Inadmissibility decision; Substantive issues: unlawful attacks on honour or reputation; Articles: 17 (1); [CCPR: UNO-Pakt II, Internationaler Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte; Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques; Patto II]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
Communication No. 380/1989, R. L. M. v. Trinidad and Tobago
(decision of 16 July 1993, adopted at the forty-eighth
session)
Submitted by:
R. L. M. (name deleted)
Alleged victim:
The author
State party:
Trinidad and Tobago
Date of communication: 17 June 1989 (initial submission)
The Human Rights Committee, established under article 28 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Meeting on 16 July 1993,
Adopts the following:
Decision on admissibility
1.
The author of the communication is R. L. M., an attorney in Trinidad and
Tobago, residing in San Fernando, Trinidad. He claims to be a victim of
violations by Trinidad and Tobago of articles 2, paragraph 3, and 17 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Facts as submitted
2.1 The author contends that he has been the target of "unfair and
unacceptable" behaviour and animosity on the part of a judge, L. D., sitting
on the Port-of-Spain Assizes Court. In several criminal cases, including
capital cases, which were presided over by the said judge and in which the
author represented the accused, this judge allegedly made unjustified remarks
which called into question the author's professional ethics. Thus, in a
murder trial before the Port-of-Spain Assizes Court in July 1987, Judge L. D.
criticized the author for having intimated to a senior police officer, during
cross-examination, that he was lying and for having accused the prosecution
of concocting and fabricating evidence. On the other hand, the judge saw no
reason for similarly criticizing the prosecutor, who had accused the author
of dishonesty on the same occasion.
2.2 The author lists four other criminal cases handled by Judge L. D., in
which he is said also to have made "baseless critical or derogatory remarks"
about the author's professional conduct. Thus, in one criminal case, the
judge made the following remarks:
"I want to say a few words on the duty of attorneys for the defendants. They
do not defend a case simply for the sake of a defence or simply on the
instructions of their clients ... Without being critical of the conduct
of the attorney in this case, attorneys should be firm in advising their
clients when there is no chance of success."
The author contends that the judge is nurturing a "personal venom or
vendetta" against him and considers his behaviour to be unfair and
unacceptable.
2.3 As to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the author
indicates that sections 137 and 138 of the Trinidadian Constitution regulate
whatever disciplinary action may be taken against a judge or judicial
officer. He has addressed a request for disciplinary action against the
judge to the Chief Justice of Trinidad, to the Prime Minister and the
President of Trinidad, without success.
2.4 The author contends that any action in respect of the judge's conduct is
further precluded by section 129, paragraph 3, of the Trinidadian
Constitution, which stipulates that the question of whether a Service
Commission has properly performed any function vested in it by the
Constitution may not be inquired into by a court. This provision has been
interpreted by the High Court and the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago
as precluding them from inquiring into the action or non-action of, for
example, the Judicial and Legal Services Commission. The complaint mechanism
set up by the latter has, in the author's opinion, become "nugatory in that
it has not even acknowledged [my] complaint". Mandamus and other avenues of
judicial review are said to be similarly unavailable.
Complaint
3.
The author contends that the comments of Judge L. D. about him
constitute an unlawful attack on his honour and reputation, for which no
remedy is available, in violation of articles 2, paragraph 3, and 17 of the
Covenant.
State party's information and observations
4.1 The State party contends that the communication is inadmissible both as
incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant, in particular article 17,
and as an abuse of the right of submission, pursuant to article 3 of the
Optional Protocol.
4.2 In this context, the State party observes that the comments alleged to
have been made by Judge L. D. do not reveal particular animosity towards the
author but merely remind him of his professional duties vis-а-vis the Court
and his clients. It further notes that comments made by a judge in his
judicial capacity "are absolutely privileged", and that no action may be
filed in the courts against such comments. Accordingly, they cannot, in the
State party's opinion, be deemed "unlawful" within the meaning of article 17
of the Covenant.
4.3 The State party explains the rationale for the privileged nature of
remarks made by judges in their judicial capacity:
"In the public interest it is desirable that persons in certain positions,
such as judges ..., should be able to express themselves with complete
freedom and, to secure their independence, absolute privilege is given
to their acts and words" (quote from Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th
ed., vol. 28, para. 96).
This rule applies even if the acts or remarks attributed to a judge are
malicious, a qualification which according to the State party does not apply
to the present case.
Issues and proceedings before the Committee
5.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Human
Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 87 of its rules of procedure,
decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the
Covenant.
5.2 The Committee has examined the information submitted by the parties,
including the author's petition to the Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago.
It observes that the author has not shown, for purposes of admissibility,
that the remarks attributed to Judge L. D. constituted an unlawful attack on
his honour and reputation. Accordingly, the author has no claim under the
Covenant, within the meaning of article 2 of the Optional Protocol.
6.
The Human Rights Committee therefore decides:
(a) That the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the
Optional Protocol;
(b) That this communication shall be communicated to the State party
and to the author of the communication.
[Done in English, French and Spanish, the English text being the original
version.]