Decision on merits; [CCPR: UNO-Pakt II, Internationaler Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte; Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques; Patto II]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
Communication No. 370/1989, G. H. v. Jamaica (decision of
23 October 1992, adopted at the forty-sixth session)
Submitted by:
G. H. (name deleted)
Alleged victim:
The author
State party:
Jamaica
Date of communication: 30 June 1989 (initial submission)
The Human Rights Committee, established under article 28 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Meeting on 23 October 1992,
Adopts the following:
Decision on admissibility
1.
The author of the communication is G. H., a Jamaican citizen currently
awaiting execution at St. Catherine District Prison, Jamaica. He claims to
be a victim of violations by Jamaica of articles 6, 7 and 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. He is represented by
counsel.
Facts as submitted
2.1 The author was arrested in August 1982 and charged with the murder, on
5 August 1982, of one C. S. He was tried jointly with his brother in the
St. James Circuit Court, Montego Bay, and convicted and sentenced to death on
3 February 1984; his brother, a minor at the time of the offence, was
sentenced to life imprisonment. The Court of Appeal of Jamaica dismissed the
author's appeal on 10 April 1987. A subsequent petition for special leave to
appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was dismissed on 16
March 1989.
2.2 C. S. was shot dead with two or three bullets fired from a 0.38 calibre
weapon in the evening of 5 August 1982 and found near the Camrose main road.
The prosecution contended that the author, his brother, one D. S. and another
individual had been walking along that road on the evening in question.
D. S. left the others temporarily and, after approximately five to seven
minutes, heard two explosions. A few minutes afterwards, the author and his
brother caught up with him; they told him that they, too, had heard the
explosions but that they ignored what had caused them. G. H. testified that
he had been walking with D. S. along the main road all along and that, when
hearing the explosions, they had all run away.
2.3 During the trial, several witnesses testified that they had seen the
author and his brother on the main road in the evening of 5 August. One W.
B. testified that he had seen G. H. standing by the body, adding that the
author had shown him a 0.38 calibre gun with live cartridges on 2 August
1982. V. B., the sister of W. B., testified that the author had been engaged
in a dispute with the deceased on 1 August 1982, and that the deceased had
attacked the author with a machete on that occasion.
2.4 The author claims that the B. family had every reason to exaggerate or
to commit perjury in court, because of a long-standing feud with his family.
He notes that W. B. had omitted any mention of the incident of 2 August 1982
in his witness statement and initial written deposition, and that the judge
himself called the evidence of V. B. "confused".
2.5 The author further points out that there was severe conflict over
important questions of timing. Thus, D. S. and another witness testified
that the events occurred shortly after 7:15 p.m.; W. B., who did not hear any
explosions, allegedly saw the author by the body just after 8:30 p.m., with
several people following him. There also was no evidence that the author had
been carrying a gun on the evening in question. The principal issue in the
case therefore was one of reliability of the evidence.
Complaint
3.1 The author complains that he did not have a fair trial, because the
trial judge misdirected it on the issue of circumstantial evidence, in that
he failed to warn the jurors that circumstantial evidence should always be
construed narrowly and rigorously, and in that he suggested that
circumstantial evidence was "free from the blemishes" of evidence by
witnesses who are either mistaken or influenced by grudge or spite. In the
author's opinion, the Court of Appeal was equally wrong in holding that the
trial judge properly directed the jury on the issue of circumstantial
evidence.
3.2 The author further submits that the judge misdirected the jury on the
law of aiding and abetting, since he put his directions in such a way that
the jury could have been left with the erroneous impression that if the
author had been present and watched the shooting, without any intent of
encouraging it, he was guilty of murder. In this context, it is noted that
the judge told the jury that "the mere presence of those watching the
spectacle, if unexplained ... is some evidence of encouragement to those
engaged in the combat or the attack".
3.3 Finally, it is claimed that the judge unfairly pressured the jury to
return an early verdict: thus, he only began his summing-up in
mid-afternoon, at 3:49 p.m., and sent the jury to the verdict room at 6:38
p.m., in the hope that the trial could end the same day.
Issues and proceedings before the Committee
4.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Human
Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 87 of its rules of procedure,
decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the
Covenant.
4.2 In as far as the author's claims under article 14 are concerned, the
Committee observes that the author's allegations relate primarily to the
conduct of the trial by the judge, the evaluation of evidence by the court,
and the judge's instructions to the jury. It recalls that it is generally
for the appellate courts of States parties to the Covenant to evaluate the
facts and evidence in a particular case. Similarly, it is for the appellate
courts and not for the Committee to review specific instructions to the jury
by the judge, unless it is clear that the instructions to the jury were
arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice, or that the judge manifestly
violated his obligation of impartiality. The author's allegations do not
show that the judge's instructions or the conduct of the trial suffered from
such defects. In this respect, therefore, the author's claims do not come
within the competence of the Committee. Accordingly, this part of the
communication is inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.
4.3 In respect of the author's claims under articles 6 and 7, the Committee
finds that they have not been substantiated, for purposes of admissibility;
in this respect, accordingly, the author has failed to advance a claim under
the Covenant, within the meaning of article 2 of the Optional Protocol.
5.
The Human Rights Committee therefore decides:
(a) That the communication is inadmissible under articles 2 and 3 of
the Optional Protocol;
(b) That this communication shall be transmitted to the State party, to
the author and to his counsel.
[Done in English, French, Russian and Spanish, the English text being the
original version.]