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CRC/C/100/D/97/2019

N.M.I.A. and Nu.M.I.A. v. Denmark

UNO-Kinderrechtsausschuss (CRC) · 2026-01-19 · en UN

Decision on merits; Subjects: RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, DENMARK; [CRC: Kinderrechtskonvention, Übereinkommen über die Rechte des Kindes; Convention relative aux droits de l'enfant; Convenzione sui diritti del fanciullo]

Erwägungen (15 Absätze)

E. 6 GE.26-00516 Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility

E. 6.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 20 of its rules of procedure under the Optional Protocol, whether the claim is admissible under the Optional Protocol.

E. 6.2 The Committee notes the authors’ argument that domestic remedies have been exhausted, as decisions by the Refugee Appeals Board are not subject to judicial review. Accordingly, and given that the State Party has not raised any objections in this regard, the Committee considers that all available domestic remedies must be deemed to have been exhausted and concludes that article 7 (e) of the Optional Protocol does not constitute an obstacle to the admissibility of the communication.4

E. 6.3 The Committee notes the State Party’s claim that the communication is inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. However, the Committee considers that the authors have sufficiently substantiated their claim that the migration authorities failed to consider the potentially prolonged separation of the family that their father’s return to Egypt would entail, even if he was returned together with them, or the cumulative effect of such a separation, the risk of instability in the children’s caregiving environment, and the possible harm to the children’s development and well-being.5 The Committee therefore considers that the authors’ claims based on articles 3, 7 and 9 of the Convention have been sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility and proceeds to consider them on the merits. Consideration of the merits

E. 7 children.6 The Committee also recalls its general comment No. 14 (2013), according to which the right of children to have their best interests taken into account as a primary consideration is a substantive right, a fundamental interpretative legal principle and a rule of procedure. Therefore, the legal duty to assess the best interests of the child applies to all decisions and actions that directly or indirectly affect the child, even if they are not the direct target of the measure; in situations in which decisions would have a major impact on children, a greater level of protection and detailed procedures to consider their best interests is appropriate. In that regard, the Committee considers it indispensable to carry out the assessment and determination of children’s best interests in the context of a potential separation of a child from the parents.7 Specifically, the best interests of children should be ensured explicitly through individual procedures as an integral part of any administrative or judicial decision concerning, inter alia, the detention or expulsion of parents associated with their own migration status. In addition, the Committee has stressed the need to conduct systematically best interests assessments and determination procedures as part of, or to inform, migration-related and other decisions that affect migrant children, which involve evaluating and balancing all the elements necessary to make a decision in the specific situation for a specific individual child or group of children. The Committee has specified that States Parties have an obligation to assess and determine the best interests of the child at the different stages of migration and asylum procedures that could result in the detention or deportation of the parents due to their migration status and that these procedures should be put in place in any decision that would separate children from their family.8 Lastly, the Committee recalls that, as a general rule, it is for national authorities to examine the facts and evidence and to interpret domestic law unless such an examination or interpretation is clearly arbitrary or amounts to a denial of justice. It is therefore not for the Committee to interpret domestic law or to assess the facts of the case and the evidence in place of the national authorities but to ensure that their assessment was not arbitrary or tantamount to a denial of justice and that the best interests of the children were a primary consideration in that assessment.9

E. 7.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 10 (1) of the Optional Protocol.

E. 7.2 The Committee notes the authors’ uncontested allegations that, in its decision of 10 June 2021 refusing their application for residence, the Danish Immigration Service did not take into account the effect of the potential family separation, the risk of instability in the children’s caregiving environment and the possible harm to their development and well-being. In this regard, the Committee observes that the Service based its decisions primarily on individual protection grounds and socioeconomic considerations and concluded that neither parent had established an individual risk of persecution or ill-treatment justifying international protection. Concerning the authors’ father, the Committee notes that the Service found that his personal conflict with an Egyptian family and his fear that his children might face reprisals as a result were insufficient to substantiate a claim for asylum. The authorities held that the possibility of his imprisonment upon return to Egypt for failing to complete compulsory military service, and the resulting impact on his family, did not justify protection. In relation to the authors’ mother, the Committee notes that the Service did not accept as credible her claim of conflict with her family or former spouse in Nepal and determined that her return would not place her at risk. It considered, but dismissed, her concern that she would be unable to care for the children alone in Egypt should her spouse be detained.

E. 7.3 The Committee takes note of the opinion issued by the observation centre on 28 August 2019 regarding the authors’ well-being, according to which both children had strong emotional reactions to the initial separation from their parents and experienced developmental setbacks during that period. It was also noted in the opinion that a renewed separation could significantly affect the children’s development and potentially be harmful to their well-being.

E. 7.4 The Committee recalls that, pursuant to article 9 (1) of the Convention, States Parties should ensure that children are not separated from their parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary in the best interests of the 4 K.Y.M. v. Denmark (CRC/C/77/D/3/2016), para. 10.2; and Y.A.M. v. Denmark (CRC/C/86/D/83/2019), para. 7.2. 5 C.C.O.U., C.C.A.M. and A.C.C. v. Denmark (CRC/C/94/D/145/2021), para. 7.5 CRC/C/100/D/97/2019 GE.26-00516

E. 7.5 The Committee recalls that State decisions affecting children must be guided by a children’s rights-based approach and demonstrate that the best interests of the child have been effectively assessed and afforded proper weight.10 The Committee notes that, in the light of the circumstances of the case, the migration authorities’ findings regarding the absence of a personal, real and imminent risk in the event of deportation do not per se appear to be manifestly arbitrary. However, the lack of consideration of the likely prolonged separation of the family members in the particular circumstances of the case and the consequences of such separation on the children indicates that the migration authorities failed to ensure that the best interests of the children were a primary consideration and to adequately safeguard the children’s right to family unity and protection from harm, in violation of articles 3 and 9 of the Convention.

E. 7.6 In the present case, given the potentially significant impact of the decisions regarding the authors’ deportation to Egypt, considering their young age and the separation from their mother that such deportation would entail, a detailed assessment of the best interests of the children would have been paramount. The Committee considers that the State Party’s failure to assess the specific impact of the decisions on the children violated their rights under articles 3 and 9 (1) of the Convention.

E. 7.7 In the light of the above finding of a violation of articles 3 and 9 of the Convention, the Committee does not consider it necessary to separately examine whether the same facts would amount to a violation of the children’s rights under article 7 of the Convention. 6 Ibid., para. 8.5. 7 General comment No. 14 (2013), paras. 6, 19, 20, 58 and 59. 8 Joint general comment No. 3 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 22 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017), paras. 30, 31 and 32 (e). 9 See, inter alia, C.C.O.U., C.C.A.M. and A.C.C. v. Denmark, para. 8.5; U.A.I. v. Spain (CRC/C/73/D/2/2015), para. 4.2; Navarro Presentación and Medina Pascual v. Spain (CRC/C/81/D/19/2017), para. 6.4; and A.R.G. v. Spain (CRC/C/85/D/92/2019), para. 4.2. 10 A.B. v. Finland (CRC/C/86/D/51/2018), para. 12.4. CRC/C/100/D/97/2019 8 GE.26-00516

E. 7.8 The Committee, acting under article 10 (5) of the Optional Protocol on a communications procedure, is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation of articles 3 and 9 of the Convention.

E. 8 The State Party is under an obligation to ensure a reassessment of the authors’ claims, considering their best interests, and to refrain from separating the family. The State Party is also under an obligation to prevent similar violations in the future. In that regard, the Committee recommends, in particular, that the State Party ensure that asylum or other proceedings directly or indirectly affecting children include an assessment of the best interests of the child as a primary consideration. Decisions involving the separation of children from one of their parents or caregivers should, in particular, include a careful consideration of the impact of the separation on the children in the light of their specific circumstances, and all possible alternatives to such a separation.

E. 9 In accordance with article 11 of the Optional Protocol, the Committee wishes to receive from the State Party, as soon as possible and within 180 days, information about the measures it has taken to give effect to the Committee’s Views. The State Party is requested to include information about any such measures in its reports to the Committee under article 44 of the Convention. The State Party is also requested to publish the present Views and to disseminate them widely.

Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)

GE.26-00516 (E) 040226 040226

Committee on the Rights of the Child

Views adopted by the Committee under the Optional

Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a

communications procedure, concerning communication

No. 97/2019*, **

Communication submitted by:

N.M.I.A. and Nu.M.I.A. (represented by the

Danish Refugee Council)

Alleged victims:

The authors

State Party:

Denmark

Date of communication:

5 September 2019 (initial submission)

Date of adoption of Views:

19 January 2026

Subject matter:

Family separation because the countries of origin

of the authors’ parents (Egypt and Nepal) are

unwilling to accept the entire family together

Procedural issue:

Non-substantiation of claims

Substantive issues:

Best interests of the child; interference with

family life; separation of children from parents

Articles of the Convention:

3, 7 and 9

Article of the Optional Protocol:

7 (f)

1.1

The authors of the communication are N.M.I.A. and Nu.M.I.A., nationals of Egypt

born in Denmark on 20 July 2014 and 19 November 2018, respectively. The authors submit

that their deportation to Egypt, separately from their mother, following the rejection of their

asylum claim, would amount to a violation by the State Party of their rights under articles 3,

7 and 9 of the Convention. The authors are represented by the Danish Refugee Council. The

Optional Protocol entered into force for the State Party on 7 January 2016.

1.2

On 6 September 2019, pursuant to article 6 of the Optional Protocol and rule 7 of the

Committee’s rules of procedure under the Optional Protocol, the Committee requested the

State Party to refrain from deporting the authors’ father to Egypt while their case was being

considered by the Committee. On 11 September 2019, the Refugee Appeals Board suspended

the time limit for the authors’ and their parents’ departure from Denmark until further notice.

* Adopted by the Committee at its 100th session (12–30 January 2026).

** The following members of the Committee participated in the examination of the communication:

Suzanne Aho, Thuwayba Al Barwani, Hynd Ayoubi Idrissi, Mary Beloff, Rosaria Correa, Timothy

Ekesa, Bragi Gudbrandsson, Mariana Ianachevici, Philip Jaffé, Sophie Kiladze, Cephas Lumina,

Benyam Dawit Mezmur, Juliana Scerri Ferrante, Aïssatou Alassane Sidikou, Zeinebou Taleb Moussa

and Benoit Van Keirsbilck.

United Nations

CRC/C/100/D/97/2019

Convention on the

Rights of the Child

Distr.: General

5 February 2026

Original: English

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1.3

On 16 April 2020, the Committee decided to suspend the consideration of the

communication while domestic procedures were still ongoing. 1 On 23 April 2024, the

Committee lifted this suspension and requested the State Party to present its observations on

admissibility and the merits.

Facts as submitted by the authors

2.1

The authors’ mother, R.L., a national of Nepal, entered Denmark on 21 August 2012

on a student visa granting the right to work, valid until 15 July 2015. Since 2011, she had

been married to a Nepalese man, who travelled to Denmark in February 2013 to work but left

after 7 to 10 days; they divorced a few months later. On 24 March 2014, she married a

national of Denmark and, on 22 May 2014, applied for family reunification. At the time of

this marriage, she was already pregnant by M.A., a national of Egypt. On 16 October 2014,

her Danish spouse informed the Danish Immigration Service that he no longer wished to

support the family reunification application, stating that he had not seen or heard from R.L.

since June 2014 and, on 28 November 2014, the application was rejected. After giving birth,

R.L. divorced her Danish spouse and married M.A., in April 2015. On 24 June 2015, she

applied for asylum, claiming a risk of violence upon return to Nepal due to conflicts with her

family and former spouse. On 29 March 2016, the Service rejected her asylum request and,

on 8 August 2016, the Refugee Appeals Board upheld that decision.

2.2

The authors’ father, M.A., arrived in Denmark on 1 September 2010 and applied for

asylum on 5 December 2011 on the grounds that he might face problems in Egypt due to his

conflict with an Egyptian family. On 19 December 2014, the Danish Immigration Service

rejected his asylum application. The Refugee Appeals Board upheld this decision on

10 August 2015.

2.3

On 24 April 2015, M.A. and R.L. married in a religious ceremony.2 N.M.I.A. was

born on 20 July 2014. On 24 June 2015, R.L. submitted an asylum application on his behalf.

The Danish Immigration Service rejected the application on 29 March 2016, and the Refugee

Appeals Board upheld that decision on 8 August 2016. Nu.M.I.A. was born on 19 November

2018.

2.4

On 11 April 2019, the Danish National Police requested the Refugee Appeals Board

to assess whether the family could be deported separately – by returning the father to Egypt

and the mother, with the children, to Nepal – or whether a joint deportation was necessary to

uphold their right to private and family life. During a meeting in February 2019 with the

Embassy of Egypt, the Danish National Police was informed that the father and children

could be deported together to Egypt. However, for the mother to be included, the parents

needed to be legally married. Danish law prohibits rejected asylum-seekers without valid

residence permits from marrying in Denmark. The Embassy of Egypt stated that marriage

under Egyptian law would require M.A. to prove that he had completed military service.

Furthermore, the Embassy of Nepal advised that, under Nepalese law, it was not possible to

issue travel documents to the entire family.

2.5

On 10 July 2019, the Refugee Appeals Board informed the Danish National Police

that, according to its practice,3 the Board had not assessed whether the family had to be

deported jointly, either to Egypt or to Nepal. The Refugee Appeals Board explained that,

even though the father and the mother had married in Denmark in a religious ceremony, the

1 The case of the authors and their family was being reviewed by the Refugee Appeals Board.

2 She converted to Islam and was married in the mosque by an imam.

3 According to the Refugee Appeals Board, where the Board’s decision concerns a married couple and

the spouses are of different nationalities, the Board decides ex officio whether the spouses can be

returned together. In the event that the spouses are of different nationalities, were married before

entering Denmark and have maintained cohabitation during their stay in Denmark, the Board includes

a note in the decision to return that it is a condition of a forced return to either country that, prior to

the forced return, both spouses have been given the opportunity to return to either country and that

both spouses have obtained or can obtain entry permits for either country and that the spouses have

declined to make use of such opportunity. If the marriage has been contracted during their stay in

Denmark, the Board does not take a joint return of the family into consideration.

CRC/C/100/D/97/2019

GE.26-00516

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Board did not order a joint deportation of families if marriage had occurred after they had

entered Denmark.

2.6

On 1 July 2019, by decision of the municipality of Lejre, the authors were forcibly

removed from the asylum centre where they lived with their parents because of statements

made by their mother about threats to commit suicide and to kill her eldest son. The children

were placed in an observation centre (Glostrup Observationshjem), a specialized institution

for families facing social challenges. Both parents maintained regular contact with the

authors. Subsequently, on 18 July 2019, the family was reunited at the observation centre.

According to documentation from the Avnstrup asylum centre, the observation period at the

observation centre was to last three months and was funded by the Danish Immigration

Service. The observation centre issued an opinion on 28 August 2019 concerning the authors’

well-being. In the opinion, the observation centre set out its assessment that the family, not

least the children, needed the family to stay together. According to the opinion, both children

had had a very strong reaction to the first separation from their parents at the observation

centre. It was noted that both children had had a setback in development. It was therefore the

view of the observation centre that another period of separation would have a significant

effect on their development and could be harmful for them. Nevertheless, the Refugee

Appeals Board maintained its decision to deport the father separately, without reassessing

the situation in the light of the family’s request to be removed together.

2.7

On 1 August 2019, the Danish Refugee Council formally requested a reconsideration,

emphasizing articles 3 and 9 of the Convention. On 5 September 2019, the Refugee Appeals

Board declined to reopen the case, claiming that there was no new information on file

necessitating a review. Meanwhile, on 30 August 2019, the father was detained at a

deportation centre, and the deportation was scheduled for 6 September 2019. On

11 September 2019, the Board suspended the time limit for the authors’ and their parents’

departure from Denmark until further notice.

2.8

On 6 February 2020, the Refugee Appeals Board decided to reopen the case and

remitted it to the Danish Immigration Service for reconsideration in view of new information

on N.M.I.A.’s nationality and on the possibility of him being issued with a travel document.

The Board observed that Nu.M.I.A. was not covered by the Board’s decisions of 10 August

2015 and 8 August 2016, as he was born on 19 November 2018, and requested the Service

to examine whether the request for reopening the case should be understood as an application

for asylum made on behalf of Nu.M.I.A.

2.9

On 10 June 2021, the Danish Immigration Service rejected the application for

residence under section 7 of the Aliens Act submitted by the authors and their parents. With

regard to the authors’ father, the Service found that he did not face a risk of persecution in

Egypt or ill-treatment warranting protection under asylum law. The claim that his children

might face problems in Egypt due to their father’s personal conflict with an Egyptian family

was not considered sufficient to alter the assessment. Furthermore, the Service concluded

that the authors had not presented individual grounds for asylum. The authorities rejected the

argument that the father’s potential imprisonment for failing to complete compulsory military

service in Egypt, and his concern that his spouse and children would be unable to cope in his

absence, could form the basis for granting asylum. It was emphasized in the assessment that

socioeconomic conditions, including financial and health-related concerns, did not constitute

grounds for international protection.

2.10

With respect to the authors’ mother, the Danish Immigration Service determined that

it could not accept as established the claim that there was a conflict between her and either

her family or her former spouse in Nepal. It concluded that, upon return, she would not be at

risk of persecution or ill-treatment warranting the granting of asylum under applicable

standards. In its assessment, the Service considered her concern that, should M.A. be returned

to Egypt, he might be imprisoned by the Egyptian authorities due to his failure to complete

mandatory military service. However, it found that her fear of being unable to cope alone in

Egypt if M.A. was imprisoned did not constitute grounds for asylum. It was determined that

the joint removal of the father, the authors and their mother to Egypt was feasible. This

conclusion was supported by a communication dated 23 September 2020 from the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, which confirmed the possibility of a combined removal. The Service

noted that the authors’ mother could apply for family reunification in Egypt. According to

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this assessment, she would be able to enter and reside in Egypt during the processing of her

application by requesting a long-stay visa.

2.11

On 26 April 2022, the Refugee Appeals Board upheld the decision of the Danish

Immigration Service of 10 June 2021. On 6 July 2022, the Danish Refugee Council appealed

the decision of the Service of 24 June 2022, which, on 20 December 2023, was upheld by the

Immigration Appeals Board. Consequently, the authors and their parents were refused

residence permits for Denmark pursuant to the first sentence of section 9c (1) of the Aliens

Act, on the grounds that no exceptional reasons existed for granting residence permits.

Complaint

3.1

The authors claim that their father’s deportation to Egypt, whether alone or

accompanied by them, would violate their rights under articles 3, 7 and 9 of the Convention.

They argue that the family separation would seriously harm their well-being and development

and would be contrary to their best interests. They contend that the Refugee Appeals Board

failed to give due weight to their best interests as children as a primary consideration by not

assessing the need for a joint removal of the family.

3.2

The authors assert that a separation would deprive them of the opportunity to be cared

for by their parents, as a result of the Board’s failure to properly examine their best interests.

The separation would not be temporary but could extend for many years or become

permanent. Their father is considered a military evader in Egypt and risks imprisonment upon

return, which would effectively prevent him from caring for his children. This would

constitute a violation of article 7 (1) of the Convention. The authors’ parents have declared

their willingness to cooperate and be removed together, provided that they are deported

jointly.

3.3

The authors claim that the Refugee Appeals Board did not assess whether the forcible

separation of the family could result in a long-term or permanent situation contrary to

article 9 of the Convention. They reiterate that, under the current circumstances, the

separation may become indefinite. The father cannot travel to Nepal, and the mother cannot

legally travel to Egypt as long as their marriage is not recognized. However, legal marriage

is not an option due to the father’s military status in Egypt and the impossibility of marrying

under Danish law as rejected asylum-seekers.

3.4

The authors argue that national remedies have been exhausted, as decisions of the

Refugee Appeals Board are final and not subject to judicial review in Danish courts.

State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits

4.1

On 20 June 2024, the State Party presented its observations on admissibility and the

merits. The State Party submits that the communication should be declared inadmissible as

manifestly ill-founded, on the grounds that the Refugee Appeals Board has determined that

the authors would not face a risk of persecution or ill-treatment upon deportation and that no

legal impediment exists to the family’s removal to Egypt. The State Party notes that, in cases

involving risks of abuse directed at children, the Refugee Appeals Board assesses whether

the harm reaches a level of severity that warrants protection under section 7 of the Aliens Act.

However, the evaluation of whether compliance with the Convention justifies granting a

residence permit on other grounds, such as humanitarian considerations, falls within the

competence of the Danish Immigration Service, the Immigration Appeals Board and the

Ministry of Immigration and Integration. The State Party notes that, according to the Refugee

Appeals Board, neither in their submission of 5 September 2019 nor at any other point in the

proceedings did the authors claim that they would face persecution or ill-treatment warranting

asylum under section 7 of the Aliens Act if deported to Egypt.

4.2

The State Party submits that, concerning spouses of different nationalities and their

children, if the marriage took place during their stay in Denmark, as in the present case, the

Refugee Appeals Board has no obligation to deport them together in the event of a

deportation. Concerning the common children of spouses or cohabitants of different

nationalities, it is first and foremost the children’s citizenship that determines to which

country they can be sent, with the parent who is also a citizen of the country in question.

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4.3

The State Party submits that, since the authors have not been able to independently

make statements regarding the risk of separation from their parents, their parents have given

statements to the Danish immigration authorities on their behalf.

4.4

The State Party also submits that the authors have not substantiated that the

assessment made by the Refugee Appeals Board was arbitrary or amounted to a manifest

error or denial of justice and that their communication merely reflects that the authors

disagree with the Board’s assessment of their and their parents’ specific circumstances and

the available background information.

4.5

With regard to the authors’ claim that a separation will have severe emotional

implications for them, and that it will be detrimental to their well-being and possibly their

further development, and thus contrary to their best interests, the State Party notes that, on

26 April 2022, the Refugee Appeals Board found that, in case of return to Egypt, M.A. would

not be at risk of being sentenced for having failed to complete his military service, which,

according to Danish legal tradition, would be a disproportionate punishment. It therefore

found that this circumstance did not justify asylum either and that his fear of such a sentence

was unsubstantiated. Furthermore, on 10 June 2021, the Board stated that, in the event of

R.L.’s return to Nepal, she would not be at risk of persecution. Lastly, the Board found that

the authors, who are nationals of Egypt, have no individual grounds for asylum.

4.6

According to the State Party, the authors have failed to sufficiently substantiate that

they would face a real risk of irreparable harm if deported to Egypt with their father and

without their mother. Nor have they demonstrated that their deportation to Egypt would, in

itself, expose them to such a risk. The State Party argues that the authors’ claims under

articles 3, 7 and 9 of the Convention are based on hypothetical circumstances that might arise

if they and their father were removed to Egypt without their mother.

Authors’ comments on the State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits

5.1

On 2 December 2024, the authors submitted their comments on the State Party’s

observations regarding the admissibility and merits of the communication.

5.2

The authors contend that the State Party failed to consider the specific facts of the case

and did not conduct a proper assessment of their best interests as children in the light of those

facts. They submit that the case concerns the imminent risk of an irreversible family

separation, as the father – whether alone or accompanied by the children – is subject to

removal to Egypt, with no realistic prospect of future family reunification. The authors assert

that neither parent can legally reside in the other’s country of nationality: the father cannot

lawfully reside in Nepal, and the mother cannot enter or reside in Egypt. Furthermore, the

mother is unable to apply for family reunification in Egypt, as the parents are not legally

married. Marriage is not possible in Denmark due to their lack of legal residency status, and

it cannot be concluded at the Embassy of Egypt because the father has not completed his

compulsory military service and cannot provide the necessary documentation.

5.3

The authors argue that their father risks imprisonment upon return to Egypt for failure

to complete military service. Should the children be removed with him, there is no guarantee

that he would be in a position to provide for or care for them during or after any period of

detention.

5.4

The authors maintain that the decision rejecting their father’s asylum claim does not

refer to or engage with their best interests as children. There was no individualized

assessment of the risk of separation from either parent. They submit that the established

practice of the Refugee Appeals Board – whereby, in cases involving parents who were not

married prior to entry into Denmark, there is no obligation to facilitate a joint removal – fails

to consider the best interests of the child and leads to de facto family separation, in

contravention of the Convention.

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Issues and proceedings before the Committee

Consideration of admissibility

6.1

Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must

decide, in accordance with rule 20 of its rules of procedure under the Optional Protocol,

whether the claim is admissible under the Optional Protocol.

6.2

The Committee notes the authors’ argument that domestic remedies have been

exhausted, as decisions by the Refugee Appeals Board are not subject to judicial review.

Accordingly, and given that the State Party has not raised any objections in this regard, the

Committee considers that all available domestic remedies must be deemed to have been

exhausted and concludes that article 7 (e) of the Optional Protocol does not constitute an

obstacle to the admissibility of the communication.4

6.3

The Committee notes the State Party’s claim that the communication is inadmissible

as manifestly ill-founded. However, the Committee considers that the authors have

sufficiently substantiated their claim that the migration authorities failed to consider the

potentially prolonged separation of the family that their father’s return to Egypt would entail,

even if he was returned together with them, or the cumulative effect of such a separation, the

risk of instability in the children’s caregiving environment, and the possible harm to the

children’s development and well-being.5 The Committee therefore considers that the authors’

claims based on articles 3, 7 and 9 of the Convention have been sufficiently substantiated for

the purposes of admissibility and proceeds to consider them on the merits.

Consideration of the merits

7.1

The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information

made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 10 (1) of the Optional Protocol.

7.2

The Committee notes the authors’ uncontested allegations that, in its decision of

10 June 2021 refusing their application for residence, the Danish Immigration Service did

not take into account the effect of the potential family separation, the risk of instability in the

children’s caregiving environment and the possible harm to their development and well-being.

In this regard, the Committee observes that the Service based its decisions primarily on

individual protection grounds and socioeconomic considerations and concluded that neither

parent had established an individual risk of persecution or ill-treatment justifying

international protection. Concerning the authors’ father, the Committee notes that the Service

found that his personal conflict with an Egyptian family and his fear that his children might

face reprisals as a result were insufficient to substantiate a claim for asylum. The authorities

held that the possibility of his imprisonment upon return to Egypt for failing to complete

compulsory military service, and the resulting impact on his family, did not justify protection.

In relation to the authors’ mother, the Committee notes that the Service did not accept as

credible her claim of conflict with her family or former spouse in Nepal and determined that

her return would not place her at risk. It considered, but dismissed, her concern that she would

be unable to care for the children alone in Egypt should her spouse be detained.

7.3

The Committee takes note of the opinion issued by the observation centre on

28 August 2019 regarding the authors’ well-being, according to which both children had

strong emotional reactions to the initial separation from their parents and experienced

developmental setbacks during that period. It was also noted in the opinion that a renewed

separation could significantly affect the children’s development and potentially be harmful

to their well-being.

7.4

The Committee recalls that, pursuant to article 9 (1) of the Convention, States Parties

should ensure that children are not separated from their parents against their will, except

when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with

applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary in the best interests of the

4 K.Y.M. v. Denmark (CRC/C/77/D/3/2016), para. 10.2; and Y.A.M. v. Denmark

(CRC/C/86/D/83/2019), para. 7.2.

5 C.C.O.U., C.C.A.M. and A.C.C. v. Denmark (CRC/C/94/D/145/2021), para. 7.5

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children.6 The Committee also recalls its general comment No. 14 (2013), according to which

the right of children to have their best interests taken into account as a primary consideration

is a substantive right, a fundamental interpretative legal principle and a rule of procedure.

Therefore, the legal duty to assess the best interests of the child applies to all decisions and

actions that directly or indirectly affect the child, even if they are not the direct target of the

measure; in situations in which decisions would have a major impact on children, a greater

level of protection and detailed procedures to consider their best interests is appropriate. In

that regard, the Committee considers it indispensable to carry out the assessment and

determination of children’s best interests in the context of a potential separation of a child

from the parents.7 Specifically, the best interests of children should be ensured explicitly

through individual procedures as an integral part of any administrative or judicial decision

concerning, inter alia, the detention or expulsion of parents associated with their own

migration status. In addition, the Committee has stressed the need to conduct systematically

best interests assessments and determination procedures as part of, or to inform,

migration-related and other decisions that affect migrant children, which involve evaluating

and balancing all the elements necessary to make a decision in the specific situation for a

specific individual child or group of children. The Committee has specified that States Parties

have an obligation to assess and determine the best interests of the child at the different stages

of migration and asylum procedures that could result in the detention or deportation of the

parents due to their migration status and that these procedures should be put in place in any

decision that would separate children from their family.8 Lastly, the Committee recalls that,

as a general rule, it is for national authorities to examine the facts and evidence and to

interpret domestic law unless such an examination or interpretation is clearly arbitrary or

amounts to a denial of justice. It is therefore not for the Committee to interpret domestic law

or to assess the facts of the case and the evidence in place of the national authorities but to

ensure that their assessment was not arbitrary or tantamount to a denial of justice and that the

best interests of the children were a primary consideration in that assessment.9

7.5

The Committee recalls that State decisions affecting children must be guided by a

children’s rights-based approach and demonstrate that the best interests of the child have

been effectively assessed and afforded proper weight.10 The Committee notes that, in the light

of the circumstances of the case, the migration authorities’ findings regarding the absence of

a personal, real and imminent risk in the event of deportation do not per se appear to be

manifestly arbitrary. However, the lack of consideration of the likely prolonged separation

of the family members in the particular circumstances of the case and the consequences of

such separation on the children indicates that the migration authorities failed to ensure that

the best interests of the children were a primary consideration and to adequately safeguard

the children’s right to family unity and protection from harm, in violation of articles 3 and 9

of the Convention.

7.6

In the present case, given the potentially significant impact of the decisions regarding

the authors’ deportation to Egypt, considering their young age and the separation from their

mother that such deportation would entail, a detailed assessment of the best interests of the

children would have been paramount. The Committee considers that the State Party’s failure

to assess the specific impact of the decisions on the children violated their rights under

articles 3 and 9 (1) of the Convention.

7.7

In the light of the above finding of a violation of articles 3 and 9 of the Convention,

the Committee does not consider it necessary to separately examine whether the same facts

would amount to a violation of the children’s rights under article 7 of the Convention.

6 Ibid., para. 8.5.

7 General comment No. 14 (2013), paras. 6, 19, 20, 58 and 59.

8 Joint general comment No. 3 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant

Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 22 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017),

paras. 30, 31 and 32 (e).

9 See, inter alia, C.C.O.U., C.C.A.M. and A.C.C. v. Denmark, para. 8.5; U.A.I. v. Spain

(CRC/C/73/D/2/2015), para. 4.2; Navarro Presentación and Medina Pascual v. Spain

(CRC/C/81/D/19/2017), para. 6.4; and A.R.G. v. Spain (CRC/C/85/D/92/2019), para. 4.2.

10 A.B. v. Finland (CRC/C/86/D/51/2018), para. 12.4.

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7.8

The Committee, acting under article 10 (5) of the Optional Protocol on a

communications procedure, is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation of

articles 3 and 9 of the Convention.

8.

The State Party is under an obligation to ensure a reassessment of the authors’ claims,

considering their best interests, and to refrain from separating the family. The State Party is

also under an obligation to prevent similar violations in the future. In that regard, the

Committee recommends, in particular, that the State Party ensure that asylum or other

proceedings directly or indirectly affecting children include an assessment of the best

interests of the child as a primary consideration. Decisions involving the separation of

children from one of their parents or caregivers should, in particular, include a careful

consideration of the impact of the separation on the children in the light of their specific

circumstances, and all possible alternatives to such a separation.

9.

In accordance with article 11 of the Optional Protocol, the Committee wishes to

receive from the State Party, as soon as possible and within 180 days, information about the

measures it has taken to give effect to the Committee’s Views. The State Party is requested

to include information about any such measures in its reports to the Committee under

article 44 of the Convention. The State Party is also requested to publish the present Views

and to disseminate them widely.