CCPR/C/44/D/248/1987

Campbell v Jamaica, Merits, Communication No 248/1987, UN Doc

CCPR/C/44/D/248/1987, IHRL 2371 (UNHRC 1992), 30th March 1992,

United Nations General Assembly [UNGA]; Office of the High

Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR]; United Nations Human

Rights Committee [UNHRC]

Date:

30 March 1992

Content type:

International court decisions

Jurisdiction:

United Nations Human Rights Committee [UNHRC]

Citation(s):

Communication No 248/1987 (Application No)

UN Doc CCPR/C/44/D/248/1987 (Official Case No)

IHRL 2371 (UNHRC 1992) (OUP reference)

Product:

Oxford Reports on International Law [ORIL]

Module:

International Human Rights Law [IHRL]

Parties:

Glenford Campbell (Jamaica [jm])

Jamaica

Judges/Arbitrators:

Francisco José Aguilar Urbina; Nisuke Ando; Christine Chanet; Vojin Dimitrijevic; Omran El Shafei;

János Fodor; Kurt Herndl; Rosalyn Higgins; Rajsoomer Lallah; Andreas Mavrommatis; Rein

Myullerson; Birame Ndiaye; Fausto Pocar; Julio Prado Vallejo; Waleed Sadi; Alegandro Serrano

Caldera; S Amos Wako; Bertil Wennergren

Procedural Stage:

Merits

Subject(s):

Legal representation, right to — Right to a judge — Detention — Judicial review

Core Issue(s):

Whether a delay of almost six weeks between a person’s arrest and the time at which he was

formally charged and brought before a judge to contest the legality of his detention was

incompatible with Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’).

Whether a delay of 18 months between conviction and dismissal of first appeal was a breach of

Article 14(3)(c) of the ICCPR.

Oxford Reports on International Human Rights Law is edited by:

Professor Claudia Martin, Washington College of Law

Professor Başak Çalı, Center for Global Public Law, Koç University, Istanbul

Dr Magnus Killander, University of Pretoria, Centre for Human Rights

Facts

F1 On 12 December 1984, Glenford Campbell was arrested and notified that he was a

suspect in a murder. He was not charged with any offence at that time but he was detained.

F2 Campbell was finally charged, after almost six weeks of detention, with multiple counts of

theft on 26 January 1985.

F3 Campbell claimed that his detention without charge between December 1984 and

January 1985 was arbitrary and unlawful under Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March

1976 (‘ICCPR’).

F4 Campbell further claimed that he was not promptly informed of the charges against him

and was not brought promptly before a judge in violation of his rights under Articles 9(2) and

9(3) of the ICCPR.

F5 Campbell was tried and convicted by the Manchester Circuit Court and sentenced to

death on 16 October 1985. His appeals failed.

F6 With respect to his appeal, Campbell claimed that he was not present during the hearing,

contrary to his express wishes, and was represented by new counsel who he was unable to

contact prior to the proceedings, in breach of Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR.

F7 Campbell claimed that the delay of 18 months between his conviction and dismissal of

appeal by the Court of Appeal was unreasonable under Article 14(3)(c) of the ICCPR.

F8 Jamaica challenged the admissibility of the communication for failure to exhaust all

available domestic remedies under Article 5(2)(b) of the Optional Protocol to the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171,

entered into force 23 March 1976 (‘Optional Protocol’). Campbell was entitled to submit a

constitutional motion to the Supreme Court which he failed to have recourse to.

Held

H1 Only those remedies which were effective needed to be exhausted for the purposes of

admissibility under Article 5(2)(b) of the Optional Protocol. (paragraphs 5.3–5.5)

H2 As legal aid was not available for a constitutional appeal, Campbell was not required to

submit a constitutional appeal as he could not afford it. The claim was, therefore, admissible.

(paragraph 5.6)

H3 Campbell was originally arrested on suspicion of having committed a serious crime, so

his detention could not be considered unlawful or arbitrary under Article 9(1) of the ICCPR.

(paragraph 6.3)

H4 The UN Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) held that the delay of almost six weeks

between Campbell’s arrest and the time at which he was formally charged was

unreasonable under Article 9(2) of the ICCPR. (paragraph 6.3)

H5 Moreover, the fact that Campbell was held for almost six weeks before being brought

before a judge to confirm his detention was contrary to Article 9(3) of the ICCPR. (paragraph

6.4)

H6 Furthermore, Campbell was unable to contest his detention before a court in breach of

Article 9(4) of the ICCPR. (paragraph 6.4)

H7 With respect to his appeal, the HRC noted that Campbell had notified the court that he

wished to be present during the proceedings. The fact that he was not in attendance or able

to instruct his lawyer prior to the hearing disclosed a violation of his right to proper legal

representation under Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR. (paragraph 6.6)

H8 On the complaint under Article 14(3)(c) of the ICCPR, the HRC held that the individual

delays between each stage of the proceedings could not be taken to be unreasonable.

(paragraph 6.8)

H9 The imposition of a death sentence following an unfair trial violated Article 6 of the

ICCPR. (paragraph 6.9)

H10 Jamaica had violated Campbell’s rights under Articles 6, 9(2), 9(3), 9(4), and 14(3)(d)

of the ICCPR and was required to provide him with an effective remedy including immediate

release. (paragraphs 7–8)

Date of Report: 28 June 2009

Reporter(s):

Alexander Pung; Castan Centre for Human Rights Law

Analysis

A1 The HRC had noted that the ‘10’ months between conviction and dismissal of appeal

was not unreasonable. However, the delay was in fact 18 months, so a mistake in the

transcription or in the reasoning arose. Having said that, the shortest period of time (between

either arrest and conviction, or conviction and dismissal of appeal) found to breach Article

14(3)(c) of the ICCPR is 22 months in Sextus v Trinidad and Tobago, UN Doc

CCPR/C/72/D/818/1998. However, see also Hill and Hill v Spain, UN Doc

CCPR/C/59/D/526/1993, where a three year delay between arrest and dismissal of final

appeal was found to breach Article 14(3)(c) of the ICCPR.

Date of Analysis: 28 November 2009

Analysis by: Sarah Joseph; Castan Centre for Human Rights Law

Instruments cited in the full text of this decision:

International

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November

1950) 213 UNTS 222; 312 ETS 5, entered into force 3 September 1953

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171,

entered into force 23 March 1976, Articles 2(3)(a), 7, 9(1), 9(2), 9(3), 9(4), 10(1), 14(1),

14(2), 14(3)(b), 14(3)(c), 14(3)(d), 14(3)(e), 14(3)(g), 14(5)

Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December

1966) 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March 1976, Articles 4(2), 5(2)(b), 5(4)

Rules of Procedure, UN Doc CCPR/C/3/Rev.2, UN Human Rights Committee, 1989

General Comment no 6, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 127, UN Human Rights Committee,

2003

Domestic

Poor Persons (Legal Proceedings) Act, 1941 (Jamaica)

Poor Prisoners’ Defence Act, 1961 (Jamaica)

Judicial Committee (General Appellate Jurisdiction) Rules Order, Statutory Instrument No

1676, 1982, Rules 2, 9

Constitution

Constitution (Jamaica), Sections 20, 25

Cases cited in the full text of this decision:

UN Human Rights Committee

Weismann de Lanza and Perdomo v Uruguay, UN Doc CCPR/C/9/D/8/1977; IHRL 2780

(UNHRC 1980), 3 April 1980

AW v Jamaica, UN Doc CCPR/C/37/D/290/1988

Kelly v Jamaica, UN Doc CCPR/C/41/D/253/1987

Collins v Jamaica, UN Doc CCPR/C/43/D/240/1987

Little v Jamaica, UN Doc CCPR/C/43/D/283/1988

GS v Jamaica, UN Doc CCPR/C/37/D/369/1989

European Court of Human Rights

McGoff v Sweden, (1986) 8 EHRR 246

Privy Council

Teper v R, (1952) AC 480; (1952) 2 All ER 447

To access full citation information for this document, see the Oxford Law Citator record

Decision - full text

Views under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol.

1 . The author of the communication is Glenford Campbell, a Jamaican citizen born on 27

October 1961 in the Parish of Manchester, Jamaica, and currently awaiting execution at St.

Catherine District Prison, Jamaica. He claims to be the victim of a violation by Jamaica of

articles 7; 9, paragraphs 1 to 3; 10, paragraph 1; and 14, paragraphs 1 to 3 and 5, of the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. He is represented by counsel.

Facts as submitted by the author

2.1 The author was arrested at midnight on 12 December 1984 at his financée’s residence

in the Copperwood District, Parish of Clarendon. He was informed that he was suspected of

having killed Ferdinand Thompson, but he was not formally charged with any offence.

2.2 On 26 January 1985, still in detention, the author was charged with larcency of a cow,

valued at $1,000 and belonging to Mr. Thompson, as well as the theft of two ropes and a

chain. On 12 March 1985 the author was served a warrant for the murder of Mr. Thompson.

It was submitted that he was the last person to have been seen with the deceased, before

the latter disappeared. A preliminary inquiry was conducted before the Court of Petty

Sessions for the Parish of Manchester on 4 July 1985; the resident examining magistrate,

Mr. Sang, ruled that a prima facie case had been made about the charge that, between 27

November and 14 December 1984, the author had murdered Mr. Thompson; the author was

committed to stand trial in the Circuit Court for the Parish of Manchester. A legal aid attorney

was assigned to him for the preparation of the trial.

2.3 The author’s trial began 14 October 1985. Mr. Campbell made an unsworn statement

from the dock. Several witnesses gave evidence for the prosecution, but the author contends

that there remain several serious discrepancies between the trial transcript, the judge’s

summing up and the facts as found by the Court of Appeal. On 16 October 1985, the jury

returned a verdict of guilty and the author was sentenced to death.

2.4 For his appeal, which was filed on 22 October 1985, the author was assigned a different

legal aid attorney. On 15 May 1987, supplementary grounds of appeal were filed by this

lawyer, and the Court of Appeal heard the appeal on 18 May 1987. On 19 May 1987, the

appeal was dismissed. The author, who had indicated on the appeal form that he wished to

be present during the hearing of the appeal, did not attend the hearing; he indicates that he

merely was informed by his lawyer, by letter of 19 May 1987, that the appeal had been

dismissed. The attorney further indicated the possibility of a further petition to the Judicial

Committee of the Privy Council. Mr. Campbell indicates that he had no opportunity to instruct

this lawyer.

2.5 On 27 October 1988, the author petitioned the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council

for special leave to appeal. On 21 November 1988, the Judicial Committee refused leave to

appeal. With this, it is submitted, available domestic remedies have been exhausted.

Complaint

3.1 The author alleges a violation of article 9, paragraphs 1 to 3. He indicates that when he

was arrested on 12 December 1984, the police officer who brought him to the Frankfield

police station and questioned him without informing him of his rights merely told him that Mr.

Thompson had been reported missing and that as he (the author) was the last person to

have been seen with Mr. Thompson, he was suspected of having killed him. It is submitted

that the author was detained from 12 December 1984 to 12 March 1985 without being

formally charged with the only offence on which he was finally indicted, murder. During this

time, he claims, he did not have access to legal representation. The author contends that, in

violation of article 9, paragraphs 2 and 3, he was not promptly informed of the charges

against him, or brought before a judge or other judicial officer authorized by law to exercise

judicial power between 12 December 1984 and 26 January 1985. In this context, he invokes

the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee as well as the decision of the European

Court of Human Rights in the case of McGoff v. Sweden, concerning article 5 of the

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. a/

3.2 The author further alleges a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (b), of the Covenant, in

that both time and facilities available to him for the preparation of his defence were severely

curtailed. Thus, he was not given the opportunity of speaking with his counsel prior to the

preliminary hearing. The same legal aid lawyer represented the author for the trial; the

author states that this lawyer visited him in prison three days before the start of the trial and

prepared a statement for him. Although that statement appears to have formed the basis for

the author’s unsworn statement from the dock on 15 October 1985, he was not given a copy;

he submits that his lawyer did not review the prosecution’s case with him.

3.3 The author further contends that his lawyer did not comply with many of his instructions;

this is said to constitute a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (e). Thus, he had requested

that witnesses be called on his behalf; counsel, in a letter of 19 April 1990, states that he had

been given the names of prospective witnesses but was unable to trace them, and that none

of the author’s relatives had come to see him. Towards the end of the trial, one person who

claimed to know the author spoke to counsel and told him that she had not testified because

she did not want to “get involved”. In the author’s opinion, the only reason why witnesses

were not traced and called was that the legal aid rates were so inadequate that the lawyer

was not able to make the necessary inquiries and initiate the necessary steps in order to

prepare his defence.

3.4 The author specifically instructed his lawyer that the evidence presented by one of the

investigating police officers was incorrect. He was told that this matter would have to be

addressed at a later stage during the trial; in the end, it was not addressed at all. The author

also informed counsel that the two investigating officers had beaten him during interrogation

and forced him to sign a statement without knowing what it was about. Although so informed,

counsel did not act on these instructions. Neither the trial transcript nor any of the

depositions taken during the preliminary hearing indicate that the police officers’ evidence

was challenged or objected to, as it should have been in accordance with the author’s

instructions. Counsel contends that, notwithstanding, the judge should have given due

consideration to the admissibility of unwritten confessional material. In this context, she

refers to the Judges Rules, which police officers must respect. Under rule 2, an officer must

caution anyone whom he suspects may have committed an offence before putting further

questions to that person. The author submits that he was not cautioned. Under rule 9,

statements taken in accordance with the Rules should, wherever possible, be taken down in

writing and signed by the person making them, after having been given an opportunity to

make appropriate corrections. The author was not asked by the police officers whether he

wished to write down his statement, nor was he invited to make any corrections.

3.5 Counsel notes that the Judges Rules have been adopted by several Commonwealth

jurisdictions, including Jamaica. Whenever a statement made in breach of the Rules is

sought to be admitted, the judge must exercise his discretion as to whether or not to admit

such a statement. If the judge decides to admit it, he must carefully instruct the jury as to

how to treat it; the author submits that the judge did not display this particular care. He

concludes that as he was never advised that he had a right to remain silent, he was, in

effect, compelled to make a statement, in violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (g).

3.6 The author, while conceding that it is in principle for the domestic courts and not for the

Committee to evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case, contends that the instructions

to the jury in respect of the author’s trustworthiness were so tainted by the judge’s own

opinion as to amount to a denial of justice, especially if combined with his instructions

concerning the circumstantial evidence and motive and with respect to the failure of counsel

to challenge the confession statement. Counsel points, in particular, to the following remark

made by the judge when summing up the author’s unsworn statement: “It would be your duty

as judges of fact to pay attention to the demeanour of the accused while he was giving his

unsworn statement”.

3.7 Moreover, it is contended that the judge did not follow the directions given by Lord

Norman in Teper v. Regina (AC 480, at 489), according to which circumstantial evidence

must always be narrowly examined. In the author’s case, the judge in fact asked the jury to

infer that the theft of the cow was the motive for the murder of Mr. Thompson, i.e.,that Mr.

Campbell had committed the murder in order t facilitate or conceal the theft of the cow. It is

submitted that the judge, in a case turning on the evaluation of circumstantial evidence,

attached undue weight to one of several possible inferences which could be drawn from a

general finding of untruthfulness.

3.8 In respect of the conduct of his appeal, the author alleges violations of article 14,

paragraphs 3 (b) and (d) and 5, of the Covenant. The attorney assigned to his appeal

concedes that he did not seek instructions from the author; the author argues that as he had

no opportunity to consult with that lawyer, he was denied his right to properly prepare his

defence. He further contends that because he was at no time informed when his appeal was

being heard and was represented for the appeal by an attorney not of his choosing, his

rights under article 14, paragraphs 3 (d) and 5, were also violated: the conduct of the appeal

is said t have jeopardized an effective appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

3.9 . The author notes that more than 18 months passed between his conviction and the

dismissal of appeal. On 7 August 1987 and again on 6 April 1988, the Court of Appeal’s

written judgement was requested. Counsel only obtained a copy of the latter in early July

1988; he served notice of his intention to petition the Judicial Committee for special leave to

appeal on 25 August 1988, and filed his petition on 27 October 1988. These delays, coupled

with the time spent in detention without being charged, are said to amount to a breach of

article 14, paragraph 3 (c).

3.10 The author contends that on the basis of his allegations detailed in paragraphs 3.2 to

3.7 above, his right, under article 14, paragraph 2, to be presumed innocent until proved

guilty according to law has been violated. He refers to the jurisprudence of the Committee in

this respect. b/

3.11 Finally, the author contends that the conditions of his imprisonment are inhuman and

degrading, amounting to a violation of articles 7 and 10 of the Covenant. Thus, he claims

that he has received physical threats from prison warders; that there is a lack of hygienic and

sanitary facilities on death row, which makes the living conditions highly insalubrious; and

that the conditions of imprisonment are seriously detrimental to his health. In support of his

contentions, the author submits a copy of a report about the conditions of detention at St.

Catherine District Prison, prepared by a United States non-governmental organization.

Furthermore, the constant stress and anxiety suffered as a result of prolonged detention on

death row are said to constitute a separate violation of article 7 of the Covenant.

3.12 With respect to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the author

contends that an application to the Supreme (Constitutional) Court would not be an available

and effective remedy in his case. He points out that legal aid is not available for this purpose

under the Poor Prisoners’ Defence Act of 1961 or the Poor Persons (Legal Proceedings) Act

of 1941, that he does not have the means to himself secure legal representation in Jamaica

to argue a constitutional motion on a pro bono basis.

3.13 The author further notes that this allegation that he was denied a fair trial was

specifically rejected by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In the circumstances, he

should not be required to argue points of law before a court of lower jurisdiction in Jamaica

which he had already argued before the Privy Council. The Privy Council, if seized of an

appeal on a decision on motion pursuant to section 25 of the Constitution, would in all

probability confirm its earlier decision. Finally, a court of lesser jurisdiction in Jamaica would

be bound by the Judicial Committee’s earlier decision.

State party’s information and observations

4.1 By submission of 20 July 1988, the State party argued that the author retained the right,

under section 110 of the Jamaican Constitution, to petition the Judicial Committee of the

Privy Council for special leave to appeal. It added that legal aid would be available to him for

that purpose. The author subsequent petition to the Judicial Committee was dismissed on 21

November 1988.

4.2 In a further submission dated 4 April 1990, made after the Committee’s decision on

admissibility, the State party contends that although the author’s petition for special leave to

appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was dismissed, he retains the right,

under sections 20 and 25 of the Constitution, to apply to the Supreme (Constitutional) Court

for redress. A decision of the Supreme Court may be appealed to the Court of Appeal of

Jamaica and from there the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

4.3 As to the author’s allegations that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the issue of

circumstantial evidence and that witnesses against him allegedly gave false evidence, the

State party argues that these claims seek to raise issued of fact and evidence which the

Committee has no competence to evaluate. The State party refers to the Committee’s

jurisprudence in this respect. c/

4.4 As to the issue of whether a copy of the written judgement of the Court of Appeal was

made available to the author or his counsel without delay, the State party notes that “the

written judgement would have been available to [the author’s] representative at the time it

was delivered by the Court of Appeal”.

Issues and proceedings before the Committee

5.1 During its thirty-fifth session, in March 1989, the Committee considered the admissibility

of the communication. With respect to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies,

the Committee concluded that, after the dismissal of the author’s petition for special leave to

appeal by the Judicial Committee, there were no further remedies available to the author.

5.2 On 30 March 1989, the Committee declared the communication admissible.

5.3 The Committee has noted the State party’s submission of 4 April 1990, made after the

decision on admissibility, in which it reaffirms its position that the communication remains

inadmissible on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Committee takes

the opportunity to expand on its admissibility findings, in the light of the State party’s further

observations.

5.4 The Committee observes that domestic remedies within the meaning of the Optional

Protocol must be both available and effective. It recalls that by submission of 10 October

1991 concerning a different case, the State party indicated that legal aid is not provided in

respect of constitutional motions. d/ It is further uncontested that no lawyer in Jamaica is

willing to represent the author for this purpose on a pro bono basis. In this context, the

Committee observes that it is not the author’s indigence that absolves him from pursuing

constitutional remedies, but the State party’s inability or unwillingness to provide legal aid for

that purpose.

5.5 The State party has claimed, again in respect of different cases involving capital

punishment, that it has no obligation under the Covenant to make legal aid available in

respect of constitutional motions, as such motions do not involve the determination of a

criminal charge, as required by article 14, paragraph 3 (d), of the Covenant. This issue

before the Committee has not, however, been raised in the context of article 14, paragraph 3

(d), but in the context of whether domestic remedies have been exhausted.

5.6 For the above reasons, the Committee maintains that a constitutional motion does not

constitute a remedy that is both available and effective within the meaning of article 5,

paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol. Accordingly, there is no reason to reverse its

decision on admissibility of 30 March 1989.

5.7 With regard to the allegations under articles 7 and 10, paragraph 1, of the Covenant,

concerning the conditions of the author’s detention on death row, the Committee notes that

the substantiation thereof was not submitted by counsel until after the adoption of the

Committee’s decision on admissibility. The Committee further observes that the issues

concerning Mr. Campbell’s detention on death row and the question of whether prolonged

detention on death row constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment were not placed before

the Jamaican courts, nor apparently brought to the attention of any other competent

Jamaican authority. As domestic remedies in this respect have manifestly not been

exhausted, the Committee is precluded from considering these allegations on their merits.

6.1 As to the substance of Mr Campbell’s admissible allegations, the Committee regrets that

several requests for clarifications notwithstanding, the State party has confined itself to the

observation that the author seeks to raise issued of facts and evidence that the Committee is

not competent to evaluate. The Committee cannot but interpret this as the State party’s

refusal to cooperate under article 4, paragraph 2, of the Optional Protocol. This provision

enjoins a State party to investigate in good faith all the allegations of violations of the

Covenant made against it and to make available to the Committee all the information at its

disposal. The summary dismissal of the author’s allegations, as in the instant case, does not

fulfil the requirements of article 4, paragraph 2. In the circumstances, due weight must be

given to the author’s allegations, to the extent that they have been credibly substantiated.

6.2 The Committee rejects the State party’s contention that the communication merely

seeks to raise issues of facts and evidence which the Committee does not have the

competence to evaluate. It is the Committee’s established jurisprudence that it is in principle

for the appellate courts of State parties to the Covenant to evaluate facts and evidence in a

particular case or to review the judge’s instructions to the jury, unless it can be ascertained

that the instructions to the jury were clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice, or

that the judge manifestly violated his obligation of impartiality. e/ In this case, the Committee

has been requested to examine matters belonging in this latter category. After careful

consideration of the material before it, the Committee concludes that the remarks made by

Justice T. about the author’s “demeanour” in his summing up to the jury were neither

arbitrary nor amounted to a manifest violation of his obligation of impartiality. The Committee

cannot conclude either that the judge’s directions unfairly buttressed the case of the

prosecution. In the circumstances, the Committee finds no violation of article 14, paragraph

1. It follows that the conduct of the trial by the judge had no incidence on the author’s right,

under article 14, paragraph 2, to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

6.3 In respect of the allegations pertaining to article 9, paragraphs 1 to 3, the State party

has not contested that the author was detained for three months before he was formally

charged with murder, and that throughout the period from 12 December 1984 to 12 March

1985 he had no access to legal representation. The Committee does not consider that the

author’s arrest was arbitrary within the meaning of article 9, paragraph 1, as he was

apprehended on suspicion of having committed a specified criminal offence. However, the

Committee finds that the author was not “promptly” informed of the charges against him: one

of the most important reasons for the requirement of “prompt” information on a criminal

charge is to enable a detained individual to request a prompt decision on the lawfulness of

his or her detention by a competent judicial authority. A delay from 12 December 1984 to 26

January 1985 does not meet the requirements of article 9, paragraph 2.

6.4 The Committee further considers that the delay from 12 December 1984 to 26 January

1985 in the present case between Mr. Campbell’s arrest and his presentation to a judge

violates the principle, in article 9, paragraph 3, that anyone arrested on a criminal charge

shall be brought “promptly” before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise

judicial power. The Committee considers to be an aggravating factor that the author had not

access to legal representation from December 1984 to March 1985. This means, in the

author’s case that his right under article 9, paragraph 4, was also violated, since he was not

in due time afforded the opportunity to obtain, on his own initiative, a decision by a court on

the lawfulness of his detention.

6.5 The right of an accused person to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation

of his defence is an important element of the guarantee of a fair trial and an important aspect

of the principle of equality of arms. In cases in which a capital sentence may be pronounced

on the accused, it is axiomatic that sufficient time must be granted to the accused and his

counsel to prepare the defence for the trial. The determination of what constitutes “adequate

time” requires an assessment of the individual circumstances of each case. The author also

contends that he was unable to secure the attendance of witnesses on his behalf. The

Committee notes, however, that the material before it does not reveal that either counsel or

the author complained to the trial judge that the time or facilities were inadequate. The

Committee therefore finds no violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (b) and (e).

6.6 Concerning the adequacy of the author’s legal representation, both on trial and on

appeal, the Committee recalls that it is axiomatic that legal assistance be made available to

individuals facing a capital sentence. In the present case, it is uncontested that the author

instructed his lawyer to raise objections to the confessional evidence, as he claimed this was

obtained through maltreatment; this was not done. This failure had a clear incidence on the

conduct of the appeal; the written judgement of the Court of Appeal of 19 June 1987

emphasizes that no objections were raised by the defence in respect of the confessional

evidence. Furthermore, although the author had specifically indicated that he wished to be

present during the hearing of the appeal, he was not only absent when the appeal was

heard but, moreover, could not instruct his representative for the appeal, despite his wish to

do so. Taking into account the combined effect of the above-mentioned circumstance, and

bearing in mind that this is a case involving the death penalty, the Committee considers that

the State party should have allowed the author to instruct his lawyer for the appeal, or to

represent himself at the appeal proceedings. To the extent that the author was denied

effective representation in the judicial proceedings and in particular as far as his appeal is

concerned, the requirements of article 14, paragraph 3 (d), have not been met.

6.7 As to the claim under article 14, paragraph 3 (g), the Committee notes that the wording

of this provision — i.e. that no one shall “be compelled to testify against himself or to confess

guilt” — must be understood in terms of the absence of any pressure from the investigating

authorities on the accused, with a view to obtaining a confession of guilt. In the present case,

the author’s claim that he was beaten during interrogation and forced to sign a blank

confession statement has not been contested by the State party. It remains the Committee’s

duty to ascertain whether the author has sufficiently substantiated his allegation,

notwithstanding the State party’s failure to address it. After careful consideration of the

material before it, the Committee is unable to determine that the investigating officers used

force to compel Mr. Campbell to confess his guilt, in violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (g),

or that the judge erred in admitting the confessional evidence put forth by the prosecution.

6.8 With respect to the claim of “undue delay” in the proceedings against the author, the

Committee does not consider that a delay of 10 months between conviction and the

dismissal of the appeal, resulted in “undue delay(s)” within the meaning of article 14,

paragraph 3 (c), of the Covenant. The Committee is further unable to conclude that the

conduct of the appeal jeopardized the author’s chances of an effective appeal to the Judicial

Committee of the Privy Council, in violation of article 14, paragraph 5. In this context, the

Committee notes that the Court of Appeal produced a written judgement within one month

after dismissing the appeal; it also lacks evidence that such delays as were experienced by

counsel in obtaining a copy of the written judgement must be attributed to the State party.

6.9 The Committee is of the opinion that the imposition of a sentence of death upon the

conclusion of a trial in which the provisions of the Covenant have not been respected

constitutes, if no further appeal against the sentence is available, a violation of article 6 of

the Covenant. As the Committee observed in its General Comment 6 (16), the provision that

a sentence of death may be imposed only in accordance with the law and not contrary to the

provisions of the Covenant implies that “the procedural guarantees therein prescribed must

be observed, including the right to a fair hearing by an independent tribunal, the presumption

of innocence, the minimum guarantees for the defence, and the right to review by a higher

tribunal”. In the instant case, while a constitutional motion to the Supreme (Constitutional)

Court might in theory still be available, it would not be an effective remedy within the

meaning of article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol, for the reasons outlined in

paragraphs 5.4 to 5.7 above. It may thus be concluded that the final sentence of death was

passed without having met the requirements of article 14, and that as a result the right

protected by article 6 of the Covenant has been violated.

7 . The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional

Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is of the view that the

facts before it disclose violations of articles 6; 9, paragraphs 2 to 4; and 14, paragraph 3 (d),

of the Covenant.

8 . In capital punishment cases, the obligation of State parties to observe rigorously all the

guarantees for a fair trial set out in article 14 of the Covenant admits of no exception. The

Committee is of the view that Mr. Glenford Campbell is entitled, according to article 2,

paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, to an effective remedy, in this case entailing his release.

The State party is under an obligation to take measures to ensure that similar violations do

not occur in the future.

9 . The Committee would wish to receive information, within 90 days, on any relevant

measures taken by the State party in respect of the Committee’s views.

[Done in English, French, Russian and Spanish, the English text being the original version.]

Footnotes:

a/ See 8 ECHR 246 [1986].

b/ Communication No. 8/1977 (Weismann and Lanza Perdomo v. Uruguay) in: Selected

Decisions of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol (United Nations

publication, Sales No. E.89.XIV.1, vol. I, pp. 45–49

c/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fifty Session, Supplement No. 40

(A/45/40), vol. II, annex X, sects. M and S, communications Nos. 290/1988 (A.W v.

Jamaica), decisions of 8 November 1989, para. 8.2, and 369/1989 (G.S. v. Jamaica), para.

3.2.

d/ See sect. J below, communication No. 283/1988 (Aston Little v. Jamaica), Committee’s

views adopted on 1 November 1991, paras. 7.3 and 7.4

e/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 40

(A/46/40), annex XI, sect. D. communication No. 253/1987 (Paul Kelly v. Jamaica), views

adopted on 8 April 1991, para. 5.13; and section C above, communication No. 240/1987

(Willard Collins v. Jamaica), views adopted on 1 November 1991, para. 8.3