Decision on merits; Substantive issues: accused persons / convicted persons defence, adequate time and facilities effective remedy fair trial fair trial - undue delay fair trial - witnesses legal assistance right to appeal; Articles: 6 (2) 14 (1) 14 (3) (b) 14 (3) (c) 14 (3) (d) 14 (3) (e) 14 (5); Procedural issues: exhaustion of domestic remedies; [CCPR: UNO-Pakt II, Internationaler Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte; Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques; Patto II]
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CCPR/C/43/D/283/l988
19 November 1991
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
______________________________________________________________
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
Forty-third session
DECISIONS
Communication No. 283/l988
Submitted by :
Aston Little (represented by counsel)
Alleged victim :
The author
State party :
Jamaica
Date of communication :
19 January 1988 (initial submission)
Documentation references
: Prior decisions -
CCPR/C/WG/32/D/283/1988
(Working Group
combined rule 86/
rule 91 decision,
dated 22 March 1988)
- CCPR/C/36/D/283/1988
(decision on
admissibility, dated
24 July 1989)
- CCPR/C/42/D/283/1988
(interlocutory
decision,
dated 24 July 1991)
Date of adoption of Views
under article 5,
paragraph 4, of the
Optional Protocol :
1 November 1991
On 1 November 1991, the Human Rights Committee adopted its
Views under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol in
respect of communication No. 283/1988. The text of the Views is
appended to the present document.
[Annex]
CCPR/C/43/D/283/1988
English
Annex
Page 1
*/
Made public by decision of the Human Rights Committee.
DEC283.43
ANNEX
Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph 4,
of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights
- Forty-third session -
concerning
Communication No. 283/1988
Submitted by :
Aston Little
(represented by counsel)
Alleged victim :
The author
State party :
Jamaica
Date of communication :
19 January 1988
(initial submission)
Date of decision on admissibility
:
24 July 1989
The Human Rights Committee
, established under article 28 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Meeting on 1 November 1991,
Having considered communication No. 283/1988, submitted to
the Committee by Aston Little under the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Having taken into account
all written information made
available to it by the author of the communication and by the
State party,
Adopts the following Views under article 5, paragraph 4, of
the Optional Protocol.
The facts as presented by the author
:
CCPR/C/43/D/283/1988
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1. The author of the communication is Aston Little, a Jamaican
citizen born on 6 February 1952 at Maroon Town, Jamaica, and
currently awaiting execution at St. Catherine District Prison,
Jamaica. He claims to be the victim of a violation by Jamaica of
articles 6, 7, lO, and l4, paragraphs 1, 2, 3(b),(d), (e), and 5
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. He
is represented by counsel.
2.1 The author was arrested on 12 January 1982 on suspicion
of having murdered, on 9 January 1982, one Oswald Dawes.
After his apprehension, the arresting officer allegedly hit
him with his gun. The prosecution contended that the author
had made a statement to the arresting officer, one Detective
Corporal C., to the effect that he was not the only one
involved, and that one O.B. and her daughter, L.D., also knew
about the crime. The author denied ever having made such a
statement. Subsequently, the investigating officer suggested
to him that he should plead guilty to the charge of murder;
when the author professed his innocence, the officer
threatened to use O.B., who had been charged along with the
author, as the prosecution's principal witness against him.
2.2 The author was detained until 16 February 1982, when he
was released on bail; on 31 March 1983 he was again remanded
in custody. On 24 April 1984 he was charged with the murder
of Mr. Dawes; he went on trial in the Circuit Court of Spanish
Town between 23 and 25 July 1984. Upon conclusion of the
trial, the jury at first did not return a unanimous verdict;
having been told by the judge to reconsider the evidence, it
again retired and thereafter returned a guilty verdict.
During the trial, the woman who had initially been charged
with him, O.B., did in fact testify against the author, and it
was, inter alia, on the basis of her testimony that he was
convicted.
2.3 On 31 July 1984, the author appealed to the Court of
Appeal of Jamaica on the grounds that the judge had
misdirected the jury (a) on the issue of corroborative
evidence, and (b) on the value of the author's alleged
confession made after his arrest. On 20 January 1986, the
appeal was dismissed. Early in 1989, the author petitioned
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for special leave
to appeal; the petition was dismissed on 5 May 1989. With
this, it is submitted, available domestic remedies have been
exhausted.
CCPR/C/43/D/283/1988
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The complaint :
3.1 The author submits that the conduct of the trial violated
article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, because the trial
judge's instructions to the jury on the issue of
"corroborative evidence" were inadequate. It is submitted
that these directions were vitally important given that (a)
the testimony of O.B. provided the only evidence against the
author, (b) her evidence was inconsistent with respect to the
author's possession of the knife with which Mr. Dawes had been
stabbed; and (c) no motive on the part of the author was ever
established. Counsel further submits that the trial judge
wrongly directed the jury that the statement made by the
author in the presence of Det. Corp. C. ("ah no mi alone
involve. L. and O. no about it too") amounted to a confession
of murder: these words could not have amounted, in law, to a
confession. It is further submitted that the judge should
have directed or warned the jury that a mere "involvement" in
any crime cannot necessarily be deemed, in the absence of
further evidence, to amount to participation sufficient to
establish guilt. Pursuant to the judge's instructions, the
jury had to convict Mr. Little if it was convinced that he had
played some part in the overall enterprise but remained unsure
as to whether he was a principal or an abettor.
3.2 The author further claims that he was denied adequate
time and facilities for the preparation of his defence,
contrary to article 14, paragraph 3(b), as well as inadequate
facilities to cross-examine witnesses, contrary to article 14,
paragraph 3(e). He states that he was assigned two
representatives, Mr. A.S. and his assistant, Ms. H.M.;
although they were assigned to the case prior to the hearing
before the examining magistrate, the author only had a brief
interview with Ms. H.M. prior to the preliminary hearing. He
further only met once for about 30 minutes with Mr. A.S. about
one month before the trial. The author submits that his
representatives were inexperienced and did not adequately
consult with him in preparation of the defence. Thus,
(a)
the statements of the prosecution witnesses were not
reviewed with the author;
(b)
his comments on the case of the prosecution were not
acted upon by his representatives;
(c)
he had only 10 minutes at the end of each trial day
to consult with counsel;
(d)
inconsistencies in the testimony of O.B. were picked
CCPR/C/43/D/283/1988
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Page 4
up by the author and notified to counsel, who failed
to take any action;
(e) counsel initially intended to call the author to
testify but then changed his mind;
(f)
at least one witness identified by the author as
capable of providing relevant and credible evidence
on his behalf was not called by A.S., who indicated
that this was unnecessary, without however providing
an explanation;
(g) the author pointed out that the distance between the
bar where he had been drinking and the
locus in quo
was such that he could not possibly have killed Mr.
Dawes and made it in time for the beginning of his
work shift at 7 a.m. The author's presence in the
bar and on the bus to work could have been
established, but counsel did not investigate the
matter, in spite of requests to this effect
formulated by the author.
3.3 The author acknowledges that the Court of Appeal assigned
a lawyer, Mr. W.C., to him for the preparation of the appeal.
He submits, however, that he was not consulted by this lawyer
either before, during or after the appeal; he addressed
several letters to W.C. before and after the hearing of the
appeal, requesting an interview, but his letters went
unanswered. It is submitted that this situation constitutes a
violation of article 14, paragraphs 3(b), (d), and 5, of the
Covenant.
3.4 Counsel claims that the delays in the judicial
proceedings in his client's case constitute violations of
articles 7, lO, and l4, paragraphs 3(c) and 5, of the
Covenant. Thus, two years and six months passed between
arrest and trial and sentence, one year and seven months
between conviction and the dismissal of the appeal, and three
years and four months between the appeal and the dismissal of
Mr. Little's petition for special leave to appeal to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
3.5 In this context, it is submitted that the Court of Appeal
of Jamaica never issued a properly reasoned judgment in the
case. It was only on 31 January 1989 that counsel
representing the author before the Judicial Committee received
a note from the Registrar of the Court of Appeal of Jamaica,
signed by one of the judges on appeal. This note merely states
that the Court of Appeal considered counsel's submissions to
CCPR/C/43/D/283/1988
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Page 5
"Prison Conditions in Jamaica", May 1990.
1
Coun sel refers to the decision of the European Cour
t
2
of Human Rights in the case of
Soering v. United Kingdom
, where
the "death row phenomenon" was
considered in terms of inhuman an
d
degrading treatment.
be devoid of merit, that there was no ground on which an
application for leave to appeal could be based, and that the
application was, accordingly, refused by oral judgment.
Counsel submits that this note does not constitute proper
grounds for the dismissal of the appeal, as it fails to
address the central issue of corroboration, namely whether the
statement allegedly given by Mr. Little to the police after
his arrest was capable of corroborating the evidence of the
prosecution's only witness, O.B.
3.6 The author further submits that the conditions of his
detention are inhuman and degrading, amounting to a violation
of articles 7 and 10 of the Covenant. He confirms the
findings of a recent report on prison conditions in Jamaica,
including the death row section of St. Catherine District
Prison to which he is confined, prepared by an American
non-governmental organization.
Specifically, he complains
1
that prison conditions are extremely insalubrious, with waste
littering the area and constant unpleasant odours. A slop
bucket in his cell, filled with human excrement, waste and
stagnant water is only emptied once a day. Inmates are
required to share eating utensils made of plastic, which are
not properly cleaned. Finally, the daily time devoted to
recreational activities is often limited to half an hour.
Combined, these conditions are said to violate the author's
inherent dignity, protected by article 10, paragraph 1.
Furthermore, the treatment allegedly constitutes cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of article
7, particularly if taking into consideration the inherent
uncertainty of the author's position as a person under
sentence of death, prolonged by the delays in the judicial
proceedings referred to in paragraph 3.4 above. Finally, the
mental anguish and anxiety resulting from prolonged detention
on death row in themselves are said to violate article 7.
2
3.7 With regard to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic
remedies in respect of the author's claim under article 7 of
the Covenant, counsel refers to the decision of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in the case of
Noel Riley et
al. v. Attorney General
, where it had been held that whatever
the reasons for or length of delay in executing a sentence of
CCPR/C/43/D/283/1988
English
Annex
Page 6
See 1982 3 A.E.R. 469.
3
Elettronica Sicula S.p.A.,
ICJ Reports 1989, p. 59, at
4
Appendix 5.
death lawfully imposed, the delay could afford no ground for
holding the execution of the sentence to be in contravention
of Section 17 of the Jamaican Constitution (similar to article
7 of the Covenant).
Counsel submits that, on the basis of
3
judicial precedent, any constitutional motion based on this
ground would inevitably fail.
3.8 Furthermore, counsel submits that a constitutional motion
based on alleged violations of the right to a fair trial
(Sections 20 and 25 of the Jamaican Constitution) would not be
an available and effective remedy within the meaning of the
Optional Protocol. If the State party submits that Mr. Little
should argue before a court of lower jurisdiction in Jamaica
issues which he had already placed before the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, then, as noted by the
International Court of Justice in a recent decision, the State
party should provide authority for that contention.
More
4
specifically, counsel observes that no legal aid is provided
for constitutional motions pursuant to the Poor Prisoners'
Defence Act (1961) or the Poor Persons (Legal Proceedings) Act
1941, at Appendix 6 and Associated Rules. The Poor Prisoners'
Defence Act only allows for the grant of legal aid
certificates in respect of "appropriate proceedings", defined
as the preliminary examination, the trial or any subsequent
appeal from conviction. Constitutional motions are not
appeals from conviction but applications for constitutional
redress. As the Poor Persons (Legal Proceedings) Act 1941 was
enacted before the Jamaican Constitution, the "legal
proceedings" referred to in the Rules do not include
applications to the Supreme Court. In any event, the author
has not succeeded in securing legal representation in Jamaica
to argue a constitutional motion on a
pro bono basis.
The State party's observations
:
4. The State party, in a submission of 21 June 1989, contends
that the communication is inadmissible because of the author's
failure to pursue remedies available to him under the Jamaican
Constitution. It notes that the provisions of the Covenant
invoked by the author are co-terminous with the rights
protected by Sections 14, 17 and 20 of the Jamaican
Constitution. Under Section 25 of the Constitution, anyone
who alleges that any of his fundamental rights has been, is
CCPR/C/43/D/283/1988
English
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Page 7
being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, may,
without prejudice to any other available action with respect
to the same matter, apply for constitutional redress.
The Committee's admissibility considerations and decision
:
5.1 At its 36th session, the Committee considered the
admissibility of the communication. It noted the State
party's contention that the communication was inadmissible
because of the author's failure to apply for constitutional
redress. In the circumstances of the case, the Committee
found that recourse to the Constitutional Court under Section
25 of the Constitution was not a remedy available to the
author within the meaning of article 5, paragraph 2(b), of the
Optional Protocol.
5.2 On 24 July 1989, the Committee declared the communication
admissible in so far as it appeared to raise issues under
article 14 of the Covenant.
The State party's objections to the admissibility decision and
the Committee's request for further clarifications
:
6.1 The State party, by submission of 10 January 1990,
rejects the Committee's findings on admissibility and
challenges the reasoning described in paragraph 5.1 above. It
argues, in particular, that the Committee's arguments reflect
a misunderstanding of the relevant Jamaican law, especially
the operation of Section 25(1) and (2) of the Constitution.
In its opinion, the proviso to Section 25(2) cannot apply to
the case, as the constitutional remedy under Section 25 is
distinct from and independent of any appellate remedies
pertaining to a criminal charge. The State party refers to
the case of Noel Riley v. Attorney General
(see paragraph
3.7), in which the appellant, after exhausting his criminal
appeals, filed a constitutional motion alleging violations of
certain of his constitutionally guaranteed rights. The
decision of the Supreme Court was in turn appealed to the
Court of Appeal and to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council.
6.2 In a further submission dated 10 October 1990, the State
party argues that the proviso to Section 25 (2) would only be
applicable to a person whose criminal appeal had been
adjudicated by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council if
CCPR/C/43/D/283/1988
English
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Page 8
See CCPR/C/37/D/369/1989 (
G.S. v. Jamaica), decisio n
5
of 8 November 1989, paragraph 3.2.
On 6 April 1989, the Human
Rights Committee had adopte
d
6
its Views under article 5, paragraph 4,
of the Optional Protocol
in respect of these cases: see CCPR/C/35/D/210/1986 an
d
225/1987.
the right whose violation has been alleged, has been the
subject of judicial determination by the Judicial Committee.
In Mr. Little's case, the State party notes, the issue of a
violation of the right to a fair trial was not determined by
the Judicial Committee. In the State party's opinion, the
Committee's admissibility decision
"would render meaningless and nugatory the hard earned
constitutional rights of Jamaicans and persons in Jamaica
by its failure to distinguish between the right to appeal
against the verdict and sentence of the court in a
criminal case and the "brand new right" to apply for
constitutional redress granted in 1962."
6.3 As to the author's claim concerning inadequate
preparation of his defence, the State party notes that article
14, paragraph 3(b), of the Covenant is co-terminous with
Section 20, paragraph 6(b), of the Jamaican Constitution, and
adds that the author should have seized the Supreme Court of
the alleged violation of his rights under this provision.
6.4 As to the author's allegation that he was denied a fair
trial because the judge misdirected the jury on the issue of
"corroborative evidence", the State party, by reference to the
Committee's jurisprudence,
submits that this claim seeks to
5
raise issues of evaluation of facts and evidence in the case,
which the Committee has no competence to evaluate.
6.5
In June 1991, counsel informed the Committee that the
Supreme (Constitutional) Court had rendered its judgment in
the cases of Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan, on whose behalf
constitutional motions had been filed earlier in 1991.
In the
6
light of this judgment and in order better to appreciate
whether recourse to the Supreme (Constitutional) Court was a
remedy which the author had to exhaust for purposes of the
Optional Protocol, the Committee adopted an interlocutory
decision during its 42nd session, on 24 July 1991. In this
decision, the State party was requested to provide detailed
information on the availability of legal aid or free legal
CCPR/C/43/D/283/1988
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Page 9
representation for the purpose of constitutional motions, as
well as examples of such cases in which legal aid might have
been granted or free legal representation might have been
procured by applicants. The State party did not forward this
information within the deadline set by the Committee, that is,
26 September 1991. By submission of 10 October 1991, the
State party replied that no provision for legal aid in respect
of constitutional motions exists under Jamaican law, and that
the Covenant does not require the States parties to provide
legal aid for this purpose.
Post-admissibility proceedings and examination of merits
:
7.1 In the light of the above, the Committee decides to
proceed with its consideration of the communication. It has
taken note of the State party's arguments on admissibility
formulated after the Committee's decision declaring the
communication admissible insofar as it raised issues under
article 14 of the Covenant, and the author's further claims
concerning violations of articles 7 and 10 of the Covenant,
which were only substantiated after the Committee's
admissibility decision.
7.2 The State party argues that the provision to Section
25(2) of the Jamaican Constitution cannot apply in the case,
as the alleged breach of the right to a fair trial was not
placed before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and
thus not subject to judicial determination by that body.
Based on the material placed before the Committee by the
author, this statement would appear to be misleading. The
author's petition to the Judicial Committee, dated 23 January
1989, submits that he was the victim of a miscarriage of
justice. The Committee observes that the issue of whether or
not a particular claim was the subject of a criminal appeal
should not necessarily depend upon the semantic expression
given to a claim, but on its underlying reasons. From this
broader perspective, Mr. Little was in fact also complaining
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that his trial
was unfair, in violation of Section 20 of the Jamaican
Constitution. Furthermore, the courts of every State party
should ex officio test whether the lower court proceedings
observed all the guarantees of a fair trial,
a fortiori in
capital punishment cases.
7.3 The Committee recalls that by submission of 10 October
1991, the State party indicated that legal aid is not provided
CCPR/C/43/D/283/1988
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Page 10
for constitutional motions. In the view of the Committee,
this supports the finding, made in its decision on
admissibility, that a constitutional motion is not an
available remedy which must be exhausted for purposes of the
Optional Protocol. In this context, the Committee observes
that it is not the author's indigence which absolves him from
pursuing constitutional remedies, but the State party's
unwillingness or inability to provide legal aid for this
purpose.
7.4
The State party claims that it has no obligation under
the Covenant to make legal aid available in respect of
constitutional motions, as such motions do not involve the
determination of a criminal charge, as required by article 14,
paragraph 3(d), of the Covenant. But the issue before the
Committee has not been raised in the context of article 14,
paragraph 3(d), but only in the context of whether domestic
remedies have been exhausted.
7.5
The Committee further notes that the author was arrested
in 1982, tried and convicted in 1984, and that his appeal was
dismissed in 1986. The Committee deems that for purposes of
article 5, paragraph 2(b), of the Optional Protocol, a further
appeal to the Supreme (Constitutional) Court would, in the
circumstances of this case, entail an unreasonable
prolongation of the application of domestic remedies.
7.6 For the above reasons, the Committee maintains that a
constitutional motion does not constitute a remedy which is
both available and effective within the meaning of article 5,
paragraph 2(b), of the Optional Protocol. Accordingly, there
is no reason to reverse its decision on admissibility of 24
July 1989, as far as article 14 is concerned.
7.7 With regard to the author's allegations of ill-treatment
during detention, the Committee notes that the substantiation
thereof was not submitted by the author until after the
Committee's decision declaring the communication admissible
with respect to article 14 of the Covenant. Moreover, the
Committee observes that the issues concerning the conditions
of detention on death row and the question whether prolonged
detention on death row constitutes inhuman and degrading
treatment were not placed before the Jamaican courts, nor
brought before any other competent Jamaican authority. Since
domestic remedies in this respect have not been exhausted, the
Committee is precluded from considering these allegations on
the merits.
CCPR/C/43/D/283/1988
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Page 11
8.1 With respect to the alleged violation of article 14,
three issues are before the Committee: (a) whether the judge's
instructions to the jury violated the author's right to a fair
trial; (b) whether the author had adequate time and facilities
for the preparation of his defence, and (c) whether any
violation of the Covenant ensued from the Court of Appeal's
failure to issue a written judgment after dismissing his
appeal.
8.2 In as much as the alleged inadequacy of, and mistakes in,
the judge's instructions to the jury are concerned, the
Committee reiterates that it is generally for the appellate
courts of States parties to the Covenant to evaluate the facts
and evidence in any particular case. It is not in principle
for the Committee to make such an evaluation or to review
specific instructions to the jury, unless it can be
ascertained that said instructions were clearly arbitrary or
amounted to a denial of justice, or that the judge manifestly
violated his obligation of impartiality. On the basis of the
material placed before it, the Committee finds no evidence
that the author's trial suffered from such defects.
8.3 The right of an accused person to have adequate time and
facilities for the preparation of his defence is an important
element of the guarantee of a fair trial and a corollary of
the principle of equality of arms. In cases in which a
capital sentence may be pronounced, it is axiomatic that
sufficient time must be granted to the accused and his counsel
to prepare the defence for the trial; this requirement applies
to all the stages of the judicial proceedings. The
determination of what constitutes "adequate time" requires an
assessment of the individual circumstances of each case. In
the instant case, it is uncontested that the author did not
have more than half an hour for consultation with counsel
prior to the trial and approximately the same amount of time
for consultation during the trial; it is further unchallenged
that he was unable to consult with counsel prior to and during
the appeal, and that he was unable to instruct his
representative for the appeal.
8.4 On the basis of the material placed before it, and
bearing in mind particularly that this is a capital punishment
case and that the author was unable to review the statements
of the prosecution's witnesses with counsel, the Committee
considers that the time for consultation was insufficient to
ensure adequate preparation of the defence, in respect of both
CCPR/C/43/D/283/1988
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Page 12
trial and appeal, and that the requirements of article 14,
paragraph 3(b), were not met. As a result, article 14,
paragraph 3(e), was also violated, since the author was unable
to obtain the testimony of a witness on his behalf under the
same conditions as testimony of witnesses against him. On the
other hand, the material before the Committee does not suffice
for a finding of a violation of article 14, paragraph 3(d), in
respect of the conduct of the appeal: this provision does not
entitle the accused to choose counsel provided to him free of
charge, and while counsel must ensure effective representation
in the interests of justice, there is no evidence that
author's counsel acted negligently in the conduct of the
appeal itself.
8.5 It remains for the Committee to decide whether the
failure of the Court of Appeal of Jamaica to issue a written
judgment violated any of the author's rights under the
Covenant. Article 14, paragraph 5, of the Covenant guarantees
the right of convicted persons to have the conviction and
sentence reviewed "by a higher tribunal according to law". In
order to enjoy the effective exercise of this right, a
convicted person is entitled to have, within a reasonable
time, access to written judgments, duly reasoned, for all
instances of appeal. To the extent that the Jamaican Court of
Appeal has not, more than five years after the dismissal of
Mr. Little's appeal, issued a reasoned judgment, he has been
denied the possibility of an effective appeal to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, and is a victim of a violation
of article 14, paragraph 5, of the Covenant.
8.6 The Committee is of the opinion that the imposition of a
sentence of death upon conclusion of a trial in which the
provisions of the Covenant have not been respected
constitutes, if no further appeal against the sentence is
possible, a violation of article 6 of the Covenant. As the
Committee noted in its General Comment 6(16), the provision
that a sentence of death may be imposed only in accordance
with the law and not contrary to the provisions of the
Covenant implies that "the procedural guarantees therein
prescribed must be observed, including the right to a fair
hearing by an independent tribunal, the presumption of
innocence, the minimum guarantees for the defence, and the
right to review of conviction and sentence by a higher
CCPR/C/43/D/283/1988
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Page 13
See CCPR/C/21/Rev.1, page 7, paragraph 7.
7
tribunal". In the present case, since the final sentence of
7
death was passed without having met the requirements for a
fair trial set out in article 14, it must be concluded that
the right protected by article 6 of the Covenant has been
violated.
9. The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5,
paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is of the view that
the facts before the Committee disclose a violation of article
14, paragraphs 3(b), (e), and 5, the latter read in
conjunction with paragraph 3(c), and consequently of article 6
of the Covenant.
10. In capital punishment cases, the obligation of States
parties to observe rigorously all the guarantees for a fair
trial set out in article 14 of the Covenant admits of no
exception. The Committee is of the view that Mr. Aston
Little, a victim of violations of article 14, and consequently
of article 6, is entitled, according to article 2, paragraph
3(a), of the Covenant, to an effective remedy, in this case
entailing his release; the State party is under an obligation
to take measures to ensure that similar violations do not
occur in the future.
11. The Committee would wish to receive information, within
ninety days, on any relevant measures taken by the State party
in respect of the Committee's Views.
[Done in English, French, Russian and Spanish, the English
text being the original version.]
-*-