Inadmissibility decision; Subjects: CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, SWEDEN; [CCPR: UNO-Pakt II, Internationaler Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte; Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques; Patto II]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.26-04169 (E) 300426 010526
Human Rights Committee
Decision adopted by the Committee under the Optional
Protocol, concerning communication No. 4691/2024*, **
Communication submitted by:
B.B. and M.K. (represented by counsel, Tomas
Fridh)
Alleged victims:
The authors
State Party:
Sweden
Date of communication:
9 October 2024 (initial submission)
Document reference:
Decisions taken pursuant to rules 92 and 94 of
the Committee’s rules of procedure, transmitted
to the State Party on 11 October 2024 (not issued
in document form)
Date of adoption of decision:
16 March 2026
Subject matter:
Deportation to Pakistan of Ahmadi Muslims with
an alleged risk of torture
Procedural issue:
Exhaustion of domestic remedies
Substantive issues:
Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment; non-refoulement; torture
Article of the Covenant:
7
Article of the Optional Protocol:
5 (2) (b)
1.1
The authors of the communication are B.B. and M.K., nationals of Pakistan born in
1948 and 1943 respectively. They submit that by deporting them to Pakistan, the State Party
would violate their rights under article 7 of the Covenant. The Optional Protocol entered into
force for the State Party on 23 March 1976. The authors are represented by counsel.
1.2
On 11 October 2024, pursuant to rule 94 of its rules of procedure, the Committee,
acting through its Special Rapporteurs on new communications and interim measures,
requested the State Party to refrain from deporting the authors to Pakistan while their case
was under consideration by the Committee. The authors remain in Sweden.
* Adopted by the Committee at its 145th session (2–19 March 2026).
** The following members of the Committee participated in the examination of the communication:
Tania María Abdo Rocholl, Wafaa Ashraf Moharram Bassim, Rodrigo A. Carazo, Yvonne Donders,
Carlos Ramón Fernández Liesa, Laurence R. Helfer, Konstantin Korkelia, Dalia Leinarte, Bacre Waly
Ndiaye, Hernán Quezada Cabrera, Akmal Saidov, Ivan Šimonović, Soh Changrok, Tijana Šurlan,
Teraya Koji, Hélène Tigroudja and Imeru Tamerat Yigezu.
United Nations
CCPR/C/145/D/4691/2024
International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights
Distr.: General
1 May 2026
Original: English
CCPR/C/145/D/4691/2024
2
GE.26-04169
Facts as submitted by the authors
2.1
The authors are Ahmadi Muslims and are from Rabwah, Pakistan. They are married
and both had leading roles in their local congregation of Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan. B.B.
led a women’s group of around 200 members; meetings were usually attended by around
80 active members. B.B. also held monthly meetings with community leaders from other
areas. Her work included teaching the Qur’an and scheduling weekly activities. B.B. held
that role for seven years. Because of discriminatory laws and oppression in Pakistan, B.B.
ensured that the meetings could take place safely, without interference.
2.2
M.K. led the local Ahmadi congregation for 12 years. His duties included deciding
how to distribute funds to members who had fallen ill. He was supported by about seven or
eight members who received orders from him.
2.3
Both B.B. and M.K. always had difficulty in expressing their religion in everyday life.
They had to be very careful in basic aspects of their daily life, such as greeting people. They
were not allowed to attend mosques. They had to take precautions with burials because of
the risk that the graves would be destroyed or tampered with.
2.4
The authors have a son in Sweden and had previously travelled there to visit him.
They had returned to Pakistan after their visit because they had a strong community there and
did not wish to live elsewhere.
2.5
However, their situation changed in 2022, when there was a rise in attacks on Ahmadi
Muslims belonging to their congregation. The authors feared for their lives. In August 2022,
Naseer Ahmad, an Ahmadi Muslim, was killed at the age of 62 by a religious extremist during
a protest. M.K. had been close to the victim and had had frequent contact with him. The
authors began to fear for their safety in a new way.
2.6
In the second half of 2022, religious leaders and extremists disseminated propaganda
in Rabwah to incite the authorities to take action against Ahmadi Muslims and the places
where they studied. On 9 January 2023, the headmaster of the Ahmadi Muslim school in
Chenab Nagar – the area in which the authors were active – was arrested. During the arrest,
an extremist who had orchestrated acts against Ahmadi Muslims, joined by his followers,
reported the headmaster to the authorities. The police then raided the headmaster’s house.
This demonstrated the strong ties between extremists and the local police with respect to
discriminatory action against Ahmadi Muslims.
2.7
There was widespread concern within the Ahmadi congregation that the authors’
house was at risk of being searched because of their position in the community. The authors
had religious literature at home and feared that it could be discovered during a police raid.
M.K. has had a bypass operation and is of weak health. He was therefore concerned about
how he would cope with the physical and mental toll of being attacked or arrested.
2.8
One day while the authors were visiting relatives, neighbours called them to tell them
that people appeared to be searching for them outside their home. The authors did not dare
to return home. They stayed with relatives and friends until they were able to leave Pakistan.
Asylum procedure
2.9
On 22 February 2023, the authors applied for asylum in Sweden. On 9 June 2023, the
Migration Agency rejected their application. In its decision, it found that while the authors
were Ahmadis and held leadership positions within their religious community, their account
of receiving threats was based on second-hand information and speculation. They had not
submitted concrete evidence of being personally targeted. They had both stated that they had
not been subjected to any ill-treatment in Pakistan as a result of their religious affiliation and
positions.
2.10
The Migration Agency noted that the authors had spent their entire lives in Pakistan
and had held their Ahmadi leadership roles for 7 and 12 years respectively, without incident.
There was no indication that they would attract attention or face persecution upon return.
2.11
Regarding the general situation of Ahmadis in Pakistan, the Migration Agency
acknowledged that there were restrictions on religious freedom and instances of
discrimination and abuse. However, country of origin information indicated that the
CCPR/C/145/D/4691/2024
GE.26-04169
3
authorities had taken action against perpetrators of violence against Ahmadis, including
arrests following the murder of Naseer Ahmad.
2.12
The Migration Agency cited the Court of Justice of the European Union in
Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y and Z,1 and concluded that the authors did not meet the
criteria for refugee status or subsidiary protection under chapter 4, sections 1 and 2, of the
Aliens Act.
2.13
The Migration Agency further assessed whether the authors could be granted
residence permits on grounds of exceptionally or particularly distressing circumstances under
chapter 5, section 6, of the Aliens Act. It found that the authors had not developed special
ties to Sweden, did not suffer from serious health conditions and had not adapted to life in
Sweden to a degree that would justify residence on humanitarian grounds.
2.14
The authors appealed against the decision of the Migration Agency to the Migration
Court. In their appeal, the authors were represented by their current public counsel. On
26 March 2024, the Migration Court rejected the authors’ appeal. The Migration Court
acknowledged that Ahmadis faced general difficulties in Pakistan but considered that the
level of interference with the authors’ religious practice did not amount to persecution. Their
claims of being targeted were based on second-hand information and assumptions, without
concrete evidence. They had lived their whole lives in Pakistan and had held leadership
positions in their Ahmadi community for many years, without having been persecuted.
2.15
The authors did not attempt to appeal against the negative decision of the Migration
Court to the Migration Court of Appeal. This was because of a technical error at the law firm
that represents the authors. The authors were not at fault.
Application for residence permits and for re-examination of the case
2.16
On 12 June 2024, the authors applied to the Migration Agency for residence permits
and for re-examination of their asylum application in the light of new circumstances
constituting an impediment to the enforcement of their expulsion order. The authors argued
that their asylum application had not been fairly assessed.
2.17
On 18 June 2024, the Migration Agency denied the authors’ application for
re-examination. It considered that the author’s new claims were additions to and
modifications of previously examined circumstances and were not new circumstances of the
kind required by law.
2.18
On 18 July 2024, the Migration Court upheld the decision of the Migration Agency.
On 7 August 2024, the authors sought leave to appeal to the Migration Court of Appeal. On
19 and 24 August 2024, they submitted additional information to the Migration Court of
Appeal. On 27 August 2024, their application was denied.
Complaint
3.1
The authors submit that by deporting them to Pakistan, the State Party would violate
their rights under article 7 of the Covenant. They would face a real, personal and foreseeable
risk of being subjected to torture or ill-treatment in Pakistan, owing to their religious beliefs
and practice as Ahmadi Muslims.
3.2
During the asylum procedure, the Migration Agency did not fairly assess their claim
and made manifest errors. The Migration Agency failed to consider the escalating attacks
towards Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan in recent years. M.K. knew an Ahmadi Muslim in his
community, Naseer Ahmad, who had been killed by an extremist. The Migration Agency
considered that the authors had not previously faced harm and could continue their practice
upon return. They could also abstain from engaging in religious practices that would expose
them to a risk of harm in Pakistan. According to guidelines issued by the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and jurisprudence of the courts
1 Court of Justice of the European Union, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y and Z, Cases No. C-71/11
and No. C-99/11, Judgment, 5 September 2012.
CCPR/C/145/D/4691/2024
4
GE.26-04169
of the European Union, whether a person could avoid a risk by abstaining from certain
religious practices is not relevant to determining the risk that they would face upon return.2
3.3
During the appeal procedure, the authors’ request for an oral hearing was denied by
the Migration Court. Their credibility had been questioned, and they wished to elaborate on
their actual reasons for applying for asylum. The authors argued in their various submissions
to the Migration Court that the Migration Agency had not considered the facts of the case
and had applied the wrong standard.
3.4
During the proceedings before the Migration Court of Appeal, the authors cited new
information regarding recent events in Pakistan. Since June 2024, there has been a surge in
arbitrary arrests and detention in Pakistan. On 25 July 2024, a group of special procedure
mandate holders requested the authorities in Pakistan to end discrimination and violence
against Ahmadi Muslims.3 Ahmadi Muslims face risks in practising their faith, including
within private homes. They risk being subjected to searches of their homes, where their
belongings may be used to find them guilty of violating discriminatory laws. Also in 2024,
17 graves of Ahmadi Muslims were desecrated. A violent mob of about 150 people attacked
a place of worship. Assailants opened fire and destroyed parts of the building. Three Ahmadi
Muslims were detained for two days on the grounds that they might perform rituals during
Eid. Because the Migration Court of Appeal denied their application for leave to appeal
during the procedure to apply for residence permits and re-examination, the authors have not
had their claims relating to the new information assessed on the merits.
State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits
4.1
In its submission of 11 April 2025, the State Party maintains that the communication
is inadmissible under article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol because the authors have not
exhausted domestic remedies. They did not file an appeal concerning their asylum case to the
Migration Court of Appeal. They assert that this was because of a technical error made by
the law firm representing them, not because of a mistake that they made themselves. However,
they could have, but did not, apply for restoration of expired time under section 37 c of the
Administrative Court Procedure Act (1971:291), which would have resulted in an
examination as to the validity of the authors’ excuse for not filing a timely appeal. If the
excuse were found to be valid, time would be restored to them to file an appeal.
4.2
Regardless of the reasons for the authors’ failure to file an appeal to the Migration
Court of Appeal, it is not for the Committee to examine those reasons at first instance. The
same applies for examination of the merits of new country reports cited by the authors in
their communication. Those new reports were not available to the migration authorities
during their examinations. The authors have the possibility to cite those reports in a new
application for residence permits or for re-examination of the issue pursuant to chapter 12,
sections 18 and 19, of the Aliens Act.
4.3
In addition, the communication is inadmissible and without merit because it is
manifestly unfounded. The Committee has stated that there must be substantial grounds for
believing that there is a real, personal and foreseeable risk of a violation of articles 6 or 7 of
the Covenant in the case of a forced return. Considerable weight should be given to the
assessment of the States Parties. The Committee is not a court of fourth instance that should
re-evaluate facts and evidence de novo. The Aliens Act contains provisions reflecting the
principles of articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. The migration authorities applied those
principles in the present case, and both the Migration Agency and the Migration Court, which
are specialized bodies with particular expertise in asylum law and practice, thoroughly
examined the authors’ case.
2 UNHCR, “Guidelines on international protection No. 6: religion-based refugee claims under
article 1 (A) (2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees”,
para. 13; and European Court of Human Rights, F.G. v. Sweden, Application No. 43611/11,
Judgment, 23 March 2016, para. 46. See also Court of Justice of the European Union, Bundesrepublik
Deutschland v. Y and Z.
3 See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/07/pakistan-experts-urge-immediate-end-
discrimination-and-violence-against.
CCPR/C/145/D/4691/2024
GE.26-04169
5
4.4
The Migration Agency held two interviews with the authors, on 2 March and 28 April
2023. The latter interview lasted five hours and took place in the presence of public counsel.
Both interviews were conducted with interpreters, whom the authors confirmed that they
understood well. Through their public counsel, the authors were invited to scrutinize and
submit written observations on the minutes from the interviews conducted, and to make
written submissions and appeals. They have thus had ample opportunity to explain the
relevant facts and circumstances in support of their claims, both orally and in writing, before
the Migration Agency, and in writing before the Migration Court. The authorities thus had
sufficient information to ensure that they had a solid basis for making a well-informed,
transparent and reasonable risk assessment.
4.5
Concerning the authors’ assertion that they did not have an oral hearing, under
chapter 16, section 5, of the Aliens Act, an oral hearing should be held before the migration
courts if the alien so requests, if it is not unnecessary and if there are no further special
grounds for not doing so. An oral hearing is not mandatory before the Migration Court. It
serves only as a supplement to the written proceedings and the contents of the case file, which
cover all matters with the Migration Agency. In the authors’ case, the Migration Court did
not question their credibility or the reliability of their assertions. Instead, the Court considered
that their statements and other evidence were insufficient to conclude that they needed
international protection. Under established case law, an oral hearing in such circumstances is
unnecessary. Accordingly, while the authors disagree with the outcome of the domestic
decisions, there is no reason to conclude that the domestic rulings were inadequate or that the
outcome of the domestic proceedings was in any way arbitrary or amounted to a denial of
justice.
4.6
In accordance with the Committee’s jurisprudence, the general situation of Ahmadis
in Pakistan does not in and of itself substantiate a claim of a personal risk of ill-treatment
under article 7 of the Covenant.4 The domestic authorities acknowledged the challenges faced
by Ahmadis in Pakistan, but considered that the authors had failed to demonstrate a specific
and individualized risk. The authors have not been personally subjected to threats or attacks,
nor have they attracted the attention of the authorities in Pakistan despite their active roles in
the Ahmadi community.
4.7
In their application for residence permits or re-examination, the authors did not
present new circumstances or country information that had not already been assessed during
the asylum proceedings. The country of origin information and case law that they cited had
already been considered during the asylum proceedings. The new country of origin
information that they cite in their communication to the Committee was only added to their
domestic case after they had filed an appeal to the Migration Court of Appeal in the residence
permit matter. However, the Migration Court of Appeal is not tasked with assessing every
complaint brought before it on its merits. Under chapter 16, section 12, of the Aliens Act,
leave to appeal is only granted for precedential or extraordinary reasons. The fact that the
Migration Court, in the authors’ view, should have decided their appeal differently, or could
decide it differently based on new country of origin information, does not suffice for the
Migration Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal. The domestic authorities did not
disregard relevant country reports but rather have not yet had the opportunity to assess them
in the light of new developments. The authors may submit a new application under chapter 12
of the Aliens Act if they believe that the current situation in Pakistan, particularly for
Ahmadis, constitutes an impediment to enforcement of their expulsion orders.
4.8
Regarding the claim that the State Party’s authorities suggested that the authors could
avoid persecution by concealing their religious beliefs, no such argument appears in the
domestic decisions, and the authors do not specify which authority made that suggestion. The
authors have not established a foreseeable, present, personal and real risk of treatment
contrary to article 7 of the Covenant in case of their return to Pakistan.
4 See R.M. and Q.M. v. Sweden (CCPR/C/141/D/4062/2021 and 4191/2022).
CCPR/C/145/D/4691/2024
6
GE.26-04169
Authors’ comments on the State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits
5.1
In their comments of 23 June 2025, the authors reiterate their arguments and add that
the Migration Court of Appeal is not an effective remedy because it grants leave to appeal in
exceptional cases only and has reviewed fewer than 1 in 3,000 cases in recent years.
5.2
The authors initiated a new asylum procedure shortly after missing the opportunity to
appeal to the Migration Court of Appeal. In the new procedure, under chapter 12, sections 18
and 19, of the Aliens Act, all relevant facts were presented and reviewed by all domestic
authorities. The Migration Agency was required to assess both new and previously submitted
facts in determining the need for protection. The emergence of new country of origin
information during that process, which further substantiates the deteriorating human rights
situation for Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan, does not preclude the Committee from examining
the communication. The domestic authorities are required to consider updated country of
origin information, whenever it is submitted by an applicant.
5.3
The worsening situation for Ahmadi Muslims should not be used to their disadvantage.
Rather, it highlights the need for domestic authorities to apply a safety margin in assessing
such cases to avoid exposing individuals to irreparable harm.
5.4
The authors reiterate their arguments on the merits. The domestic authorities
implicitly relied on an assumption that the authors could avoid persecution in Pakistan by
concealing their religious identity. The fact that the authors held roles in the Ahmadi
community does not mean that they could openly practise their faith. During his asylum
interview, M.K. mentioned the severe restrictions on religious expression for Ahmadis in
Pakistan. M.K. stated that they could not attend mosques, recite the Qur’an or pray in public.
Those facts were not disputed by the domestic authorities, and the Migration Agency
acknowledged the legal and constitutional restrictions on Ahmadi religious practices in
Pakistan.
5.5
In a report published in 2021, the Home Office of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland confirms that Ahmadi Muslims are criminalized for most religious
activities and are required to renounce their faith to obtain official documents.5 In 2024,
Ahmadis in Pakistan were targeted through arbitrary arrests, home searches, desecration of
graves and mob violence. This indicates that the threats against them are escalating. Even
private religious practices are no longer safe.
5.6
The domestic authorities considered that the determinative factor was whether the
authors would openly practise their faith in a way that would lead to punishment in Pakistan.
That standard is flawed. The correct test to apply, under international law, is whether an
Ahmadi Muslim could live openly in Pakistan but for the risk of persecution. The authors
have a genuine religious belief and a desire to practise their faith openly, which would expose
them to criminal liability and a real risk of torture or ill-treatment in Pakistan. In Sweden,
they have practised their faith freely and wish to continue doing so. The domestic authorities
failed to consider the risk of harassment and violence from non-State actors, including
religious groups and the public, which further compounds the risk that the authors would face.
5.7
As remedies, the authors request declaratory relief, cancellation of removal and
compensation for legal costs in the amount of 30,000 kronor.
State Party’s additional observations
6.1
In its additional observations of 22 August 2025, the State Party addresses the authors’
argument that an appeal to the Migration Court of Appeal would have been ineffective. On
the contrary, the Migration Court of Appeal is the final judicial instance in Swedish migration
proceedings, and its decisions are binding and have suspensive effect. Such an appeal is
indeed a remedy within the meaning of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol. The
European Court of Human Rights has affirmed the effectiveness of that remedy.6 The authors
5 See United Kingdom, Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note – Pakistan: Ahmadis,
version 5.0, September 2021.
6 See European Court of Human Rights, Hajj Hussein v. Sweden, Application No. 18452/11, Decision
on Admissibility, 20 September 2011.
CCPR/C/145/D/4691/2024
GE.26-04169
7
failed to exhaust it for the reasons previously mentioned. Under the Committee’s
jurisprudence, authors are responsible for complying with reasonable procedural rules,
including time limits for appeals.7 Failures by legal representatives cannot be attributed to a
State Party, unless the latter contributed to those failures.8 In the authors’ case, the State Party
did not do so.
6.2
A correction must be made to the substance of the authors’ remarks referred to in
paragraph 5.2 above. The application that they described was not in fact a new asylum
application and was not part of the asylum procedure. Rather, it was an application for
residence permits or for re-examination, under chapter 12, sections 18 and 19, of the Aliens
Act. Unlike asylum applications, those applications are limited to an assessment of new
circumstances that may constitute an impediment to enforcement of an expulsion order. A
full re-examination of the grounds for asylum is undertaken only if the Migration Agency
grants it under section 19 of the Aliens Act. That did not happen in the authors’ case, because
the circumstances that they invoked were not considered new. The residence permit
application is an extraordinary remedy. It does not absolve the authors from pursuing all
available judicial remedies against the original expulsion order. At a minimum, the new
country reports cited by the authors in their communication to the Committee should have
been submitted to the Migration Agency in their application, in order for the remedy to be
considered exhausted.
Issues and proceedings before the Committee
Consideration of admissibility
7.1
Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must
decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is
admissible under the Optional Protocol.
7.2
The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional
Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international
investigation or settlement.
7.3
In accordance with article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol, the Committee shall not
consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that the individual
has exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Committee notes the State Party’s
position that the authors did not exhaust domestic remedies because they did not file an
appeal during the asylum procedure to the Migration Court of Appeal, to contest the decision
of the Migration Court.
7.4
The Committee recalls that authors of communications must exercise due diligence in
the pursuit of available remedies. 9 The Committee notes the authors’ assertion that the
Migration Court of Appeal is an ineffective remedy because it rarely grants leave to appeal.
However, the Committee recalls that the effectiveness of a remedy does not depend on the
certainty of a favourable outcome for the author, and that mere doubts about the effectiveness
of a remedy do not absolve the author from the obligation to attempt to exhaust that remedy.10
The Committee notes that applications for leave to appeal to the Migration Court of Appeal
have suspensive effect with respect to expulsions, that the body is the final judicial instance
in Swedish migration proceedings and that its decisions are binding. While the authors filed
a subsequent application for a residence permit based on impediments to the enforcement of
the expulsion order, that procedure was extraordinary and did not absolve the authors of the
obligation to exhaust remedies during the asylum procedure. Accordingly, the Committee
considers that the Migration Court of Appeal represented an effective remedy during the
asylum procedure and that the authors were required to exhaust it.
7 Aduhene and Agyeman v. Germany (CCPR/C/93/D/1543/2007), para. 6.2.
8 Lim et al. v. Australia (CCPR/C/87/D/1175/2003), para. 6.2.
9 Alakuş v. Türkiye (CCPR/C/135/D/3736/2020), para. 9.6.
10 For example, D.Č. v. Lithuania (CCPR/C/134/D/3327/2019), para. 8.3; and G.B. v. Türkiye
(CCPR/C/142/D/3592/2019), para. 9.3.
CCPR/C/145/D/4691/2024
8
GE.26-04169
7.5
As to whether the authors exercised due diligence in pursuing that remedy, the
Committee notes the authors’ statement that because of a technical error, their legal
representative failed to appeal to the Migration Court of Appeal during the asylum procedure,
and that they were not responsible for that error. The Committee notes that the nature of the
technical error has not been specified. The Committee recalls that an author is required to
abide by reasonable procedural requirements such as filing deadlines, and that the errors or
omissions of an author’s legal representative cannot be attributed to the State Party, unless
they were in some measure due to the latter’s conduct.11 In this communication, there is no
indication of any such State responsibility. The authors have not alleged that the law firm,
whose fees were paid by the State Party and whose services the authors have continued to
retain since the asylum procedure, was chosen for them by the authorities. In addition, the
authors have not explained why they did not apply for restoration of expired time under
section 37 c of the Administrative Court Procedure Act (1971:291). Such an application could
have resulted in an extension of the time limit to apply for leave to appeal if the authors’
excuse were found to be valid. Recalling that the fulfilment of reasonable procedural rules is
the responsibility of the applicant,12 the Committee considers that by failing to apply for leave
to appeal to the Migration Court of Appeal during the asylum procedure, the authors did not
exhaust available and effective domestic remedies. The communication is therefore
inadmissible under article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol.
7.6
In the light of its findings, the Committee deems it unnecessary to examine other
grounds of inadmissibility.
8.
The Committee therefore decides:
(a)
That the communication is inadmissible under article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional
Protocol;
(b)
That the present decision shall be transmitted to the State Party and to the
authors.
11 Lim et al. v. Australia, para. 6.2. See also L.F. v. New Zealand (CCPR/C/113/D/2211/2012), para. 6.4;
and G.A. v. Uzbekistan (CCPR/C/124/D/2335/2014), para. 9.5.
12 Aduhene and Agyeman v. Germany, para. 6.2.