CCPR/C/69/D/690/1996

Communication Nos. 690/1996 and 691/1996, Venier & Nicolas v. France

(Views adopted on 10 July 2000, sixty-ninth session)*

Submitted by:

Marc Venier and Paul Nicolas (represented by

François Roux, legal counsel)

Alleged victim:

The authors

State party:

France

Date of communications:

14 and 17 November 1995

Date of admissibility decision:

11 July 1997

The Human Rights Committee, established under article 28 of the International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights,

Meeting on 10 July 2000,

Having concluded its consideration of communications No. 690/1996 & 691/1996

submitted to the Human Rights Committee by Marc Venier and Paul Nicolas under the Optional

Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

Having taken into account all written information made available to it by the authors of

the communication, and the State party,

Adopts the following:

Views under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol

1.

The authors of the communications, dated 14 and 17 November 1995, are Marc Venier

and Paul Nicolas, French citizens born in 1967 and 1968, respectively, and currently domiciled

at Audincourt, France and Gabarret, France, respectively. They claim to be victims of violations

by France of articles 18, 19 and 26, juncto article 8, of the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights. The authors are represented by counsel, François Roux.

* The following members of the Committee participated in the examination of the present

communication: Mr. Nisuke Ando, Mr. P.N. Bhagwati, Lord Colville, Ms. Elizabeth Evatt,

Mr. Louis Henkin, Mr. Eckart Klein, Mr. David Kretzmer, Mr. Rajsoomer Lallah,

Ms. Cecilia Medina Quiroga, Mr. Martin Scheinin, Mr. Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen,

Mr. Roman Wieruszewski, Mr. Maxwell Yalden, Mr. Abdallah Zakhia. Under rule 85 of the

Committee’s rules of procedure, Ms. Christine Chanet did not participate in the examination of

the case. The text of an individual opinion by Committee members Nisuke Ando, Eckart Klein,

David Kretzmer and Abdallah Zakhia is appended to this document.

The facts as submitted by the authors

2.1

The authors, recognized conscientious objectors, began their civilian service duties

on 23 June 1988 (Mr. Nicolas) and 16 November 1989 (Mr. Venier). After approximately one

year of service, the authors notified the authorities that they intended to cease performing their

civilian service duties, and did so on 1 July 1989 and 1 February 1991, respectively. The authors

invoked the allegedly discriminatory character of article 116 (6) of the National Service Code

(Code du service national), pursuant to which conscientious objectors were required to perform

civilian national service duties for a period of 24 months, whereas military service did not

exceed 12 months.

2.2

The authors were charged before the Criminal Court (Tribunal Correctionnel) of Paris

and the Criminal Court of Orléans, respectively, with desertion in peacetime, pursuant to

articles 398 and 399 of the Code of Military Justice. On 4 July 1991, the Criminal Court of Paris

found Mr. Nicolas guilty as charged and sentenced him to one year’s imprisonment; on

17 June 1992 the Criminal Court of Orléans found Mr. Venier also guilty and sentenced him

to 10 months’ imprisonment, rejecting the arguments of the defence, which had invoked

articles 9, 10 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and articles 18 and 19 of

the Covenant.

2.3

On appeal by Mr. Nicolas, the Paris Court of Appeal confirmed the guilty verdict but

modified the sentence into a two months’ suspended prison sentence. On 8 February 1993, the

Court of Appeal of Orléans confirmed the Criminal Court’s decision concerning Mr. Venier but

reduced the sentence to eight months’ imprisonment (of which six months were suspended). On

14 December 1994, the Court of Cassation rejected the authors’ further appeals, holding that

article 116 (6) of the National Service Code was not discriminatory and did not violate articles 9,

10 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. With that latter decision, all available

remedies are said to have been exhausted.

The complaints

3.1

According to the authors, both article 116 (6) of the National Service Code (in its version

of July 1983 prescribing a period of 24 months of civilian service for conscientious objectors)

and article L.2 of the National Service Code in its version of January 1992 (as amended by

Act No. 92n9 of 4 January 1992), which sets the duration of civilian service for conscientious

objectors at 20 months, violates articles 18, 19 and 26, juncto article 8 of the Covenant in that

they double the duration of service for conscientious objectors in comparison with that for

persons performing military service.

3.2

The authors acknowledge that in case No. 295/19881 the Committee has held that an

extended period of alternative service was neither unreasonable nor punitive, and has found no

violation of the Covenant. However, they invoke and quote at length from the individual

opinions appended to the Committee’s Views by three of its members, who had concluded that

the challenged legislation was not based on either reasonable or objective criteria, such as a more

severe type of service or the need for special training to perform the longer service. The authors

fully endorse the conclusions of those three members of the Committee.

3.3

The authors observe that under articles L.116 (2) to L.116 (4) of the National Service

Code, each application for recognition as a conscientious objector has to be approved by the

Minister for the Armed Forces. If he refuses, an appeal to the Administrative Tribunal is

possible under article L.116 (3). In such circumstances, the authors argue, it cannot be assumed

that the length of civilian service was fixed purely for reasons of administrative convenience,

since anyone agreeing to perform civilian service twice as long as military service should be

deemed to have genuine convictions. Rather, the length of civilian service must be deemed to

have a punitive character, which is not based on reasonable or objective criteria.

3.4

In support of their contention, the authors invoke a judgement of the Italian

Constitutional Court of July 1989, which held that the provision for non-military service lasting

eight months longer than military service was incompatible with the Italian Constitution. They

further point to a decision adopted by the European Parliament in 1967 which, on the basis of

article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, suggested that the duration of alternative

service should be the same as that of military service. Moreover, the Committee of Ministers of

the Council of Europe has declared that alternative service must not have a punitive character

and that its duration, in relation to military service, must remain within reasonable limits

(Recommendation No. R(87)8 of 9 April 1987). Finally, the authors note that the

United Nations Commission on Human Rights declared, in a resolution adopted on

5 March 1987,2 that conscientious objection to military service should be regarded as a

legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as recognized by

the Covenant.

3.5

In these circumstances, the authors submit that requiring them to perform civilian service

that is twice as long as military service constitutes unlawful and prohibited discrimination on the

basis of opinion, and that the possibility of imprisonment for refusal to perform civilian service

beyond the length of time of military service constitutes a violation of articles 18, paragraph 2,

19, paragraph 1, and 26 of the Covenant.

The State party’s observations on admissibility and the authors’ comments thereon

4.1

The State party contends firstly that the communications are incompatible

ratione materiae with the provisions of the Covenant since, on the one hand, the Committee has

acknowledged in its decision on communication No. 185/1984 (L.T.K. v. Finland) that “the

Covenant does not provide for the right to conscientious objection; neither article 18 nor

article 19 of the Covenant, especially taking into account paragraph 3 (c) (ii) of article 8, can

be construed as to imply that right” and since, on the other hand, by virtue of article 8,

paragraph 3 (c) (ii) of the Covenant, the internal regulation of national service, and therefore of

conscientious objector status for those States which recognize it, does not fall within the scope of

the Covenant and remains a matter for domestic legislation.

4.2

Subsidiarily, the State party contends that domestic remedies have not been exhausted by

the authors. In this connection, it submits that the authors of the communications have exhausted

the judicial remedies open to them, but have not exhausted all administrative remedies. The

argument put forward in this connection is that, by leaving their duty stations before having

received replies from the military authorities concerning their requests for a reduction in the

length of their service, the authors violated the provisions of the National Service Code, thus

becoming liable to criminal prosecution, and did not wait for the military authorities to refuse

their requests and then bring the matter before the Administrative Tribunal.

4.3

Third and last, the State party contends that the authors do not qualify as victims of a

violation of articles 18, paragraph 2, 19, paragraph 1, and 26 of the Covenant. With regard to

articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant, the State party claims that by recognizing conscientious

objector status and offering conscripts a choice as to the form of their national service, it allows

them to opt freely for the national service appropriate to their beliefs, thus enabling them to

exercise their rights under articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant. In this connection, the State party

concludes, quoting the decision on communication No. 185/1984 cited above, that as the authors

were “not prosecuted and sentenced because of [their] beliefs or opinions as such, but because

[they] refused to perform military service”, they cannot therefore claim to be victims of a

violation of articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant.

4.4

With regard to the alleged violation of article 26 of the Covenant, the State party, noting

that the authors complain of a violation of this article because the length of alternative civilian

service is double that of military service, submits first of all that “the Covenant, while

prohibiting discrimination and guaranteeing equal protection of the law to everyone, does not

prohibit all differences of treatment”, which must be “based on reasonable and objective criteria”

(communication No. 196/1985, Gueye v. France). The State party argues in this connection that

the situation of conscripts performing alternative civilian service differs from that of those

performing military service, notably in respect of the heavier constraints of service in the army,

and that a longer period of alternative civilian service constitutes a test of the sincerity of

conscientious objectors, designed to prevent conscripts from claiming conscientious objector

status for reasons of comfort, ease and security. The State party also quotes the Committee’s

Views on communication No. 295/1988 (Järvinen v. Finland), where the Committee held that the

16-month period of alternative service imposed for conscientious objectors - double the

eight-month period of military service - was “neither unreasonable nor punitive”. The State

party therefore concludes that the difference of treatment complained of by the authors is based

on the principle of equality, which requires different treatment of different situations.

4.5

For all of these reasons, the State party requests the Committee to declare the

communications inadmissible.

5.1

Concerning the State party’s first argument as to the Committee’s competence

ratione materiae, the authors cite the Committee’s General Comment No. 22 (48), where it is

stated that the right to conscientious objection “can be derived from article 18, inasmuch as the

obligation to use lethal force may seriously conflict with the freedom of conscience and the right

to manifest one’s religion or belief. When this right is recognized by law or practice, there shall

be no differentiation among conscientious objectors on the basis of the nature of their particular

beliefs; likewise, there shall be no discrimination against conscientious objectors because they

have failed to perform military service”. According to the authors, it is clear from these

comments that the Committee is competent to determine whether or not there has been a

violation of the right to conscientious objection under article 18 of the Covenant.

5.2

The authors claim that the problem posed in their case lies not in a possible infringement

of conscientious objectors’ freedom of belief by French legislation, but in the conditions for the

exercise of that freedom, since alternative civilian service is twice the length of military service,

without this being justified by any provision to protect public order, in violation of article 18,

paragraph 3, of the Covenant. The authors invoke in this context the Committee’s General

Comment No. 22 (48), which states that “limitations imposed must be established by law and

must not be applied in a manner that would vitiate the rights guaranteed in article 18. (...)

Restrictions may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory

manner”, and conclude that requiring conscientious objectors to perform alternative civilian

service which is twice the length of military service constitutes a discriminatory restriction on

the enjoyment of the rights set forth in article 18 of the Covenant.

5.3

As to the question of the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the authors state that domestic

remedies in respect of the criminal proceedings brought against them have, in fact, been

exhausted since the Court of Cassation dismissed their appeals against the Court of Appeal

judgements on 14 December 1994. With regard to the non-exhaustion of administrative

remedies, the authors maintain that such remedies were not open to them inasmuch as, not

having been notified of any administrative decision, they could not bring the matter before the

Administrative Tribunal.

5.4

Concerning the alleged violation of article 26, the authors claim that requiring a period of

civilian service twice the length of military service constitutes a difference of treatment which is

not based on “reasonable and objective criteria” and therefore constitutes discrimination

prohibited by the Covenant (communication No. 196/1985 cited above). In support of this

conclusion, the authors argue that there is no justification for making civilian service twice the

length of military service; in fact, unlike in the Järvinen case (communication No. 295/1988

cited above), the longer duration is not justified by any relaxation of the administrative

procedures for obtaining conscientious objector status since, under articles L.116 (2) and

L.116 (4) of the National Service Code, applications for conscientious objector status are subject

to approval by the Minister for the Armed Forces following an examination which may result in

refusal. Nor is it justified in the general interest or as a test of the seriousness and sincerity of the

beliefs of the conscientious objector. Indeed, the mere fact of taking special steps to test the

sincerity and seriousness of the beliefs of conscientious objectors in itself constitutes

discrimination based on the recognition of a difference of treatment between conscripts.

Furthermore, conscientious objectors derive no benefit or privilege from their status - unlike, for

example, persons assigned to perform international cooperation services instead of military

service, who have the opportunity to work abroad in a professional field corresponding to their

university qualifications for 16 months (i.e. four months less than the civilian service for

conscientious objectors) - and a difference of treatment is not, therefore, justified on that ground.

The Committee’s decision on admissibility

6.1

At its sixtieth session, the Committee decided to join the consideration of

communications Nos. 690/1996 and 691/1996. It then proceeded to consider the admissibility of

the communications.

6.2

Concerning the requirement of exhaustion of available domestic remedies, the Committee

took note of the fact that the authors had exhausted all the judicial remedies that were open to

them. The Committee also considered that administrative remedies were not available to the

authors of the communications. The Committee therefore concluded that it was not prevented by

article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol from dealing with the communications.

6.3

The Committee took note of the State party’s arguments concerning the incompatibility

of the communications ratione materiae with the provisions of the Covenant. In this regard, the

Committee considered that the matter raised in the communications did not concern a violation

of the right to conscientious objection as such. The Committee considered that the authors had

sufficiently substantiated their claim, for the purposes of admissibility, that the communications

might raise issues under provisions of the Covenant.

7.

Accordingly, on 11 July 1997, the Committee decided that the communications were

admissible.

The State party’s observations on the merits of the communication

8.1

By submission of 18 June 1998, the State party argues that the communication should be

rejected because the authors are not victims of a violation of the Covenant, and because their

complaints are ill-founded.

8.2

According to the State party, article L.116 of the National Service Code in its version of

July 1983 instituted a genuine right to conscientious objection, in the sense that the sincerity of

the objections is said to be shown by the request alone, if presented in accordance with the legal

requirements (that is, justified by an affirmation of the applicant that he has personal objections

to using weapons). No verification of the objections took place. To be admissible, requests had

to be presented on the 15th of the month preceding the incorporation into the military service.

Thus a request could only be rejected if it was not justified or if it was not presented in time. A

right to appeal existed to the administrative tribunal.

8.3

Although the normal length of military service since January 1992 in France

was 10 months, some forms of national service lasted 12 months (military service of scientists)

and 16 months (civil service of technical assistance). The length of the service for conscientious

objectors was 20 months. The State party denies that the length has a punitive or discriminatory

character. It is said to be the only way to verify the seriousness of the objections, since the

objections are no longer tested by the administration. After having fulfilled their service,

conscientious objectors have the same rights as those who have finished civil national service.

8.4

The State party informs the Committee that on 28 October 1997 a law was adopted to

reform the national service. Under this law, all young men and women will have to participate

between their 16th and 18th birthday in a one day call-up to prepare for defence. Optional

voluntary service can be done for a duration of 12 months, renewable up to 60 months. The new

law is applicable to men born after 31 December 1978 and women born after 31 December 1982.

8.5

According to the State party, its system of conscientious objection was in accordance

with the requirements of articles 18, 19 and 26 of the Covenant, and with the Committee’s

general comment No. 22. The State party notes that its regime for conscientious objection did

not make any difference on the basis of belief, and no process of verification of the justification

forwarded by the applicants occurred, other than in many neighbouring countries. No

discrimination existed against conscientious objectors, as their service was a recognised form of

the national service, on equal footing with military service or other forms of civil service.

In 1997, just under 50 per cent of those performing civil service were doing this on the basis of

conscientious objections to military service.

8.6

The State party submits that the authors of the present communications have not been

victims of discrimination on the basis of their choice to perform national service as a

conscientious objector. It notes that they were convicted for not complying with their

obligations under the civil service, which they had freely chosen. Their convictions were thus

not because of their personal beliefs, nor on the basis of their choice for alternative civil service,

but on the basis of their refusal to respect the conditions of that type of service. The State party

notes that at the time when the authors requested to perform alternative military service, they had

not indicated any objection to the length of service. Moreover, in the case of Mr. Venier, the

State party notes that the reason which he gave for abandoning his civil service, was “the attitude

of his country towards the Third World”, and thus unrelated to the alleged discriminatory

character of the length of service for conscientious objectors. In this context, the State party

notes that it would have been open to the authors to choose another form of unarmed national

service, such as one of technical assistance. On this basis, the State party argues that the authors

have not established that they are victims of a violation by the State party.

8.7

Subsidiarily, the State party argues that the authors’ claims are ill-founded. In this

context, the State party recalls that according to the Committee’s own jurisprudence, not all

differences in treatment constitute discrimination, as long as they are based on reasonable and

objective criteria. In this context, the State party refers to the Committee’s Views in case

No. 295/1988 (Järvinen v. Finland), where the service for conscientious objectors was 16 months

and that for other conscripts 8 months, but the Committee found that no violation of the

Covenant had occurred because the length of the service ensured that those applying for

conscientious objector status would be serious, since no further verification of the objections

occurred. The State party submits that the same reasoning should apply to the present cases.

8.8

In this context, the State party also notes that the conditions of the alternative civil service

were less onerous than that of military service. The conscientious objectors had a wide choice of

posts. They could also propose their own employer and could do their service within their

professional interest. They also received a higher indemnity than those serving in the armed

forces. In this context, the State party rejects counsel’s claim that the persons performing

international cooperation service received privileged treatment vis à vis conscientious objectors,

and submits that those performing international cooperation service did so in often very difficult

situations in a foreign country, whereas the conscientious objectors performed their service in

France. In the case of Mr. Venier, he performed his civil service with the secretariat of the

“Movement for a non-violent alternative”, whereas Mr. Nicolas was posted with the international

civil service in Ile de France.

8.9

The State party concludes that the length of service for the authors of the present

communications had no discriminatory character compared with other forms of civil service or

military service. The differences that existed in the length of the service were reasonable and

reflected objective differences between the types of service. Moreover, the State party submits

that in most European countries the time of service for conscientious objectors is longer than

military service.

Counsel’s comments on the State party’s submission

9.1

In his comments, dated 21 December 1998, counsel submits that at issue are the

modalities of civil service for conscientious objectors. He submits that the double length of this

service was not justified by any reason of public order and refers in this context to paragraph 3 of

article 18 of the Covenant which provides that the right to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may

be subject only to such limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or

morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. He also refers to the Committee’s

general comment No. 22 where the Committee stated that restrictions may not be imposed for

discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner. He argues that the imposition

upon conscientious objectors of civil service of double length as that of the military service

constitutes a discriminatory restriction, because the manifestation of a conviction such as the

refusal to carry arms, does not in itself affect the public safety, order, health, or morals or the

fundamental rights and freedoms of others since the law expressly recognizes the right to

conscientious objection.

9.2

Counsel states that, contrary to what the State party has submitted, persons who requested

status as a conscientious objector were subject to administrative verification and did not have a

choice as to the conditions of service. In this context, counsel refers to the legal requirements

that a request had to be submitted before the 15th of the month of incorporation into the military

service, and that it had to be reasoned. Thus, the Minister for the Armed Forces might refuse a

request and no automatic right to conscientious objector status existed. According to counsel, it

is therefore clear that the reasons given by the conscientious objector were being tested.

9.3

Counsel rejects the State party’s argument that the authors had made an informed choice

as to the kind of service they were going to perform. Counsel emphasizes that they made their

choice on the basis of their convictions, not on the basis of the length of service. They had no

choice in the modalities of the service. Counsel argues that no reasons of public order exist to

justify that the length of civil service for conscientious objectors be twice the length of military

service.

9.4

Counsel maintains that the length of service constitutes discrimination on the basis of

opinion. Referring to the Committee’s Views in communication No. 295/1988 (Järvinen v.

Finland), counsel submits that the present case is to be distinguished, since in the earlier case the

extra length of service was justified, in the opinion of the majority in the Committee, by the

absence of administrative formalities in having the status of conscientious objector recognized.

9.5

As far as other forms of civil service are concerned, especially those doing international

cooperation service, counsel rejects the State party’s argument that these were often performed

in difficult conditions and on the contrary, asserts that this service was often fulfilled in another

European country and under pleasant conditions. Those performing the service moreover built

up a professional experience. According to counsel, the conscientious objector did not draw any

benefit from his service. As regards the State party’s argument that the extra length of service is

a test for the seriousness of a person’s objections, counsel argues that to test the seriousness of

conscientious objectors constitutes in itself a flagrant discrimination, since those who applied for

another form of civil service were not being subjected to a test of their sincerity. With regard to

the advantages mentioned by the State party (such as no obligation to carry a uniform, not being

under military discipline), counsel notes that the same advantages were being enjoyed by those

performing other kinds of civil service and that these did not exceed 16 months. With regard to

the State party’s argument that the conscientious objectors received a higher pay than those

performing military service, counsel notes that they worked in structures where they were

treated as employees and that it was thus normal that they would receive a certain remuneration.

He states that the pay was little in comparison with the work done and much less than that

received by normal employees. According to counsel, those performing cooperation service

were better paid.

Issues and proceedings before the Committee

10.1

The Human Rights Committee has considered the present communication in the light of

all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided in article 5, paragraph 1 of the

Optional Protocol.

10.2

The Committee has noted the State party’s argument that the authors are not victims of

any violation, because they were not convicted for their personal beliefs, but for deserting the

service freely chosen by them. The Committee notes, however, that during the proceedings

before the courts, the authors raised the right to equality of treatment between conscientious

objectors and military conscripts as a defence justifying their desertion and that the courts’

decisions refer to such claim. It also notes that the authors contend that, as conscientious

objectors to military service, they had no free choice in the service that they had to perform. The

Committee therefore considers that the authors qualify as victims for purposes of the Optional

Protocol.

10.4

The issue before the Committee is whether the specific conditions under which

alternative service had to be performed by the authors constitute a violation of the Covenant.3

The Committee observes that under article 8 of the Covenant, States parties may require service

of a military character and, in case of conscientious objection, alternative national service,

provided that such service is not discriminatory. The authors have claimed that the requirement,

under French law, of a length of 24 months for national alternative service, rather than

12 months for military service, is discriminatory and violates the principle of equality before the

law and equal protection of the law set forth in article 26 of the Covenant. The Committee

reiterates its position that article 26 does not prohibit all differences of treatment. Any

differentiation, as the Committee has had the opportunity to state repeatedly, must however be

based on reasonable and objective criteria. In this context, the Committee recognizes that the

law and practice may establish differences between military and national alternative service and

that such differences may, in a particular case, justify a longer period of service, provided that

the differentiation is based on reasonable and objective criteria, such as the nature of the specific

service concerned or the need for a special training in order to accomplish that service. In the

present case, however, the reasons forwarded by the State party do not refer to such criteria or

refer to criteria in general terms without specific reference to the authors’ cases, and are rather

based on the argument that doubling the length of service was the only way to test the sincerity

of an individual’s convictions. In the Committee’s view, such argument does not satisfy the

requirement that the difference in treatment involved in the present cases was based on

reasonable and objective criteria. In the circumstances, the Committee finds that a violation of

article 26 occurred, since the authors were discriminated against on the basis of their conviction

of conscience.

11.

The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional

Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, is of the view that the facts

before it disclose a violation of article 26 of the Covenant.

12.

The Human Rights Committee notes with satisfaction that the State party has changed the

law so that similar violations will no longer occur in the future. In the circumstances of the

present case, the Committee considers that the finding of a violation constitutes sufficient

remedy for the authors.

[Adopted in English, French and Spanish, the English text being the original version.

Subsequently issued also in Arabic, Chinese and Russian as part of the present report.]

Notes

APPENDIX

Individual opinion by Nisuke Ando, Eckart Klein, David Kretzmer

and Abdallah Zakhia (dissenting)

We dissent from the Committee’s Views for the same reasons we have laid down in our

separate dissenting opinion on the Foin case (Communication No. 666/1995).

(Signed) N. Ando

(Signed) E. Klein

(Signed) D. Kretzmer

(Signed) A. Zakhia

[Done in English, French and Spanish, the English text being the original version. Subsequently

issued also in Arabic, Chinese and Russian as part of the present report.]

1 Järvinen v. Finland, Views adopted on 25 July 1990, paras. 6.4 to 6.6.

2 E/CN.4/1987/L.73 dated 5 March 1987.

3 See also the Committee’s Views in case No. 666/1995, Foin v. France,

CCPR/C/67/D/666/1995.