the first days, they were held
in a building without access to the children’s centre or social support and that the first author,
then aged 11, did not meaningfully attend school despite compulsory education requirements.
Leisure activities outside the centre never occurred, and the possibility of outings was illusory.
4 See Constitutional Court, judgment III. ÚS 3289/14 of 10 May 2017, in which the Court assessed
detention conditions for children at Bělá Jezová (paras. 58–60), and the Committee’s general
comment No. 6 (2005) for exceptional circumstances permitting the deprivation of liberty of children
in migration contexts (paras. 61–63).
CRC/C/101/D/193/2022
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GE.26-14839
The family was required to pay for its detention, resulting in significant expenses and ongoing
debt, which the authors describe as humiliating. The detention had a serious emotional impact
on all the family members: both daughters cried frequently, the minor daughter struggled to
adapt and showed signs of distress, and the parents, who are illiterate, traumatized and
unfamiliar with European systems, were unable to support their children adequately. The
older daughter assumed an adult role as the family’s main communicator, adding further
strain. The detention aggravated pre-existing trauma from Taliban persecution and their flight,
causing anxiety, fear and helplessness incompatible with the rights and best interests of
children under the Convention.
5.4
The authors argue that there is a clear normative divide in international human rights
law with respect to immigration detention of children. While United Nations treaty bodies,
led by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, have consistently affirmed that immigration
detention of children is inherently incompatible with the Convention and violates the best
interests principle, European frameworks still formally permit child detention in narrowly
defined exceptional circumstances. 5 States frequently rely on this lower threshold to
normalize detention and dilute safeguards, such as the principle of last resort, the requirement
that detention be of the shortest appropriate duration and the provision of genuinely
child-friendly conditions.
5.5
Relying on the Committee’s general comments, its joint general comments with the
Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families and its recent Views, the authors maintain that immigration detention of children is
never permissible, not even as a measure of last resort, and that detention with parents for
reasons of family unity remains incompatible with article 37 of the Convention.6 Detention
is said to inherently harm children’s physical, mental and developmental well-being and
therefore violates the best interests principle.
5.6
The authors further argue that the Czech Republic knew or ought to have known of
this standard well before the events at issue. Since at least 2011, multiple United Nations
treaty bodies have repeatedly called on the State Party to end immigration detention of
children, prohibit de facto detention with parents and ensure non-custodial alternatives.7
Despite this, detention of children continues as a routine practice rather than as an exceptional
measure.
5.7
The authors submit that the elder daughter should be recognized as a victim under the
Convention because the Czech authorities failed to properly assess her age and wrongly
treated her as an adult during detention. Although her Austrian identification card recorded
her date of birth as 1 January 2001, the authors contend that this date was merely indicative.
In the absence of precise information and official documentation, the Austrian authorities
administratively recorded the date of birth as 1 January, a common practice in asylum
procedures that may artificially increase a person’s recorded age. Given this context and her
proximity to the age of majority, there was a real possibility that the elder daughter was still
a minor at the time of detention, which should have triggered child-specific safeguards.8
5 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Report of the 2012 Day of General Discussion on the rights of
all children in the context of international migration, para. 78; and European Court of Human Rights,
A.M. and Others v. France, Application No. 24587/12, Judgment, 12 July 2016.
6 Joint general comment No. 3 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 22 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017),
paras. 5 and 11; joint general comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child
(2017), paras. 7–12; E.H. et al. v. Belgium (CRC/C/89/D/55/2018), paras. 13.9–13.12.
7 CRC/C/CZE/CO/3-4, para. 66; CAT/C/CZE/CO/6, paras. 20 and 21; and CCPR/C/CZE/CO/4,
paras. 28 and 29.
8 Joint general comment No. 3 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 22 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017),
paras. 5 and 11 (obligation to identify children promptly in migration procedures); and joint general
comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), para. 3 (risk
of diminished protection for children aged 15–18).
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GE.26-14839
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5.8
The authors contend that the authorities should have conducted an age assessment ex
officio, particularly in the light of strong indications that the recorded date of birth was
approximate. By relying uncritically on the Austrian document and making no further
inquiries, the authorities failed to apply international standards governing age determination,
including the presumption of minority and the benefit of the doubt. This resulted in the fourth
author being questioned, searched and detained under adult procedures, thereby depriving
her of protection under the Convention.9
5.9
In response to the State Party’s argument that the fourth author confirmed her age and
raised the issue only at the constitutional stage, the authors stress their extreme vulnerability
as undocumented asylum-seekers, their lack of legal awareness, language barriers and limited
access to effective legal assistance during earlier proceedings. They submit that the duty to
assess age rested with the authorities, particularly in migration-control contexts involving
adolescents close to adulthood. By raising the issue before the Constitutional Court, the
authors maintain that domestic remedies were sufficiently exhausted, in line with the
Committee’s case law on the purpose of admissibility requirements.10
5.10
The authors emphasize that children aged 15 to 18 are particularly at risk of
misidentification and underprotection in migration contexts and that States must ensure
prompt, child-friendly and culturally sensitive age-assessment procedures. In situations of
residual uncertainty, individuals must be presumed to be minors and treated accordingly.11
The fourth author was, or should have been presumed to be, a minor at the time of detention
and therefore qualifies as a victim of the alleged violations, rendering her complaints
admissible.
5.11
The authors dispute the relevance of the State Party’s argument that the conditions of
detention were suitable for children. They submit that, as a matter of principle, no closed
immigration detention centre can ever be appropriate for children, since such facilities are
designed to deprive individuals of liberty. In their view, investing in the humanization of
detention centres cannot substitute for the obligation to develop community-based,
non-custodial alternatives. In any event, the authors reiterate that the actual conditions of
detention and the restrictive regime aggravated the distress suffered by the first and fourth
authors, contributing to anxiety, fear and humiliation.
Third-party intervention
6.1
On 5 October 2023, the International Commission of Jurists, the AIRE Centre, the
Dutch Council for Refugees and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles submitted a
third-party intervention, following the leave to intervene granted on 15 September 2023.
6.2
The interveners argue that international law establishes an absolute prohibition on
immigration detention of children, including when they are accompanied by their families,
grounded in articles 3 and 37 of the Convention. Drawing on joint general comment No. 4 of
the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), they stress that the “last
resort” exception in article 37 (b) cannot apply in migration contexts, as detention is
inherently incompatible with the child’s best interests. This position is reinforced by the
Committee’s jurisprudence in the cases E.H. et al. v. Belgium and K.K. and R.H. v. Belgium,12
in which the Committee found violations of article 37, read alone and in conjunction with
article 3 of the Convention, in cases involving the detention of children with their families.
9 Committee on the Rights of the Child, general comments No. 6 (2005), paras. 31 and 33 (duty to
identify and protect children in migration contexts); and No. 7 (2005), para. 36 (benefit of the doubt
and presumption of minority in age assessment).
10 Y.M. v. Spain (CRC/C/78/D/8/2016), paras. 8.2 and 8.3 (purposes of admissibility and exhaustion of
domestic remedies).
11 Committee on the Rights of the Child, general comment No. 14 (2013), paras. 6 and 39 (best interests
as a primary consideration, including in procedural decisions); and joint general comment No. 4 of
the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), paras. 3 and 10 (age assessment,
presumption of childhood, and heightened vulnerability).
12 See E.H. et al. v. Belgium and A.M.K. and S.K. v. Belgium (CRC/C/89/D/73/2019).
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6.3
The interveners situate this approach within broader international and regional
standards, including the findings of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment13 that such detention is never necessary and
may amount to ill-treatment, and the consistent jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights, which has emphasized the extreme vulnerability of child migrants and has
found that their detention often breaches article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights).14 The
Court has further clarified that children’s best interests must prevail over migration control
objectives, that detention is arbitrary where alternatives are not considered and that family
unity cannot justify detention but instead requires non-custodial solutions for the entire
family.15
6.4
In parallel, the interveners emphasize that States are under a positive obligation to
implement non-custodial, community-based alternatives to detention, consistent with the
Committee’s standards, guarantees under the European Convention on Human Rights (arts. 3,
5 and 8) and European Union law requirements on necessity, proportionality and prior
consideration of alternatives, as reflected in the case law of the Court of Justice of the
European Union.16 They also underline the centrality of procedural guarantees, including the
child’s right to be heard under article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, access
to information, and legal representation as essential components of any best interests
determination and migration procedure.
6.5
With respect to age assessment, the interveners submit that it must be strictly regulated,
non-routine and guided by the presumption of minority and the benefit of the doubt, as
affirmed in joint general comments No. 3 and No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 22 and No. 23 of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017) and in the Committee’s jurisprudence involving
Spain.17 They stress that age assessment should be undertaken where serious doubt persists,
and must follow a holistic, multidisciplinary approach, rather than relying on intrusive and
unreliable medical methods with wide margins of error. They cite the judgment of the
European Court of Human Rights in Darboe and Camara v. Italy (2022) to confirm that the
presumption of minority forms an integral part of the protection of private life under article 8
of the European Convention on Human Rights and must be accompanied by robust
procedural safeguards, including legal assistance and informed participation. The interveners
also argue that flawed or unnecessary age assessments risk depriving children of their rights
and exposing them to detention and other harm, thereby potentially resulting in violations of
articles 3 and 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
State Party’s comments on the third-party intervention
7.1
The State Party rejects the interveners’ assertion of an absolute prohibition on
immigration detention of children, maintaining instead that article 37 of the Convention does
not impose a categorical ban. It argues that the Committee’s own jurisprudence demonstrates
the need for detention to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account factors such
as the child’s age, the duration and conditions of the detention, the circumstances of the case
and whether alternatives were considered. In the State Party’s view, detention may be
compatible with the Convention if it is lawful, non-arbitrary, necessary, proportionate,
limited in time and attentive to the child’s best interests. This interpretation, it submits, is
consistent with broader international and regional law, including the jurisprudence of the
13 See A/HRC/28/68 and A/HRC/37/50.
14 European Court of Human Rights, Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, Application
No. 13178/03, Judgment, 12 October 2006; Popov v. France, Applications No. 39472/07 and
No. 39474/07, Judgment, 19 January 2012; Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, Application
No. 41442/07, Judgment, 19 January 2010; and M.D. and A.D. v. France, Application No. 57035/18,
Judgment, 22 July 2021.
15 European Court of Human Rights, Rahimi v. Greece, Application No. 8687/08, Judgment, 5 April
2011; and Popov v. France, paras. 140 and 141.
16 See, for example, Court of Justice of the European Union, C-528/15, Al Chodor.
17 See N.B.F. v. Spain (CRC/C/79/D/11/2017), A.L. v. Spain (CRC/C/81/D/16/2017), J.A.B. v. Spain
(CRC/C/81/D/22/2017) and R.K. v. Spain (CRC/C/81/D/22/2017).
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GE.26-14839
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European Court of Human Rights and European Union standards, which also permit
detention under strict safeguards rather than prohibiting it outright.
7.2
Regarding alternatives to detention, the State Party accepts that States are obliged to
consider non-custodial measures but contends that this obligation was fulfilled in the present
case. It emphasizes that domestic courts do assess alternatives and may overturn detention
decisions where this has not been done. However, in the authors’ situation, the authorities
concluded, on the basis of their conduct and risk of absconding, that no less coercive measure
would have been effective and that detention was therefore justified.
7.3
On procedural rights, the State Party again challenges the admissibility of the claim
under article 12 of the Convention, arguing non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and lack of
substantiation. In any event, it submits that the right to be heard was respected: the adult
authors were interviewed with interpretation services, the minor’s interests were represented
by her father, the authors were legally represented throughout and they consented to written
court proceedings.
7.4
Lastly, on age assessment, the State Party broadly accepts the interveners’ general
principles – that such procedures should not be routine and should only occur where doubts
arise – but argues that these principles are irrelevant to the facts. It maintains that no age
assessment was required because the fourth author consistently identified herself as being
18 years of age, and this was supported by the available documentation. Since no doubt
existed as to her majority, the authorities had no obligation to apply the presumption of
minority or conduct further verifications. The State Party therefore concludes that its
approach was consistent with applicable standards and reiterates its position that the
communication should be found inadmissible or, alternatively, be dismissed on the merits.
Issues and proceedings before the Committee
Consideration of admissibility
8.1
Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must
decide, in accordance with rule 20 of its rules of procedure under the Optional Protocol,
whether the claim is admissible under the Optional Protocol.
8.2
The Committee notes the State Party’s argument that the fourth author cannot be
considered a victim within the meaning of the Convention, as she had allegedly reached the
age of majority at the time of the events. At the same time, the Committee notes the authors’
submission that, given the absence of reliable documentation, the identical recording of dates
of birth for all the family members and their specific cultural background, the State Party
should have conducted an age assessment ex officio and have applied the presumption of
minority. The Committee also notes the authors’ argument that, given their vulnerability,
language barriers and limited access to legal assistance, the issue of age determination could
only be raised effectively at the constitutional stage. In these circumstances, and in the
absence of any challenge by the State Party concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies
in relation to this part of the complaint, the Committee considers that article 7 (e) does not
constitute an obstacle to the admissibility of the authors’ claim regarding the fourth author.
8.3
Regarding the authors’ claims under article 12 of the Convention relating to the fact
that the first author has not been heard, the Committee notes that the authors challenged the
detention decisions before the Regional Court, subsequently lodged a complaint in cassation
with the Supreme Administrative Court and ultimately submitted a constitutional appeal
before the Constitutional Court, which was dismissed. However, it also notes the State Party’s
contention that the authors have not raised this allegation before the domestic courts, either
expressly or in substance. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the authors have not
exhausted available and effective domestic remedies within the meaning of article 7 (e) of
the Optional Protocol in relation to this part of the complaint.
8.4
The Committee notes the authors’ claims under articles 5, 6 (2) and 16 of the
Convention. However, on the basis of the information before it, the Committee considers that
the authors have not provided sufficient arguments or evidence to substantiate, for the
purposes of admissibility, how the facts of the case would give rise to distinct violations of
these provisions, beyond the claims already raised under articles 3, 12 and 37 of the
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Convention. In particular, the Committee observes that the authors have failed to demonstrate
how the family’s detention for 34 days would, in itself, have violated the first and fourth
authors’ rights to development and family life. The authors have also failed to indicate how
this detention would have amounted to a violation of the general provisions contained in
article 5 of the Convention regarding the State Party’s duty to respect the responsibilities,
rights and duties of parents. Accordingly, the Committee declares this part of the
communication inadmissible under article 7 (f) of the Optional Protocol for lack of sufficient
substantiation.
8.5
However, the Committee considers that the authors’ claims under articles 3 and 37 (a)
and (b) of the Convention, in relation to the de facto detention of the first and fourth authors
for reasons related to their migration status and the decisions issued ordering the parents’
detention, have been sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility. Accordingly,
it declares these claims admissible and proceeds to their consideration on the merits.
Consideration of merits
9.1
The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information
made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 10 (1) of the Optional Protocol.
9.2
The Committee notes the authors’ claims that the first and fourth authors were
detained for 34 days in the Bělá-Jezová detention centre because of their and their parents’
migration status, in conditions incompatible with their needs and best interests, and that this
detention caused them significant psychological harm. It further notes the State Party’s
argument that the detention was lawful, necessary to prevent absconding and carried out in a
facility suitable for families with children.
9.3
The Committee recalls its jurisprudence according to which the detention of children
because of their or their parents’ migration status constitutes a violation of children’s rights
and is contrary to the principle of the best interests of the child, given the harm inherent in
any deprivation of liberty and the negative impact that immigration detention can have on
children’s physical and mental health and on their development. It also recalls that, in the
context of migration, the possibility of deprivation of liberty as a measure of last resort is not
applicable and that such deprivation of liberty is generally disproportionate and therefore
arbitrary within the meaning of article 37 (b) of the Convention.18 In this light, the Committee
has affirmed that children should never be detained for reasons related to their or their parents’
migration status and States should expeditiously and completely cease or eradicate the
immigration detention of children and that any kind of child immigration detention should
be forbidden by law and such prohibition should be fully implemented in practice.19
9.4
In the present case, the Committee observes that the detention of the first and fourth
authors was imposed on them de facto for the purpose of their transfer under the Dublin
procedure and was thus based solely on their migration status. The Committee notes that,
while the first author was not herself subject to a formal detention order, she and the fourth
author were placed in a closed detention centre and faced the same restrictions as the adults
held there, including restrictions on their movement. It further observes that their detention
lasted 34 days and that the authors expressed their willingness to return voluntarily to Austria.
The Committee notes that the assessment conducted by the domestic authorities focused
primarily on the preservation of family unity and the alleged suitability of detention
conditions. However, the Committee recalls that, where the best interests of the child require
maintaining family unity, this does not justify the detention of the child but rather requires
the adoption of non-custodial solutions applicable to the family as a whole.20
9.5
The Committee notes that the authorities’ assessment of the best interests of the child
was limited and did not address the inherent harm of detention on children or meaningfully
18 E.H. et al. v. Belgium, paras. 13.9–13.12; and A.M.K. and S.K. v. Belgium, paras. 10.9–10.11.
19 Joint general comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017)
on State obligations regarding the human rights of children in the context of international migration in
countries of origin, transit, destination and return, para. 5.
20 Ibid., para. 11.
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GE.26-14839
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consider non-custodial measures that could also preserve family unity or demonstrate how
the children’s interests were weighed against other considerations, as required under article 3
of the Convention.
9.6
In these circumstances, the Committee finds that the children’s deprivation of liberty
amounted to arbitrary detention in violation of article 37 (b) of the Convention, read alone
and in conjunction with article 3. Taking into account the harm inherent in the deprivation of
liberty of children and its negative impact on their physical and mental well-being and
development, the Committee further considers that such detention, in the circumstances of
the present case, is incompatible with article 37 (a) of the Convention.
9.7
The Committee notes the authors’ claim that the State Party failed to properly assess
the age of the fourth author, treating her as an adult without conducting an age assessment
procedure despite indications that she may have been a child, as her date of birth was
approximate. It recalls that States Parties have an obligation to promptly identify children in
migration contexts and to ensure that, where there is reasonable doubt as to age, the individual
is afforded the benefit of the doubt and treated as a minor pending appropriate assessment.
The Committee observes that the entire family’s dates of birth were recorded identically and
that no additional steps were taken to verify the age of the fourth author. It considers that
these circumstances should have prompted the authorities to conduct a more thorough and
culturally sensitive age assessment. By failing to do so and apply the presumption of minority,
the State Party deprived the fourth author of the protection measures guaranteed to children
under the Convention, including safeguards related to deprivation of liberty and the
assessment of her best interests. The Committee therefore concludes that the State Party
violated the rights of the fourth author under article 3 of the Convention, read in conjunction
with article 37.
9.8
The Committee, acting under article 10 (5) of the Optional Protocol on a
communications procedure, finds that the facts before it disclose a violation of articles 3
and 37 (a) and (b) of the Convention with regard to the first and fourth authors.
10.
The State Party should therefore provide the first and fourth authors with effective
reparation for the violations suffered, including by reimbursing the cost of their detention.
The State Party is also under an obligation to prevent similar violations in the future. The
State Party should:
(a)
Ensure that children are not deprived of their liberty due to their or their parents’
migration status and that non-custodial solutions are available to preserve family unity;
(b)
Ensure that, when there is reasonable doubt about a person’s age, a prompt,
child-sensitive and culturally appropriate age assessment is conducted, with the benefit of the
doubt and the presumption of minority applied pending its outcome.
11.
In accordance with article 11 of the Optional Protocol, the Committee wishes to
receive from the State Party, as soon as possible and within 180 days, information about the
measures it has taken to give effect to the Committee’s Views. The State Party is requested
to include information about such measures in its reports to the Committee under article 44
of the Convention. The State Party is also requested to publish the present Views and to
disseminate them widely.