opencaselaw.ch

CEDAW/C/91/D/169/2021

K.J. v. Switzerland

UNO-Frauenrechtsausschuss (CEDAW) · · en CH

Decision on merits; Subjects: WOMEN'S RIGHTS, GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE, SWITZERLAND; [CEDAW: Frauenrechtskonvention, Übereinkommen zur Beseitigung jeder Form von Diskriminierung der Frau; Convention sur l'élimination de la discrimination à l'égard des femmes]

Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)

United Nations

CEDAW/C/91/D/169/2021

Convention on the Elimination

of All Forms of Discrimination

against Women

Distr.: General

21 July 2025

Original: English

25-12060 (E) 150825

*2512060*

Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination

against Women

Views adopted by the Committee under article 7 (3) of

the Optional Protocol, concerning communication

No. 169/2021*,**,***

Communication submitted by:

K.J. (represented by counsel)

Alleged victim:

The author

State Party:

Switzerland

Date of communication:

10 May 2021

References:

Transmitted to the State Party on

19 May 2021 (not issued in document

form)

Date of adoption of views:

4 July 2025

Subject matter:

Removal of a woman who is a survivor

of sexual and gender-based violence

under the Dublin III Regulation to

Greece

Procedural issues:

Exhaustion of domestic remedies; lack

of substantiation

Substantive issues:

Non-refoulement; gender-based

violence

Articles of the Convention:

2 (c)–(f), 3 and 12

Article of the Optional Protocol:

4 (1) and (2)

* Adopted by the Committee at its ninety-first session (16 June–4 July 2025).

** The following members of the Committee participated in the examination of the present

communication: Brenda Akia, Hiroko Akizuki, Hamida Al-Shukairi, Violet Eudine Barriteau,

Rangita de Silva de Alwis, Corinne Dettmeijer-Vermeulen, Nada Moustafa Fathi Draz, Yamila

González Ferrer, Madina Jarbussynova, Marianne Mikko, Mu Hong, Ana Peláez Narváez,

Jelena Pia-Comella, Bandana Rana, Elgun Safarov and Patsilí Toledo Vásquez.

*** A joint opinion of Committee members Hiroko Akizuki, Rangita de Silva de Alwis, Corinne

Dettmeijer-Vermeulen and Jelena Pia-Comella (dissenting) is annexed to the present views.

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1.1 The communication is submitted by K.J., a national of Afghanistan, born in

1993. The author claims to be a victim of a violation by Switzerland of her rights

under articles 2 (c)–(f), 3 and 12 of the Convention. The Optional Protocol to the

Convention entered into force for Switzerland on 29 December 2008. The author is

represented by counsel, Stephanie Motz and Lea Hungerbühler.

1.2 On 19 May 2021, the Committee, acting under article 5 (1) of the Optional

Protocol, through its Working Group on Communications under the Optional

Protocol, requested the State Party to refrain from returning the author to Greece

pending consideration of her communication. On 20 May 2021, the State Party

informed the Committee that the State Secretariat for Migration had requested the

competent authority not to take any steps to transfer the author to Greece.

Facts as submitted by the author

2.1 The author belongs to the Hazara ethnic group in Afghanistan. As a young child,

she and her family were forced to flee from their home in Afghanistan to the Islamic

Republic of Iran. At the age of 17, her brother forcibly married her by custom to a

44-year-old man as his second wife in order to use her dowry to pay for surgery for

their severely sick mother.

2.2 The author was regularly mistreated, sexually abused and raped by her husband.

Owing to the patriarchal system in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the lack of

protection for victims of marital rape and domestic violence, she was unable to obtain

any protection. After a particularly violent rape, the author went to the police, who

told her that to prove that she had been raped, she would have to undergo a medical

examination, which in the Islamic Republic of Iran is possible only with the

agreement of the husband or legal guardian, which she refused as a result. Since the

author was unable to prove the incidents, she was forced to leave the police station

and went to her parents’ home. Shortly after having reported the sexual violence to

the police, the author received a letter1 stating that the investigation had been closed

as marital rape was not a punishable offence.

2.3 The author tried to stay with her parents to avoid living with her husband. After

a short period of time, her husband started blackmailing her parents: if she wanted to

stay with them, the parents had to pay back the dowry. Since they could not repay the

amount, the father sent the author back to her violent husband. Besides the sexual

violence, which occurred on a regular basis, her husband cut off her hair and

threatened to cut off other body parts if she didn’t “behave”. He also regularly choked

her with a belt up to the point at which she lost consciousness.

2.4 The domestic violence became so serious that her husband broke her hand while

attacking her with a chair. He forbade her to go to the hospital, even though she was

in intolerable pain. Her neighbours saw her suffering and later helped her to flee the

country.2

2.5 On the way to Greece, the author was violently raped near the Iraqi-Turkish

border by a friend of the smuggler, and upon her arrival in Greece, she realized that

she was pregnant. After finally reaching Lesbos in October 2017, she was raped two

more times within one month.3 After the first incident, she went to the police to report

the rape. Since she could not identify the offender, the police did not commence any

__________________

1 Presumably from the police, but the author does not specify.

2 No further information provided.

3 The author submitted a sexual violence medical certificate issued in Greece on 18 October 2017,

the date of the initial medical examination.

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investigation. Nor did they send her to a specialized aid organization for victims of

sexual violence. After the second rape, she therefore did not inform the police.

2.6 In November 2017, she had an illegal abortion in Athens. A few months later, in

response to threats from her husband, who claimed to be following her, she moved to

Athens, where she was raped again, this time on the streets of the city. She tried to

make a complaint at the police station. Again, no assistance of any kind was provided

to her. After this incident, she returned to Lesbos, since she felt less unsafe there.

2.7 On an unspecified date, the author applied for asylum in Greece. On 25 October

2018, the author had her asylum interview in Athens and, on 5 November 2018, was

granted refugee status. Owing to that status, the housing, financial aid and other

support that she was receiving came to an end on 31 August 2019. As a result, the

author was forced to fend for herself on the streets, with no protection from sexual

and physical assault. Furthermore, she was no longer able to get any medical or

mental health treatment, which she urgently required, because the services were

available only to asylum-seekers, not to recognized refugees. In addition, she was told

that her violent husband had followed her to Athens and was looking for her. When

she asked for help in that regard, no support was provided.4 As a consequence, she

was again forced to flee in order to have her basic needs covered and to obtain

protection from gender-based violence.

2.8 On 14 September 2019, the author arrived in Switzerland. 5 She applied for

asylum two days later. On 19 September 2019, as a result of a search using the

Eurodac system, it transpired that she had been granted refugee protection in Greece.

In her interview under Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and

of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for

determining the member State responsible for examining an application for

international protection lodged in one of the member States by a third-country

national or a stateless person (Dublin III Regulation), she was asked to provide

summary reasons as to why she could not be removed to Greece as a safe third

country. The author raised the fact that she had been raped and stated that, during the

year and a half that she had spent in Greece, she had not felt safe on a single day or

night. On 1 October 2019, the author was summarily interviewed by the State

Secretariat for Migration. On 21 October 2019, the Greek authorities responded

positively to the Swiss readmission request.

2.9 On 10 January 2020, the State Secretariat for Migration conducted an interview

with the author, during which she was able to raise her particular vulnerability as a

survivor of sexual and gender-based violence as a factor that had not been sufficiently

assessed. On 14 January 2020, the basic medical service in the asylum camp assessed

the author to be displaying psychological problems including depression, prescribed

her medication and recommended that she undergo further medical examinations. On

20 January 2020, the State Secretariat for Migration ordered her removal from

Switzerland on the basis of the readmission agreement with Greece, asserting that the

author came under the protection of the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees and women’s organizations. The author submits that the

State Secretariat for Migration failed to consider that, despite the presence of such

organizations in Greece, she still experienced gender-based violence, was repeatedly

raped and followed by her husband and hence would face great danger if returned to

Greece.

__________________

4 No details provided as to whom or which authority the author asked for assistance.

5 The author took a direct flight from Athens to Switzerland with her Greek passport for

foreigners and Greek identity card for foreigners.

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2.10 On 28 January 2020, the author appealed to the Federal Administrative Court,

claiming extreme vulnerability as a woman who had been a victim of gender-specific

persecution and who was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. She requested

the annulment of the decision of the State Secretariat for Migration of 21 January

2020 and the acceptance of her asylum application or, alternatively, a reassessment.

From a procedural point of view, she requested that the proceedings be conducted free

of charge and that an advance on costs be waived. In a judgment dated 3 February

2020, the Court dismissed the appeal on the basis that Greece was a safe third country

and that the author would therefore be able to obtain the necessary medical treatment

there, finding that the presumption of safety had not been rebutted. Concerning the

author’s fear of gender-based persecution, as her husband was looking for her and she

would face dangerous living conditions in Greece, the Court stated that Greece was

bound by the rule of law and had a functioning police and justice system. The Court

therefore dismissed the appeal on the grounds that Greece was a safe third country.

The author was hospitalized from 11 February to 3 March 2020 owing to a major

depressive episode.6

2.11 On 24 March 2021, the State Secretariat for Migration denied the author’s

request for reconsideration, on the grounds that adequate medical treatment facilities

were available in Greece. On 16 April 2021, the author appealed the decision to the

Federal Administrative Court. She argued that a removal would put her at risk of

gender-based violence, torture and inhuman treatment owing to the lack of social,

medical and legal support and police protection available, in combination with her

particularly vulnerable situation and the fact that she would be homeless. Her appeal

was dismissed the same day. On 30 April 2021, the author applied for reconsideration

of that decision, since the Court had not considered the evidence submitted previously

about the sexual and gender-based violence to which she had been subjected in

Greece. In an interim decision dated 5 May 2021, the Court confirmed its decision

withdrawing suspensive effect and noting that the mentioned evidence would be of

no relevance.

2.12 Referring to her health issues, the author submits that she is suffering from

serious mental health issues and was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder,

episodic panic disorder and a medium to severe depressive episode. The author is

extremely destabilized, which led to inpatient treatment of several weeks from

February to March 2020 due to suicidal ideation. After the inpatient therapy, the

doctors considered it essential for her to continue with the therapy and to establish a

stable setting for such therapy. In November 2020, she was again hospitalized in the

trauma department for about four months. In a medical report of March 2021, it was

highlighted that long-term medical treatment and therapy were urgently required.

2.13 The author affirms that most refugees who are returned to Greece by other

European countries are taken back to Athens. In Athens, she would be exposed to a

serious and real risk of sexual and gender-based violence. Young unaccompanied

women in particular are at real risk of exploitation and sexual abuse, without any legal

or physical protection by the police – even more so if they do not speak Greek.

Complaint

3.1 The author claims that the State Party has failed to undertake an individualized

and gender-sensitive assessment of her asylum and reconsideration applications in

breach of her rights under articles 2 (e) and (f) and 3 of the Convention, as well as in

__________________

6 Subsequently, as shown in a crisis intervention report of 7 October 2020, a moderate depressive

episode, post-traumatic stress disorder and a panic disorder were diagnosed.

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connection to the Committee’s general recommendation No. 32 (2014) on the gender-

related dimensions of refugee status, asylum, nationality and statelessness of women. 7

3.2 The author further claims that the State Party authorities have decided to remove

her to a State where she will face a real, serious and personal risk of gender-based

violence and a lack of needed medical treatment in breach of articles 2 (c)–(f), 3 and

12 of the Convention. She claims that the removal of recognized refugees with a

particular vulnerability to Greece, with its desolate living conditions and inadequate

medical treatment options, would violate the refoulement prohibition. 8

3.3 She further affirms that her removal would amount to torture and ill-treatment

in violation of her rights under articles 2 (c)–(f), 3 and 12 of the Convention in the

light of her being a highly vulnerable, suicidal survivor of severe sexual and gender-

based violence and that, in Greece,9 she would be uprooted from her stable therapy

setting and would have no access to housing, mental health, medical, legal or social

support and would be exposed to a serious and real risk of further serious sexual and

gender-based violence – including threats from her husband – without any State

protection.

3.4 The author claims that her removal to Greece entails a real risk of torture or

inhuman and degrading treatment and further sexual and gender-based violence in

violation of the refoulement prohibition as guaranteed under the Convention because

of the combination of above-mentioned case-specific factors going beyond the

deplorable general situation for refugees in Greece.

State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits

4.1 On 25 January 2022, the State Party provided its observations regarding

admissibility and the merits, focusing on several key factual clarifications and legal

arguments. It offers a detailed account of the author’s circumstances in the Islamic

Republic of Iran and the legal proceedings that ensued.

4.2 The State Party highlights that the author did not raise the issue of sexual

violence in Greece or invoke the guarantees of the Convention during her ordinary

asylum and appeal proceedings or in the request for reconsideration. These issues

were mentioned only in her appeal to the Federal Administrative Court on 16 April

2021, long after the initial proceedings. The Court noted that the author ’s allegation

that she had been a victim of sexual violence in Greece must be considered as having

been made subsequently and was thus implausible. Consequently, the Court dismissed

her appeal as inadmissible on 18 May 2021, citing the untimeliness of the allegations

without a plausible justification and her failure to pay the advance on costs.

4.3 The State Party argues that the author’s complaints to the Committee are

inadmissible because she did not exhaust domestic remedies by failing to raise these

issues earlier in the domestic proceedings. Moreover, the State Party points out that

the author’s communication to the Committee is insufficiently substantiated, as

required under article 4 (2) (c) of the Optional Protocol. The Committee, in its

jurisprudence, has emphasized that it does not replace national authorities in assessing

facts or evidence unless the assessment was biased, based on gender stereotypes or

arbitrary, or amounted to a denial of justice.

__________________

7 See R.S.A.A. et al. v. Denmark (CEDAW/C/73/D/86/2015).

8 Human Rights Committee, O.A. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/121/D/2770/2016), para. 8.9 ff.; and

Committee against Torture, A.N. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/64/D/742/2016), paras. 7.3 and 8.8.

9 Reference is made to the recent decision by Switzerland to reconsider a comparable case

following a request by the Committee for interim measures (see M.M. v. Switzerland

(CEDAW/C/81/D/160/2020)).

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4.4 The State Party provides details of the procedures followed in the author’s case,

noting that she applied for asylum in Switzerland on 16 September 2019 and was

individually interviewed on 1 October 2019, where she was given the opportunity to

present her case and any reasons against her transfer to Greece. During this interview,

the author stated that she had left the Islamic Republic of Iran owing to the

ill-treatment to which she was subjected by her husband, and mentioned the difficult

living conditions that she had experienced in Greece, the fear of her husband finding

her and her psychological problems, but she expressly stated that she had not

encountered any problems in Greece. The Swiss authorities, after considering her

statements and the conditions in Greece, concluded that Greece was a safe country

for the author, where she could receive protection and assistance. The State Party

submits that, in its judgment of 20 January 2020, the State Secretariat for Migration

stated that the medical problems claimed were not so serious that they could not be

adequately treated in Greece, which was a member State of the European Union. The

State Party maintains that the medical reports submitted in the context of the

reconsideration proceedings10 do not contraindicate a removal to Greece.

4.5 The State Party also notes that the domestic authorities, including the State

Secretariat for Migration and the Federal Administrative Court, conducted a thorough

and individualized examination of the author’s case, considering all relevant aspects,

including her health condition and the threats from her husband. The State Secretariat

for Migration noted that Greece had adequate medical infrastructure and that the

author could continue her treatment there. The Federal Administrative Court

confirmed these findings in its ruling of 3 February 2020 and again in its subsequent

decisions.

4.6 The State Party concludes that the author’s complaint to the Committee was

formulated in a very general manner and did not demonstrate, with concrete evidence,

that the national authorities’ assessment of her case was biased or arbitrary. The State

Party emphasizes that the domestic authorities did not ignore the author’s gender-

related arguments but concluded that her return to Greece was lawful and that Greece

could provide adequate protection for her as a recognized refugee.

4.7 The State Party also addresses the author’s claim that she would face inhuman

and degrading treatment in Greece. It argues that Greece, as a State member of the

European Union, is bound by European Union law, which ensures that refugees

receive adequate protection and assistance, including access to healthcare and

housing. It asserts that the Greek police could protect the author from any threats

posed by her husband and that Greece has the medical facilities necessary to treat her

condition. Furthermore, the State Party emphasizes that the European Court of Human

Rights has consistently held that Greece provides adequate protection to refugees and

that the Committee should not substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of

the national authorities.

4.8 Finally, the State Party submits that the author has not provided evidence to

substantiate her claim that she would face a real risk of inhuman or degrading

treatment if returned to Greece. It argues that the author’s general references to

reports on the situation in Greece do not sufficiently demonstrate that her return

would violate her rights under the Convention. The State Party concludes that the

__________________

10 Medical report of 3 March 2020 and discharge report of 17 March 2021: accounts of inpatient

psychiatric treatment from 11 February to 3 March 2020 and from November 2020 to March

2021. In the first report, it was indicated that the author had suffered experiences of abuse in the

Islamic Republic of Iran and Greece, without, however, elaborating on them. In the second, it

was indicated that, during the second treatment, the trauma-specific therapy showed very good

results with regard to improvements in post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms and in the

depressive symptomatology.

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author’s communication should be declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust

domestic remedies and for lack of sufficient substantiation and that, even if it were

admissible, it should be dismissed on the merits, as the national authorities had

conducted a thorough and fair examination of her case.

4.9 In sum, the State Party submits arguments concerning: (a) the delay in raising

the complaint, as the author only mentioned her experiences of sexual violence in

Greece during a late stage in the Swiss domestic proceedings, specifically in her

appeal to the Federal Administrative Court on 16 April 2021, and this delay led the

Court to declare her appeal inadmissible, as it was out of time and lacked a substantive

basis for success; (b) the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, as the author did not

pay the advance costs required for her appeal, resulting in its inadmissibility;

(c) insufficient substantiation, as the author’s communication to the Committee

lacked concrete details to support her claims, while the Swiss authorities had

conducted a thorough individual examination of her case, considering all relevant

aspects, including gender-related issues; (d) the assessment of the facts by national

authorities, as it is generally the responsibility of national authorities to assess the

facts, the evidence and the application of national law, unless the assessment was

arbitrary or discriminatory or constituted a denial of justice; (e) procedural fairness,

as the author had been given ample opportunity to present her case during the asylum

proceedings in the State Party, including a hearing with an interpreter, and the

domestic authorities had considered her arguments and evidence before concluding

that her return to Greece would be lawful and safe; (f) compatibility with international

standards, as Greece is obligated under European Union law to provide adequate

protection and support to refugees, including access to healthcare and housing, the

author could continue her medical treatment in Greece, and the Greek police could

protect her from any threats posed by her husband; (g) the contradictions in the

author’s statements, in particular regarding her claim that she had got remarried to a

Greek national, who had also mistreated her, the inconsistencies surrounding which

raised doubts about the credibility of her claims of sexual violence in Greece; and

(h) the author’s procedural rights, as those rights, including the right to be heard and

the opportunity to appeal decisions, were respected throughout the asylum process,

so the fact that she did not pursue those remedies to their conclusion does not

constitute a violation of the Convention.

Author’s comments on the State Party’s observations on admissibility and

the merits

5.1 The author disputes the State Party’s claim that she failed to exhaust domestic

remedies in her case, arguing that there is no requirement under the Convention to

raise issues of sexual violence in a specific domestic procedure. She asserts that she

did raise the issue in her appeal to the Federal Administrative Court and that the

authorities were already aware of her experiences of sexual and gender-based

violence from earlier medical reports11 and asylum procedures.

5.2 The author contends that the national authorities failed to thoroughly investigate

her claims or provide a supportive environment for disclosure, 12 arguing that this

failure led to an inadequate consideration of her vulnerability and risk of being

subjected to sexual and gender-based violence in the future. She also challenges the

State Party’s reliance on the theoretical commitments of Greece to international law

rather than assessing her specific situation. The author concludes that she has

__________________

11 The author argues that the sexual violence that she suffered in Greece was documented in a

medical report of 3 March 2020 and that her reporting of it could therefore not be described as

late, nor could her claims in that regard be described as implausible.

12 No further detail provided.

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exhausted all available domestic remedies and sufficiently substantiated her claim of

procedural violations under the Convention.

5.3 The author argues that the State Party’s claims of a thorough and gender-

sensitive examination of her asylum case are inaccurate. The author contends that the

State Party merely referenced the theoretical legal obligations of Greece without

addressing specific evidence or reports, including medical documentation detailing

her experiences of sexual and gender-based violence. In its decisions, the State Party

did not adequately consider the actual conditions in Greece or the author’s specific

vulnerabilities.

5.4 The author asserts that the State Party failed to conduct a proper individualized

and gender-specific assessment, relying instead on generalized legal commitments by

Greece and not addressing the detailed medical and psychological evidence

submitted. She argues that the State Party’s approach disregarded the trauma that she

had experienced and the need for a supportive environment for full disclosure.

5.5 Furthermore, the author refutes the State Party’s claim that she did not raise

procedural violations or provide adequate details. She points out that she did raise

these issues in her appeals and that the State Party’s procedural shortcomings,

including inadequate risk assessments and lack of sensitivity to sexual and gender-

based violence, violated international and domestic legal standards.

5.6 In addition, the author highlights the deteriorating situation for refugees in

Greece, in particular for those with mental health issues and survivors of trauma.

Recent changes in Greek law and reports of inadequate support for such individuals

underscore the increased risk that the author would face if returned to Greece. The

author notes that the Swiss Federal Administrative Court has recently ruled that

returning vulnerable individuals to Greece is unreasonable, countering the State

Party’s claims about the compliance of Greece with international standards.

5.7 The author argues that, by relying on the theoretical obligations of Greece,

rather than addressing actual conditions or evidence, the State Party failed to provide

a proper assessment of her situation. Despite numerous reports highlighting the dire

circumstances for refugees in Greece, in particular survivors of sexual and gender-

based violence, the State Party has not presented any concrete evidence of the

effective implementation of Greek laws.

5.8 The author emphasizes her right to rehabilitation as a survivor of multiple

incidents of sexual and gender-based violence, irrespective of where these occurred.

She criticizes the State Party for not addressing her initial disclosure of sexual and

gender-based violence and for failing to consider the lack of adequate rehabilitation

services in Greece, which violates international obligations under the Convention on

the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention

against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

5.9 The State Party’s argument that the author’s symptoms of post-traumatic stress

disorder have improved and could be managed in Greece is challenged by the author,

who points out that evidence in support of the State Party’s affirmation that adequate

services are available is lacking. The author also disputes the State Party’s claim about

the handling of her health issues during the readmission process (claiming that the

State Secretariat for Migration had failed to inform the Greek authorities about her

vulnerabilities) and the potential for adequate protection from her husband’s threats

in Greece.

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Issues and proceedings before the Committee

Consideration of admissibility

6.1 In accordance with rule 64 of its rules of procedure, the Committee must decide

whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol. In accordance

with rule 72 (4), it is to do so before considering the merits of the communication.

6.2 In accordance with article 4 (1) of the Optional Protocol, the Committee shall

not consider a communication unless it has ascertained that all available domestic

remedies have been exhausted, unless the application of such remedies is unreasonably

prolonged or unlikely to bring effective relief. The Committee notes the State Party’s

challenges to the admissibility of the communication on this ground, given that the

author raised her claims that she had been raped in Greece late in her appeal of 16 April

2021 to the Federal Administrative Court.

6.3 The Committee recalls its jurisprudence, in which it is established that authors

must have raised the claims that they wish to bring before the Committee in substance

at the domestic level 13 in order to give the domestic authorities and courts an

opportunity to take a decision thereon.14 It also notes that the author raised the issue

of sexual violence experienced in Greece in her appeal to the Federal Administrative

Court on 16 April 2021, thereby giving the national authorities the opportunity to

examine those claims.

6.4 The Committee also notes that the author underwent a full asylum procedure,

followed by a re-examination procedure; that her request for suspensive effect was

denied; and that she was ordered to pay a fee in the amount of 1,500 Swiss francs. In

this regard, the Committee takes note of the author’s contention that, as her request

for suspensive effect had been denied, the appeal to the Federal Administrative Court

did not constitute an effective remedy as defined in article 4 of the Optional Protocol.

The Committee considers that the author exhausted domestic remedies because she

had claimed specifically, although late, that she had been subjected twice to sexual

violence in Greece in her appeal (complaint and application for super-provisional

measures) to the Federal Administrative Court, which could have resolved the

substance of the claim brought before the Committee. Accordingly, the Committee

considers that it is not precluded by the requirements of article 4 (1) of the Optional

Protocol from examining the present communication.

6.5 The Committee notes the author’s claim that, by returning her to Greece, the

State Party would expose her to a real and personal risk of serious forms of gender-

based violence. In view of the information provided, in particular regarding the

author’s vulnerable situation as a survivor of sexual violence in the Islamic Republic

of Iran with recognized refugee status and the alleged failure of the national

authorities to conduct an individualized trauma-informed and gender-sensitive

assessment, the Committee considers that the author’s claims are sufficiently

substantiated for the purposes of admissibility. Accordingly, it proceeds with the

examination of the merits of the communication.

__________________

13 See Kayhan v. Turkey (CEDAW/C/34/D/8/2005), para. 7.7, M.A. v. Switzerland

(CEDAW/C/80/D/145/2019), para. 6.7, and S.T.H. v. Switzerland (CEDAW/C/87/D/165/2021),

para. 7.5.

14 See N.S.F. v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

(CEDAW/C/38/D/10/2005), para. 7.3, M.A. v. Switzerland, para. 6.7, and S.T.H. v. Switzerland,

para. 7.5.

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Consideration of the merits

7.1 The Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the

information made available to it by the author and by the State Party, in accordance

with the provisions of article 7 (1) of the Optional Protocol.

7.2 The Committee takes note of the author’s undisputed claim that she is a survivor

of severe gender-based violence that was inflicted on her from an early age in the

Islamic Republic of Iran and while fleeing near the Iraqi-Turkish border, for which

she was recognized as a refugee in Greece. The Committee also notes the author ’s

claim that she was subjected to gender-based violence in Greece – in Lesbos, where

she was raped twice within a month, and in Athens. The Committee takes note that

the sustained violence led to the deterioration of her mental health and that she suffers

from depression and has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and

episodic panic disorder. The Committee observes that the author’s vulnerability in

terms of her mental health has been ascertained in several medical reports by

psychiatrists issued in the State Party.

7.3 The Committee reiterates that, according to its jurisprudence, the Convention

has extraterritorial effect only when the woman to be returned will be exposed to a

real, personal and foreseeable risk of serious forms of gender-based violence.15

7.4 The Committee recalls that, under article 2 (d) of the Convention, States Parties

undertake to refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against

women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions act in conformity with

that obligation. The Committee also recalls that, under international human rights law,

the non-refoulement principle imposes a duty on States to refrain from returning a

person to a jurisdiction in which he or she may face serious violations of human rights,

notably arbitrary deprivation of life or torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading

treatment or punishment.16 In addition, the Committee considers that gender-based

violence, which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and

fundamental freedoms under general international law or under human rights

conventions, is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention and

that such rights include the right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture. 17

The Committee has further developed its interpretation of violence against women as

a form of gender-based discrimination in its general recommendation No. 35 (2017)

on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19,

reaffirming the obligation of States Parties to eliminate discrimination against

women, including gender-based violence against women, stating that the obligation

comprises two aspects of State responsibility for such violence, that which results

from the acts or omissions of both the State Party or its actors, on the one hand, and

non-State actors, on the other.18 A State Party would therefore be in violation of the

Convention if it returned a person to another State where it was foreseeable that

serious gender-based violence would be inflicted on that person. Such a violation

would also occur when no protection against the identified gender-based violence can

be expected from the authorities of the State to which the person is to be returned.

What amounts to serious forms of gender-based violence depends upon the

circumstances of each case and must be determined by the Committee on a case-by-

__________________

15 See, for example, M.N.N. v. Denmark (CEDAW/C/55/D/33/2011), para. 8.10, and R.S.A.A. et al.

v. Denmark, para. 7.7.

16 General recommendation No. 32, para. 21.

17 General recommendation No. 19 (1992) on violence against women, para. 7.

18 General recommendation No. 35, para. 21.

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case basis at the stage of consideration of the merits, provided that the author has

made a prima facie case by sufficiently substantiating her allegations. 19

7.5 In the present case, the Committee notes the State Party’s contention that all the

author’s allegations were thoroughly examined by the State Party’s immigration

authorities. At the same time, the Committee observes that the author ’s allegations

that she had been raped three times in Greece had been dismissed because the

authorities considered that she had brought those allegations late in the proceedings,

which affected her credibility.

7.6 In that connection, the Committee recalls that it is generally for the authorities

of States Parties to the Convention to evaluate the facts and evidence and the

application of national law in a particular case,20 unless it can be established that the

evaluation was biased or based on gender stereotypes that constitute discrimination

against women, was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. The issue

before the Committee is therefore whether there was any irregularity or arbitrariness

in the decision-making process regarding the author’s asylum application to the extent

that the State Party authorities failed to properly assess the risk of irreparable harm

to the author if she was returned to Greece under the Dublin III Regulation. The

Committee reiterates that, in carrying out their assessment, States Parties should give

sufficient weight to the real and personal risk that a person might face if deported.

7.7 In the present case, the Committee considers that it was incumbent upon the

State Party to undertake an individualized assessment of the real, personal and

foreseeable risk that the author would face as an unaccompanied woman victim of

severe gender-based violence suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and

depression.

7.8 The Committee considers that the State Party did not appear to accord any due

weight to the author’s vulnerable status as a refugee and victim of severe gender-

based violence suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and depression. The

Committee therefore considers that, given the author’s status as a recognized refugee

and survivor of gender-based violence and the time often required in order for victims

to be able to speak about such violence,21 it was not sufficient for the State Party to

dismiss her claim that she had been subjected to gender-based violence in Greece

merely because she had brought it later in the proceedings. In addition, the Committee

considers that the State Party has not examined in an individualized and sufficiently

thorough manner the foreseeable consequences for the author’s mental health if she

is forcibly removed from a country where she is currently in a stable therapy setting.

The Committee therefore considers that a more thorough risk assessment would have

been required by the exigencies of the case.

8.

Accordingly, acting under article 7 (3) of the Optional Protocol to the

Convention, the Committee concludes that the removal of the author would amount

to a breach of articles 2 (c)–(f), 3 and 12 of the Convention.

9.

The Committee makes the following recommendations to the State Party:

(a) Concerning the author of the communication:

(i)

Reopen her asylum request, taking into account the Committee’s views;

__________________

19 See A. v. Denmark (CEDAW/C/62/D/53/2013), para. 8.6, and R.S.A.A. et al. v. Denmark,

para. 7.8.

20 See, for example, R.P.B. v. Philippines (CEDAW/C/57/D/34/2011), para. 7.5, and R.S.A.A. et al.

v. Denmark, para.8.4.

21 European Court of Human Rights, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09,

Judgment, 21 January 2011 para. 254, and N.H. et al. v. France, Application Nos. 28820/13,

75547/13 and 13114/15, Judgment, 2 July 2020, para. 100.

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(ii) Refrain from returning her to Greece while the reassessment of her case is

still pending;

(iii) Provide continued specialized medical support;

(b) General:

(i)

Take all measures necessary to ensure that victims of gender-based

violence with refugee status who are in need of protection are not returned to

the country of their first entry under the Dublin III Regulation without an

individualized, trauma-informed and gender-sensitive assessment of the real

risk of irreparable harm.

10. In accordance with article 7 (4) of the Optional Protocol, the State Party shall

give due consideration to the views of the Committee, together with its

recommendations, and shall submit to the Committee, within six months, a written

response, including information on any action taken in the light of the views and

recommendations of the Committee. The State Party is also requested to publish the

Committee’s views and recommendations and to have them widely disseminated in

order to reach all relevant sectors of society.

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Annex

Joint opinion of Committee members Hiroko Akizuki,

Rangita de Silva de Alwis, Corinne Dettmeijer-Vermeulen

and Jelena Pia-Comella (dissenting)

1.

We are of the opinion that the communication is inadmissible under article 4 (2) (c)

of the Optional Protocol.

2.

We have taken note of the author’s undisputed claim that she is a survivor of

severe gender-based violence inflicted upon her from an early age in the Islamic

Republic of Iran and while fleeing near the Iraqi-Turkish border, for which she has

been granted refugee status by Greece.

3.

We have noted the State Party’s argument that the author’s claim of a fear of

sexual and gender-based violence specifically in Greece was raised very late and

without a plausible explanation. We observe that her failure to justify the late

submission about the sexual and gender-based violence in Greece affected the

author’s credibility. We also note that the author had opportunities to raise her claim

about sexual violence suffered in Greece, together with claims of sexual violence

endured at the hand of her husband in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as at the

Iraqi-Turkish border, at an early stage of the asylum proceedings – in her interviews

with the State Secretariat for Migration in October 2019 and January 2020, in her first

appeal to the Federal Administrative Court in January 2020 and in her request for

reconsideration submitted to the State Secretariat for Migration in early 2021. In this

regard, we further note the author’s allegation that she did not have a supportive

environment in which to reveal the sexual violence that she had endured in Greece.

However, we observe that the author has failed to stipulate and substantiate the

specific conditions that would have prevented her from raising this claim earlier.

4.

We have noted the decision of the Federal Administrative Court of 5 May 2021

in conjunction with its decision of 16 April 2021, in which it stated that “according

to the crisis intervention report of 9 October 2020 of the Psychiatric Services Thurgau,

which is in the files, the complainant stated that she had married a Greek in Greece

who had abused her, which is why she had fled to Switzerland (cf. p. 3), that these

statements contradict earlier statements according to which the complainant was

primarily afraid of being tracked down in Greece by her husband who lived in Iran,

that in the complaint against the reconsideration decision, it is argued for the first

time that the complainant was the victim of rape twice on the island of Lesvos and

once in Athens, that contradictory information on the place and extent of the sexual

violence suffered was thus submitted in the course of the proceedings, that these

contradictions are capable of casting doubt on the complainant’s submissions”.

5.

We recall that it is generally for the authorities of States Parties to the

Convention to evaluate the facts and evidence in a particular case, 1 unless it can be

established that this evaluation was biased or based on gender stereotypes that

constitute discrimination against women or that it was clearly arbitrary or amounted

to a denial of justice. We consider that the fact that the State Party authorities took

this issue as an element undermining the credibility of the author ’s allegations in the

absence of a plausible explanation does not appear to be arbitrary, gender-biased or a

denial of justice.

6.

We note that the Convention must be interpreted in accordance with the general

principles of international law. In such interpretation, due account must be taken of

__________________

1 See, for example, R.P.B. v. Philippines (CEDAW/C/57/D/34/2011), para. 7.5, and K.I.A. v.

Denmark (CEDAW/C/74/D/82/2015), para. 9.6.

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the context in which the Convention is applied, which, according to article 31 (3) (c)

of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, includes “any relevant rules of

international law applicable in the relations between the parties”, including the

Dublin III Regulation. However, we consider that it is not within the Committee’s

competence to assess whether national authorities applied or interpreted the

Dublin III Regulation correctly; rather, it is for the Committee to ensure that such

application or interpretation is in line with the State Party’s obligations under the

Convention.2 We note that the Dublin III Regulation provides that a State may not

transfer an applicant to an otherwise responsible State if it would expose him or her

to “a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment”, given “systemic flaws in the asylum

procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants” in that State. We consider

that States should interpret this provision in line with their obligations under the

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women to

refrain from returning an individual where a real, personal and imminent risk exists

that he or she will be exposed to gender-based violence.

7.

We consider that the author has not sufficiently substantiated her claim or

developed the facts and arguments put forward, for the purposes of admissibility, to

demonstrate that she, as a woman who is a survivor of sexual and gender-based

violence, would face a real, personal and foreseeable risk of sexual violence, inhuman

and degrading treatment or living conditions and lack of access to adequate health

care if she were returned to Greece.

__________________

2 See, by analogy, Committee on the Rights of the Child, J.M. v. Chile (CRC/C/90/D/121/2020),

para. 7.4.