E/C.12/77/D/150/2019

GE.25-03957 (E) 200325 200325

Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

Decision adopted by the Committee under the Optional

Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic,

Social and Cultural Rights concerning communication

No. 150/2019*, **

Communication submitted by:

Jean Luc Claparède, Michel Miguet and Olivier

Salelles (represented by counsel, Frédéric Fabre)

Alleged victims:

The authors

State Party:

France

Date of communication:

4 September 2018 (initial submission)

Date of adoption of decision:

14 February 2025

Subject matter:

Compensation for hours worked

Procedural issue:

Manifestly ill-founded

Substantive issue:

Work and employment

Article of the Covenant:

7 (a)

Article of the Optional Protocol:

3 (2) (e)

1.

The authors of the communication are Jean Luc Claparède, Michel Miguet and Olivier

Salelles, all French nationals, born on 28 June 1961, 13 January 1957 and 12 September 1962,

respectively. They claim to be victims of a violation by the State Party of their rights under

article 7 (a) of the Covenant. The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State Party on

18 June 2015. The authors are represented by counsel, Frédéric Fabre.

A.

Summary of the information and arguments submitted by the parties

Factual background

2.1

The authors held contracts of employment of indeterminate duration as teachers,

entered into with the director of Lycée Léonard de Vinci, a vocational upper secondary school

in Montpellier, having been recruited as part of a drive to hire contractual teachers under

agreements establishing apprentice training centres. Mr. Claparède’s and Mr. Miguet’s

employment contracts took effect on 1 September 2005 and Mr. Salelles’ employment

* Adopted by the Committee at its seventy-seventh session (10–28 February 2025).

** The following members of the Committee participated in the examination of the communication:

Aslan Abashidze, Lazhari Bouzid, Asraf Ally Caunhye, Laura-Maria Crăciunean-Tatu, Charafat

El Yedri Afailal, Peters Sunday Omologbe Emuze, Santiago Manuel Fiorio Vaesken, Joo-Young Lee,

Karla Vanessa Lemus De Vásquez, Seree Nonthasoot, Giuseppe Palmisano, Laura Elisa Pérez, Julieta

Rossi, Preeti Saran and Michael Windfuhr. Pursuant to rule 23 of the rules of procedure under the

Optional Protocol, Ludovic Hennebel did not take part in the examination of the communication.

United Nations

E/C.12/77/D/150/2019

Economic and Social Council

Distr.: General

14 March 2025

English

Original: French

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contract took effect on 1 September 2009. Their status, according to their contracts, was that

of non-tenured contractual employees of a local public educational establishment. Following

the decision by Lycée Léonard de Vinci to transfer its EN34 apprentice training centre

membership agreement and charter to Lycée Jean Mermoz, effective from 1 September 2012,

the authors requested Lycée Jean Mermoz to provide them with new employment contracts

that incorporated the substantive clauses of their original contracts. When Lycée Jean

Mermoz rejected this request, the authors decided to take a closer look at the terms of their

contracts and realized that the number of working hours set out therein – namely 666 hours

a year for Mr. Salelles and Mr. Miguet and 518 hours a year for Mr. Claparède, who worked

part-time at a rate of 14/18ths – exceeded the lawful limits applicable to the working hours

of teachers established in article 521-1 of the Education Code and Decree No. 81-535 of

12 May 1981, which were set at 504 hours for the part-time schedule followed by

Mr. Claparède and 648 hours for a full-time schedule; they also realized that they were

spending time performing tasks above and beyond the working hours established in their

contracts and should therefore be paid overtime. Letters sent to Lycée Jean Mermoz in which

the authors expressed these concerns were to no avail.

2.2

On 25 July 2013, the Montpellier Administrative Court registered claims by the

authors in which they asked the Court to order Lycée Jean Mermoz and Lycée Léonard de

Vinci to compensate them for hours worked since 1 January 2008, in application of article

L.761-1 of the Code of Administrative Justice. Mr. Claparède claimed compensation for 450

hours of unpaid work over a period of five years: 14 hours set out in his employment contract,

40 hours of liaison with apprentice-employing businesses, 6 hours of preparation for the

school semester and 30 hours of compulsory weekly meetings per year. Mr. Miguet claimed

compensation for 648 hours of unpaid work over a period of five years: 18 hours set out in

his employment contract, 65 hours of liaison with apprentice-employing businesses, 8 hours

of preparation for the school semester and 38 hours of compulsory meetings per year. Over

the same period, Mr. Salelles claimed compensation for 576 hours of unpaid work: 18 hours

set out in his employment contract, 51 hours of liaison with apprentice-employing businesses,

8 hours of preparation for the school semester and 38 hours of compulsory meetings per year.

2.3

In judgments passed on 17 October 2014, the Montpellier Administrative Court held

that, even if article L.521-1 of the Education Code was applicable to the authors, the cited

article did not provide that the annual number of teaching weeks could not exceed 36 weeks,

as they claimed, and that they were therefore not entitled to claim compensation for the hours

they claimed to have worked as overtime. The Administrative Court also found that the rules

governing the annual number of working hours of contractual teachers in apprentice training

centres had no bearing on the situation of the authors, whose contracts had been entered into

with another type of institution. With regard to the hours spent performing tasks other than

face-to-face teaching, the Administrative Court noted that the authors received an apprentice

support allowance for upper-secondary-school teaching staff, in accordance with Decree

No. 99-703 of 3 August 1999 and were therefore not entitled to claim additional remuneration.

The Administrative Court consequently rejected the authors’ claims.

2.4

In judgments passed on 15 January 2016 on appeals filed by the authors, the Marseille

Administrative Court of Appeal noted that it followed from article L.6232-10 of the Labour

Code and articles 1, 3 and 7 of Decree No. 81-535 that, given the temporary nature of

agreements establishing apprentice training centres, the execution of such agreements could

not give rise to positions equivalent to those held by tenured teachers. The Administrative

Court of Appeal ruled that the authors therefore had no grounds for claiming that the annual

number of working hours required of them should comply with the service obligations

defined in Decree No. 92-1189 of 6 November 1992 on the Special Status of Vocational

Upper-Secondary-School Teachers and that the contracts they entered into with Lycée

Léonard de Vinci could not lawfully set the annual number of working hours at 666 hours

for Mr. Salelles and Mr. Miguet or at 518 hours for Mr. Claparède. The Administrative Court

of Appeal also ruled that the authors had no grounds for claiming that the hours they had

worked in excess of 648 hours a year in the case of Mr. Salelles and Mr. Miguet and 504

hours in the case of Mr. Claparède should have been paid as overtime.

2.5

However, with regard to the hours worked over and above the service hours set out in

their contracts, the Administrative Court of Appeal ruled that the purpose of the allowance

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established by Decree No. 99-703 was not to remunerate hours worked in excess of the set

number of service hours, but rather to recompense teachers for the diversity of tasks required

of them, and that, contrary to the view of the Montpellier Administrative Court, payment of

this allowance could not be made in lieu of payment for the hours worked by the authors over

and above their contractual obligations in order to complete the tasks covered by the

allowance. Consequently, the Administrative Court of Appeal ruled that the authors were

entitled to claim compensation for the hours they had spent working on tasks other than

teaching beyond the numbers indicated in their contracts. Given the lack of clarity as to the

number of hours the authors had worked, the Court decided to commission an expert

appraisal to clarify this issue before ruling on their claims for compensation.

2.6

In its judgments of 13 July 2017, handed down following receipt of the commissioned

expert appraisals, the Marseille Administrative Court of Appeal ruled that the appraisals’

findings were irregular, since Lycée Jean Mermoz had not been given the opportunity to

submit comments. The Court nonetheless decided to retain the appraisals for informational

purposes. It found that, in the light of the authors’ employment contracts and article 2 of

Decree No. 68-536 of 23 May 1968 and article 5 of Decree No. 50-1253 of 6 October 1950,

it was clear that the overtime hours for which the aforementioned provisions established the

terms and conditions of remuneration were teaching hours worked over and above the

number of contracted working hours, whereas the hours of work for which the authors were

claiming overtime consisted of time spent preparing for the school semester, attending

teaching staff meetings and visiting business premises, all tasks related to the hours of face-

to-face tuition that they had worked in accordance with their contracts. Consequently, those

hours did not qualify for remuneration under the terms of their contracts. Moreover, there

were no provisions on the remuneration of the hours worked in the decrees on which the

authors’ contracts were based. Lastly, the Court noted that civil servants cannot legitimately

claim any right to remuneration or compensation other than that provided for by the legally

applicable texts, and that the legal texts invoked by the authors did not establish any specific

remuneration for the hours of work referred to. The Court therefore rejected the authors’

claims.

2.7

On 19 March 2018, the Council of State issued decisions of inadmissibility in respect

of appeals in cassation filed by the authors.

2.8

The authors argue that, although the claims had been filed before the entry into force

of the Optional Protocol for the State Party, they were still being pressed at the time of the

submission of the communication to the Committee. They assert that they have not brought

any other action before an international court and that they submitted the present

communication within 12 months of the last domestic decision.

Complaint

3.1

The authors complain of being forced to work unpaid overtime. They argue that the

Marseille Administrative Court of Appeal recognized that they had been “forced” to work

overtime for the preparation of the school semester, attending teaching staff meetings and

visiting business premises, but that there is no provision in domestic law for the payment of

such overtime. They claim that the absence of any provision for the payment of the overtime

demonstrates that the State Party’s national law does not comply with article 7 of the

Covenant.

3.2

They contest the reasoning of the Montpellier Administrative Court that they were

already receiving compensation for the aforementioned working hours, arguing that the

compensation provided for in Decree No. 99-703 is a flat-rate bonus of €99.93 awarded in

recognition of the quality of their teaching and not an hourly allowance. It cannot therefore

cover the overtime imposed on the authors.

3.3

The authors point out that the expert appraisals commissioned by the Marseille

Administrative Court of Appeal recommend payment for the hours worked. According to

these appraisals, all face-to-face hours worked in excess of the legal annual limit must be

considered as payable overtime; time spent attending pre-semester teaching staff meetings,

which does not fall within the scope of service obligations, cannot be treated as additional or

payable working time; however, visits to business premises constitute face-to-face time with

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apprentices and must therefore be remunerated; and hours spent attending weekly meetings

constitute overtime insofar as they take place outside of working hours and are therefore

payable. The authors point out that, according to the appraisals, the contracts concluded by

the Hérault Public Apprentice Training Centre do not comply with the requirements

governing the working hours of non-tenured teachers involved in initial apprenticeship

training; that, since the annual number of working hours for a full-time job is 648, all face-

to-face hours worked in excess of this amount must be considered as overtime if those hours

do not fall within the scope of teaching time; and that they have a legitimate claim to

compensation for hours worked over and above normal working hours during the period

2008–2013. It is recommended in these appraisals that Mr. Salelles and Mr. Miguet should

each be awarded €31,178.29 and that Mr. Claparède should be awarded €26,950.01.

State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits

4.1

On 3 January 2022, the State Party submitted its observations on the admissibility and

merits of the communication. The State Party points out that the authors were recruited under

contracts of indeterminate duration by Lycée Léonard de Vinci as managers of an apprentice

training centre, known as the Hérault Public Apprentice Training Centre since 2011, by

means of supplementary agreements dated 1 September 2006 with retroactive effect from

1 September 2005 in the case of Mr. Claparède and Mr. Miguet and by a supplementary

agreement dated 31 August 2009 with effect from 1 September 2009 in the case of

Mr. Salelles. Responsibility for management of the Centre was transferred to Lycée Jean

Mermoz by a decision of 29 June 2012, but the authors refused to sign the contracts offered

to them by the director of that school, on the ground that they believed that the clauses relating

to the annual number of working hours were not compliant with the school’s legal obligations.

They were consequently dismissed pursuant to a decision of 3 October 2013.

4.2

The State Party notes that, on 15 July 2014, while the legal proceedings described by

the authors (paras. 2.1–2.7, above) were under way, the Montpellier Administrative Court, to

which the authors had submitted a claim for illegality of an administrative act, annulled the

contract proposals made by Lycée Jean Mermoz. The Administrative Court ruled that the

proposals, which did not reproduce the substantial clauses of the contracts held by the authors

prior to the transfer of responsibility for the management of the apprentice training centre,

were illegal. The authors also made a claim for damages in respect of their dismissals.

Following the rejection of their claim by the Montpellier Administrative Court on 29 April

2016, the Marseille Administrative Court of Appeal ordered Lycée Jean Mermoz to pay

€20,000 to Mr. Claparède, €40,000 to Mr. Miguet and €22,000 to Mr. Salelles.

4.3

The State Party asserts that the communication is inadmissible because it is manifestly

ill-founded, in accordance with article 3 (2) (e) of the Optional Protocol. The State Party

notes that the authors merely assert, without providing any further details, that the Marseille

Administrative Court of Appeal recognized that they had been forced to work without pay

and noted that no national legal text provides for the payment of the hours worked and

imposed. According to the State Party, the authors do not explain how its national law is

contrary to article 7 (a) of the Covenant. The State Party points out that it was only before

the Council of State that the authors invoked the general legal principle that all work deserves

a wage. The State Party concludes that the authors’ claims are thus not sufficiently

substantiated to enable the Committee to rule on their merits.

4.4

The State Party points out that it is not for the Committee to interpret the State Party’s

national legal order, but only to decide whether the assessment of evidence or the

interpretation of the national law applied was manifestly arbitrary or equivalent to a denial

of justice that violated a right enshrined in the Covenant.1 According to the State Party, in the

case at hand, the domestic courts examined the merits of the arguments raised before them in

detail and issued sufficiently reasoned rulings. The Montpellier Administrative Court

examined all the arguments put forward by the authors concerning the remuneration of the

hours they considered to be overtime and gave sufficient reasoning. On appeal, the Marseille

Administrative Court of Appeal did the same, deciding first to stay the proceedings and

1 Arellano Medina v. Ecuador (E/C.12/63/D/7/2015), para. 8.10 and Martínez Fernández v. Spain

(E/C.12/64/D/19/2016), para. 6.4.

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commission an expert appraisal to establish the number of hours worked by the authors in

order to be able to rule on the validity of their allegations. After the expert had delivered his

report, the Administrative Court of Appeal issued a ruling concerning the remuneration

requested by the authors. According to the State Party, the latter cannot seriously claim that

the national courts’ assessment of their appeals constitutes a denial of justice simply because

the appeals were rejected or because the Council of State did not admit their appeals in

cassation.

4.5

On the merits, and in the alternative, the State Party maintains that its national

legislation does not disregard the rights guaranteed by article 7 of the Covenant. With regard

to the number of teaching hours and compensation for hours allegedly worked in excess of

contractual obligations, the State Party asserts that the authors were not forced to work

teaching hours in excess of the annual service hours set out in their contracts. According to

settled jurisprudence, the authors’ status as non-tenured agents of the State means that private

law, and more specifically the Labour Code, does not apply to their employment relationship

with the public institution that employed them. As the courts ruled in the present case, there

is no legal or regulatory provision in the Labour Code establishing the number of service

hours required of teachers in apprentice training centres, since the status of such teachers

varies according to the nature of the organization managing the centre. Moreover, the State

Party notes that in view of the limited duration of agreements establishing apprentice training

centres, the Council of State considers that positions in such centres are necessarily temporary.

Thus, given the temporary nature of these positions and the specific nature of the teaching

provided in apprentice training centres, the appeal judge rightly found that such positions

were not equivalent to those held by teachers with the status of tenured civil servants and

thus did not have the same service obligations in terms of the annual number of service hours.

According to the State Party, the Marseille Administrative Court of Appeal legitimately

concluded that the annual number of service hours provided for in the authors’ contracts had

been legally established and the authors had therefore not worked any additional teaching

hours.

4.6

With regard to activities related to teaching and the remuneration of hours allegedly

worked in excess of contracted hours, the State Party points out that the authors’ contracts

stipulated that they could be required to work paid overtime in accordance with Decree

No. 68-536. Article 2 of that decree provides that “persons responsible for general, technical,

theoretical or practical teaching shall be remunerated for each hour of tuition provided by

means of an hourly wage determined in accordance with the procedures set out in article 5 of

the amended Decree of 6 October 1950”. Accordingly, as found by the Administrative Court

of Appeal, the overtime covered by these provisions comprises hours of tuition provided over

and above the number of contracted hours and does not include hours spent performing tasks

resulting from the provision of the contracted hours of tuition. According to the State Party,

the aforementioned provisions were thus not intended to serve as a basis for the remuneration

of the overtime claimed by the authors. The other texts on which the authors’ contracts were

based were also found by the appeal judge to provide no legal basis for the remuneration of

the overtime claimed. More generally, according to settled jurisprudence, no civil servant

may claim any right to remuneration or compensation other than that provided for in a law

or regulation (the “no compensation without law” principle). The State Party argues that the

appeal judge was therefore right to dismiss the authors’ claims for compensation and that,

given the absence of substantive arguments, the Council of State was entitled to reject their

appeals in cassation.

4.7

The State Party further argues that the hours spent preparing for the school semester,

attending teaching staff meetings and visiting business premises, for which the authors claim

overtime, formed part of their service obligations and were covered by their main salary. As

the authors were contractual employees of a local public educational establishment, they were

subject to the service regulations applicable to such staff, which are set with reference to

those applicable to tenured secondary school teachers. The authors were therefore required

to teach a maximum of 18 hours a week, i.e. 648 hours a year, to which must be added the

time spent performing the teaching-related tasks referred to in article 2 (II) of Decree

No. 2014-940 of 20 August 2014, for which no separate bonus is provided. Therefore, the

time spent preparing for the school semester and attending teaching staff meetings did not

entitle the authors to overtime pay, since these activities were covered by the remuneration

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they received for their main duties. Similarly, under article 5 of Decree No. 2014-940,

teachers must participate in the pedagogical supervision of students during periods of on-the-

job training. This means that the hours spent visiting business premises form part of their

service obligations, for which they receive their primary remuneration. The Marseille

Administrative Court of Appeal consequently ruled that the provisions of Decrees No. 68-

536 and No. 50-1253 did not apply in this case, since the hours worked did not comprise

hours of overtime tuition, but rather were hours of work that fell within the scope of the

authors’ main teaching duties that were remunerated as such.

4.8

The State Party points out that, as noted by the Montpellier Administrative Court in

its judgments of 17 October 2014, the apprentice support allowance paid to the authors under

Decree No. 99-703 was intended to compensate teachers for specific tasks carried out in the

apprenticeship context. According to the State Party, national laws and regulations ensure

that contractual teachers in local public educational establishments working in apprentice

training centres receive fair remuneration that covers the variety of tasks they perform. The

State Party stresses that the organization of the work and the terms of the remuneration of

contractual teachers, including in relation to overtime, are identical to those of tenured

teachers. The State Party concludes that the provisions of its domestic law concerning the

remuneration of contractual teachers such as the authors do not violate article 7 (1) (a) of the

Covenant.

Authors’ comments on the State Party’s observations

5.1

In their comments of 28 February 2022, the authors reiterate that, in its ruling of

13 July 2017, the Marseille Administrative Court of Appeal found that the hours for which

they were requesting overtime pay comprised hours spent on tasks related to the face-to-face

teaching that they had performed under their contracts. There is no provision for the payment

of such overtime in the terms and conditions of their contracts, and civil servants cannot claim

the benefit of any right to remuneration other than that provided for in the legally applicable

texts. The authors state that they are invoking article 7 of the Covenant to assert the principle

that all work deserves a wage. They reiterate that the domestic courts have recognized that

they are not entitled to pay for the hours they were “forced” to work. They claim to have

asserted their right to be paid for these hours, including before the Council of State.

5.2

The authors dispute the State Party’s observation that the role of the Committee is

limited to deciding whether the assessment of evidence or the interpretation of the domestic

law applied was manifestly arbitrary or equivalent to a denial of justice that violated a right

enshrined in the Covenant. They submit that it is not a question of challenging a court

decision, but rather of challenging the quality of the law, which, in their view, does not

guarantee that all hours of work are paid.

5.3

According to the authors, Memorandum No. 82-357 of 19 August 1982, which applied

to their contracts, provided for the remuneration of the hours worked. However, this provision

was not respected by the Hérault Public Apprentice Training Centre. The hours spent

completing accessory tasks, including liaising with companies, were all worked in addition

to the teaching hours stipulated in the authors’ contracts. They note that the purpose of a

memorandum is to apply the law, not to create it. They maintain that they had precarious jobs

as contractual workers in the French education system.2

5.4

On the merits, the authors point out that, in their view, the State Party acknowledges

that the hours worked over and above the hours stipulated in their employment contracts were

not paid, but, in the absence of an applicable law, the Administrative Court of Appeal was

unable to rule that they should be paid for those hours. They deduce from the State Party’s

comments that it recognizes that its national law lacks provisions for the application of

article 7 of the Covenant. They argue that the State Party claims that they are not entitled to

payment for hours spent performing teaching-related tasks because, as is the case for all civil

servants, these tasks are subsumed under teaching hours. However, they are not civil servants

and their contracts do not stipulate that they must work for free. The authors argue that, in its

2 The authors refer to the Committee’s general comment No. 23 (2016) on the right to just and

favourable conditions of work (E/C.12/GC/23), paras. 9 and 10.

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preliminary rulings of 15 January 2016, the Marseille Administrative Court of Appeal

recognized that they had indeed performed unpaid hours of work, carrying out tasks related

to teaching. They also reiterate the court-appointed expert’s conclusion that they had a

legitimate claim to compensation for hours worked over and above normal working hours. It

was only owing to the absence of an applicable national law that the Administrative Court of

Appeal was unable to rule that they should be compensated. They argue that, in the

aforementioned rulings, the Administrative Court of Appeal held that the apprentice support

allowance is not intended as remuneration for teaching-related activities and that they are

entitled to remuneration for their overtime.

B.

Committee’s consideration of admissibility

6.1

Prior to considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must

decide, in accordance with rule 10 (2) of its provisional rules of procedure under the Optional

Protocol, whether or not the communication is admissible.

6.2

The Committee recalls that under article 3 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol, it is not

competent to rule on communications relating to facts that occurred prior to the entry into

force of the Optional Protocol for the State Party concerned unless those facts continued after

that date. The Committee notes that the authors complain that they were not paid for certain

hours worked over the period 2008–2013 and that the Optional Protocol entered into force

for the State Party on 18 June 2015. The Committee recalls, however, that judicial decisions

of the national authorities are to be considered as part of the facts of the case when they are

the result of procedures directly connected with the initial facts, actions or omissions, which

gave rise to the violation, provided they are capable of remedying the alleged violation. If

such decisions are adopted after the Optional Protocol’s entry into force for the State Party

concerned, the criterion provided for in article 3 (2) (b) does not affect the admissibility of

the communication, since, when these remedies are exercised, the national courts have the

possibility of considering the complaints, putting an end to the alleged violations and

potentially providing redress.3 In the present case, the Committee notes that the Marseille

Administrative Court of Appeal and the Council of State took their respective decisions after

the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State Party, the former having examined

the merits of the authors’ claims in detail. As these decisions were capable of remedying the

violations alleged in the communication, the Committee concludes that article 3 (2) (b) of the

Optional Protocol does not preclude the admissibility of this communication.

6.3

The Committee takes note that the State Party considers that the communication is

inadmissible because it is manifestly ill-founded, in accordance with article 3 (2) (e) of the

Optional Protocol, on the grounds that the authors’ claims do not demonstrate that the

decisions of the national authorities were manifestly arbitrary or equivalent to a denial of

justice that violated a right enshrined in the Covenant. In this regard, the Committee recalls

its jurisprudence that its task in considering a communication is confined to assessing

whether the facts as described in the communication, including with regard to the application

of national law, reveal a violation by the State Party of the economic, social and cultural

rights set forth in the Covenant; it also recalls that it is primarily for the courts of the States

Parties to assess the facts and evidence in each case and to interpret and apply the relevant

legilsation.4 The Committee’s role, then, is solely to determine whether the assessment of

evidence or the application of national law was manifestly arbitrary or amounted to a denial

of justice that violated a right enshrined in the Covenant.5

3 In this respect, see I.D.G. v. Spain (E/C.12/55/D/2/2014), para. 9.3; C.A.P.M. v. Ecuador

(E/C.12/58/D/3/2014), para. 7.4; Martins Coelho v. Portugal (E/C.12/61/D/21/2017), para. 4.2;

Alarcón Flores et al. v. Ecuador (E/C.12/62/D/14/2016), para. 9.8; Arellano Medina v. Ecuador,

para. 8.3; Trujillo Calero v. Ecuador (E/C.12/63/D/10/2015), para. 9.5; S.C. and G.P. v. Italy

(E/C.12/65/D/22/2017), para. 6.6; and M.L.B. v. Luxembourg (E/C.12/66/D/20/2017), para. 7.2.

4 I.D.G. v. Spain, par. 13.1; López Rodríguez v. Spain (E/C.12/57/D/1/2013), para. 12; Arellano Medina

v. Ecuador, para. 8.10; and Martínez Fernández v. Spain, para. 6.4.

5 Ibid.

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6.4

In the present case, the Committee notes that the disputes between the parties concern

the interpretation and application of the provisions of domestic law relating to the salaries

paid to the authors and, more specifically, compensation for the unpaid hours the authors

claim to have worked. The Committee notes that the parties disagree, in particular, on

whether the domestic courts have recognized that the authors were not remunerated for hours

spent preparing for the school semester, attending teaching staff meetings and visiting

business premises, and on whether there is any legal provision for remuneration of such hours.

The Committee also notes that, according to the Marseille Administrative Court of Appeal,

these hours of work all related to the hours of face-to-face tuition they worked in accordance

with their contracts. The Committee observes that the Administrative Court of Appeal noted

that, according to article 2 of Decree No. 68-536, the authors were remunerated for each hour

of tuition provided by means of an hourly wage determined in accordance with the procedures

set out in article 5 of the Decree of 6 October 1950. The Committee notes that, according to

the domestic courts, the hours of work that the authors claimed as overtime fell within the

scope of their service obligations under article 2 of Decree No. 2014-940 and were therefore

covered by their main salary. The Committee also notes that, while the authors argue that the

State Party erroneously refers to the legislative framework applicable to “civil servants”, the

State Party points out that the organization of the work of contractual teachers in local public

educational establishments and the terms of their remuneration are identical to those of

tenured teachers. The Committee further notes the absence of any other relevant evidence in

the file to demonstrate that the domestic courts’ conclusion that the applicable domestic law

does not prescribe separate remuneration for the specified hours in addition to their main

salaries was manifestly arbitrary, or that this law is itself contrary to the Covenant. In this

respect, the Committee notes that the authors challenge the interpretation of domestic law by

the domestic courts, without demonstrating that this interpretation was arbitrary or that it

amounted to a denial of justice. The Committee further considers that the authors have not

provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that their remuneration was contrary to their

rights under article 7 (a) of the Covenant. Consequently, the Committee concludes that the

authors have not sufficiently substantiated their claims and that the communication is

inadmissible under article 3 (2) (e) of the Optional Protocol.

C.

Conclusion

7.

The Committee therefore decides:

(a)

That the communication is inadmissible under article 3 (2) (e) of the Optional

Protocol;

(b)

That the present decision shall be communicated to the State Party and to the

authors.