Inadmissibility decision; Substantive issues: accused persons / convicted persons competent, independent and impartial tribunal fair trial suit at law; Articles: 14 (1); Procedural issues: ratione materiae ratione temporis; [CCPR: UNO-Pakt II, Internationaler Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte; Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques; Patto II]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
EE, Communication Mo. 491/1992,_J.L. y. Australia (decision
of 28 July 1992. adopted at the forty-fifth session)
Submitted by:
J,L. (name deleted)
Alleged victim:
The author
State party:
Australia
Date of communication: 7 August 1991 (initial submission)
The Human Rights Committee, established under article 28 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Meeting on 28 July 1992,
Adopts the following!
Decision on admissibilitv
1.
The author of the communication is J.L., an Australian citizen residing
in Moorabbin, Victoria, Australia. He claims to be a victim of violations by
Australia of article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Sights. The Optional Protocol entered into force for Australia on
25 December 1991.
Facts as submitted by the author
2.1 The author is a solicitor; in the State of Victoria, the practice of law
is regulated by the Legal Profession Practice Act of 1958. Pursuant to
section 83 (1), no one may practise law unless he or she is duly qualified and
holds a certificate issued by the Law Institute of Victoria. Under the Act,
two fees must be paid before a practising certificate is issued: an annual
practising fee and a compulsory professional indemnity insurance premium.
Pursuant to section 90, anyone without a practising certificate is not
qualified to practise law.
2.2 Section 88 (2) (c) stipulates that the rules determining a practising fee
for solicitors have no effect unless approved by the Chief Justice. The
latter may also approve the regulations concerning the professional indemnity
insurance. In 1985, the Chief Justice approved a new insurance scheme
proposed by the Law Institute, under which its Solicitors' Liability Committee
was entitled to henceforth determine the insurance premium.
2.3 In 1986, J.L* refused to pay the increased premium for the new insurance
scheme, since he considered it to be invalid. Re claimed that, apart from
being a tax which had to be determined by Parliament, the Institute had not
sought the necessary recommendations from its members for the new rules, nor
had it complied with the so-called regulatory impact statement requirements of
the Subordinate Legislation Act of 1962.
2.4 The Institute refused to issue the author's practising certificate; the
latter did, however, continue to practise. On 13 May 1986, the Secretary of
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the Institute obtained an injunction against J.L. pursuant to section 90 (7)
of the Act, which stipulates that:
"On application made ... by the secretary ... of the Institute/ the
Supreme Court may, if it is satisfied that an unqualified person is
acting or practising as a solicitor ..., make an order restraining that
person from so acting or practising."
2.5 J.L. ignored the injunction. On 21 Kay 1986, the Chief Justice sentenced
him to three weeks' imprisonment for contempt of court. The author appealed
the injunction and the committal order. On 10 April 1987, the full Court
dismissed the appeal against the committal order but set aside the injunction,
inter alia, on the ground that the members of the Institute had not
recommended the new insurance regulations.
2.6 Under a subsequent amendment to the Act, the Solicitor's Liability
Committee may determine the insurance premium with the approval of the
Institute's Council and without the necessary recommendations from the
Institute's members. Notwithstanding, the author, maintaining that the fee
constituted a form of taxation that would have to be determined by Parliament,
continued to practise without the requisite certificate.
2.7 Throughout 1988, the author refused to pay his practising fees to the
Institute, complaining that the Institute used the fees "improperly" to
finance private activities, rather than for administrative or regulatory
purposes. He contended that, although the Act did not specify the purpose for
which the fee should be used, it was a statutory fee and should accordingly be
used solely for such purposes. He further claimed that, as the fee was also
fee for membership in the Institute, he was forced to become a member in a
union.
2.8 On 11 and 15 March 1988, another judge of the Supreme Court, upon
application of the Law Institute, issued another injunction against J.L. He
ruled that the practising fee was commensurate to the Institute's statutory
functions and that the insurance premiwi was not a "tax", but a contribution
to the governance and good order of the profession. The order of
15 March 1988 carried a stay until the "final determination of an appeal by
the applicant or further order". An appeal against the order of 11 March was
rejected by the full Court on 8 December 1988. The High Court refused leave
to appeal from the court's 3 u a9 e m e r t t o n 1 3 October 1989. No application to
modify or discharge the orders was made by the Law Institute.
2.9 On 30 November 1990, a Supreme Court judge again found the author in
contempt of court. The author argued that a stay of the order of
15 March 1988 was still valid, as he had not appealed against it. The judge,
however, held that the stay h,ad expired with the High Court's denial of leave
to appeal. On 7 December 1990, the judge fined the author for having failed
to obtain practising certificates for 1989 and 1990. The full Court denied
leave to appeal against this order on 15 March 1991. Upon application from
the Institute, the author's name was struck off the roll of solicitors and
barristers of the Supreme Court on 11 June 1991. In addition, the author was
again fined for contempt of court, with the proviso that, if the fine was not
paid within 30 days, he would be placed under arrest.
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2.10 The author did not appeal against this order, nor did he pay the fine.
On 1 September 1991, he was taken into custody. Upon application of the
Institute, a further order was issued on 2 October 1991, by which the author
was to remain in custody until 29 November 1991. Applications for habeas
corpus and bail were dismissed..
Complaint
3.1 The author complains that he has been denied proceedings before an
independent and impartial tribunal. He alleges that the Supreme Court of
Victoria is institutionally linked to the Law Institute by means of
section 88 (2) <c) of the Legal Profession Practice Act {see para. 2.2 above);
the judges' rulings are said to be partial because of their "special
relationship" with the Institute. It is further submitted that the judges of
the Supreme Court simply refused to rule on the issue of whether the
practising fee and insurance premium were valid.
3.2 The author claims that his detention was unlawful, as he was detained for
refusing to pay a fine that in fact exceeded the maximum fine envisaged by the
Act.
He contends that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case
against him, as there was no court rule authorizing a committal order for an
indefinite period until the payment of the fine,
3.3 With respect to the date of entry into force of the Optional Protocol for
Australia, it is claimed that the violation of article 14 of the Covenant has
continuing effects, in that the author remains struck off the roll of
solicitors of the Supreme Court, without any prospect of being reinstated.
Issues and proceedings before the Committee
4.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Human
Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 87 of its rules of procedure,
decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the
Covenant.
4.2 The Committee has noted the author's claim that his detention between
1 September and 29 November 1991 was unlawful. It observes that this event
occurred prior to the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for Australia
(25 December 1991), and that it does not have consequences which in themselves
constitute a violation of any of the provisions of the Covenant. Accordingly,
this part of the communication is inadmissible ratione temporis. As to the
author's contention that he was denied a fair and impartial hearing, the
Committee notes that although the relevant court hearings took place before
25 December 1991, the eEfects of the decisions taken by the Supreme Court
continue until the present time. Accordingly, complaints about violations of
the author's rights allegedly ensuing from these decisions are not in
principle excluded ratione temporis.
4.3 As to the author's contention that he was forced to contribute to the
activities of the Law Institute by paying a practising fee as well as an
insurance premium, the Committee notes that the regulation of the activities
of professional bodies and the scrutiny of such regulations by the courts may
raise issues in particular under article 14 of the Covenant. More
particularly, the determination of any rights or obligations in a suit at law
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in relation thereto entitles an author to a fair and public hearing. It is in
principle for States parties to regulate or approve the activities of
professional bodies, which may encompass the provision for insurance schemes.
In the instant case, the fact that the practise of law is governed by the
Legal Profession Practice Act of 1958 and that the rules providing for a
practising fee and a professional indemnity insurance will have no effect
unless approved by the Chief Justice does not lead in itself to the conclusion
that the court, as an institution, is not an independent and impartial
tribunal. Furthermore, the entitlement of the court, under Australian law, to
commit the author for contempt of court for failing to respect an injunction
not to practise law without having paying practising fee and the insurance
premium, is a matter of domestic law and beyond the Committee's competence to
investigate.
4.4 Accordingly, the communication is inadmissible as incompatible with the
provisions of the Covenant, within the meaning of article 3 of the Optional
Protocol.
5.
The Human Rights Committee therefore decides:
(a) That the communication is inadmissible under article 3 of the
Optional Protocol;
(b) That this decision shall be transmitted to the author and, for
information, to the State party.
[Done in English, French, Russian and Spanish, the English text being the
original version.]
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