Inadmissibility decision; Substantive issues: accused persons / convicted persons fair trial; Articles: 14 (1); Procedural issues: exhaustion of domestic remedies ratione materiae interim measures; [CCPR: UNO-Pakt II, Internationaler Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte; Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques; Patto II]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
M. Communication No. 290/1988. A. W. vy. Jamaica
(Deciaion of § Novembex 1989, adopted ai, the
tnirty-seventh session)
Submitted by: A. W. [name deleted]
Alleged victim: The author
State party concerned: Jamaica
Date of sommunication: 16 February 1988 (date of initial letter)
» established under article 28 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Meeting on 8 November 1989,
Adopta the following:
Decision on admissibility*
1. The author of the communication (initial submission dated 16 February 1988 and
subsequent correspondence) is A. W., a Jamaican citizen currently awaiting
execution at St. Catherine District Prison, Jamaica. He claims to be the victim of
a violation of his human rights by Jamaica. He is represented by counsel.
2.1 The author, who claims to be innocent, was arrested on 14 June 1983 and
charged, together with one G. 8., a/ with a murder, on 13 June 1983, of one R. H..
He waa tried in the Westmoreland Cizouit Court, Jamaica, convicted and sentenced to
death on 7 Junv 1984. On 7 April 1986, the Court of Appeal of Jemaica dismissed
his appeal.
2.2 The author states that on 13 June 1983 he was working in his cane field, when
Mr. H. approached him and attacked him with a knife; in the course of the ensuing
struggle, the assailant suffered head injuries. Afterwards, the author stopped a
passing police car and informed the police officer of the incident. This officer
reportedly told the avthor and his co-defendant to place the wounded man into the
beck cf the police car and drove him to the hospital. Later that day, the same
officer returned to the author's home, informed him that Mr. H. had died and
proceeded to arrest him. He was charged with murder the following day.
2.3 It is alleged that the trial was conducted in a biased way. Although the
author's lawyer allegedly cross-examined the two witnesses against him, the judge
is said to have constantly interrupted the defence, objected to several relevant
questions and even suggested answers to the witnesses. No witnesses are said to
have testified on the author's behalf.
a The text of an individual opinion by Ms. Christine Chanet is reproduced
in the appendix.
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3. By decision of 8 July 1988, the Working Group of the Human Rights Committee
transmitted the communication to the State party and requested it, under rule 91 of
the rules of procedure, to provide information and observations relevant to the
question of the admissibility of the communication. It further requested the State
party, under rule 86 of the rules of procedure, not to carry out the death sentence
against the author while his comnunication was under ‘onsideration by the
Committee. The author was requested tu provide several clarifications concerning
his case.
4. In his reply, dated 10 October 1988, tho author claime that the statements of
the two prosecution witnesses were contradictory. In particular, one of the
witnesses referred to a machete allegedly used by the author as the lethal] weapon,
the other one to an iron pipe and a stone. No iron pipe was, however, exhibited
and no forensic teste were carried out on a stick and a stone which had been
introduced in evidence. Moreover, the knife allegedly used by Mr. H. was not
recovered by the police and, although the trial judge requested that this point be
Clarified, the police apparently did not comply with the request. The author
contends, in particular, that he did not get a fair trial since the trial judge
failed to direct the jury on the issue of self-defence.
5. In his submission under rule 91, dated 2 December 1988, the State party erques
that the communication is inadmissible pursuant to article 5S, paragraph 2 (b), of
the Optional Protocol because the author may still appiy, under Section 110 of the
Jamaican Constitution, for special leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council,
6. By further letter dated 5 May 1989, counsel indicates that the author's
petition for spevial leave to appeal was heard and dismissed by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council on 4 May 1989.
7. In a further submission dated 12 July 1989, the State party contends that, in
spite of the dismissal of the author's petition by the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, the communication remains inadmissible for failure to exhaust
domestic remedies, since the author has failed to pursue remedies available to him
under the Jamaican Constitution. In this context, the State party submits that the
provigion of the Covenant invoked by the author (art. 14) is coterminous with the
right guaranteed by Section 20 of the Jamaican Constitution, which provides for due
process. Under Section 25 of the Constitution, if anyone alleges that any one of
the rights guaranteed by Section 25 has been, is being, or is to be contravened in
relation to him, he may, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the
game matter which is lawfully available, apply to the Supreme Constitutional Court
for redress. The State party thue reiterates that the comrunication is
inadmissible.
8.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, t:he Human Righte
Committee must, in accordance with rule 87 of its rules of procedure, decide
whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant.
8.2 The Committes has considered the material aubmitted by the author's counsel,
including the author's petition for special leave to appeal to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council. From this information, it appears thet the author
Claims bias of the court, in particular in reapect of the adequacy or otherwise of
the judge's instructions to the jury, in the light of tha evidence that was put
before the jury and which it was for the jury to accept or reject. While
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article 14 of the Covenant guarantees the right to a fair trial, it is for the
appellate courts of the States parties of the Covenant to evaluate facts and
evidence in a particular case. h/ Thus the review, by the Committee, of specific
instructicas to the jury by the judge in a trial by jury or of generalised claims
of bias is beyond the scope of application of article 14. In the circumstances,
the Committee concludes that the communication ie inadmissible as incompatible with
the provisions of the Covenant, pursuant to article 3 of the Optional Protocol.
9. The Human Rights Committee therefore decides:
(a) The communication is inadmissible;
(b) This decision chall be transmitted to the State party, to the author and
to his counsel.
Notes
a/ «Mr. G. 8S.'s communication No. 369/1989 was declared inadmissible by the
Committee on 8 November 1989.
b/ For an application of this principle, see communication No. 201/1985
(Hendriks v. Netherlands), final views adopted on 27 July 1988, para. 10.4.
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APPENDIX
As emphasised by the Committee in the case of communication No. 2906/1988, it
ie within the competence of national courts, particularly eppeal courts, to assess
the fairness of the conditions in which a trial takes place.
However, this competence cannot exclude that of the Committee in
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. When a
communication is submitted to it, the Committees assesses whether the trial was
conducted in accordance with the provisions of artic.e 14 of the Covenant.
At the admissibility stage, the Committee proceeds to a prima facie review of
the applicant's grievances. The author of this communication chal*tnges the
regularity of the judge's conduct of the hearing. In particular, A. W. referred to
an examination of the witnesses which might be contrary to article 14,
paragraph 3 (e), of the Covenant.
It is therefore my view that, while the facts adduced by the applicant could
be regarded ae insufficiently substantiated, they could not be declared
incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant on the basis of srticle 3 of the
Optional Protocol.
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