CCPR/C/145/D/3223/2018

GE.26-04271 (E)

Human Rights Committee

Decision adopted by the Committee under the Optional

Protocol, concerning communication No. 3223/2018**, ***

Communication submitted by:

E.U. (represented by counsel, Ben Juratowitch,

Noah Rubins, Catherine Drummond, Joshua

Kelly and Mariia Puchyna, of Freshfields

Bruckaus Deringer)

Alleged victim:

The author

State Party:

Uzbekistan

Date of communication:

1 June 2018 (initial submission)

Document references:

Decision taken pursuant to rule 92 of the

Committee’s rules of procedure, transmitted to

the State Party on 10 August 2018 (not issued in

document form)

Date of adoption of decision:

16 March 2026

Subject matter:

Repeated police detention and forced psychiatric

treatment of a human rights defender

Procedural issues:

Exhaustion of domestic remedies; abuse of

submission

Substantive issues:

Torture; arbitrary detention; ill-treatment; fair

trial; arbitrary interference with privacy;

freedoms of expression and assembly;

discrimination; effective remedy

Articles of the Covenant:

2 (1) and (3), 7, 9 (1)–(5), 10 (1), 12 (1) and (2),

14 (1), 17, 18, 19, 21 and 26

Articles of the Optional Protocol:

3 and 5 (2) (b)

1.

The author of the communication is E.U., a national of Uzbekistan born in 1957. She

claims that the State Party has violated her rights under articles 7, 9 (1)–(5), 10 (1), 12 (1)

and (2), 14 (1), 17, 18, 19, 21 and 26, read separately and in conjunction with articles 2 (1)

* Reissued for technical reasons on 18 June 2026.

** Adopted by the Committee at its 145th session (2–19 March 2026).

*** The following members of the Committee participated in the examination of the communication:

Tania María Abdo Rocholl, Wafaa Ashraf Moharram Bassim, Rodrigo A. Carazo, Yvonne Donders,

Mahjoub El Haiba, Carlos Ramón Fernández Liesa, Laurence R. Helfer, Konstantin Korkelia, Dalia

Leinarte, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, Hernán Quezada Cabrera, Ivan Šimonović, Soh Changrok, Teraya

Koji, Hélène Tigroudja and Imeru Tamerat Yigezu. Pursuant to rule 108 of the Committee’s rules of

procedure, Akmal Saidov did not participate in the examination of the communication.

United Nations

CCPR/C/145/D/3223/2018*

International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights

Distr.: General

5 May 2026

Original: English

CCPR/C/145/D/3223/2018

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GE.26-04271

and (3) of the Covenant. The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State Party on

28 December 1995. The author is represented by counsel.

Factual background

2.1

The author, a human rights defender, was detained on 25 occasions between 2001 and

2017: 7 times in psychiatric institutions and 18 times by police.

2.2

In 2001, the author was apprehended by police on her way to a demonstration and

taken to Tashkent City Psychiatric Hospital No. 1. She was evaluated by a medical

commission and diagnosed with schizophrenia on 7 April 2001. The hospital requested Mirzo

Ulugbek District Court to authorize the author’s involuntary hospitalization and treatment,

which the court did on 10 April 2001. The author remained in the hospital until 30 June 2001.

She was subsequently involuntarily hospitalized and treated on the basis of court decisions,

which were based on psychiatric evaluations, between 27 August and 30 December 2002,

27 August and 27 October 2005, 7 March and 1 June 2016 and 1 to 23 March 2017. She was

also kept in psychiatric detention for shorter periods of time on 6 November 2001 and on 11

and 12 April 2017, without any legal basis explained to her. Since September 2006, the author

has been under ongoing involuntary outpatient treatment.

2.3

On 18 occasions during the same period, the author was arrested and detained by

police and/or national security service for periods of time lasting from a few hours to several

days. The arrests happened usually while the author was attending peaceful protests or

monitoring the use of forced labour in cotton fields. There was never a record of detention.

She was interrogated, beaten on some occasions and searched on many occasions, including

a cavity search on two occasions. In addition, her documents, camera, memory sticks and

computers were seized on some occasions and photographs and information were deleted.

The author complained to the police or prosecutor’s office in some cases. She received either

a response that her allegations could not be confirmed, or no response at all.

2.4

On 24 August 2006, Mirobod District Court declared the author legally incompetent

following a request by the Tashkent Mirobod District Prosecutor and based on psychiatric

conclusion No. 110 dated 17 December 2002, according to which the author suffered from

schizophrenia, could not understand her actions and needed a guardian.

2.5

In 2014, the author applied for a biometric passport and exit visa. Although her

biometric passport was issued on 1 December 2014, she was not issued with an exit visa.

Further to her complaints to different authorities, on 7 March 2018, the Ministry of the

Interior informed her that her request had been rejected on 23 January 2015, without

providing any explanation.

2.6

According to the author, she could not exhaust domestic remedies because she had

been deprived of her legal capacity since 2006 and did not have direct access to courts. She

did not have an appointed guardian until 2018, when her lawyer was eventually appointed as

her guardian by the local governor (khokim). As she had not received the court decisions in

relation to her involuntary hospitalizations in 2001 and 2002, she could not appeal them. She

claims that she was scared of retaliation from the State authorities if she complained and that,

given the State Party’s human rights record, there was no prospect of success and no effective

domestic remedy for her to exhaust. Regarding the delay in submission, the author claims

that she was afraid of repercussions by the State Party if she escalated her complaints outside

the country. Only during the period 2016–2017, with the change of the regime, did she feel

that she could submit a communication to the Committee.

Complaint

3.1

The author claims a violation of article 7 of the Covenant for her involuntary

psychiatric hospitalization; for the conditions of detention and abuse by the personnel; for

her forced medication, beginning in 2006, which had severe side effects; and for the

humiliating treatment and physical and verbal abuse by police officers to which she was

subject while in police detention.

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3.2

She claims that her treatment while in psychiatric detention was inhumane: among

other things, she was denied access to medical documents and subjected to physical and

verbal abuse by hospital officials; in addition, visits by her family members, colleagues and

lawyers were restricted.

3.3

The author claims that her involuntary psychiatric detention was not in accordance

with the procedure established by law and that it was not medically justified, necessary or

proportionate, and thus was in violation of her rights under article 9 (1) of the Covenant. Her

arrest and detention by law enforcement officials were unlawful and arbitrary as no

explanations were given and they were not properly recorded.

3.4

The author also claims that her right, under article 9 (2) of the Covenant, to be

informed of the reasons for her arrest and detention was violated during her involuntary

confinement in psychiatric institutions and arrests by law enforcement officers.

3.5

Her right to be brought promptly before a judge, as protected by article 9 (3) of the

Covenant, was violated when she was kept by police on 6 November 2001 for 10 days and

then released without charge; and on 27 August 2005, when she was arrested by the police

and charged with disrespecting State emblems under article 215 of the Criminal Code, and

then detained at Tashkent City Psychiatric Hospital No. 1 without a court order for 52 days.

3.6

The author claims that she was not brought to court to verify the legality of her

deprivation of liberty in psychiatric and police detention, in violation of article 9 (4) of the

Covenant.

3.7

The author also claims that she was not provided with compensation regarding any of

the 25 periods of unlawful detention, in violation of article 9 (5) of the Covenant.

3.8

The author submits that her access to cotton fields was repeatedly obstructed by the

police, without any justification, in violation of article 12 (1) of the Covenant. The unjustified

rejection of her application for an exit visa prevented her from leaving the State Party, in

violation of article 12 (2) of the Covenant.

3.9

The author claims that she was denied access to court, in violation of article 14 (1) of

the Covenant, as she was declared legally incompetent, which interfered with her ability to

protect herself legally. That declaration was arbitrary and not based on independent medical

evidence.

3.10

The author also claims a violation of her right to privacy, family life and home, as

protected under article 17 of the Covenant, in particular through forced psychiatric detention

and actions by police officers in response to her human rights-related activities. The author

also claims to have been subjected to unlawful attacks to her honour and reputation as a

human rights defender by being diagnosed with schizophrenia, confined to psychiatric

institutions and forcefully medicated.

3.11

The author further claims that her involuntary hospitalization on 7 March 2016 was

connected with her interest in Islam and therefore violated her rights under article 18 of the

Covenant.

3.12

The author claims that, contrary to articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant, she was

subjected to persecution for exercising her right to freedom of expression relating to her

human rights work.

3.13

The author also claims a violation of article 26, read in conjunction with article 2 (1),

of the Covenant, because the abuses against her amount to discrimination by the State Party

on the basis of her human rights work.

3.14 The author further claims that her right to an effective remedy under article 2 (3) of

the Covenant was violated with respect to each of the violations described above. The vast

majority of her complaints were ignored and she was not provided with reparation for

multiple violations of her rights.

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State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits

4.1

On 9 November 2019, the State Party submitted its observations on the admissibility

and merits of the communication. The State Party contends that the communication is

inadmissible because the author failed to exhaust domestic remedies on all of her claims.

4.2

Regarding the author’s argument that she did not have access to domestic remedies

because she was deprived of legal capacity, the State Party refers to the Custodianship and

Guardianship Act of 2 January 2014, which provides that the protection of interests of a

person deprived of legal capacity is performed by a guardian. The State Party thus notes that

she did not use article 315 of the Civil Procedure Code, which allows individuals to request

the reinstatement of their legal capacity in court.

4.3

According to the State Party, the author’s allegations about possible retaliation by the

authorities are unsubstantiated by reliable evidence.

4.4

The State Party argues that, as a person deprived of legal capacity, the power of

attorney signed by the author authorizing counsel to represent her in the present case before

the Committee is invalid.

4.5

The State Party denies any violation of the author’s rights under the Covenant.

According to the State Party, the author’s psychiatric hospitalization was necessitated by her

aggressive behaviour towards her neighbours and towards the medical personnel visiting her

at home and by a petition from the local self-governing body, requesting a psychiatric

evaluation in view of her behaviour. The hospitalization of the author was based on court

decisions and psychiatric evaluations.

4.6

Regarding the author’s police detention, the State Party explains that police detention

records are kept for five years and it is impossible to find information concerning the author’s

claims that date from earlier than 2014.

Author’s comments on the State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits

5.1

On 13 February 2020, the author submitted her comments on the State Party’s

observations, accusing the State Party of staining her reputation by providing information

irrelevant to her submission. The author claims that the State Party failed to provide

supporting documents to prove that her hospitalization had been initiated following the

expression of concern by community elders. She claims that the hospitalization was

connected to the monitoring of forced labour in cotton fields, in the same way as her

hospitalizations in 2002 and 2016.

5.2

The author reiterates her claim that she did not have direct access to court to request

the restoration of her legal capacity although, despite that constraint, she nevertheless did

submit an appeal. She disagrees with the State Party that she could have filed an appeal

together with her guardian because, at the fault of the State Party, no guardian was appointed

for her until 2018. She maintains her claim of the futility of the domestic remedies in her

case. She refers to the State Party’s record related to the treatment of human rights defenders

to confirm her claims of feared retaliation.

5.3

The author claims that, under the Committee’s rules of procedure, she can be

represented by counsel before the Committee.

5.4

The author reiterates her claims on the merits.

State Party’s additional observations

6.1

On 20 April 2020, the State Party submitted additional observations and supporting

documents. The State Party clarifies that the information about the author preceding 2001

was submitted not to bring the reputation of the author into disrepute, but to counter her claim

about punitive psychiatric treatment.

6.2

The State Party disagrees with the author’s claim that the guardian was appointed for

her only in 2018 and that because of this she could not have appealed the 2006 court decision

depriving her of legal capacity. The State Party reiterates that, under the Custodianship and

Guardianship Act, a guardian can be appointed only based on written consent, which was

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absent in the author’s case. Therefore, in the absence of such consent, the local governor

could not appoint a guardian. In such situations, the Act provides that, if a legal guardian is

not appointed within one month, the functions of guardianship are performed by local

authorities, which, in the author’s case, was the district healthcare organization.

Additional comments from the author

7.

On 23 October 2020, the author responded that no new points of relevance had been

raised by the State Party that would necessitate the submission of further comments from her.

Issues and proceedings before the Committee

Consideration of admissibility

8.1

Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must

decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is

admissible under the Optional Protocol.

8.2

The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional

Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international

investigation or settlement.

8.3

The Committee notes that the events in the author’s case took place between 2001 and

2017, while her submission to the Committee was filed on 1 June 2018. The Committee

recalls that, although there are no fixed time limits for the submission of communications

under the Optional Protocol and mere delay in submission does not of itself involve abuse of

the right to submit a communication, 1 the Committee expects a reasonable explanation

justifying a delay.2 According to rule 99 (c) of its rules of procedure,3 a communication may

constitute an abuse of the right of submission when it is submitted five years after the

exhaustion of domestic remedies by the author of the communication or, where applicable,

three years after the conclusion of another procedure of international investigation or

settlement, unless there are reasons justifying the delay, taking into account all the

circumstances of the communication. As a general practice, the Committee assesses

compliance with rule 99 (c) of its rules of procedure by reference to the point at which

domestic remedies have been exhausted. Where domestic remedies have not been exhausted,

including in cases where the author claims that such remedies were not available, the

Committee may assess the timeliness of the communication by reference to the time of the

alleged violation.

8.4

In the present case, the Committee notes the author’s allegations of fear of retaliation

by the authorities for bringing the complaint to the Committee before the change of regime

in the State Party in 2016 as reason for the delay in submission. However, the Committee

observes, from information available to it on file, that, since 2001, the author has carried out,

on an ongoing and regular basis (sometimes several times a month), numerous civic activities

in her capacity as a human rights defender, including investigations, monitoring and protests,

and has submitted numerous complaints to the police, prosecutor’s office and courts. In this

light, the Committee is not persuaded that the delay was justified.4 The Committee therefore

accepts for consideration the part of communication related to the events starting in June

2013 and declares the claims preceding that date to be inadmissible under article 3 of the

Optional Protocol for excessive delay in submission.

8.5

The Committee notes the State Party’s argument under article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional

Protocol that the author has not exhausted domestic remedies on any of the claims submitted

to the Committee. The Committee also notes the author’s claim that she was unable to exhaust

1 Polacková and Polacek v. Czech Republic (CCPR/C/90/D/1445/2006), para. 6.3; and D.S. v. Russian

Federation (CCPR/C/120/D/2705/2015), para. 6.4.

2 Gobin v. Mauritius (CCPR/C/72/D/787/1997), para. 6.3; and A.K. and M.K. v. Russian Federation

(CCPR/C/138/D/2895/2016 and 2896/2016), para. 6.6.

3 CCPR/C/3/Rev.12. At the time of submission of the communication, that rule was enshrined in

rule 96 (c) of the rules of procedure.

4 See, mutatis mutandis, H.R. v. Uzbekistan (CCPR/C/131/D/2479/2014), para. 6.5.

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domestic remedies because, given the human rights situation in the State Party, there was no

reasonable prospect of success in trying, because she was afraid of retaliation by the State

Party if she complained of the alleged violations and because she was deprived of her legal

capacity in 2006 and did not have a guardian until 2018.

8.6

The Committee recalls its jurisprudence to the effect that authors must avail

themselves of all domestic remedies in order to fulfil the requirement of article 5 (2) (b) of

the Optional Protocol, insofar as such remedies appear to be effective in the given case and

are de facto available to the author.5 The Committee also recalls that mere doubts about the

effectiveness of the remedies, or in this case about the relevance of such remedies, do not

absolve an individual from exhausting available domestic remedies.6

8.7

The Committee notes that the author alleges the futility of domestic remedies based

only on the general human rights record in the State Party. The Committee also notes that the

author does not provide any concrete examples to substantiate the inefficiency of the

domestic remedies in similar cases.7 Regarding the author’s allegations of fear of retaliation

as a reason for not exhausting domestic remedies, the Committee refers to paragraph 8.4

above and finds the author’s argument insufficient to justify the failure to exhaust domestic

remedies.

8.8

Addressing the author’s claim that domestic remedies were not available to her

because she had been deprived of her legal capacity in 2006, the Committee notes that the

decision of 24 August 2006, by which Mirobod District Court declared the author legally

incompetent, could be appealed within 20 days. The author mentions that she submitted an

appeal; however, there are no details and no supporting documentation provided by the author

to enable the Committee to verify this claim. The Committee notes that the author was

represented by counsel and was not herself in detention at that time. The Committee does not

have information as to whether and how the author attempted to restore her legal capacity. In

addition, the Committee notes that the author does not address the State Party’s statement

that she did have an ipso jure guardian, namely, the district healthcare organization, when

she was deprived of her legal capacity and that she does not clarify whether she knew about

this guardianship authority and tried to obtain their support in filing complaints. The

Committee also notes that the author did not attempt to exhaust domestic remedies on her

claims preceding the 2006 court decision, while she had full legal capacity. In the light of the

above considerations, the Committee is unable to conclude that the author was exempted

from the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies.

8.9

The Committee notes that the only claim for which the author tried to exhaust

domestic remedies and provided supporting documentation was her involuntary

hospitalization in March 2016, when the author’s mother and lawyer submitted a cassation

appeal to Mirobod District Court. In this case, the Committee observes that the court

requested additional documents from the author’s representatives, which were not submitted

by the deadline. The author has not provided in her communication any explanation as to

why such documents could not have been furnished. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence

that authors are bound by procedural rules such as filing deadlines applicable to the

exhaustion of domestic remedies, provided that the restrictions are reasonable. 8 In such

circumstances, the Committee cannot conclude that the author exercised “requisite

diligence”9 under article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol.

5 Warsame v. Canada (CCPR/C/102/D/1959/2010), para. 7.4; and Bykova v. Russian Federation

(CCPR/C/144/D/2982/2017), para. 7.6.

6 Chen v. Netherlands, communication No. 1584/2007, para. 6.2; Alekseev et al. v. Russian Federation

(CCPR/C/134/D/2943/2017), para. 6.4; and P.F. and M.F. v. France (CCPR/C/130/D/2780/2016),

para. 10.9.

7 See, mutatis mutandis, O.K. v. Latvia (CCPR/C/110/D/1935/2010), para. 7.4.

8 Bhullar v. Canada (CCPR/C/88/D/982/2001), para. 7.3.

9 Ibid.

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8.10

In view of the above considerations, the Committee finds that the author has not

exhausted domestic remedies on the claims raised before the Committee and has not

sufficiently justified the failure to do so. The Committee therefore finds the author’s claims

inadmissible under article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol.

8.11

In view of the above, the Committee considers it unnecessary to examine other

grounds of admissibility, including the State Party’s objection to the author’s representation.

9.

The Committee therefore decides:

(a)

That the communication is inadmissible under articles 3 and 5 (2) (b) of the

Optional Protocol;

(b)

That the present decision shall be transmitted to the State Party and to the

author.