CCPR/C/43/D/230/1987

Distr.

RESTRICTED */

CCPR/C/43/D/230/l987

19 November 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

_________________________________________________________________

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE

Forty-third session

DECISIONS

Communication No. 230/l987

Submitted by :

Raphael Henry (represented by counsel)

Alleged victim :

The author

State party :

Jamaica

Date of communication :

29 May 1987 (initial submission)

Documentation references

: Prior decisions - CCPR/C/30/D/230/1987

(combined rule 86,

rule 91 decision,

dated 21 July 1987)

-

CCPR/C/WG/32/D/230/1987

(further Working

Group

combined rule 86,

rule 91 decision,

dated 22 March 1988)

- CCPR/C/38/D/230/1987

(decision on

admissibility, dated

15 March 1990)

- CCPR/C/42/D/230/1987

(interlocutory

decision, dated 24

July

1991)

Date of adoption of Views

under article 5,

paragraph 4, of the

Optional Protocol :

1 November 1991

On 1 November 1991, the Human Rights Committee adopted its

Views under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol,

concerning communication No. 230/1987. The text of the Views is

CCPR/C/43/D/230/1987

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Annex

Page 1

annexed to the present document.

[Annex]

*/

Made public by decision of the Human Rights Committee.

DEC230.43

ANNEX

Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph 4,

of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights

- Forty-third session -

concerning

Communication No. 230/1987

Submitted by :

Raphael Henry

(represented by counsel)

Alleged victim :

The author

State party :

Jamaica

Date of communication :

29 May 1987

(initial submission)

Date of decision on admissibility

:

15 March 1990

The Human Rights Committee

, established under article 28 of

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

Meeting on 1 November 1991,

Having considered communication No. 230/1987, submitted to

the Committee by Mr. Raphael Henry under the Optional Protocol to

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

Having taken into account

all written information made

available to it by the author of the communication and by the

State party,

Adopts the following Views under article 5, paragraph 4, of

the Optional Protocol.

CCPR/C/43/D/230/1987

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Annex

Page 2

The facts as submitted by the author

:

1.

The author of the communication is Raphael Henry, a Jamaican

citizen currently awaiting execution at St. Catherine District

Prison, Jamaica. He claims to be the victim of a violation by

Jamaica of his rights under article 14 of the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. He is represented by

counsel.

2.1 The author was arrested in August 1984 and charged with the

murder, on 12 August 1984 in the parish of Portland, Jamaica, of

one Leroy Anderson. He was tried in the Portland Circuit Court

in March 1985, found guilty as charged and sentenced to death on

7 March 1985. The Jamaican Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal

on 28 January 1986, and the Judicial Committee of the Privy

Council dismissed his petition for special leave to appeal in

February 1987.

2.2 It is stated that on 12 August 1984, the author was walking

from his home to the fields along railroad tracks when he was

approached and suddenly attacked by Mr. Anderson. He sought to

defend himself with a machete, and in the ensuing struggle, Mr.

Anderson was fatally wounded.

2.3 With respect to the circumstances of the appeal, the author

states that he was not present when it was heard and dismissed.

Furthermore, the legal aid lawyer assigned to represent him

before the Portland Circuit Court and who was familiar with his

file, did not himself argue the appeal but assigned substitute

counsel to the hearing of the appeal; the author adds that the

attorney who replaced his previous counsel was totally unprepared

for the task. Still in the context of the appeal, the author

indicates that he has experienced great difficulties in obtaining

the court documents in his case; he states that by letter dated 3

September 1987 from the Registrar of the Court of Appeal, he was

informed that the Court of Appeal had only delivered an oral

judgment in the case.

CCPR/C/43/D/230/1987

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Page 3

2.4 The London law firm which represented the author before the

Judicial Committee of the Privy Council observes that his

petition was dismissed because of the absence of a written

judgment from the Court of Appeal. In this context, it is

indicated that three other Jamaican capital cases were heard and

dismissed by the Judicial Committee in January 1987, all of which

raised the issue of the absence of a written judgment of the

Court of Appeal. In this context, counsel explains that the

dismissal of the author's petition was due to his failure to meet

the Judicial Committee's Rules of Procedure, namely, to explain

the grounds on which he was seeking special leave to appeal, and

to provide the Judicial Committee with copies of the decisions of

the lower courts. Counsel refers, in particular, to Sections

3(1)(b) and 4(a) of the Judicial Committee (General Appellate

Jurisdiction) Rules Order (1982 Statutory Instrument No.1676).

2.5 Counsel recalls that before the Judicial Committee the

author's representative requested the members of the Judicial

Committee to (a) allow the petition on the ground that the

failure of the Court of Appeal to provide a written judgment in a

capital case was such a violation of the principles of natural

justice that leave to appeal should be granted and (b) remit the

case to Jamaica with a direction, under Section 10 of the

Judicial Committee Act of 1844, that the Court of Appeal be

required to provide written reasons.

2.6 At the time, counsel advised that a constitutional motion

should be filed in the Supreme Court of Jamaica. Counsel

indicates that she has been exploring the possibility of filing a

constitutional motion on the author's behalf; in mid-1989, the

author's file was transmitted to a new counsel in London, who

subsequently confirmed that in spite of all her efforts to this

effect, no Jamaican lawyer agreed to represent the author, on a

no-fee basis, in any constitutional motion which it may be

possible to bring before the Supreme (Constitutional) Court.

The complaint :

3.1 The author claims that he was denied a fair trial and, in

particular, that the preliminary investigations in the case were

biased; thus, the arresting officers allegedly threatened him so

as to induce him to confess the crime. It is further submitted

CCPR/C/43/D/230/1987

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Annex

Page 4

See Eagle Trust Ltd. v. Pigot-Brown

[1985] 3 All ER

1

119; Norton Tools Co. Ltd v. Tewson

[1973], 2 WLR 45; R. v.

Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex Parte Khan (Mahmud)

, [1983], 2

WLR 759.

that the prosecution witnesses were wholly unreliable, as they

could not realistically have witnessed the course of events from

the point where they claimed to have been standing. Finally, the

trial judge is said to have failed to properly direct the jury on

the issue of manslaughter and legitimate self-defence, and the

issue of provocation allegedly was not put to the jury.

3.2 The author concedes that he was represented by a legal aid

attorney during the trial but submits that the preparation of his

defence was totally inadequate, due to minimal opportunities to

consult with his lawyer prior to the trial. In particular, the

author contends that his defence was prepared on the first day of

the trial. Furthermore, he claims that witnesses against him

were not thoroughly cross-examined. Two witnesses were called on

his behalf - they were not, however, eyewitnesses, and in the

author's opinion were not given the opportunity to testify under

the same conditions as the witnesses against him. This was

because the prosecutor allegedly ridiculed and intimidated the

defence witnesses, thereby producing an incoherent testimony

which undermined the credibility of the witnesses in the eyes of

the jury.

3.3 The author contends that the absence of a written judgment

of the Court of Appeal of Jamaica constitutes a violation of his

constitutional rights, and resulted in the dismissal of his

petition for special leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee.

In this way, he claims, he was denied a fair review of his case,

in violation of article 14, paragraph 5, of the Covenant.

3.4 It is submitted that the Court of Appeal was under a duty to

provide the written reasons for its decision of 28 January 1986,

especially since the Court's reasoned judgment was necessary in

order to pursue a further appeal, and that failure to provide

written reasons would frustrate a prospective appellant's right

to exercise his right of appeal. According to counsel, there is

ample support, in British and Commonwealth jurisprudence,

for

1

the proposition that there is a judicial duty to give reasons for

a decision, the rationale being that written reasons afford an

CCPR/C/43/D/230/1987

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Annex

Page 5

Bugdaycay v. Secretary of State for the Home Department

2

[1987] 1 All ER 940.

insight into the legal or factual bases for the judgment and

afford the complainant the opportunity to exercise any available

right of appeal in a timely and informed manner.

3.5 Counsel further submits that the failure of the Judicial

Committee to direct the Court of Appeal to produce a written

judgment and to admit his petition left Mr. Henry with no

available remedy and amounted to a denial of his right of appeal

against conviction and sentence, in violation of article 14,

paragraph 5. By failing to exercise the powers conferred upon it

by the Judicial Committee Act, the Privy Council is said to have

"abdicated" its supervisory jurisdiction, conferred by Section

110, paragraph 3, of the Jamaican Constitution, to ensure that

the decisions of the lower courts were not deficient.

3.6 In counsel's opinion, a recent decision of the House of

Lords underscores the importance of the supervisory function of

2

courts. In this judgment it was stated that the courts are

entitled, within limits, "...to subject an administrative

decision to a more rigorous examination, to ensure that it is in

no way flawed, according to the gravity of the issue which the

decision determines. ...When an administrative decision under

challenge is said to be one which may put the applicant's life at

risk, the basis of the decision under challenge must surely call

for the most anxious scrutiny." Although this reasoning was

applied in the context of an administrative decision, counsel

submits that it is applicable to the author's case. The "special

responsibility" rests with the Judicial Committee in view of the

very real threat of execution facing the author; in counsel's

opinion, the Judicial Committee did not exercise the "anxious

scrutiny " required by the particular circumstances of the

author's case.

The State party's observations

:

4. The State party, by submission of 26 October 1988, concedes

that the Court of Appeal of Jamaica did not issue a written

judgment in the case; the Court confined itself to an oral

CCPR/C/43/D/230/1987

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Page 6

judgment when refusing Mr. Henry's application for leave to

appeal. By further submission of 26 January 1989, the State

party argues that the communication is inadmissible on the ground

of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, since the author failed

to take action under the Jamaican Constitution to seek

enforcement of his right, under Section 20 of the Constitution,

to a fair trial and legal representation. In this context, it

submits that the fact that an appellant has not been afforded

redress by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council does not

mean that he has exhausted domestic remedies, since even after a

hearing of a criminal appeal by the Privy Council, an appellant

may still exercise his constitutional rights to seek redress in

the Jamaican courts.

The Committee's admissibility considerations and decision

:

5.1 At its 38th session, the Committee considered the

admissibility of the communication. It took note of the State

party's contention that the communication was inadmissible

because of the author's failure to pursue constitutional remedies

available to him under the Jamaican Constitution. In the

circumstances of the case, the Committee found that recourse to

the Constitutional Court under Section 25 of the Constitution was

not a remedy available to the author within the meaning of

article 5, paragraph 2(b), of the Optional Protocol.

5.2 The Committee noted that part of the author's allegations

related to claims of bias on the part of the trial judge,

particularly in respect of the adequacy or otherwise of the

judge's instructions to the jury. The Committee reiterated that

the review by it of specific instructions by the judge to the

jury is beyond the scope of application of article 14 of the

Covenant, unless it can be ascertained that the instructions to

the jury were clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of

justice, or that the judge manifestly violated his obligation of

impartiality. In the circumstances, the Committee found that the

judge's instructions did not suffer from such defects.

5.3 On 15 March 1990, accordingly, the Committee declared the

communication admissible in respect of article 14, paragraphs

3(b), (d), (e), and 5 of the Covenant.

CCPR/C/43/D/230/1987

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Page 7

The State party's objections to the admissibility decision and

the Committee's request for further clarifications

:

6.1 The State party, in a submission of 6 February 1991, rejects

the Committee's findings on admissibility and challenges the

reasoning described in paragraph 5.1 above. It argues, in

particular, that the Committee's reasoning reflects a

misunderstanding of the relevant Jamaican law, especially the

operation of Sections 25(1) and (2) of the Jamaican Constitution.

The right to apply for redress under Section 25(1) is, in the

terms of the provision itself, "without prejudice to any other

action with respect to the same matter which is lawfully

available." The only limitation is contained in Section 25(2)

which, in the State party's opinion, is not applicable in the

case, since the alleged breach of the right to a fair trial was

not at issue in the criminal law appeal to the Court of Appeal

and to the Judicial Committee:

"... If the contravention alleged was not the subject of

the criminal law appeals,

ex hypothesi, those appeals could

hardly constitute an adequate remedy for that contravention.

The decision of the Committee would render meaningless and

nugatory the hard earned constitutional rights of Jamaicans

and persons in Jamaica, by its failure to distinguish

between the right to appeal against the verdict and sentence

of the court in a criminal case, and the "brand new right"

to apply for constitutional redress granted in 1962."

6.2 The State party submits that the admissibility decision

attaches undue significance to the fact that the Jamaican courts

have not yet had occasion to rule on the application of the

proviso to Section 25(2) of the Constitution in circumstances

where the applicant has already exhausted his criminal law

appellate remedies. It notes that in the case of

Noel Riley v.

The Queen [A.G. (1982) 3 AER 469], Mr. Riley was able to apply,

after the dismissal of his criminal appeal by the Court of Appeal

and the Privy Council, to the Constitutional Court for redress

and thereafter to the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council,

although unsuccessfully. In the State party's opinion, this

precedent illustrates that recourse to criminal law appellate

remedies does not render the proviso of Section 25(2) applicable

in situations where, following criminal law appeals, an

individual files for constitutional redress.

CCPR/C/43/D/230/1987

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Page 8

6.3 Furthermore, the State party challenges the Committee's

interpretation of the relationship between Section 25(2) and a

fundamental human right protected by Chapter Three of the

Jamaican Constitution: even if Chapter Three of the Constitution

grants a specific right such as protection from arbitrary arrest

or detention (Section 15), the Committee would test the

applicability of Section 25(2) in relation to the Supreme Court's

powers regarding the right of an individual to seek enforcement

and protection of such a right; since that specific question had

not been the subject of judicial determination by the domestic

courts, the Committee would be able to conclude that the remedy

does not exist and is not available. In the State party's

opinion, this approach has the result that the Committee would

conclude that many of the rights set forth in the Jamaican and

Westminster Model Constitutions are not existent or not

available, on the ground that the issue of the applicability of

Section 25(2) had not been subject to judicial determination by

the courts.

6.4 In respect of the absence of legal aid for the filing of

constitutional motions, the State party submits that nothing in

the Optional Protocol or in customary international law would

support the contention that an individual is relieved of the

obligation to exhaust domestic remedies on the grounds that there

is no provision for legal aid and that his indigence has

prevented him from resorting to an available remedy. In this

connection, the State party observes that the Covenant only

imposes a duty to provide legal aid in respect of criminal

offenses (article 14, paragraph

3(d)). Furthermore, international conventions dealing with

economic, social and cultural rights do not impose an unqualified

obligation on States to implement such rights: article 2 of the

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

for instance, provides for the progressive realization of

economic rights and relates to the "capacity of implementation"

of States. In the circumstances, the State party argues that it

is incorrect to infer from the author's indigence and the absence

of legal aid in respect of the right to apply for constitutional

redress that the remedy is necessarily non-existent or

unavailable. Accordingly, the State party requests the Committee

to review its decision on admissibility.

6.5 In June 1991, counsel informed the Committee that the

Supreme (Constitutional) Court had rendered its judgment in the

cases of Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan, on whose behalf

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On 6 April 1989, the Human Rights Committee had adopted

3

its Views under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol

in respect of these cases: see CCPR/C/35/D/210/1986 and

225/1987.

constitutional motions had been filed earlier in 1991.

In the

3

light of this judgment and in order better to appreciate whether

recourse to the Supreme (Constitutional) Court was a remedy which

the author had to exhaust for purposes of the Optional Protocol,

the Committee adopted an interlocutory decision during its 42nd

session, on 24 July 1991. In this decision, the State party was

requested to provide detailed information on the availability of

legal aid or free legal representation for the purpose of

constitutional motions, as well as examples of such cases in

which legal aid might have been granted or free legal

representation might have been procured by applicants. The State

party did not forward this information within the deadline set by

the Committee, that is, 26 September 1991. By submission of 10

October 1991 concerning another case, it replied that no

provision for legal aid in respect of constitutional motions is

made under Jamaican law, and that the Covenant does not require

States parties to provide legal aid for this purpose.

6.6

In the above interlocutory decision, as well as the decision

on admissibility, the State party was requested to also provide

information and observations in respect of the substance of the

author's allegations. In the interlocutory decision of 24 July

1991, the Committee added that should no comments be forthcoming

from the State party on the merits of the author's allegations,

it might decide to give due consideration to these allegations.

In spite of the Committee's requests, the State party did not

provide any information and observations in respect of the

substance of the author's allegations.

Post-admissibility proceedings and examination of merits

:

7.1 In the light of the above, the Committee decides to proceed

with its consideration of the communication. It has taken note

of the State party's request that it review its decision on

admissibility, in the light of the arguments outlined in

paragraphs 6.1 to 6.4 above.

7.2 The State party argues that the proviso to Section 25(2) of

the Jamaican Constitution cannot apply in the case, as the

alleged breach of the right to a fair trial was not the subject

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Page 10

matter of the appeals to the Court of Appeal and the Judicial

Committee. Based on the material placed before the Committee by

the author, this statement would appear to be incorrect. The

author's notice of appeal, dated 11 March 1985, clearly refers to

"unfair trial" as one of the grounds of appeal. If the Court of

Appeal did not examine this ground - and there is no means of

ascertaining whether it did, since it only delivered an oral

judgment - the responsibility does not lie with the author, and

it cannot be argued that he did not attempt to exhaust local

remedies in respect of this issue. Furthermore, the issue of

whether or not a particular claim was the subject of a criminal

appeal should not necessarily depend upon the semantic expression

given to a claim, but on its underlying reasons. Looked at from

this broader perspective, Mr. Henry was in fact also complaining

to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that his trial had

been unfair, in violation of Section 20 of the Jamaican

Constitution. Furthermore, the courts of every State party

should ex officio test whether the lower court proceedings

observed all the guarantees of a fair trial,

a fortiori in

capital punishment cases.

7.3

The Committee recalls that by submission of 10 October 1991

in a different case, the State party indicated that legal aid is

not provided for constitutional motions. In the view of the

Committee, this supports the finding made in its decision on

admissibility, that a constitutional motion is not an available

remedy which must be exhausted for purposes of the Optional

Protocol. In this context, the Committee observes that it is not

the author's indigence which absolves him from pursuing

constitutional remedies, but the State party's unwillingness or

inability to provide legal aid for this purpose.

7.4

The State party claims that it has no obligation under the

Covenant to make legal aid available in respect of constitutional

motions, as such motions do not involve the determination of a

criminal charge, as required by article 14, paragraph 3(d), of

the Covenant. But the issue before the Committee has not been

raised in the context of article 14, paragraph 3(d), but only in

the context of whether domestic remedies have been exhausted.

7.5 Moreover, the Committee notes that the author was arrested

in 1984, tried and convicted in 1985 and that his appeal was

dismissed in 1986. The Committee deems that for purposes of

article 5, paragraph 2(b), of the Optional Protocol, a further

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appeal to the Supreme (Constitutional) Court would, in the

circumstances of the case, entail an unreasonable prolongation of

the application of domestic remedies.

7.6 For the above reasons, the Committee maintains that a

constitutional motion does not constitute a remedy which is both

available and effective within the meaning of article 5,

paragraph 2(b), of the Optional Protocol. Accordingly, there is

no reason to reverse the decision on admissibility of 15 March

1990.

8.1 With respect to the alleged violation of article 14 of the

Covenant, four issues are before the Committee: (a) whether the

author had adequate time for the preparation of his defence; (b)

whether he could have witnesses on his behalf examined under the

same conditions as the witnesses against him; (c) whether the

author's legal representation before the Court of Appeal was in

conformity with that required under article 14, paragraph 3(d);

and (d) whether any violation of the Covenant ensued from the

Court of Appeal's failure to issue a written judgment after

dismissing his appeal.

8.2 In respect of the first claim, the State party has not

denied the author's claim that he did not have adequate time for

the preparation of his defence, that his opportunities to consult

with counsel prior to the trial were minimal, and that his

defence actually was prepared on the first day of the trial. The

Committee cannot ascertain, however, whether the court actually

denied counsel adequate time for the preparation of the defence.

Similarly, the Committee cannot ascertain whether the prosecution

witnesses were not properly cross-examined because of objections

on the part of the court or because of a professional judgment

made by author's counsel. In the circumstances, the material

before the Committee does not suffice for a finding of a

violation of article 14, paragraphs 3(b) and (e).

8.3 As to Mr. Henry's representation before the Court of Appeal,

the Committee reaffirms that it is axiomatic that legal

assistance must be available to a convicted prisoner under

sentence of death. This applies to all the stages of the

judicial proceedings. In Mr. Henry's case, it is uncontested

that legal counsel was available to him for the appeal: the

appeal form, dated 11 March 1985, reveals that the author did not

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wish to be represented before the Court of

Appeal by a court-appointed lawyer, but by counsel of his own

choice, whose services he had the means to secure, and that he

wished to attend the hearing of the appeal. What is at issue is

whether the author had the right to be present during the appeal

although he was represented by legal counsel, albeit by

substitute counsel. The Committee considers that once the author

opted for representation by counsel of his choice, any decision

by this counsel relating to the conduct of the appeal, including

a decision to send a substitute to the hearing and not to arrange

for the author to be present, cannot be attributed to the State

party but instead lies within the author's responsibility; in the

circumstances, the latter cannot claim that the fact that he was

absent during the hearing of the appeal constituted a violation

of the Covenant. Accordingly, the Committee concludes that

article 14, paragraph 3(d), has not been violated.

8.4 It remains for the Committee to decide whether the failure

of the Court of Appeal of Jamaica to issue a written judgment

violated any of the author's rights under the Covenant. Article

14, paragraph 5, of the Covenant guarantees the right of

convicted persons to have the conviction and sentence reviewed

"by a higher tribunal according to law". In this context, the

author has claimed that, because of the non-availability of the

written judgment, he was denied the possibility of effectively

appealing to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which

allegedly routinely dismisses petitions which are not accompanied

by the written judgment of the lower court. In this connection,

the Committee has examined the question whether article 14,

paragraph 5, guarantees the right to a single appeal to a higher

tribunal or whether it guarantees the possibility of further

appeals when these are provided for by the law of the State

concerned. The Committee observes that the Covenant does not

require States parties to provide for several instances of

appeal. However, the words "according to law" in article 14,

paragraph 5, are to be interpreted to mean that if domestic law

provides for further instances of appeal, the convicted person

must have effective access to each of them. Moreover, in order

to enjoy the effective use of this right, the convicted person is

entitled to have, within a reasonable time, access to written

judgments, duly reasoned, for all instances of appeal. Thus,

while Mr. Henry did exercise a right to appeal to "a higher

tribunal" by having the judgment of the Portland Circuit Court

reviewed by the Jamaican Court of Appeal, he still has a right to

a higher appeal protected by article 14, paragraph 5, of the

Covenant, because article 110 of the Jamaican Constitution

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See CCPR/C/21/Rev.1, page 7, paragraph 7.

4

provides for the possibility of appealing from a decision of the

Jamaican Court of Appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy

Council in London. The Committee therefore finds that Mr.

Henry's right under article 14, paragraph 5, was violated by the

failure of the Court of Appeal to issue a written judgment.

8.5 The Committee is of the opinion that the imposition of a

sentence of death upon conclusion of a trial in which the

provisions of the Covenant have not been respected constitutes,

if no further appeal against the sentence is available, a

violation of article 6 of the Covenant. As the Committee noted

in its General Comment 6(16), the provision that a sentence of

death may be imposed only in accordance with the law and not

contrary to the provisions of the Covenant implies that "the

procedural guarantees therein prescribed must be observed,

including the right to a fair hearing by an independent

tribunal, the presumption of innocence, the minimum guarantees

for the defence, and the right to review by a higher tribunal".

4

In the present case, since the final sentence of death was passed

and an important requirement set forth in article 14 was not met,

it must be concluded that the right protected by article 6 of the

Covenant has been violated.

9. The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph

4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights, is of the view that the facts before

the Committee disclose a violation of article 14, paragraph 5,

and consequently of article 6 of the Covenant.

10. In capital punishment cases, the obligation of States parties

to observe rigorously all the guarantees for a fair trial set out

in article 14 of the Covenant admits of no exception. The

Committee is of the view that Mr. Raphael Henry, a victim of a

violation of article 14, paragraph 5, and consequently of

article 6, is entitled, according to article 2, paragraph 3(a),

of the Covenant, to an effective remedy, in this case entailing

his release; the State party is under an obligation to take

measures to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the

future.

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11. The Committee would wish to receive information, within

ninety days, on any relevant measures taken by the State party in

respect of the Committee's Views.

[Done in English, French, Russian and Spanish, the English text

being the original version.]

-*-