Inadmissibility decision; Subjects: RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, TÃRKİYE; [CRC: Kinderrechtskonvention, Übereinkommen über die Rechte des Kindes; Convention relative aux droits de l'enfant; Convenzione sui diritti del fanciullo]
Erwägungen (11 Absätze)
E. 1 We wish to express our dissenting opinion regarding the Committee’s decision to declare inadmissible the part of the communication relating to the Tel Rifaat bombardment, on the ground that the information on file does not allow it to establish that the State Party exercised effective control over the persons who were victims of the attack.
E. 2 The evidence available in the case file demonstrates that the State Party’s armed forces and its proxies were conducting military operations, including bombing raids, throughout the area where the child victims and their families resided. These facts are widely known.
E. 3 The fundamental questions that arise here concern, on the one hand, the standard of proof required for the communication to be admissible, and on the other, who bears the burden of proof.
E. 4 As regards the standard of proof, at the admissibility stage it is sufficient to determine, on the balance of probabilities – or to put it another way, whether it is more likely than not – that the State Party or its proxies conducted the attack. Such a finding would have allowed the case to be examined on its merits.
E. 5 At the merits stage, the examination could have been more thorough and would have required greater cooperation from the State Party. In its defence, the State Party could not merely have asserted categorically that it was not responsible for this deadly attack; rather, it would have had to cooperate fully in establishing the truth and determining responsibility. The State Party must be recognized as having an obligation to cooperate, particularly given that it possesses military information – which is, by definition, classified or unknown to the authors – that can shed light on the situation. At this stage, the Committee could have sought proactively to establish evidence of the State Party’s responsibility, for example by hearing the parties or calling upon experts with knowledge of the facts.
E. 6 They did not enjoy the protection of their State, since their community is not recognized as such and the State in which they live was certainly neither able nor willing to afford them any protection whatsoever.
E. 7 To require them to identify the competent authorities in a foreign country strikes us as an unreasonable demand which fails to take into account the fact that the State to which they would have had to lodge an appeal is perceived as their enemy, having bombed their community for years. In these circumstances, it is entirely unsurprising that the authors have absolutely no confidence in that State’s judicial system.
E. 8 The Committee’s decision to grant the authors protection of the identities of the child victims, due to the risk of reprisals, demonstrates its full awareness of the authors’ and their families’ vulnerable situation.
E. 9 By requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies in this particular context, the Committee has raised the threshold to such an extent that it is unlikely that any child caught up in a multidimensional armed conflict could meet this admissibility requirement. CRC/C/101/D/186/2022 GE.26-15461 17
E. 10 We are also troubled by the reference to the fact that the authors are represented by a lawyer, which is cited as justification for a stricter requirement regarding the exhaustion of legal remedies. In other words, it is implied that it is preferable not to be represented by legal counsel in order to benefit from a less stringent approach to assessing admissibility. We find this implicit message regrettable.
E. 11 Consequently, we would have found the complaint admissible and therefore the Committee should have analysed it on its merits.
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.26-15461 (E) 031126 031126
Committee on the Rights of the Child
Decision adopted by the Committee under the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a
communications procedure, concerning communication
No. 186/2022*, **, ***
Communication submitted by:
Parents A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J and K
(represented by Cesare Romano and John Cerone)
Alleged victims:
42 Kurdish children in the north-east of the Syrian
Arab Republic
State Party:
Türkiye
Date of communication:
29 September 2020
Date of adoption of decision:
23 September 2026
Subject matter:
Airstrikes into the north of the Syrian Arab
Republic, killing and maiming children
Procedural issues:
Jurisdiction; exhaustion of domestic remedies
Substantive issues:
Right to life; privacy; measures of protection;
international humanitarian law; best interests of
the child
Articles of the Convention:
2 (1), 3 (2), 4, 6 (1) and (2), 16 (1), 19 (1), 38 (1)
and (4) and 39
Articles of the Optional Protocol:
5 (1) and 7 (e)
1.1
The authors of the communication are 11 parents of 42 children of Kurdish origin
from the Syrian Arab Republic who died or were injured as a result of two air attacks on their
neighbourhoods (hereinafter referred to as the “child victims”). They claim that the State
Party violated the rights of the child victims enshrined in articles 6 (1) and (2), 16 (1), 19 (1),
38 (1) and (4) and 39, read in conjunction with articles 2 (1), 3 (2) and 4 of the Convention.
They are represented by counsel. The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State Party
on 26 March 2018.
* Adopted by the Committee at its 101st session (1–28 September 2026).
** The following members of the Committee participated in the consideration of the communication:
Suzanne Aho, Thuwayba Al Barwani, Hynd Ayoubi Idrissi, Mary Beloff, Timothy Ekesa, Bragi
Gudbrandsson, Mariana Ianachevici, Philip Jaffé, Sophie Kiladze, Cephas Lumina, Benyam Dawit
Mezmur, Aïssatou Alassane Sidikou, Juliana Scerri Ferrante, Zeinebou Taleb Moussa and Benoit Van
Keirsbilck.
*** A joint opinion by Committee members Benoit Van Keirsbilck and Bragi Gudbrandsson (dissenting)
and a joint opinion by Committee members Benoit Van Keirsbilck, Bragi Gudbrandsson and
Philip Jaffé (dissenting) are annexed to the present decision.
United Nations
CRC/C/101/D/186/2022
Convention on the
Rights of the Child
Distr.: General
4 November 2026
Original: English
CRC/C/101/D/186/2022
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GE.26-15461
1.2
On 16 June 2022, the Committee, acting through its working group on
communications, decided to register the communication and to accept the authors’ request to
protect the identity of the child victims. Consequently, the child victims’ names were not
disclosed to the State Party. This decision was based on the following considerations: (a) the
stated well-founded risk of reprisals in light of the continuing presence of Turkish Armed
Forces in and around the author’s residence at the time of registration; (b) the alleged
incapacity or unwillingness of Syrian security forces to protect them; and (c) the fact that the
child victims’ identity was deemed unnecessary in order for the State Party to provide
observations on the admissibility and the merits of the present communication, given that the
alleged attacks are well documented.1
1.3
On 12 October 2022, the Committee accepted the State Party’s request to examine the
admissibility of the communication separately from the merits, pursuant to rule 18 (6) of the
Committee’s rules of procedure under the Optional Protocol.
1.4
On 17 November 2022, the Committee, acting through its working group on
communications, decided to consult with the Independent International Commission of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic on its documentation of the attacks reported in the
present communication, in accordance with rule 10 (1) of the Committee’s rules of procedure
under the Optional Protocol. On 19 January 2023, the Commission shared both public and
confidential information with the Committee. The Committee considers that the public
materials, which include relevant excerpts of the Commission’s report2 and 68 copies of
open-source materials gathered for the investigations, are sufficient to inform the present
decision. Hence, the Committee will rely solely on those public sources, thereby ensuring
full equality of arms between the parties.
Facts as submitted by the authors
General context
2.1
The authors note that, during the Syrian civil war, the Kurds, who had been trying to
defend their autonomy amid the conflict in both the Syrian Arab Republic and neighbouring
Iraq, emerged as a distinct party to the hostilities. Following an attempted coup against the
Government of Türkiye in July 2016, the State Party intensified its persecution of Kurds,
driven by fears of secession. This context prompted the launching by the State Party of attacks
into Syrian territory, particularly areas with Kurdish majorities. One such attack was
“Operation Olive Branch”, a cross-border military operation conducted in March 2018 by the
Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian National Army into the Kurdish-majority Afrin district
in the north-west of the Syrian Arab Republic. As a result of this attack, most civilians fled
Afrin and relocated to Tel Rifaat, a town in Aleppo Governorate, also in the north-west of
the Syrian Arab Republic.
2.2
A second operation, called “Operation Peace Spring”, was launched on 9 October
2019 into the north of the Syrian Arab Republic by the Turkish Armed Forces, in conjunction
with the Syrian National Army, with the stated goal of expelling the Syrian Democratic
Forces from the region and creating a “safe zone” to relocate some of the 3.6 million Syrians
who had fled to the State Party. The operation began with air and artillery strikes targeting
the predominately Kurdish-populated cities of Tal Abyad, Ras al-Ayn, Ayn Issa and Qamishli.
Those attacks left scores of civilians dead, severely injured or displaced, many of them
children. Two days later, on 11 October 2019, the Turkish Armed Forces bombarded water
distribution centres and ambulances, captured and executed medical staff and prevented
Kurdish Red Crescent convoys from providing aid to the affected population.
2.3
The present communication relates to two incidents, notably the bombardment of
Qidûrbek, a neighbourhood of Qamishli, on 10 October 2019, and the bombardment of Tel
Rifaat, on 2 December 2019. The authors note that both Qamishly and Tel Rifaat are towns
1 See, in this regard, the admissibility decision adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women in the case of K.J. and 34 other South Sudanese women v. South
Sudan (CEDAW/C/91/D/222/2024), para. 1.2.
2 A/HRC/43/57.
CRC/C/101/D/186/2022
GE.26-15461
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located by the Turkish border within the proposed “safe zones”, still controlled by the Kurds
but surrounded by areas patrolled by Turkish forces and their proxies.
Bombardment of Qamishli
2.4
On 10 October 2019, State Party artillery struck Qidûrbek, a neighbourhood of
Qamishli located 1 kilometre away from the border with the State Party. The area was
residential, with no military base or combatants nearby. Family A, composed of Father A,
Mother A and four children (A1 (12 years old at the time), A2 (10 years old), A3 (7 years
old) and A4 (3 years old)), was preparing to leave the town due to the attacks. At about
4.30 p.m., shrapnel from a shell landed directly in front of the house, precisely where A1 was
standing, causing him to die instantly. A2’s right leg was severed and her left leg fractured.
A3 sustained shrapnel injuries that caused permanent loss of vision in his right eye. The attack
forced family A to seek refuge in the Kurdish-controlled territories in Iraq.
2.5
The authors indicate that both the Independent International Commission of Inquiry
on the Syrian Arab Republic3 and Amnesty International4 have documented this attack.
Bombardment of Tel Rifaat
2.6
After Turkish armed forces and the Free Syrian Army had captured Afrin, the
Government of the State Party declared that Tel Rifaat and Manbij (in Aleppo Governorate)
would be next.5 On 2 December 2019, the Syrian National Army, supported by the Turkish
Armed Forces, launched an attack in Tel Rifaat, 35 kilometres from the Turkish border.6 At
approximately 2 p.m., a shell struck a street corner in the main street of the neighbourhood,
landing among a group of children. A second shell hit nearby three minutes later, followed
by a third one later that evening. The authors report that the area of these attacks was purely
residential. There were no military checkpoints and no military activity in or near the vicinity.
The child victims of families B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J and K were among the victims of the
attacks.
2.7
Family B had been displaced to Tel Rifaat on 16 March 2018 (Mother B and her four
children, B1, B2, B3 and B4, aged 11, 8, 7 and 6 years respectively at the time of the attacks).
On 2 December 2019, Mother B was at home with two children, B1 and B4, while B2 and
B3 were playing outside with other children. At approximately 2.45 p.m., a shell landed at
the corner of the house. B3 died immediately, as his injuries were severe. B2 sustained
shrapnel wounds to his back and shoulders. Doctors were unable to remove all the shrapnel
from his shoulder, and he still feels sharp pain in his shoulders when the weather is cold.
2.8
Family C had been displaced to Tel Rifaat on 14 March 2018. The family consisted
of Father C and Mother C and their four children – C1, C2, C3 and C4 – who, at the time of
the attack, were 10, 9, 8 and 6 years old respectively. Families B and C shared the same home.
When the shell landed, C3 and C4 were playing outside, near their home. C1 and C2 were
inside the home with their mother. C4 sustained severe wounds, causing his death. C3
suffered shrapnel wounds to his forehead, thighs and right arm. Doctors removed most of the
shrapnel but were unable to extract the pieces embedded in his thigh.
2.9
Family D had been displaced to Tel Rifaat on 15 March 2018. The family consisted
of Father D, Mother D and six children – D1, D2, D3, D4, D5 and D6. At the time of the
attack, they were 16, 14, 13, 11, 9 and 7 years old respectively. The parents were at home,
and D3, D4, D5 and D6 were playing outside. D4 was near the place of impact. He sustained
shrapnel injuries to both eyes and wounds to the abdomen. Eventually, he was transported to
3 Ibid.
4 Amnesty International, “Syria: damning evidence of war crimes and other violations by Turkish
forces and their allies”, 18 October 2019.
5 A/HRC/39/65, para. 6.
6 The authors cite A/HRC/43/57, in which the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic states: “Tall Rif’at, which is in neighbouring I’zaz District and under the
control of the Syrian Democratic Forces, experiences regular shelling. In a shelling incident, allegedly
originating from Jariz near I’zaz City, that occurred in the early afternoon on 2 December,
10 civilians were killed, including 2 children, and 12 more suffered injuries. The affected civilians
had previously been displaced from the Afrin area.”
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Aleppo for eye surgery and remained in intensive care for three days. The eye surgery was
unsuccessful and his capacity to see is still limited.
2.10
Family E had been displaced to Tel Rifaat on 13 October 2018. The family consisted
of Father E, Mother E and four children – E1, E2, E3, and E4 – who at the time of the attack
were 11, 9 and 6 years old, and 2 months old, respectively. On the day of the attack, E1 was
playing outside in the street with the other children. When the shell landed, Mother E
immediately rushed out of a neighbour’s house and saw E1 on the ground. He was taken to
hospital, where he died from shrapnel wounds sustained near his heart.
2.11
Family F had been displaced to Tel Rifaat on 16 March 2018. The family consisted of
Father F, Mother F and six children – F1, F2, F3, F4, and F5 and F6 (twins) – who at the time
of the attack were 15, 14, 13, 10, 9 and 9 years old, respectively. On the day of the attack, F4,
F5 and F6 were outside, while F1, F2 and F3 remained inside. The shell landed near their
house. An ambulance arrived and took F4 and F6, accompanied by Mother F, to the Kurdish
medical point. Upon arrival, Mother F noticed that F5 was already there, where he had died
from a shrapnel injury to his forehead. F6 sustained wounds to his left hand from shrapnel;
later, he was diagnosed with hepatitis B. F4 was wounded by two pieces of shrapnel in his
left leg that doctors have not yet been able to remove.
2.12
Family G had been displaced to Tel Rifaat on 16 March 2018. The family consisted
of Father G, Mother G and four children. Besides their children G1 and G2, who at the time
of the attack were 17 and 12 years old respectively, they had two adopted sons, who are not
part of the present communication. G2 was in the neighbourhood, near where the shell landed,
and was pronounced dead upon arrival at a Kurdish Red Crescent medical facility. Shrapnel
had penetrated his neck.
2.13
Family H had been displaced to Tel Rifaat on 3 September 2019. The family consisted
of Father H, Mother H and two children – H1 and H2 – who at the time of the attack were
5 and 2 years old respectively. When the shell landed, H1 was at home with her mother and
H2 was playing in the street. H2 was fatally injured in the explosion and was pronounced
dead at the Kurdish Red Crescent facility in Afrin.
2.14
Family I had been displaced to Nubl on 16 March 2018 and in June 2018 they moved
to Tel Rifaat. Father I and Mother I had three children – I1, I2 and I3 – who at the time of the
attack were 11, 10 and 7 years old respectively. When the shell landed, I1 and I3 were inside
and I2 was outside playing. I2 sustained shrapnel injuries to his left leg, resulting in a
fractured bone. He still has two fragments of shrapnel lodged in his left leg that doctors have
been unable to remove. He continues to experience severe pain when walking or running.
2.15
Family J had been displaced to Tel Rifaat on 17 March 2018. Father J and Mother J
had two children – J1 and J2 – who at the time of the attack were 7 and 4 years old
respectively. J1 and J2 were in the street playing with other children. As a result of the attack,
J2 lost his right leg. Eventually, he received an artificial leg from the Kurdish Red Crescent,
which allows him to walk, even though he experiences great discomfort. J1 sustained
shrapnel injuries all over his body. He still has shrapnel in his foot and cannot walk when the
weather is cold. He also has small pieces of shrapnel in his genital area that doctors have
been unable to remove.
2.16
Family K had been displaced to Tel Rifaat on 16 March 2018. Father K and Mother
K had five children – K1, K2, K3, K4 and K5 – who at the time of the attack were 14, 12, 10,
8 and 7 years old respectively. When the shell landed, Mother K was inside the home with
K2, K4 and K5, while K1 and K3 were outside in the street. K1 and K3 died immediately as
a result of the explosion.7
2.17
Since the attack in Tel Rifaat, families B to K have been further internally displaced
to other locations in the Syrian Arab Republic and to Kurdish-controlled territories in Iraq.
7 The authors provide medical documents describing the injuries sustained by the child victims.
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GE.26-15461
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Jurisdiction
2.18
The authors argue that the State Party’s military occupation in the north of the Syrian
Arab Republic, particularly in the areas close to Qamishli and Tel Rifaat, is undisputed and
has been verified by numerous international governmental agencies, non-governmental
organizations and media outlets. The authors note that, in Armed Activities on the Territory
of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), the International Court of
Justice recognized that, when the occupying forces substitute their own authority for that of
the Government concerned, they are in control of the territory and the intervening State
should therefore be considered the “occupying Power”. At that point, the responsibility of
the intervening State is engaged both for any acts of its military that violate its international
obligations and for any lack of vigilance in preventing violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law by other actors present in the occupied territory.8 While the
European Court of Human Rights considered in Issa and Others v. Turkey that the mere
presence of Turkish armed forces for a limited time and purpose in northern Iraq was
insufficient to establish jurisdiction, 9 the authors contend that the circumstances of the
present case differ from those of the Issa case since the State Party’s occupation in the north
of the Syrian Arab Republic is considerably more prolonged and stable than the fleeting
military presence that it maintained in northern Iraq in 1995. They note that the State Party
has been in control of a large part of the north of the Syrian Arab Republic since 2018–2019
and that the Sochi Agreement concluded in October 2019 between the Russian Federation
and the State Party solidified the control by the latter of the region. They argue that the State
Party’s control is pervasive and includes water resources, more than 600 settlements,
checkpoints on all the roads, the occupation of schools and private homes and the
expropriation of businesses, agricultural lands, tools and vehicles.10
2.19
The authors argue that while the occupation and control of the north of the Syrian
Arab Republic is sufficient to establish the State Party’s legal responsibility, it might not be
necessary for the purposes of the application of the Convention. They allege that territorial
control is but one type of control for the establishment of jurisdiction. Even in the absence of
territorial control, control over individuals suffices to bring those individuals within the
jurisdiction of States Parties to human rights treaties.11
2.20
According to the authors, there is a preponderance of evidence suggesting that the
violations were committed by the Turkish Armed Forces and/or the Syrian National Army.
Firstly, the State Party is undoubtedly responsible for internationally wrongful acts
committed by its armed forces, as widely confirmed by the International Law Commission.12
Responsibility attaches to the State even if armed forces acted contrary to the instructions
given or exceeded their authority. The State is also responsible even if its armed forces simply
failed to adopt sufficient measures to prevent loss of civilian life.13 Therefore, if the Turkish
Armed Forces fired the shells that killed and maimed the children, that would be clearly
attributable to the State Party. 14 Secondly, the State Party is also responsible for
internationally wrongful acts committed by its proxies; that is, the State Party would still be
responsible even if the artillery shells that killed and maimed the children had been fired by
its proxies – the Syrian National Army/Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army. According to the
8 Judgment of 19 December 2005, paras. 172–179.
9 Application No. 31821/1996, judgment of 16 November 2004.
10 The authors refer to A/HRC/43/57, paras. 50–57.
11 The authors cite jurisprudence from, inter alia, the International Court of Justice, the European Court
of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee (general
comment No. 36 (2018)) and the Committee against Torture (general comment No. 2 (2007)).
12 The authors cite the International Law Commission’s “Responsibility of States for internationally
wrongful acts” (General Assembly resolution 56/83), and in particular art. 4 (1): “The conduct of any
State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ
exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the
organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a
territorial unit of the State.”
13 Ibid., art. 7.
14 The authors refer to Ergi v. Turkey, Application No. 66/1997/850/1057, European Court of Human
Rights, Judgment, 28 July 1998, para. 79.
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International Law Commission articles on State responsibility: “The conduct of a person or
group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or
group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of,
that State in carrying out the conduct.” 15 The authors admit that, under different
circumstances, for different purposes and at different times, various international courts and
tribunals have adopted different standards of control, including “strict control”, “effective
control”, “overall control”, “overall effective control” and so on. However, the authors
suggest that the “overall control” standard is the most appropriate standard for the purposes
of the Committee and for international human rights treaties generally. 16 Should the
Committee be of the same opinion, it would be difficult not to conclude that even if the shells
that maimed and killed the victims had been fired by the Syrian National Army rather than
by the Turkish Armed Forces, the State Party is still internationally responsible.
Exhaustion of domestic remedies
2.21
The authors admit that they have not exhausted domestic remedies. They contend that,
although the Optional Protocol provides for only two exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of
domestic remedies, namely where remedies are unreasonably prolonged or are unlikely to
bring effective relief, general principles of international procedural law and the prevailing
practice of international courts and tribunals as well as of the human rights treaty bodies
indicate that there are also other exceptions, for example those relating to the availability,
adequacy and accessibility of the remedy.17 The authors explain that, in the present case, the
existing domestic remedies in the State Party are neither available nor accessible to them and
are ineffective in view of their personal circumstances, particularly the fact that the victims
are children, as well as the general legal and political context. While various legal avenues
exist, the authors indicate that, given the nature of the facts, the appropriate remedy should
lie within the criminal court system. However, criminal remedies are not available to them
either in law or in practice. Under article 13 (1) (a) and (2) of the Criminal Code of the State
Party, investigation and prosecution of the events covered by their claims are subject to a
request by the Ministry of Justice. Therefore, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office,
which would have jurisdiction over the alleged offences, could have enquired into the matter
ex officio and requested the permission of the Minister of Justice. However, there is no
evidence that such a request was made. There is also no evidence that the Ministry of Justice,
sua sponte, requested the prosecutor to investigate the matter. As a result, this procedural
requirement prevents the authors from requesting the prosecution of such crimes, as the
burden to initiate proceedings lies with the State. The authors further argue that the State
Party cannot plausibly claim that its prosecutor and/or the Ministry of Justice was not aware
of the violations that had allegedly been committed during “Operation Peace Spring”, due to
the extensive coverage of the events in the reports of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. 18 And yet, despite numerous
well-documented incidents of civilian casualties during the operation, there is no evidence
that the Ministry of Justice has ever called upon prosecutors to investigate any of them. The
authors also point out that, even if criminal proceedings were initiated, they would be unlikely
to result in conviction of the perpetrators in the light of previous decisions of the domestic
15 International Law Commission articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts,
art. 8.
16 The so-called “overall control” test was formulated by the Appeals Chamber of the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, in the case
against Duško Tadić. See Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, case No. IT-94-1-A, judgment of 15 July 1999,
p. 42, para. 106.
17 The authors cite the commentary to the International Law Commission articles on responsibility of
States for internationally wrongful acts, according to which “only those local remedies which are
‘available and effective’ have to be exhausted before invoking the responsibility of a State”. See the
Commission’s draft articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, with
commentaries (A/56/10), p. 121 para. 5.
18 See A/HRC/43/57.
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GE.26-15461
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courts.19 Finally, the authors claim that existing domestic remedies would not be accessible
to them given their situation of forced displacement and destitution and the impossibility of
them travelling to the State Party since this would expose them to substantial danger.
Complaint
3.1
The authors claim that the State Party violated the child victims’ rights under
articles 6 (1) and (2), 16 (1), 19 (1), 38 (1) and (4) and 39, read in conjunction with
articles 2 (1), 3 (2) and 4, of the Convention.
3.2
The authors argue that the State Party failed in its obligation to protect civilians, in
particular children, and to take precautions to minimize incidental loss of life, in breach of
article 6 (1) and (2) of the Convention.
3.3
The authors submit that the State Party subjected the child victims to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with their privacy, family and home, in violation of article 16 (1). The
authors note that the notion of privacy included in this provision is deemed to include various
elements, including physical and psychological integrity, decisional autonomy, personal
identity, informational privacy and physical and spatial privacy, which were all neglected
during the attacks. The attacks in Qamishli and Tel Rifaat also shattered the victims’ families,
and the siblings of the deceased victims have been deprived of close family members, causing
severe psychological trauma. Moreover, in the aftermath of the attack, the victims had to
abandon their homes and flee with their families.
3.4
The authors further claim that the State Party failed to take all appropriate measures
to protect the victims from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, in
violation of article 19 (1).
3.5
The authors submit that the State Party failed to respect and ensure respect for rules
of international humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts which are relevant to
the child, and to take all feasible measures to ensure protection and care of the children who
were affected by an armed conflict, in breach of article 38 (1) and (4). They add that the State
Party failed to take all appropriate measures to promote their physical and psychological
recovery and social reintegration as victims of armed conflicts, in violation of article 39.
3.6
Finally, the authors claim that the State Party violated a series of umbrella provisions
of the Convention – articles 2, 3 and 4 – read in conjunction with the above-mentioned articles.
They allege that the State Party failed to respect and ensure the Convention rights in regard
to each child victim within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, and to ensure
to the victims such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being, as well as to take
all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for the implementation of the
rights recognized in the Convention.
3.7
In view of the above, the authors request the Committee to establish the State Party’s
responsibility for these violations and to recommend that the State Party provide them with
compensation and full physical and psychological reparation. The authors also request the
Committee to recommend that the State Party take all necessary steps to ensure that peace
and security are re-established in the north of the Syrian Arab Republic, with a view to
ensuring non-repetition of such violations. Finally, the authors suggest that the Committee
consider recommending that the State Party issue a public apology, to be widely publicized,
both in the State Party and in the Syrian Arab Republic, in Turkish, Arabic, Kurdish and
English, and that the State Party build, at its own expense, two schools or rehabilitation
centres for children affected by the war, one in Qamishli and another in Tel Rifaat, in memory
of the child victims.
State Party’s observations on admissibility
4.1
In its observations, dated 16 August 2022, the State Party argues that the
communication is inadmissible owing to: (a) lack of ratione personae competence; (b) lack
19 The authors refer to the Human Rights Watch report entitled “Turkey: no answers for Kurdish
victims”, 5 November 2015, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/05/turkey-no-answers-
kurdish-victims.
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of ratione loci competence; (c) failure to exhaust domestic remedies; (d) lack of sufficient
substantiation of the claims; and (e) abuse of the right of submission.
4.2
With regard to ratione personae competence, the State Party claims that the attacks
on Qamishli and Tel Rifaat were not committed by the Turkish Armed Forces. It contends
that the authors have not provided tangible and credible prima facie evidence establishing
that the Turkish Armed Forces committed the attacks on Qamishli or that the attacks on Tel
Rifaat were committed by the Syrian National Army.20
4.3
With regard to ratione loci competence, the State Party submits that the authors are
not “within its jurisdiction” for the purposes of article 2 of the Convention. It argues that it
did not exercise effective control over the territory in which the alleged attacks were carried
out, asserting that “in such a chaotic environment, determining ‘effective control’ exclusively
by one State is by nature impossible”. It maintains that the Turkish Armed Forces were not
in a position to control actions attributable to other States or armed groups.
4.4
With regard to exhaustion of domestic remedies, the State Party notes that the authors
did not avail themselves of any domestic remedy, contrary to the exigencies of due diligence.
The State Party argues that the authors cannot invoke financial considerations as an exception
to the exhaustion requirement and that, in any event, they could have raised those arguments
before the domestic authorities. It further submits that domestic remedies cannot be regarded
as ineffective and that the authors’ arguments in this respect are unfounded and politically
motivated. The State Party notes that the authors themselves acknowledge that, under
article 13 of the Criminal Code, although the initiation of criminal proceedings for certain
offences requires a request by the Minister of Justice, public prosecutors may also initiate
proceedings ex officio. The State Party maintains, however, that in practice, ex officio
investigations are generally triggered by petitions submitted by victims and that, in the
present communication, the authors did not submit such a petition. The State Party further
argues that public prosecutors cannot open an investigation ex officio in the absence of
tangible evidence of the commission of a crime and that, in any event, this does not absolve
the authors of the obligation to pursue available domestic remedies. It adds that, under
articles 8 and 11 of the Criminal Code, the authors could have lodged a complaint without a
request by the Minister of Justice being required.
4.5
The State Party argues that the authors have failed to sufficiently substantiate their
allegations, as the evidence to which they refer is insufficient to support their claims. It
further submits that the domestic authorities are better placed to establish the material truth
on the basis of the relevant evidence.
4.6
Finally, the State Party argues that the communication contains unfounded
assumptions about the political context and misguided accusations, which amount to an abuse
of the right of submission.
Author’s comments on the State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits
5.1
The authors provided their comments on the State Party’s observations on
admissibility on 16 September 2022. With regard to jurisdiction ratione personae, they claim
that they have filed more than sufficient evidence to suggest that, prima facie, the State Party
is responsible for the attacks. With regard to the attacks on Qamishli, the authors claim that
the communication provided tangible and credible evidence that they originated from the
territory of the State Party, given that Qamishli is located 1 kilometre south of the border,
within sight of the troops in that territory, and that there is a presumption that only the armed
forces of the State Party operate in the State Party’s territory. Regarding the attacks on Tel
Rifaat, the authors claim that they provided credible witness statements corroborated by
neutral international observers that they were carried out by the Syrian National Army, which
is widely understood to operate as a proxy of the Turkish Armed Forces. The authors note
that, on the day of the launching of Operation Peace Spring, the President of Türkiye, Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, himself tweeted: “The Turkish Armed Forces, together with the Syrian
20 The State Party argues that witness accounts contained in the reports of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic do not constitute actual evidence.
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National Army, just launched #OperationPeaceSpring against PKK/YPG and Da’esh
terrorists in northern Syria.”
5.2
With regard to jurisdiction ratione loci, the authors argue that the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic has documented the
effective control that the State Party exercised over the region. They add that, even if this
were not the case, it is sufficient to prove that the State Party exercised control over the
victims themselves, which is a consequence of the mere fact that the attacks on the victims
are attributable to the State Party. They also argue that under the “effects-based standard”,
applied by the Committee in Saachi et al.,21 if a transboundary harm originates in the territory
of a State Party, it is enough to consider that the victims are under the jurisdiction of the State
Party.
5.3
With regard to exhaustion of domestic remedies, the authors claim that the
requirement should be flexible in light of the principle of the best interests of the child and
their specific situation. They add that if the Committee sets too high a threshold for
exhaustion of domestic remedies for children living in war zones who have been victimized
by a foreign State, the individual communications procedure might become unavailable to
countless children. They also claim that they cannot be expected to exhaust domestic
remedies that are at best inaccessible, unavailable and ineffective while they are in dire need
of assistance. The authors assert that the State Party has failed to point out any specific
remedy they should have exhausted other than suggesting they should have alerted
prosecutors and/or resorted to the Constitutional Court, without explaining exactly what
remedies these State organs could provide and how effective those remedies could be. The
authors insist that remedies are unavailable, inaccessible and ineffective, and add that they
did nothing to subject themselves to the State Party’s jurisdiction, but that it was suddenly
and violently imposed on them, and that they should therefore not be expected to avail
themselves of the justice of the country that victimized them in order to pursue their claims;
that requiring victims to physically cross into the State Party’s territory to submit their claims
is de facto disproportionate and unreasonable. They allege that any lawyer who would
represent them in their bid for remedies would likely be imprisoned, as has already happened
to hundreds who have criticized the State Party. They claim that victims do not have to
exhaust remedies in cases where doing so would be objectively dangerous for themselves or
their legal representatives.
5.4
Finally, the authors argue that they have presented well-documented facts together
with substantiated evidence and have highlighted how, even for cases of international
criminal responsibility, as opposed to State responsibility, courts regularly rely on new
reports and witness interviews to support factual findings. With regard to the claim of abuse
of the right of submission, the authors explain that the communication was prepared by
respected international legal scholars with no political motive, as demonstrated by the fact
that neither the submission of the communication nor its registration by the Committee was
made public.
5.5
The authors explain that since the filing of the communication, there have been at least
30 more attacks in Qamishli and Tel Rifaat, and children have continued to die or be injured.
They claim that these attacks show that there is a strong possibility that children or their
parents or legal guardians may be harmed or killed. They request the Committee to request
the State Party:
(a)
To use the utmost care in carrying out military operations in areas inhabited by
civilians, and in particular where there are children, and specifically in and around Tel Rifaat
and Qamishli, in accordance with the customary rules of precaution, as reflected in rules 15
to 24 of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Study on Customary
International Humanitarian Law and incorporated into article 38 (1) of the Convention;
(b)
To immediately take all feasible measures to ensure protection and care of
children who are affected by an armed conflict, in accordance with its obligations under
article 38 (4) of the Convention;
21 Sacchi et al. v. Argentina (CRC/C/88/D/104/2019).
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(c)
To remind the State Party that it is responsible not only for the actions of its
own armed forces but also for the actions of its proxies, including the Syrian National Army,
and that, in any event, it is obliged both to respect and to ensure respect for the rules of
international humanitarian law, in accordance with article 38 (1) of the Convention.
Issues and proceedings before the Committee
Consideration of admissibility
6.1
Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must
decide, in accordance with rule 20 of its rules of procedure, whether the claim is admissible
under the Optional Protocol.
6.2
The Committee notes the State Party’s submission that the communication is
incompatible ratione personae with the Convention, as there is no evidence that the alleged
attacks were committed by its agents or by the Syrian National Army, and ratione loci, as the
State Party has no effective control over the territory where the alleged attacks took place.
The Committee considers that both issues relate, in the present case, to the determination of
whether the child victims were under the jurisdiction of the State Party at the time when the
alleged violations took place, for the purposes of article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol.
6.3
The Committee recalls that, under article 2 (1) of the Convention, States Parties are
obliged to respect and ensure the rights of the children within their jurisdiction, but that the
Convention does not limit a State’s jurisdiction to its “territory”.22 The Committee has
previously addressed the issue of States’ extraterritorial responsibilities in cases where
effective control has been alleged over territory or persons outside their borders, and has
determined that a State may also have jurisdiction in respect of domestic acts that are
performed, or that produce direct and foreseeable effects, outside its national borders.23
Similarly, the Human Rights Committee has stated that a State Party has an obligation to
respect and ensure the right to life of all persons who are within its territory and all persons
subject to its jurisdiction, that is, all persons over whose enjoyment of the right to life it
exercises power or effective control. This includes persons located outside any territory
effectively controlled by the State, whose right to life is nonetheless impacted by its military
or other activities in a direct and reasonably foreseeable manner.24
6.4
In order to determine the State Party’s extraterritorial jurisdiction in the present case,
the Committee must therefore establish whether the State Party exercised effective control
over the territory where the alleged attacks took place (territorial control) or over the
enjoyment of Convention rights by the child victims (personal control).
6.5
Regarding the determination of the existence of territorial control, the Committee
takes note of the authors’ statements that the State Party has militarily occupied areas in the
north of the Syrian Arab Republic close to the towns affected by the two attacks that are the
object of the present communication.
6.6
The Committee notes that the European Court of Human Rights has recognized that a
State’s responsibility may be engaged where, as a consequence of military action – whether
lawful or unlawful – that State in practice exercises effective control of an area situated
outside its national territory.25 The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and
freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control, whether it be
22 F.B. et al. v. France (CRC/C/86/D/R.77/2019), para. 8.6. Territorial jurisdiction was deliberately left
out of art. 2 (1) of the Convention. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Legislative History of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, vol. I, HR/PUB/07/1, pp. 332
and 333, paras. 157–163.
23 Sacchi et al. v. Turkey (CRC/C/88/D/108/2019), paras. 9.4–9.7; F.B. et al. v. France
(CRC/C/86/D/R.77/2019), para. 8.6; and C.E. v. Belgium (CRC/C/79/D/12/2017).
24 See the Committee’s general comment No. 36 (2018), para. 63.
25 European Court of Human Rights cases: Loizidou v. Turkey, Application No. 15318/89, judgment of
18 December 1996, para. 52; Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others, Application No. 52207/99,
para. 70; and Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, paras. 114–116.
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GE.26-15461
11
exercised directly, through its armed forces or through a subordinate local.26 Pursuant to
article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, a territory is considered occupied when it is
actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the
territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised. The International
Court of Justice has considered that, for the purposes of determining whether a territory is
occupied as understood in jus in bello, there needs to be sufficient evidence to demonstrate
that the said authority had in fact been established and exercised by the intervening State in
the areas in question.27 The Committee further notes that the European Court of Human
Rights has also recognized the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a State over a
territory when, through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that
territory, it exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that
Government.28 In determining whether effective control exists, the Court will primarily have
reference to the strength of the State’s military presence in the area.29 Other indicators may
also be relevant, such as the extent to which its military, economic and political support for
the local subordinate administration provides it with influence and control over the region.30
6.7
In the present case, the Committee takes note of the authors’ statement that the State
Party has been in control of a large part of the north of the Syrian Arab Republic since 2018–
2019, and that such control is lasting and pervasive and includes settlements, checkpoints
and the occupation of water resources, schools and private homes, among other things. The
Committee further notes that the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic has established that, by 21 November 2019, the State Party had secured
territory that they referred to as a “safe zone”, which consisted of an area stretching between
Tall Abyad and Ra’s al-Ayn,31 and that checkpoints within the “safe zone” were controlled
by Turkish officers and staffed by Syrian National Army fighters.32 However, the Committee
notes that the towns affected by the attacks in the present case were not included in the areas
that were controlled either by the State Party’s armed forces or by Syrian armed forces at the
time of the events, according to the report of the Independent International Commission. The
Committee further notes that there is no information on file that would suggest that the State
Party exercised any authority over Qamishli and Tel Rifaat at the time when the attacks took
place as described by the authors, either through its armed forces or a local subordinate. The
Committee therefore concludes that the information on file does not allow it to establish that
the State Party exercised effective control over the territory in question for the purposes of
bringing the child victims under its jurisdiction.
6.8
Regarding the determination of the existence of personal control over the child victims,
the Committee has already considered that a State’s jurisdiction may be established in respect
of domestic acts that are performed, or that produce direct and foreseeable effects, outside its
national borders (see para. 6.2 above).33 Jurisdiction in such cases is justified to the extent
that victims affected by the State’s acts are brought under its control. Similarly, the European
Court of Human Rights has long-standing jurisprudence asserting jurisdiction where a State
exercises “authority and control” over individuals. In the context of military operations, in
particular, the Committee acknowledges the jurisprudence of other treaty bodies34 and of the
European Court of Human Rights, recognizing that, in certain circumstances, the use of force
by a State’s agents operating outside its territory may bring the individuals thereby brought
26 European Court of Human Rights, Loizidou v. Turkey, Application No. 15318/89, judgment of
18 December 1996, para. 62.
27 International Court of Justice, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic
of the Congo v. Uganda), judgment of 19 December 2005, para. 173.
28 See the European Court of Human Rights judgment in Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others,
Application No. 52207/99, para. 71.
29 Loizidou v. Turkey, Application No. 15318/89, judgment of 18 December 1996 (merits), paras. 16
and 56; and Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, para. 387.
30 Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, paras. 388–394.
31 A/HRC/43/57, para. 46.
32 Ibid., para. 60.
33 Sacchi et al. v. Turkey (CRC/C/88/D/108/2019), paras. 9.4–9.7; F.B. et al. v. France
(CRC/C/86/D/R.77/2019), para. 8.6; and C.E. v. Belgium (CRC/C/79/D/12/2017).
34 See, inter alia, Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 31 (2004), para. 10.
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under the control of the State’s authorities into the State’s jurisdiction.35 In the context of
active military conflict, the European Court of Human Rights has considered the exercise of
“physical power and control” over the persons in question, or the existence of “isolated and
specific acts of violence involving an element of proximity”, as determining factors. 36
Without endorsing this test, the Committee must determine whether there is sufficient
information and evidence on file to support the claim that the attack on Qamishli was prima
facie attributable to State Party military forces or their proxies.
6.9
Although the question of attribution is primarily a merits issue directed at determining
State responsibility, the Committee considers that, in the present case – where the facts
relevant to establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction based on personal control are contested,
and where territorial control has not been established (see para. 6.7 above) – it must first
assess whether there is sufficient information on file to establish prima facie that the attacks
are attributable to the State Party as a preliminary evidentiary issue.37
6.10
The Committee observes that it is undisputed between the parties and has been
extensively documented by United Nations sources that Operation Peace Spring was
launched by the State Party on 9 October 2019, with the intended objective of expelling the
Syrian Democratic Forces from the region and creating a “safe zone” to relocate Syrian
refugees.38 The launching of airstrikes and artillery shelling over Qamishli (on 10 October
2019) and Tel Rifaat (on 2 December 2019) is also undisputed and has been documented by
independent sources, such as the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic.39 However, the parties disagree as to the attribution of these specific
attacks. In this regard, the authors argue that the State Party’s military forces were directly
responsible for the attack on Qidûrbek and that the State Party’s army and/or the Syrian
National Army were responsible for the attack on Tel Rifaat. Conversely, the State Party
contends that its armed forces did not participate in either of the attacks, that the authors have
not provided evidence of this participation or of the participation of the Syrian National Army
in the Tel Rifaat attacks, and that the State Party has no control over actions attributable to
other States or armed groups.
6.11
The Committee notes that, under international law, an internationally wrongful act
may be attributed to a State and engage its international responsibility if – inter alia – it was
committed by its organs40 or by persons or groups of persons acting on the instructions of, or
under the direction or control of, that State.41 The Committee needs to determine, therefore,
whether there is sufficient information or evidence to attribute the attacks prima facie to the
Turkish Armed Forces and/or the Syrian National Army, and if it is only the latter, whether
it can be established that this group operated on the instructions of, or under the direction or
control of, the State Party.
6.12
Regarding the attack on Tel Rifaat, the Committee observes the absence of any
specific information or evidence on file establishing prima facie that the attack was, directly
or indirectly, imputable to the State Party under any of the attribution tests presented by the
authors (see para. 2.20 above). In this regard, the Committee notes that, while the
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic reported that
a shelling attack took place in Tel Rifaat on 2 December 2019, it noted that it allegedly
originated from Jariz, near the city of I’zaz – territory seemingly under disputed control at
the time of the events. The Committee notes that the authors have not provided any further
information or evidence that would suggest that either the Turkish Armed Forces or the
35 European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber judgements in: Jaloud v. the Netherlands,
Application No. 47708/08, para. 139; Hassan v. United Kingdom, Application No. 29750/09,
para. 74; and Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, Application No. 55721/07, para. 136.
36 Georgia v. Russia (II), Application No. 38263/08, paras. 130–132.
37 European Court of Human Rights, Grand chamber judgment in Ukraine and the Netherlands v.
Russia, admissibility decision (Applications No. 8019/16, No. 43800/14 and No. 28525/20),
para. 551.
38 A/HRC/43/57, para. 56.
39 See, inter alia, A/HRC/43/57, paras. 45 and 49.
40 International Law Commission articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts,
art. 4 (1).
41 Ibid., art. 8.
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13
Syrian National Army launched the attack or that it originated from the State Party’s territory
or from a territory controlled by the State Party. Therefore, on the basis of the information
available to it, the Committee cannot conclude that the attacks were prima facie attributable
to the State Party and that the child victims of families B to K were under its jurisdiction. The
Committee therefore declares this part of the communication inadmissible pursuant to
article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol.
6.13
Conversely, the Committee notes the existence of specific circumstances surrounding
the attack on Qamishli that are relevant to establishing jurisdiction under the “effective
control” standard set out above. These include the timing of the attack, which occurred on
the second day of Operation Peace Spring launched by the State Party in the north of the
Syrian Arab Republic, and the proximity of that neighbourhood to the State Party’s border,
approximately 1 kilometre away; the nature of the attack, namely airstrikes, which was
consistent with the pattern of attacks carried out by the State Party in that region during the
initial phase of the operation, as reported by several independent sources, including the
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic; and witness
accounts indicating that the attack originated from the State Party’s territory. In this regard,
the Committee notes that this particular attack was documented by the Independent
International Commission and that witnesses interviewed reported that the shells had been
launched from the Nseibin area of the State Party.42 By contrast, the State Party has merely
denied its involvement in the attack and has failed to provide any evidence capable of
rebutting the facts as presented by the authors. In particular, the Committee notes the absence
of any expert analysis of impact sites, which could have reasonably been performed by the
State Party. The Committee is therefore satisfied that the authors have provided sufficient
information and evidence to establish, well beyond the prima facie requirement, that the
attacks into Qamishli were cross-border shelling originating from the State Party’s territory.
The Committee therefore concludes that, based on the probability that the State Party
launched the attack into Qamishli, it exercised effective control over the enjoyment of the
rights of victims A1, A2, A3 and A4, thereby bringing them within its jurisdiction for the
purposes of article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol.
6.14
The Committee notes the State Party’s argument that the authors have failed to
exhaust any domestic remedies and, in particular, that they have failed to file a criminal
complaint under articles 8 to 13 of the Turkish Criminal Code. The Committee recalls that
authors must make use of all judicial or administrative avenues that may offer them a
reasonable prospect of redress. The Committee considers that domestic remedies need not be
exhausted if, objectively, they have no prospect of success, for example in cases where under
applicable domestic laws the claim would inevitably be dismissed or where established
jurisprudence of the highest domestic tribunals would preclude a positive result. Nevertheless,
the Committee notes that mere doubts or assumptions about the success or effectiveness of
remedies do not absolve the authors from exhausting them.43
6.15
In the present case, while the authors acknowledge that they have not pursued any
domestic remedies, they contend that such remedies would be ineffective, unavailable and
inaccessible to them in law and in practice. They argue that article 13 of the Criminal Code
of the State Party provides that investigation and prosecution of the events covered by their
claims are “subject to a request of the Ministry of Justice”. The authors add that their status
as child victims and their situation of forced displacement and destitution, as well as their
inability to travel to the State Party to file a criminal action, would make those remedies
inaccessible to them in practice.
42 A/HRC/43/57, para. 49: “Most casualties were inflicted in the early days of the offensive, including in
areas outside of the territory eventually controlled by Operation Peace Spring forces. On 10 October
in Qamishli, in the neighbourhood of Qadour Beck, at around 4.30 p.m., a mortar hit a civilian house
resulting in the death of a boy and seriously injuring one girl aged 8 and one boy aged 11. The
children were playing outside when the attack took place. The attack also killed an elderly woman
who was passing by at the time of the incident. Witnesses described the Qadour Beck neighbourhood
as a civilian area, with no military objectives located nearby. Witnesses reported that shells had been
launched from the Nseibin area of Turkey, adjacent to Qamishli.”
43 Sacchi et al. v. Turkey (CRC/C/88/D/108/2019), para. 9.16; D.C. v. Germany (CRC/C/83/D/60/2018),
para. 6.5; and S.F. v. Ireland (CRC/C/91/D/94/2019), para. 11.4.
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6.16
The Committee first observes that the authors have not provided any information
demonstrating that the criminal remedies identified by the State Party would be ineffective
in bringing effective relief for the violations alleged before the Committee. With respect to
the availability of such remedies, the Committee notes the State Party’s uncontested assertion
that, pursuant to articles 8 and 11 of the Turkish Criminal Code, the authors could have
lodged a criminal complaint for offences committed by its citizens abroad without the request
from the Minister of Justice required under article 13. The Committee further notes that,
although the authors have been forcibly displaced to Iraq, they are legally represented, and
nothing in the case file indicates that the filing of such a complaint must be carried out in
person and by the victims themselves, or that identity protection would be unavailable in the
State Party.
6.17
In the light of all the above, the Committee considers that the authors have failed to
exhaust domestic remedies on behalf of A1, A2, A3 and A4 and declares this part of the
communication inadmissible pursuant to article 7 (e) of the Optional Protocol.
7.
The Committee therefore decides:
(a)
That the communication is inadmissible under articles 5 (1) and 7 (e) of the
Optional Protocol;
(b)
That the present decision shall be transmitted to the authors of the
communication and to the State Party.
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Annex I
Joint dissenting opinion by Committee members
Bragi Gudbrandsson and Benoit Van Keirsbilck (dissenting)
concerning the admissibility of the communication with
regard to the Committee’s jurisdiction over the attack on Tel
Rifaat
1.
We wish to express our dissenting opinion regarding the Committee’s decision to
declare inadmissible the part of the communication relating to the Tel Rifaat bombardment,
on the ground that the information on file does not allow it to establish that the State Party
exercised effective control over the persons who were victims of the attack.
2.
The evidence available in the case file demonstrates that the State Party’s armed forces
and its proxies were conducting military operations, including bombing raids, throughout the
area where the child victims and their families resided. These facts are widely known.
3.
The fundamental questions that arise here concern, on the one hand, the standard of
proof required for the communication to be admissible, and on the other, who bears the
burden of proof.
4.
As regards the standard of proof, at the admissibility stage it is sufficient to determine,
on the balance of probabilities – or to put it another way, whether it is more likely than not –
that the State Party or its proxies conducted the attack. Such a finding would have allowed
the case to be examined on its merits.
5.
At the merits stage, the examination could have been more thorough and would have
required greater cooperation from the State Party. In its defence, the State Party could not
merely have asserted categorically that it was not responsible for this deadly attack; rather, it
would have had to cooperate fully in establishing the truth and determining responsibility.
The State Party must be recognized as having an obligation to cooperate, particularly given
that it possesses military information – which is, by definition, classified or unknown to the
authors – that can shed light on the situation. At this stage, the Committee could have sought
proactively to establish evidence of the State Party’s responsibility, for example by hearing
the parties or calling upon experts with knowledge of the facts.
6.
Consequently, we would have found the complaints relating to the Tel Rifaat
bombardment admissible, and the Committee should therefore have examined them on their
merits.
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Annex II
Joint opinion (dissenting) by Committee members
Bragi Gudbrandsson, Philip Jaffé and
Benoit Van Keirsbilck (dissenting) concerning the
admissibility of the communication in regard to the
exhaustion of domestic remedies
1.
We wish to express our dissenting opinion regarding the Committee’s decision to
consider the communication inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
2.
The authors themselves acknowledge that they have not exhausted domestic remedies,
citing the two exceptions set out in article 7 (e) of the Optional Protocol (i.e. the remedies are
unreasonably prolonged or are unlikely to bring effective relief) and pointing out that there
are also other exceptions, such as the availability, adequacy and accessibility of the remedy
(see para. 2.21 of the decision). They consider that the available remedies are neither effective
nor accessible, given their particular circumstances, including the fact that the victims are
children and the legal situation and political context.
3.
While it is regrettable that they did not at least attempt the remedy they had identified,
namely lodging a complaint with the State Party’s criminal courts, the fact remains that the
only effective course of action appears to be lodging a complaint with the Public Prosecutor
General in Ankara, which raises serious doubts as to its effectiveness, especially since he
could have acted ex officio, being aware that the victims were seeking redress for the
violation of their rights.
4.
We believe that the burden of proof of the effectiveness of a remedy cannot rest solely
on the author, especially considering that the author and the State Party do not always have
equal access to the evidence and procedures. Nothing in the State Party’s defence suggests
that it carried out any investigation into the facts, or the conduct and actions of its army, even
after the submission of the communication, despite having had ample time to do so
between 2020 and 2026.
5.
In the present case, we consider that the Committee has not taken sufficient account
of the circumstances of the case, and in particular that the authors are Kurds, caught up in a
particularly violent armed conflict, that they have already been displaced on several
occasions as a result of the conflict, that they are caught in the crossfire between numerous
parties to this war, and that they have been victims of massive attacks which have killed or
maimed many members of their families. It is reasonable to assume that their priority was to
protect themselves, to heal their wounds and to try to rebuild their lives following such
traumatic events, which continued for several years.
6.
They did not enjoy the protection of their State, since their community is not
recognized as such and the State in which they live was certainly neither able nor willing to
afford them any protection whatsoever.
7.
To require them to identify the competent authorities in a foreign country strikes us
as an unreasonable demand which fails to take into account the fact that the State to which
they would have had to lodge an appeal is perceived as their enemy, having bombed their
community for years. In these circumstances, it is entirely unsurprising that the authors have
absolutely no confidence in that State’s judicial system.
8.
The Committee’s decision to grant the authors protection of the identities of the child
victims, due to the risk of reprisals, demonstrates its full awareness of the authors’ and their
families’ vulnerable situation.
9.
By requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies in this particular context, the
Committee has raised the threshold to such an extent that it is unlikely that any child caught
up in a multidimensional armed conflict could meet this admissibility requirement.
CRC/C/101/D/186/2022
GE.26-15461
17
10.
We are also troubled by the reference to the fact that the authors are represented by a
lawyer, which is cited as justification for a stricter requirement regarding the exhaustion of
legal remedies. In other words, it is implied that it is preferable not to be represented by legal
counsel in order to benefit from a less stringent approach to assessing admissibility. We find
this implicit message regrettable.
11.
Consequently, we would have found the complaint admissible and therefore the
Committee should have analysed it on its merits.