Inadmissibility decision; Procedural issues: ratione temporis; [CCPR: UNO-Pakt II, Internationaler Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte; Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques; Patto II]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
Communication No. 490/1992, A. S. and L. S. v. Australia
(decision of 30 March 1993, adopted at the forty-seventh
session)
Submitted by:
A. S. and L. S. (names deleted)
Alleged victims:
The authors
State party:
Australia
Date of communication:
26 December 1991 (initial submission)
The Human Rights Committee, established under article 28 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Meeting on 30 March 1993,
Adopts the following:
Decision on admissibility
1.
The authors of the communication dated 26 December 1991 are A. S. and
L. S., Australian citizens currently residing in Tuross Head, New South
Wales, Australia. They claim to be victims of violations by Australia of
articles 2, 16, 17, 26 and "others possibly to be determined by the Human
Rights Committee" of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. The Optional Protocol entered into force for Australia on
25 December 1991.
Facts as submitted
2.1 The authors are shareholders and directors of the Sapphire Investments
Ltd. In 1981-1982, they bought a number of land tracts at Merimbula, New
South Wales. In 1984, they decided to use the land for the construction of a
retirement village, "Valley High Resort Village"; this was an ambitious
project requiring substantial borrowing. Initially, Sapphire Investments was
funded by Esanda Ltd., but in March 1985, the company approached other
financiers for a sizeable loan in order to buy out Esanda and fund the
further development of the project. A. S. approached the E. M. Group, a
Melbourne-based consulting group acting as mortgage managers, brokers and
finance consultants. Another company, B. P. T., a government-licensed lender
of public investment funds, acted as the trustee of certain property trusts
established and managed by E. M. As the trustee, B. P. T. advanced money to
Sapphire Investments against certain collaterals.
2.2 In 1985 and 1986, disputes arose between the authors and B.P.T./E.M.
concerning the extent of the financial engagements of the latter. They
centred around the issue whether or not B.P.T/E.M. would provide the totality
of the funds required to construct, market and manage Valley High, and
whether or not E. M. would provide, or assist in opening, further credit
lines required by the authors' company in the event that B. P. T. did not do
so. The authors contend that such representations were indeed made; the
respondents contest it.
2.3 On 15 May 1987, the authors filed a Statement of Claim in the Supreme
Court of New South Wales and in the Federal Court of Australia, for breach of
contract and several alleged violations of the Australian Trade Practices
Act. On 16 December 1987 the Federal Court ruled in favour of B. P. T. and
E. M.
2.4 According to the authors, the case before the Federal Court was
"rushed"; they contend that they went into the hearing unprepared and against
their express wishes, after the refusal of the judge to reschedule the
hearing. In this context, they consider that the judge inappropriately
invoked a Bar Association rule which prompted their duly instructed senior
counsel, a Q. C., to retire from the case with immediate effect, after
"unsubstantiated" allegations that he had previously provided commercial and
legal advice to the authors.
2.5 As a result of the adverse decisions, the authors lost their property,
including their family home; they consider themselves victims of illegal
dispossession and believe that this dispossession was orchestrated to cover
up a major financial scandal involving the defendants and to cover "corporate
criminals". In A. S.'s opinion, B. P. T. knowingly entered into a number a
conflicting positions on the Valley High project, with the intention of
fraudulently stripping Sapphire Investments and the A. S. Family Trust of its
assets. The defendants allegedly were aided in this endeavour by the E. M.
Group.
2.6 The authors further consider that the Government, in order to limit the
damage, "colluded" with the judicial authorities to deny the authors justice.
Several appeals for a revision of the judgement addressed to the Federal
Commissioner for Human Rights, the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice of
New South Wales were unsuccessful. The authors admit that it would be
possible to challenge the judgement in the High Court; however, the office of
the Attorney-General has rejected their request for the assignment of legal
aid.
Complaint
3.1 The authors contend that by precipitating the departure of their senior
counsel in the proceedings before the Federal Court, the judge discriminated
against them and unduly favoured the defendants, who were able to introduce
another senior counsel, whereas the authors themselves were left without
competent legal advice. The judge's action is said to constitute a violation
of articles 2 and 26.
3.2 It is further submitted that the judge unjustly refused to make a ruling
under Section 57 of the Legal Aid Act of New South Wales, when rejecting the
authors' request for a postponement of the hearing, because the issue of a
legal aid assignment had not been settled by the Legal Aid Commission. A. S.
and L. S. explain that the judge's refusal forced their children and friends
to advance money so as to avoid losing the family home by default. They
submit that a decision about the assignment of legal aid was not made until
after the beginning of the trial on 28 August 1987, with a new senior counsel
appearing for the authors, and add that their new lawyer only had one weekend
to study the file.
3.3 The authors claim to be victims of a violation of article 17 of the
Covenant, because the judge allegedly allowed the defendants to introduce as
evidence confidential documentation on A. S. obtained by "illegal means" from
the Federal Department of Social Security. The judge also did not stop the
defendants from introducing allegedly defamatory and unsubstantiated remarks
designed to discredit their honour and reputation. By so doing, the
defendants allegedly were able to distort the court records, which would
otherwise have shown that they were in breach of the Trustee Act of the State
of Victoria.
3.4 In respect of their appeal, the authors allege violations of
articles 16, 17 and 26, since the Court of Appeal proceeded with the hearing
of the appeal in the autumn of 1987, even after being informed that L. S.
could not attend the hearing because of illness. The authors further claim
that they were denied equality before the law, because they were denied legal
aid to argue the seven grounds of appeal. In this context, A. S. indicates
that the Court ruled that he, as an Australian of non-anglophone origin, was
capable of representing the interests of Sapphire Investments, whereas the
defendants were represented by a Queen's Counsel.
3.5 Finally, the authors claim a violation of articles 2 and 26, because the
Court of Appeal allegedly did not reach an independent verdict based on the
evidence in the appeal documents, thereby denying the authors an effective
remedy.
Issues and proceedings before the Committee
4.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Human
Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 87 of its rules of procedure,
decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the
Covenant.
4.2 With regard to the application of the Optional Protocol to Australia,
the Committee recalls that it entered into force on 25 December 1991. It
observes that the Optional Protocol cannot be applied retroactively and
concludes that the Committee is precluded ratione temporis from examining
events that occurred in 1985-1987, unless it is demonstrated that these acts
or omissions continued or had effects after the entry into force of the
Optional Protocol, constituting in themselves violations of the Covenant. No
evidence has been adduced to show that the proceedings at issue had such
effects.
5.
The Human Rights Committee therefore decides:
(a) That the communication is inadmissible;
(b) That this decision shall be transmitted to the authors and, for
information, to the State party.
[Done in English, French and Spanish, the English text being the original
version.]