Decision on merits; Subjects: CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, CAMEROON; [CCPR: UNO-Pakt II, Internationaler Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte; Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques; Patto II]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.26-04719 (E) 050526 050526
Human Rights Committee
Views adopted by the Committee under the Optional
Protocol, concerning communication No. 4105/2022*, **
Communication submitted by:
Hamidou Yaya Marafa (represented by Marion
Lafouge and, previously, by Ndiva Kofele Kale)
Alleged victim:
The author
State Party:
Cameroon
Date of communication:
23 June 2020 (initial submission)
Document references:
Decisions taken pursuant to rules 92 and 94 of
the Committee’s rules of procedure, transmitted
to the State Party on 15 February 2022 (not
issued in document form)
Date of adoption of Views:
12 March 2026
Subject matter:
Right to fair trial; ill-treatment
Procedural issues:
Level of substantiation of claims; admissibility
ratione materiae; examination under another
procedure of international investigation or
settlement; abuse of the right of submission
Substantive issues:
Torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; right
to fair trial; conditions of detention
Articles of the Covenant:
2 (1)–(3), 7, 9 (1), (2), (4) and (5) and 14 (1),
(3) (b), (c) and (e) and (5)
Articles of the Optional Protocol:
1–3 and 5 (2) (a)
1.1
The author of the communication is Hamidou Yaya Marafa, a national of Cameroon
born in 1952. He claims that the State Party has violated his rights under articles 2 (1)–(3), 7,
9 (1), (2), (4) and (5) and 14 (1), (3) (b), (c) and (e) and (5) of the Covenant. The Optional
Protocol entered into force for the State Party on 27 September 1984. The author is
represented by counsel.
1.2
On 15 February 2022, pursuant to rule 94 of its rules of procedure, the Committee,
acting through its Special Rapporteurs on new communications and interim measures,
* Adopted by the Committee at its 145th session (2–19 March 2026).
** The following members of the Committee participated in the examination of the communication:
Tania María Abdo Rocholl, Wafaa Ashraf Moharram Bassim, Rodrigo A. Carazo, Yvonne Donders,
Carlos Ramón Fernández Liesa, Laurence R. Helfer, Konstantin Korkelia, Dalia Leinarte, Bacre Waly
Ndiaye, Hernán Quezada Cabrera, Akmal Saidov, Ivan Šimonović, Soh Changrok, Tijana Šurlan,
Teraya Koji, Hélène Tigroudja and Imeru Tamerat Yigezu.
United Nations
CCPR/C/145/D/4105/2022
International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights
Distr.: General
7 May 2026
Original: English
CCPR/C/145/D/4105/2022
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requested the State Party to provide the author with immediate access to adequate and
specialized medical care that may be required to preserve his sight, while his case was under
consideration by the Committee. The request for interim measures was reiterated to the State
Party on 15 March and 22 June 2022, 10 July 2023 and 10 July 2025.
Facts as submitted by the author
2.1
As part of an effort to combat corruption, a series of investigations referred to as
“Operation Épervier” was initiated in the State Party in 2004. This was followed in 2006 by
the creation of the National Anti-Corruption Commission and the establishment in 2011 of
the Special Criminal Court. The operation resulted in the detention and conviction of dozens
of former government officials, including a former prime minister, two former secretaries-
general of the Office of the President, and several directors and officers of major State
corporations. The author notes that observers questioned whether the investigations were
launched to fight corruption or whether they were a means to neutralize political rivals.
2.2
At the time of the anti-corruption investigations, the author was a member of the
political bureau of the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement party and had held
several senior positions in the party for close to 20 years, including at a ministerial level. He
left government in December 2011 during a cabinet reshuffle but still retained his
membership in the political bureau of the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement.
2.3
The author notes that he received a summons to appear in the chambers of an
examining magistrate on 16 April 2012 for a deposition in a matter concerning other persons
who had been indicted on charges of misappropriation of public funds. The investigation was
in relation to the purchase of an aircraft in 2001, which was to be used for the President’s
travels (referred to as the so-called BBJ-2 affair). At the time of the alleged offence, the
author was the Secretary-General of the Office of the President. The author presented himself
in the examining magistrate’s chambers on the appointed date but declined to be questioned
by the examining magistrate, whom he had requested should be recused from the
investigation on grounds that the magistrate was biased. He notes that, having refused to be
questioned by the magistrate, the preliminary investigation should have been suspended until
the recusal issue was resolved, in accordance with article 598 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Instead, the author was arrested on the spot and remanded in custody. He was given no
reasons for his arrest.
2.4
On 22 September 2012, the author was convicted by the High Court of Mfoundi of
the misappropriation of US$ 29 million in public funds and sentenced to 25 years’
imprisonment. He was also ordered, jointly with other defendants, to repay the
US$ 29 million that, it was alleged, had been misappropriated. The author notes that the
purchase of the aircraft had been made through a company based in the United States of
America, which, subsequently, before the delivery of the aircraft, had declared bankruptcy.
He notes that the Government was, however, indemnified for the funds paid for the aircraft
during the bankruptcy proceedings. Additionally, no misappropriation of funds was found by
a forensic certified public accountant appointed by a United States bankruptcy trustee to track
such activity, nor was any payment traced to the author’s bank accounts or linked to any of
his other assets.
2.5
The author appealed the High Court judgment to the Supreme Court1 to challenge the
lawfulness of his arrest, detention and sentence. He also petitioned the Supreme Court for
provisional release pending the resolution of his appeal, an opportunity that, he states, was
unavailable to him at the trial stage. The request was, however, rejected by the Supreme Court
on 26 November 2013. The Supreme Court upheld the guilty verdict on 18 May 2016 but
reduced the sentence to 20 years’ imprisonment. The author notes that it took four years for
the Supreme Court to consider his appeal. Oral hearings were held on 17 and 18 May 2016.
However, the author discovered later that the Supreme Court had already, on 3 May 2016,
reached a decision on his appeal, two weeks before hearing the arguments on the grounds of
1 The author notes that, under domestic law, a first instance judgment would normally be appealed to
the regional court of appeal. However, following an amendment to the law, all appeals against
convictions on charges of corruption are to be filed with a special chamber of the Supreme Court.
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the appeal. The author states that the judgment was based on distortions of the trial record,
flawed legal reasoning and discredited jurisprudence, underscoring that his detention and
conviction were political in nature.
2.6
In the meantime, in June 2015, the author submitted a complaint to the Working Group
on Arbitrary Detention, alleging that his arrest, detention and conviction were politically
motivated and in violation of his right to a fair trial. On 27 April 2016, the Working Group
found that his detention was arbitrary.2 The Working Group called upon the State Party to
terminate his detention and provide him with an appropriate remedy. The author notes that
the State Party has not complied with the recommendation and that he remains in prison.
2.7
The author submits that he has exhausted all available domestic remedies. He argues
that the State Party does not have a forum in which victims of unlawful detention can exercise
their right to an effective remedy. He notes that, in theory, there exists a mechanism for
compensation under articles 236 and 237 of the Criminal Procedure Code, under which a
claim for compensation may be submitted to a compensation and reparations commission, or
by filing an appeal with the administrative court.3 The author, however, states that this avenue
only exists in theory, as the commission was not operational at the time of his sentencing and
the submission of his complaint, and as, according to the consistent jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court, administrative courts are not competent to hear cases involving decisions
handed down during judicial proceedings or claims for compensation for injury attributable
to the functioning of the judicial system. In this connection the author notes that, although
the compensation and reparations commission was created in 2005, its members were only
formally installed in August 2018 and, at the time of the submission of his complaint, had
yet to meet in session. He argues that he therefore did not have recourse to any available
effective domestic remedy for the violations of his rights under the Covenant.
2.8
On 8 February 2022, following the submission of his initial complaint, the author
submitted a request for interim measures concerning his state of health and especially his
deteriorating sight. He notes that he suffers from cardiac and respiratory problems, declining
vision, and a general deterioration in his health because of the deplorable conditions of
detention. The author further notes that, following the decision by the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention in April 2016, the State Party had flown in an ophthalmologist from the
Quinze-Vingts National Ophthalmology Hospital in Paris to operate on his left eye, in 2016.
The right eye was operated on in 2017, and both eyes were operated on in 2021. However,
he states that, as a result of the harsh detention conditions, since September 2021, he has lost
sight in his right eye and is at risk of losing the remaining 20% sight capacity in his left eye.
Complaint
Article 9 (1)
3.1
The author claims that he was deprived of his liberty in a manner not in accordance
with the law. He notes that the Criminal Procedure Code sets out the requirements for the
issuance of a remand warrant for purposes of arrest and detention consistent with article 9 (1)
of the Covenant. He argues that the summons issued by the examining magistrate in his case
was the wrong instrument for arresting and detaining an accused person under domestic
legislation. In this connection, he notes that section 218 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code
stipulates that, before the issuance of a remand warrant, the examining magistrate must
charge the defendant.4 The author claims that this stipulation was not adhered to in his case,
as the 16 April 2012 remand warrant did not charge him with the commission of any crime.
2 A/HRC/WGAD/2016/22.
3 Section 236 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code reads as follows: “Any person who has been illegally
detained may, when the proceedings end in a no-case ruling or an acquittal which has become final,
obtain compensation if he proves that he has actually suffered injury of a particularly serious nature as
a result of such detention.” Section 237 (1) reads as follows: “The compensation provided for under
section 236 is awarded at first instance by the decision of a commission.”
4 The author notes that section 218 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code includes the following: “The
Examining Magistrate, may, at any time after charging the defendant but before the committal order,
issue a remand warrant against him; provided that the offence is punishable with loss of liberty.”
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The author further notes that the very same section prescribes the issuance of a remand
warrant only when the offence with which the defendant is charged is punishable by loss of
liberty. He argues that, without any specific charges levelled against him, it would have been
difficult to ascertain whether he was facing the prospect of prosecution in connection with an
offence that was punishable by loss of liberty. The author finally notes that section 218 (1)
of the Criminal Procedure Code recognizes remand in custody as an exceptional measure that
can only be undertaken to preserve evidence, maintain public order, protect life and property,
or ensure the appearance of an accused person.
Article 9 (2)
3.2
The author claims that he was not informed of the reason for his arrest at the time of
his arrest or of the charges against him, nor was he apprised of his due process rights, such
as the right to silence and privilege against self-incrimination. He was provided with no
reasons for his arrest until three months after the arrest, that is, on 16 July 2012, during his
arraignment before the High Court.
Article 9 (4)
3.3
The author claims that he was unable to challenge his arrest and detention at the trial
stage. He notes that, under the Criminal Procedure Code, appeals in cases of corruption
charges must be filed directly with the Judicial Chamber of the Supreme Court. After his
conviction, the author filed an appeal with this chamber to challenge the lawfulness of his
arrest, detention and sentence. Under domestic law the appellate court was under an
obligation to rule on his appeal within six months. However it took it four years to rule on
the appeal, and his petition for release from detention pending the appeal was rejected by the
Court.
Article 9 (5)
3.4
The author claims that the State Party’s failure to establish a legal framework for
compensating victims of unlawful detention amounted to a violation of his rights under
article 9 (5), read alone and in conjunction with article 2 (2), of the Covenant. He notes that
articles 236 and 237 of the Criminal Procedure Code in theory provide for a compensation
scheme. However, he claims that the compensation scheme does not exist in practice. He
further argues that, as per the wording of articles 236 and 237 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, the compensation framework applies only to victims of wrongful police detention and
those in pretrial detention but does not address post-trial detention.
Article 14 (1)
3.5
The author claims that the courts examining his case lacked independence and
impartiality. He claims that the presiding judge in the trial court was predisposed to decide
the case on factors extraneous to the law and his conscience and that the presiding judge
played an active role in drafting the indictment against him. He further claims that two
prosecutors who had processed his case at the indictment stage were subsequently promoted
to serve as judges of the Judicial Chamber of the Supreme Court and did not recuse
themselves from examining his appeal, thereby failing to respect the principle of impartiality.
He claims that one of these judges, in his capacity as the official in charge of prosecution at
the time of the first instance hearings in his case, took part in pretrial sessions in June 2012,
during which instructions were given to the examining magistrate on how to draft the order
referring the author for trial in the High Court. The second promoted judge had, in his role
as Attorney General at the Court of Appeal for the Centre Region, supervised the issuance of
the indictment against the author.
3.6
The author further claims that his right to a fair public hearing was violated, as he was
tried in a courtroom that looked and sounded like a military barracks with an audience
composed, in the main, of soldiers and local and national police, the majority of whom wore
masks and were armed with assault rifles. The public was subjected to an arbitrary system of
selecting who should be allowed to enter the courtroom.
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Article 14 (3) (b)
3.7
The author claims a violation of his rights under article 14 (3) (b) of the Covenant,
stating that he was denied access to documents in the possession of the prosecution and
material to his defence. He claims that the State Party’s authorities failed to provide him with
access to the case file containing depositions of witnesses and evidence gathered during the
preliminary investigation, despite repeated oral and written requests by his counsel.
Additionally, the author claims that he was denied access to exculpatory evidence gathered
during the preliminary investigation. He notes that a judicial police report, as well as a report
prepared by a magistrate of the Legal Department, both concluded that no evidence had been
found incriminating him in the allegedly missing aircraft funds for which he was convicted.
These documents were, however, withheld from the author during the trial.
3.8
The author further claims that he was not given adequate time to prepare his defence.
It was only on 16 July 2012, in the course of his arraignment to enter a plea, that he was
informed that his trial would begin the following week, on 24 July 2012. The presiding judge
also informed him that the record of the preliminary investigation was ready, and copies
would immediately be made available to his defence team. However, it was not until late in
the afternoon on 19 July 2012 that an incomplete case file was delivered to him.
Article 14 (3) (c)
3.9
The author notes that Law No. 2011/028 of 14 December 2011, on the creation of a
special criminal court, as amended by Law No. 2012/011 of 16 July 2012, directs the
Supreme Court to review an appeal and render its judgment within six months of the appeal.
He notes that, in his case, however, it took the Court over four years to render a judgment,
which he claims amounts to a violation of his rights under article 14 (3) (c) of the Covenant.
Article 14 (3) (e)
3.10
The author claims that a material witness, a lawyer retained by the State Party in the
bankruptcy proceedings related to the purchase of the aircraft and who had signed a
settlement agreement on behalf of the Government, refused to appear as a witness in the case
on the grounds that it would be in breach of the attorney code of ethics. The author notes that
the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code would have allowed the trial court to subpoena
the witness, but it chose not to do so. He argues that, bearing in mind the severity of the
charges against him, the court’s failure to hear this witness was in violation of his rights under
article 14 (3) (e) of the Covenant. The author further states that, one year after his conviction,
this lawyer would publicly admit in a press conference that the settlement agreement had
resolved the issue of the allegedly missing aircraft funds and that he confirmed that the State
Party had been fully indemnified in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Article 14 (5)
3.11
The author argues that article 11 (2) and (3) of Law No. 2011/028, as amended by
Law No. 2012/011, established a procedure for appeals that tilts heavily in favour of the
prosecution, as the rules limit the defendant to raising only errors of law in an appeal, while
the prosecution is allowed to raise points of law and newly discovered facts.5 The author thus
argues that his right to have his conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal was
violated.
3.12
The author claims that, on 3 May 2016, the Supreme Court had already reached and
drafted a decision on his appeal, two weeks before the oral appeal hearings in his case were
held on 17 and 18 May 2016, in violation of his rights under article 14 (5) of the Covenant.
5 Article 11 (2) and (3) of Law No. 2012/011, as amended by Law No. 2012/011, provides that the
public prosecution service can appeal both on the facts and on points of law, whereas the other parties
can appeal only on points of law.
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Article 2 (1) and (3)
3.13
In addition to his claims under articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant, the author further
claims that the State Party violated its general obligation under article 2 (1), by failing to
ensure his right to be free from arbitrary arrest or detention and his right to a fair trial. He
further claims that the failure by the State Party to implement the recommendations of the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in its opinion, that is, to terminate his detention and
compensate him for the harm suffered, amounted to a violation of his rights under article 2 (3)
of the Covenant.
Further submissions by the author
4.1
On 10 June 2025, the author made a further submission in the communication. He
submits that, in addition to the claims invoked in his initial complaint, the conditions of his
detention also amount to a violation of his rights under article 7 of the Covenant. He notes
that, following the submission of his initial complaint, gradually, due to a lack of access to
adequate treatment, his glaucoma became resistant to all available therapies.6 He notes that
the medical practice responsible for his care stated that the therapeutic resources needed to
halt the progression of the glaucoma were not available in the State Party and recommended
his referral to a hospital in France. The author repeatedly requested the Office of the President
to organize medical evacuations. His requests, however, remained unanswered. The author
argues that, by depriving him of adequate medical care, the State Party has subjected him to
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment with risks of imminent and irreparable
consequences, namely, the imminent risk of total blindness and the risk of enucleation of the
eyeballs.
4.2
The author notes that, following his arrest, he was placed in pretrial detention at the
Kondengui Central Prison in Yaoundé. On 25 May 2012, he was transferred to a military
prison nominally attached to Kondengui Central Prison but located on the premises of the
Secretariat of State for Defence, under the authority of the Minister of Defence. He remains
detained there to this day. His glaucoma has continued to deteriorate and, in April 2022,
doctors responsible for his ophthalmological care issued a medical certificate noting an
almost certain risk of blindness if something was not done as soon as possible.7 In May 2023,
and again in July 2023, he unsuccessfully requested the Office of the President to grant him
medical evacuation and, upon his return, the possibility of serving his sentence under house
arrest.
4.3
Concerning the admissibility of claims submitted under article 7 of the Covenant, the
author notes the Committee’s jurisprudence that claims must be raised in the initial complaint,
unless new circumstances arise. The author argues that, in his case, the deterioration of his
medical condition began after the submission of his initial complaint, and the condition has
continued to worsen with time, due to the State Party’s failure to provide him with adequate
medical care. The author further argues that there are no effective remedies available to him
in the State Party due to the lack of an independent and impartial judiciary. He argues that
the impossibility of having any complaint of ill-treatment investigated renders the protection
that domestic remedies could offer illusory.8
4.4
Concerning the merits of his claims under article 7 of the Covenant, the author states
that the conditions of detention at the Secretariat of State for Defence facility where he is
held are notoriously inhumane.9 He notes that it is a facility, under the authority of the
6 The author refers to a medical certificate dated 4 September 2021 and two further medical reports
issued in October 2021.
7 The author refers to a medical certificate dated 25 April 2022.
8 The author refers to the 2023 report of the United States Department of State on Cameroon and the
joint alternative report submitted by Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture, the
International Federation of Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture, Droits et Paix,
Ensemble contre la peine de mort and the World Coalition against the Death Penalty for the 2024
review of Cameroon by the Committee against Torture.
9 The author refers to a 2017 report by Amnesty International
(https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/campaigns/2017/07/cameroon-torture-chambers/) and a 2019
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military, whose function as a prison was only officially recognized in May 2012, in order to
retroactively legalize the transfer there in 1997 of a former secretary-general of the Office of
the President, and to allow the transfer of the author, among others. Only a small number of
people whose cases are considered to be sensitive by the authorities are detained at the
Secretariat of State for Defence facility and kept under constant military surveillance.
4.5
The author argues that his past and present conditions of detention amount to torture
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Upon his incarceration in 2012, and for months
thereafter, he was subjected to a series of deprivations, resulting in the deterioration of his
health. These include deliberate deprivation of a healthy environment, as his cell, measuring
only 10 m2, had no windows or electricity and was extremely damp. These unsanitary
conditions, particularly the humidity, caused the author to suffer from a series of chronic
respiratory infections. Another example is the deliberate deprivation of both natural and
artificial light. He notes that, as his cell lacked windows or electricity, this resulted in a drastic
decline in his eyesight, which was already failing at the time. He emphasizes that it is
medically established that darkness is harmful to people suffering from glaucoma, who find
it difficult to adapt to it, and that darkness worsens the condition, as it can trigger acute angle-
closure glaucoma, with extremely painful attacks due to increased intraocular pressure.
Although the harsh detention conditions did not change, he nevertheless was able to install
an electrical socket at his own expense. He is only allowed to go out into a small courtyard,
which is also accessed by four other inmates.
4.6
The author claims that, in addition to the inadequate conditions of detention, he has
also been denied access to adequate medical care and treatment, in violation of his rights
under article 7 of the Covenant. Specifically, the author argues that he has regularly been
denied access to his medical file, which was confiscated by the Secretariat of State for
Defence in 2019, and that he has been denied access to adequate ophthalmological care, even
though the State Party’s authorities were aware of his eye conditions as early as 2011.
Although he was able to undergo cataract surgery, the essential post-operative check-ups
were gradually spaced out and then simply postponed indefinitely. In the absence of regular
follow-up, treatments that proved harmful to the author and that caused allergic reactions
therefore continued. This lack of access to care resulted in the author’s glaucoma becoming
resistant to drug treatment, and no concrete measures were taken to adapt the care, even
though a team of foreign doctors offered to make arrangements in that regard. In this
connection, he further states that other detainees in the State Party have been granted medical
evacuation organized by the State authorities.
4.7
The author further claims that he has been denied access to adequate general medical
care. In addition, the prison administration has repeatedly found excuses to delay his transfer
when he needed to undergo specific medical examinations. He argues that, even when
treatment is provided, it is thus systematically delayed and therefore inadequate. Similarly,
he notes that he has been prevented from attending his dental follow-up appointments and
must therefore make do with palliative measures to relieve the pain. The author also claims
that he was not provided with appropriate treatment during the coronavirus disease
(COVID-19) pandemic. During the pandemic, he submitted a request to the Office of the
President for medical evacuation or, failing that, for his conditions of detention to be adjusted,
as he was 67 years old at the time and particularly vulnerable due to chronic lung problems
accompanied by respiratory failure. When he contracted the virus in April 2021, a few days
after his cellmate, who had not been placed in clinical isolation despite testing positive, the
author was unable, unlike his cellmate, to receive hospital treatment. It was only after intense
media coverage that he was finally admitted to Yaoundé Central Hospital. The author claims
that his medical confidentiality has been breached. When he is able to consult with doctors,
this is done under military escort, which, he argues, contravenes the requirements of
confidentiality and dignity.
4.8
The author further claims that he has been deprived of social contact in detention, in
violation of his rights under article 7 of the Covenant. He notes that the Secretariat of State
for Defence facility is referred to as the “secret prison”, expressly designed to keep detainees
report by Human Rights Watch (https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2019/05/06/cameroun-recours-regulier-
la-torture-et-la-detention-au-secret).
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in complete isolation and under constant surveillance, subjecting them to a dehumanizing
routine and limiting visits to very strict time slots. To date, he is still subject to special
restrictions on visits. Every two months, he must submit a list of potential visitors (including
his lawyers) to the administration for approval, with the provision that this list must be
resubmitted each time. Finally, he is deprived of any means of incoming or outgoing
correspondence with the outside world, as he is not allowed to keep any paper, pens or other
communication materials in his cell.
4.9
On 10 October 2025, the author submitted a further claim under article 14 of the
Covenant, which, he notes, is based on new circumstances. He states that he has regularly
been summoned by the Secretariat of State for Defence military command to be notified of
writs relating to ongoing domestic proceedings, while at the same time being prevented from
communicating freely with his counsel. He notes that his counsel, who has been representing
him since 2012, has recently been denied entry to the premises of the Secretariat of State for
Defence on several occasions without valid reason.
Lack of cooperation by the State Party
5.
On 15 February 2022, the State Party was requested to submit its observations on the
admissibility and merits of the communication. Reminders to the State Party to submit the
observations were sent on 14 March and 10 July 2023 and 10 July and 4 November 2025.
The Committee regrets the failure of the State Party to respond to these requests in a timely
manner and to provide any information with regard to the admissibility and merits of the
author’s claims within the deadlines indicated. The Committee recalls that article 4 (2) of the
Optional Protocol implicitly obliges States Parties to examine in good faith all allegations
brought against them and to make available to the Committee all the information at their
disposal. In the absence of a reply from the State Party, due weight must be given to the
author’s allegations, to the extent that they are substantiated.
Issues and proceedings before the Committee
State Party’s failure to respect the Committee’s request for interim measures pursuant to
rule 94 of the Committee’s rules of procedure and article 1 of the Optional Protocol
6.1
In a note verbale dated 15 February 2022, pursuant to rule 94 of its rules of procedure,
the Committee requested the State Party to provide the author with immediate access to
adequate and specialized medical care that may be required to preserve his sight. This request
was reiterated to the State Party on 15 March and 22 June 2022, 10 July 2023 and
10 July 2025.
6.2
The Committee notes that the adoption of interim measures pursuant to rule 94 of its
rules of procedure, in accordance with article 1 of the Optional Protocol, is vital to the role
entrusted to the Committee under that article. Failure to respect the interim measures
requested by the Committee with a view to preventing irreparable harm undermines the
protection of the rights enshrined in the Covenant.10
6.3
As indicated in paragraph 19 of the Committee’s general comment No. 33 (2008) on
the obligations of States Parties under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant, failure to
implement interim measures is incompatible with the obligation to respect in good faith the
procedure of individual communications established under the Optional Protocol. The
Committee is therefore of the view that, by failing to respect the request for interim measures,
namely, to provide the author with immediate access to adequate and specialized medical
care while his case was pending before the Committee, the State Party failed in its obligations
under article 1 of the Optional Protocol.11
10 See, for example, B.A. et al. v. Austria (CCPR/C/127/D/2956/2017), para. 9.1; and Rehman v.
Hungary (CCPR/C/138/D/2963/2017), para. 7.1.
11 B.A. et al. v. Austria, para. 9.2; and Rehman v. Hungary, para. 7.2.
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Consideration of admissibility
7.1
Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must
decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is
admissible under the Optional Protocol.
7.2
As required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, the Committee must
ascertain that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international
investigation or settlement. The Committee notes that, in its opinion No. 22/2016, adopted
on 27 April 2016, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found the author’s detention to
be arbitrary. The Committee recalls that article 5 (2) (a) does not preclude it from considering
communications on cases previously dealt with by another international investigation or
settlement body,12 even when the body has adopted a decision on the merits, unless the State
Party has made a reservation explicitly prohibiting successive appeals,13 which is not the case
here. As the Working Group had completed its examination of the case before the author’s
communication was considered by the Committee, there is no obstacle to the admissibility of
the communication under that provision.
7.3
The Committee notes the author’s submission that he has exhausted all available
domestic remedies. It notes the author’s information that, following his conviction by the
High Court, he challenged the lawfulness of his arrest, detention and sentence before the
Supreme Court. The Committee further notes his argument that the mechanism for
compensation for victims of unlawful arrest and detention, as provided for under articles 236
and 237 of the Criminal Procedure Code, was not operational at the time of the submission
of his complaint. The Committee finally notes the author’s submission that, as concerns his
claims under article 7 of the Covenant, there are no effective remedies available to him in the
State Party due to the lack of an independent and impartial judiciary. The Committee notes
that the State Party has not responded to the author’s claims, nor has it provided any
information on any domestic remedy that would have been available to the author in the
present case. Taking the above considerations into account, the Committee thus finds that it
is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from considering the
communication.
7.4
The Committee notes the author’s claims that the State Party violated its general
obligation under article 2 (1) and (3) of the Covenant, by failing to ensure his right to be free
from arbitrary arrest or detention and his right to a fair trial, as well as by failing to implement
the recommendations of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in its opinion
No. 22/2016. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence according to which the provisions of
article 2 of the Covenant set out general obligations for States Parties and do not give rise,
when invoked separately, to claims in a communication under the Optional Protocol.14 The
Committee therefore declares the claims under article 2 (1) and (3) of the Covenant to be
inadmissible ratione materiae under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.
7.5
The Committee further notes the author’s claims that the State Party’s failure to
establish a legal framework for compensating victims of unlawful detention amounted to a
violation of his rights under article 9 (5), read alone and in conjunction with article 2 (2), of
the Covenant. The Committee reiterates that article 2 (2) cannot be invoked in a claim in a
communication under the Optional Protocol in conjunction with other provisions of the
Covenant, except when the failure by the State Party to observe its obligations under article 2
is the proximate cause of a distinct violation of the Covenant directly affecting the individual
claiming to be a victim.15 The Committee notes, however, that the author has already alleged
a violation of his rights under article 9 (5), resulting from the interpretation and application
of the existing laws of the State Party, and the Committee does not consider that an
12 L.E.S.K. v. Netherlands, communication No. 381/1989, para. 5.2.
13 Wade v. Senegal (CCPR/C/124/D/2783/2016), para. 11.2; and Tsarsi et al. v. Chad
(CCPR/C/140/D/3806/2020), para. 6.2.
14 For example, Taylor et al. v. New Zealand (CCPR/C/138/D/3666/2019), para. 6.5; Devi Maya Nepal
v. Nepal (CCPR/C/132/D/2615/2015), para. 6.6; and Billy et al. v. Australia
(CCPR/C/135/D/3624/2019), para. 7.4.
15 For example, Poliakov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/111/D/2030/2011), para. 7.4; and Zhukovsky v. Belarus
(CCPR/C/127/D/2724/2016), para. 6.4.
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examination of whether the State Party also violated its general obligations under article 2 (2),
read in conjunction with article 9 (5), is distinct from the examination of the violation of the
author’s rights under article 9 (5). The Committee therefore considers that the author’s claims
in this regard are incompatible with article 2 (2) of the Covenant and inadmissible under
article 3 of the Optional Protocol.
7.6
The Committee notes that, in a further submission dated 10 June 2025, the author
raised claims under article 7 of the Covenant that he did not explicitly invoke in his initial
communication. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence in which it stated that authors must
raise all of their claims in their initial submission, before the State Party is asked to provide
its observations on the admissibility and merits of the communication, unless they can
demonstrate why they were unable to raise all of their claims simultaneously.16 In the present
case, the Committee notes the author’s argument that the deterioration of his medical
condition occurred after the submission of his initial complaint in 2020 and has continued to
worsen with time due to the State Party’s failure to provide him with adequate medical care.
The Committee additionally notes that the author’s request for interim measures, which was
submitted prior to the State Party being asked to provide its observations on the admissibility
and merits of the communication, raised claims regarding his deteriorating health and lack of
access to adequate medical care. The Committee thus finds that the author has demonstrated
why the more detailed information on his deteriorating health could not have been submitted
in the initial submission and finds that it is thus not precluded by article 3 of the Optional
Protocol from considering the claims in question.
7.7
The Committee, however, notes that, in addition to the claims raised under article 7
of the Covenant concerning his deteriorating health condition, the author has also raised
claims of having been deprived of social contact and means of correspondence, strict limits
on visitation and constant surveillance, while in detention. The Committee observes that these
claims relate to the period since the author’s initial detention in 2012 and were not raised in
his complaint before the Committee in 2020. It notes that the author has not indicated why
he could not have raised these claims in his initial submission and considers that they
constitute an abuse of the right of submission and are therefore inadmissible under article 3
of the Optional Protocol.
7.8
The Committee notes that, on 10 October 2025, the author submitted a further claim
under article 14 (3) (b) of the Covenant, arguing that he was being prevented from
communicating freely with his counsel concerning ongoing domestic investigations. The
Committee, however, notes that the author has not provided any further specific information
or argumentation in support of this claim, and it therefore finds the claim to be insufficiently
substantiated for the purposes of admissibility and inadmissible under article 2 of the
Optional Protocol.
7.9
The Committee, however, considers that the author has sufficiently substantiated the
remainder of his claims. Accordingly, the Committee declares the author’s remaining claims
under articles 7, 9 (1), (2), (4) and (5) and 14 (1), (3) (b), (c) and (e) and (5) of the Covenant
admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits.
Consideration of the merits
8.1
The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information
submitted to it by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. The
Committee notes that, in failing to respond to a communication, or responding incompletely,
a State that is the object of a communication puts itself at a disadvantage because the
Committee is then compelled to consider the communication in the absence of full
information relating to the communication. In the absence of any explanations from the State
Party in respect of the merits, due weight must be given to the author’s allegations to the
extent that they have been sufficiently substantiated (see para. 5 above).17
16 For example, S.R. v. Lithuania (CCPR/C/132/D/3313/2019), para. 8.8; and D.Č. v. Lithuania
(CCPR/C/134/D/3327/2019), para. 8.4.
17 Sheriffdeen v. Sri Lanka (CCPR/C/133/D/2978/2017), para. 6.1.
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11
Article 9 (1)
8.2
The Committee notes the author’s claims that he was deprived of his liberty in a
manner not in accordance with domestic law (see para. 3.1 above). It also notes the author’s
claim that no grounds were provided for his remand in custody. The Committee recalls that
deprivation of liberty is permissible only when it takes place on such grounds and in
accordance with such procedure as are established by domestic law and when this is not
arbitrary.18 In addition, the Committee recalls that remand in custody on criminal charges
must be reasonable and necessary in all circumstances.19 In the absence of a response from
the State Party, the Committee considers that due weight must be given to the author’s
allegations. Taking the above into account, the Committee finds that the facts described
amount to a violation of the author’s rights under article 9 (1) of the Covenant.20
Article 9 (2) and (4)
8.3
The Committee notes the author’s claims that he was not informed of the reason for
his arrest at the time of his arrest or of the charges against him (see paras. 3.2 and 3.3 above).
In this connection the Committee recalls that one major purpose of requiring that all arrested
persons be informed of the reasons for the arrest is to enable them to seek release if they
believe that the reasons given are invalid or unfounded. The reasons must include not only
the general legal basis of the arrest, but also enough factual specifics to indicate the substance
of the complaint, such as the wrongful act and the identity of an alleged victim. 21 The
Committee further recalls that the right to judicial review under article 9 (4) of the Covenant
applies in principle from the moment of arrest and that any substantial waiting period before
a detainee can bring a first challenge to detention is impermissible.22 In the absence of a
response from the State Party, the Committee gives due weight to the author’s claims and
finds that the author’s rights under article 9 (2) and (4) were violated.
Article 9 (5)
8.4
The Committee notes the author’s claims that his rights under article 9 (5) of the
Covenant were violated, as the State Party has failed to establish a legal framework for
compensation for unlawful arrest or detention (see para. 3.4 above). The Committee recalls
that article 9 (5) obliges States Parties to establish the legal framework within which
compensation can be afforded to victims, as a matter of enforceable right and not as a matter
of grace or discretion. The remedy must not exist merely in theory but must operate
effectively, and payment must be made within a reasonable period of time.23 In the absence
of a response by the State Party regarding the author’s claims, the Committee considers that
due weight must be given to the author’s allegations. Accordingly, the Committee concludes
that, in the circumstances of the present case, the author’s rights under article 9 (5) of the
Covenant were violated.
Article 14 (1)
8.5
The Committee notes the author’s claims that the courts examining his case lacked
independence and impartiality (see para. 3.5 above). The Committee recalls that the
requirement of impartiality under article 14 (1) of the Covenant has two aspects. First, judges
must not allow their judgment to be influenced by personal bias or prejudice, harbour
preconceptions about the particular case before them, or act in ways that improperly promote
the interests of one of the parties to the detriment of the other. Second, the tribunal must also
appear to a reasonable observer to be impartial.24 In the present case, and in the absence of a
18 For example, Maksudov et al. v. Kyrgyzstan, communications No. 1461/2006, No. 1462/2006,
No. 1476/2006 and No. 1477/2006, para. 12.2.
19 General comment No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person, para. 12.
20 See also A/HRC/WGAD/2016/22, para. 50.
21 General comment No. 35 (2014), para. 25.
22 Ibid., para. 42. See also Akwanga v. Cameroon (CCPR/C/101/D/1813/2008), para. 7.4; and Bengono
v. Cameroon (CCPR/C/132/D/2609/2015), para. 7.2
23 General comment No. 35 (2014), para. 50.
24 General comment No. 32 (2007) on the right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial,
para. 21.
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response from the State Party regarding the author’s claims, the Committee gives due weight
to the author’s allegation and thus considers that the failure by the two judges in question to
recuse themselves from examining the author’s appeal amounted to a violation of his rights
under article 14 (1) of the Covenant.
8.6
The Committee further notes the author’s claims that his right to a fair public hearing
was violated (see para. 3.6 above). The Committee recalls that the notion of fair trial includes
the guarantee of a fair and public hearing. Fairness of proceedings entails the absence of any
direct or indirect influence, pressure or intimidation or intrusion from whatever side and for
whatever motive. A hearing is not fair if, for instance, the defendant in criminal proceedings
is faced with the expression of a hostile attitude from the public or support for one party in
the courtroom that is tolerated by the court, thereby impinging on the right to defence, or is
exposed to other manifestations of hostility with similar effects. 25 Courts must make
information regarding the time and venue of the oral hearings available to the public and
provide for adequate facilities for the attendance of interested members of the public, within
reasonable limits, taking into account, inter alia, the potential interest in the case and the
duration of the oral hearing.26 In the absence of a response by the State Party regarding the
author’s claims, the Committee gives due weight to the author’s allegations and concludes
that the circumstances described amount to a violation of the author’s rights to fair and public
hearing under article 14 (1) of the Covenant.
Article 14 (3) (b)
8.7
The Committee notes the author’s claims that he was denied access to documents in
the possession of the prosecution and material to his defence, including the statements of
witnesses, as well as a police report and a report prepared by a magistrate of the Legal
Department, which both concluded that no evidence had been found incriminating him in the
alleged misappropriation of public funds. The Committee recalls that the requirement under
article 14 (3) (b) of the Covenant that an accused person must have adequate facilities for the
preparation of his or her defence must include access to documents and other evidence and
that this access must include all materials that the prosecution plans to offer in court against
the accused or that are exculpatory.27 The Committee further notes the author’s claim that he
was not given adequate time to prepare his defence (see para. 3.8 above). In the absence of
any response by the State Party, the Committee gives due weight to the author’s claims and
finds that the facts described amount to a violation of his rights under article 14 (3) (b) of the
Covenant.
Article 14 (3) (c)
8.8
The Committee notes the author’s claim that his right to be tried without undue delay
was violated, as it took the Supreme Court four years to review his appeal and render its
judgment. It further notes the author’s information that he was detained during the appeals
stage and his information that, under domestic law, the Court was under an obligation to
review his appeal within six months of its filing. The Committee recalls that the right of the
accused to be tried without undue delay is not only designed to avoid keeping persons too
long in a state of uncertainty about their fate and, if they are held in detention during the
period of the trial, to ensure that such deprivation of liberty does not last longer than necessary
in the circumstances of the specific case, but also to serve the interests of justice.28 What is
reasonable has to be assessed in the circumstances of each case, taking into account mainly
the complexity of the case, the conduct of the accused and the manner in which the matter
was dealt with by the administrative and judicial authorities. In cases where the accused are
denied bail by the court, they must be tried as expeditiously as possible. The Committee
further recalls that this guarantee relates not only to the time between the formal charging of
the accused and the time by which a trial should commence, but also the time until the final
judgment on appeal. All stages, whether in first instance or on appeal, must take place without
25 Ibid., para. 25.
26 Ibid., para. 28.
27 Ibid., para. 33; and Andela v. Cameroon (CCPR/C/138/D/3838/2020), para. 6.4. See also
A/HRC/WGAD/2016/22, para. 44.
28 General comment No. 32 (2007), para. 35.
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undue delay.29 In the absence of any further explanation by the State Party in the present case
regarding the length of the appeal proceedings, and considering the author’s information on
the stipulated time frames under domestic legislation, the Committee gives due weight to the
author’s claims and finds that the facts described amount to a violation of the author’s rights
under article 14 (3) (c) of the Covenant.
Article 14 (3) (e)
8.9
The Committee notes the author’s claim that the failure by the trial court to subpoena
a material witness amounted to a violation of his rights under article 14 (3) (e) of the Covenant.
The Committee recalls that article 14 (3) (e) guarantees the right of accused persons to
examine or have examined the witnesses against them and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on their behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against
them.30 It recalls, however, that the right of the accused to examine witnesses on his or her
own behalf is not absolute. The accused only has the right to have those witnesses admitted
who are relevant for the defence and the right to be given a proper opportunity to question
and challenge the witnesses testifying against him or her at some stage of the proceedings.31
In the absence of any further explanation by the State Party regarding the author’s claim in
this regard, the Committee gives due weight to the author’s claim and finds that, in the
circumstances of the case, the facts described amount to a violation of the author’s rights
under article 14 (3) (e) of the Covenant.
Article 14 (5)
8.10
The Committee notes the author’s claim that his right to have his conviction and
sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal was violated (see paras. 3.11 and 3.12 above). The
Committee recalls that, although a factual retrial is not required under the Covenant,32 a
procedure enabling a substantial and effective review of the conviction is, and the review
should make possible an assessment of the evidence and facts, and not simply a
reconsideration on points of law.33 A review that is limited to the formal or legal aspects of
the conviction without any consideration whatsoever of the facts is not sufficient under the
Covenant.34 The Committee further notes that the State Party has not provided any response
to the author’s claim that the decision on his appeal was reached by the appellate court, before
the oral hearing on the grounds of appeal. In the absence of a response by the State Party, the
Committee thus gives due weight to the author’s claims and finds that the circumstances
described amount to a violation of his rights under article 14 (5) of the Covenant.
Article 7
8.11
The Committee notes the author’s claims that he has been denied adequate medical
care in detention, which has irreparably damaged his physical and mental health with risks
of imminent and irreparable consequences, namely, the imminent risk of total blindness and
the risk of enucleation. Specifically, the Committee notes his claims that the deliberate
deprivation of both natural and artificial light in his cell resulted in a drastic decline in his
eyesight, due to his glaucoma. The Committee further notes the author’s claims that, in
addition, he has also systematically been denied access to adequate generalized and
specialized medical care and treatment. Specifically, it notes his claims that he has regularly
been denied access to his medical file, that his medical confidentiality has been breached and
that he has been denied access to adequate ophthalmological care and regular follow-up
treatment, which resulted in his glaucoma becoming resistant to drug treatment. The
Committee notes the author’s information that he is now practically blind due to not having
29 Ibid., para. 35.
30 Ibid., para. 39; and Andela v. Cameroon, para. 6.6.
31 General comment No. 32 (2007), para. 39. See also, for example, Allaberdiev v. Uzbekistan
(CCPR/C/119/D/2555/2015), para. 8.8; Y.M. v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/116/D/2059/2011),
para. 9.9; A.M. v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/141/D/3068/2017), para. 6.9; and A.A. v. Russian
Federation (CCPR/C/139/D/2964/2017), para. 6.9.
32 Rolando v. Philippines (CCPR/C/82/D/1110/2002), para. 4.5.
33 Gómez Vázquez v. Spain (CCPR/C/69/D/701/1996), para. 11.1; and Wade v. Senegal, para. 12.2.
34 General comment No. 32 (2007), para. 48; and Andela v. Cameroon, para. 6.7.
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received the appropriate care and that he continues to suffer acute pain due to intraocular
pressure and is at real and imminent risk of enucleation.
8.12
The Committee notes that a State Party is under an obligation to observe certain
minimum standards of detention, which include the provision of medical care and treatment
for sick prisoners, in accordance with rule 24 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules
for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules). 35 In the present case, the
Committee notes the author’s claims, as supported by medical records, that he was not able
to receive medical treatment appropriate to his condition and that, as a result, he is in acute
pain and at risk of total blindness and enucleation. It further notes that, despite having
knowledge of the lack of specialized care in the State Party appropriate to the author’s needs,
the State Party’s authorities denied the author’s request to organize such treatment abroad,
despite this having been authorized and arranged for other detainees in the State Party in
similar position to the author. In the absence of any observations by the State Party on the
author’s claims regarding his lack of access to adequate medical care in detention, the
Committee considers that due weight must be given to the author’s claims. Accordingly, the
Committee concludes that, in the circumstances of the present case, the facts as submitted
disclose a violation of the author’s rights under article 7 of the Covenant.
9.
The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view that
the facts before it disclose a violation of the author’s rights under articles 7, 9 (1), (2), (4) and
(5) and 14 (1), (3) (b), (c) and (e) and (5) of the Covenant and of article 1 of the Optional
Protocol.
10.
In accordance with article 2 (3) (a) of the Covenant, the State Party is under an
obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy. This requires it to make full
reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. Accordingly, the State
Party is obligated, inter alia, to take appropriate steps: (a) to ensure that the author is
immediately released from detention; and (b) to provide the author with adequate
compensation, including with regard to the impact of the detention on his physical and mental
health. The State Party is also under an obligation to take steps to prevent similar violations
from occurring in the future.
11.
Bearing in mind that, by becoming a Party to the Optional Protocol, the State Party
has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a
violation of the Covenant and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State Party has
undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective remedy when it has been
determined that a violation has occurred, the Committee wishes to receive from the State
Party, within 180 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to the
Committee’s Views. The State Party is also requested to publish the present Views and to
have them widely disseminated in the languages of the State Party.
35 Suleimenov v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/119/D/2146/2012), para. 8.7; and Rouse v. Philippines
(CCPR/C/84/D/1089/2002), para. 7.8.