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CCPR/C/145/D/3192/2018

Anatoly Vilitkevich, Alyona Vilitkevich, Venera v. Russian Federation

UNO-Menschenrechtsausschuss (CCPR) · 2026-03-13 · en UN

Decision on merits; Subjects: CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, RUSSIAN FEDERATION; [CCPR: UNO-Pakt II, Internationaler Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte; Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques; Patto II]

Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)

GE.26-05329 (E) 290526 290526

Human Rights Committee

Views adopted by the Committee under the Optional

Protocol, concerning communication No. 3192/2018*, **, ***

Communication submitted by:

Anatoly Vilitkevich, Alyona Vilitkevich, Venera

Mikhailova, Viner Ganiev, Alfiya Ilyasova,

Syuzanna Ilyasova, Yelena Kozhevnikova,

Oksana Lapina, Gulfiya Khafizova, Lilianna

Khafizova, Nadezhda Yakimova and Olesya

Yakimova (represented by counsels Shane Brady

and Haykaz Zoryan)

Alleged victims:

The authors

State Party:

Russian Federation

Date of communication:

30 April 2018 (initial submission)

Document references:

Decision taken pursuant to rule 92 of the

Committee’s rules of procedure, transmitted to

the State Party on 19 June 2018 (not issued in

document form)

Date of adoption of Views:

13 March 2026

Subject matter:

Criminal charges brought against a Jehovah’s

Witness for “extremism”; arrest and detention for

peaceful religious meeting; search and seizures

in private homes; discrimination on religious

grounds; religious minority rights

Procedural issues:

Exhaustion of domestic remedies; substantiation

of claims

Substantive issues:

Right to liberty and security of person;

interference with privacy and home; freedom of

thought, conscience and religion; equality before

the law; rights of minorities to profess and

practise their religion

Articles of the Covenant:

9 (1) and (3), 17 (1) and (2), 18 (1–3), 26 and 27

* Adopted by the Committee at its 145th session (2–19 March 2026).

** The following members of the Committee participated in the examination of the communication:

Tania María Abdo Rocholl, Wafaa Ashraf Moharram Bassim, Rodrigo A. Carazo, Yvonne Donders,

Carlos Ramón Fernández Liesa, Konstantin Korkelia, Dalia Leinarte, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, Hernán

Quezada Cabrera, Akmal Saidov, Ivan Šimonović, Soh Changrok, Tijana Šurlan, Teraya Koji and

Hélène Tigroudja.

*** Individual opinions by Committee members Hernán Quezada Cabrera (partially concurring)

and Hélène Tigroudja (partially dissenting) are annexed to the present Views.

United Nations

CCPR/C/145/D/3192/2018

International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights

Distr.: General

8 May 2026

Original: English

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GE.26-05329

Articles of the Optional Protocol:

2 and 5 (2) (b)

1.1

The authors of the communication are the following 12 individuals, all of whom are

nationals of the Russian Federation: Anatoly Vilitkevich, born in 1986; Alyona Vilitkevich,

born in 1983; Venera Mikhailova, born in 1967; Viner Ganiev, born in 1964; Alfiya Ilyasova,

born in 1975; Syuzanna Ilyasova, born in 2001; Yelena Kozhevnikova, born in 1969; Oksana

Lapina, born in 1974; Gulfiya Khafizova, born in 1960; Lilianna Khafizova, born in 1989;

Nadezhda Yakimova, born in 1961; and Olesya Yakimova, born in 1985. They claim that the

State Party has violated their rights under articles 9 (1), 17 (1) and (2), 18 (1–3), 26 and 27

of the Covenant. In addition, Mr. Vilitkevich alleges that his rights have been violated under

article 9 (3) of the Covenant. The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State Party on

1 January 1992. The authors are represented by counsel.

1.2

On 30 April 2018, Mr. Vilitkevich submitted a request for interim measures, asking

the Committee to request his release from pretrial detention. On 19 June 2018, the Committee,

through its Special Rapporteurs on new communications and interim measures, decided not

to grant that request.

Facts as submitted by the authors

2.1

All of the authors are Jehovah’s Witnesses residing in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan,

in the Russian Federation. On 20 April 2017, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation

declared the National Administrative Centre of Jehovah’s Witnesses, together with 395

affiliated local religious organizations, to be “extremist organizations”. The Court ordered

their liquidation and banning, and the confiscation of their property by the State. Prior to that

decision, Mr. Vilitkevich served as a religious minister and all the other authors were

members of the same “religious group”, as defined in section 7 of the Federal Act on Freedom

of Conscience and Religious Associations.

2.2

On 5 April 2018, the Leninsky District Court of Ufa granted the request of the Ufa

Investigative Department to authorize searches of the authors’ homes based on their

suspected participation in the activity of a religious organization that had been banned

pursuant to a final court decision. As stated in the Investigative Department’s request,

between 19 October and 19 November 2017, in Ufa the authors knowingly participated in

the activities of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, a banned religious organization that had been

designated extremist pursuant to Supreme Court Decision No. AKPI 17-238. The

Investigative Department’s request also indicated that the authors had deliberately and

knowingly engaged in preaching, attending and conducting meetings, propagating the

organization’s activity, thus furthering its aims despite its liquidation and prohibition in the

Russian Federation.

2.3

On 10 April 2018, the police carried out simultaneous raids on the authors’ homes.

The raids lasted several hours. The police seized property, including religious literature and

personal belongings such as telephones and computers. The authors then were taken to the

Investigative Department Office, where they spent several hours and were interrogated,

photographed and fingerprinted. All of the authors were released after interrogation, except

Mr. Vilitkevich, who remained in police custody.

2.4

On 12 April 2018, Mr. Vilitkevich was charged as a suspect under article 282.2 of the

Criminal Code for organizing the activities of an organization that had been declared

extremist pursuant to a final court decision, punishable by up to 10 years of imprisonment.

That same day, the Leninsky District Court authorized his remand in custody until 2 June

2018. On 16 April 2018, Mr. Vilitkevich lodged an appeal against that decision before the

Supreme Court of the Republic of Bashkortostan. On the same date, the authors also filed

separate appeals against the Leninsky District Court’s ruling of 5 April 2018 authorizing the

searches of their homes.

Complaint

3.1

The authors claim that their rights under article 9 (1) of the Covenant were violated

when they were taken against their will to the Investigative Department Office, where they

were made to wait for hours – some of them all day – and then interrogated, photographed

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and fingerprinted. They claim to have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention on the

basis of their religion, without being suspects in any criminal proceedings.

3.2

Mr. Vilitkevich claims, in addition, that his arrest and detention on 12 April 2018

constituted a violation of article 9 (3) of the Covenant. He argues that the courts failed to

provide any evidence that his pretrial detention was necessary.

3.3

The authors claim that their rights under article 17 (1) of the Covenant were violated

when the police carried out the raids on their homes and seized religious texts, computers and

other personal belongings.

3.4

The authors also claim that their rights under article 18 (1) of the Covenant were

violated when the police searched and seized their Bibles and religious texts. Mr. Vilitkevich

claims, in addition, that his arrest and detention for his religious ministry constitute a

violation of his rights under article 18 (1). The authors further claim that the State’s actions

amounted to coercion, contrary to article 18 (2) of the Covenant. They maintain that the

authorities sought to intimidate them into abandoning their faith under the pretext of

combating extremism, with the aim of suppressing the religious practice of Jehovah’s

Witnesses. They submit that such interference with their peaceful religious activities cannot

be justified under article 18 (3) of the Covenant.

3.5

The authors claim that the State violated their rights under articles 26 and 27 of the

Covenant by discriminating against them, as a religious minority, on the basis of their

religious beliefs. They argue that, as Jehovah’s Witnesses, they were subjected to

prosecutions that no other religious organization in the Russian Federation has experienced,

without reasonable or objective justification. They claim that they were denied the right to

profess and practise their faith in community with others and that the measures taken by the

authorities, including raids, prosecutions and bans, were aimed at extinguishing their

religious identity and practice.

State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits

4.1

In a note verbale dated 24 December 2018, the State Party submitted its observations

on admissibility and the merits of the communication, requesting the Committee to find the

communication inadmissible under articles 2 and 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol.

4.2

The State Party submits that the authors failed to exhaust domestic remedies in several

respects: (a) Mr. Vilitkevich did not file cassation appeals against the Leninsky District Court

decision of 12 April 2018 ordering his detention, rendering his claims under article 9 (1) and

(3) inadmissible; (b) the authors did not lodge cassation appeals against the ruling of 5 April

2018 authorizing the search of their residences, rendering their allegations under article 17

inadmissible; and (c) the authors failed to raise their claims under article 18 (2), as well as

articles 26 and 27, before the domestic courts. According to the State Party, only 9 of the

12 authors lodged appeals against the search of their homes.

4.3

The State Party further submits that, on 21 June 2018, the Supreme Court of the

Republic of Bashkortostan overturned the Leninsky District Court decision of 1 June 2018

and replaced detention with house arrest, and that Mr. Vilitkevich has not appealed that

decision.

4.4

With regard to the merits of the authors’ allegations under article 9 (1) and (3) of the

Covenant, the State Party submits that 11 of the authors were not formally placed under arrest.

Mr. Vilitkevich was arrested and detained under article 282.2 of the Criminal Code not for

peaceful worship, but for organizing the activities of the Ufa chapter of the “Administrative

Centre of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia”, which is a banned organization, despite knowing

that it had been outlawed by the Supreme Court on 20 April 2017 for extremist activities. His

detention was based on the reasonable suspicion that, if released, he might obstruct the legal

proceedings or influence witnesses, and did not therefore amount to arbitrary detention. The

domestic courts carefully assessed all the relevant facts, including the absence of a criminal

record, his family ties, place of residence and health status. Subsequently the appeal court

reviewed the necessity of detention and replaced it with house arrest. There were no

procedural irregularities or arbitrariness.

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4.5

With regard to article 17 of the Covenant, the State Party submits that the searches of

the authors’ homes were duly authorized by the courts in a criminal investigation under article

282 of the Criminal Code and were lawful. The authors’ argument that the searches

constituted criminalization of religious activity essentially reflects disagreement with the

decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 20 April 2017. The searches were

carried out with the aim of confiscating religious material as evidence in a criminal

investigation. During the searches and seizure of property, a balance was maintained between

the private interests of the individuals concerned and the public interest in the conduct of

criminal proceedings.

4.6

The State Party objects to the claim that articles 26 and 27 were violated, given that

the searches of the authors’ homes and Mr. Vilitkevich’s arrest were based on legitimate

grounds set out in the Act on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations and the Act

on Combating Extremist Activity, which provide for restrictions on activities of religious

organizations. The authors were aware of the Supreme Court decision declaring the

Administrative Centre of Jehovah’s Witnesses an extremist organization and banning it in

the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, they took part, out of religious motivation, in pursuing

the goals of the extremist organization aimed at spreading the faith through preaching in

public places and residential locations, thereby conducting propaganda for a banned

organization and directly participating in activities conducted by members of the Jehovah’s

Witnesses. The State Party argues that the restrictions imposed on the authors were

proportionate and necessary in a democratic society, not based on any discriminatory grounds

but aimed at protecting others, preventing harm to public order and security, society and the

State.

Authors’ comments on the State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits

5.1

On 15 July 2019, the authors submitted their comments on the State Party’s

observations, in which they reiterated their arguments concerning all the allegations. They

maintain that the cassation appeal procedure in the Russian Federation is not an effective

remedy and does not need to be exhausted.

5.2

The authors updated the Committee on developments that had taken place since their

original submission. On 21 June 2018, the Supreme Court of Bashkortostan partially upheld

Mr. Vilitkevich’s appeal, replacing his detention with house arrest after he had spent 73 days

in pretrial detention. His house arrest was subsequently extended on seven occasions until 2

March 2019. On 28 February 2019, it was replaced with an indefinite travel ban pending trial.

In total, Mr. Vilitkevich remained under restraint for 325 days, including 73 days in detention

and 252 days under house arrest. The authors refer to opinion No. 11/2019 of the Working

Group on Arbitrary Detention, concerning a similar case, and argue that deprivation of liberty

in Mr. Vilitkevich’s case was arbitrary and discriminatory.1

Additional submissions

From the State Party

6.

On 2 September 2020, the State Party reiterated that there had been no violation of

the Covenant. It submits that Mr. Vilitkevich’s detention was lawful, based on evidence of

his continued organizational activities, and notes that the restrictive measures were

progressively mitigated over time. The State Party maintains that the searches of the authors’

homes were lawful, conducted with proper judicial authorization, and resulted in the seizure

of materials related to criminal activity. The State Party also submits that the domestic courts

examined the authors’ cases observing all procedural safeguards.

From the authors

7.

On 25 August 2022, the authors submitted to the Committee two more recent opinions

of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention2 and the judgment of the European Court of

1 A/HRC/WGAD/2019/11.

2 A/HRC/WGAD/2019/34 and A/HRC/WGAD/2020/10.

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Human Rights in LRO and Others v. Russian Federation, 3 condemning the systemic

persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses in the State Party.

Issues and proceedings before the Committee

Consideration of admissibility

8.1

Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must

decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is

admissible under the Optional Protocol.

8.2

The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional

Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international

investigation or settlement.

8.3

The Committee notes the State Party’s argument that only 9 of the 12 authors

submitted appeals against the order of 5 April 2018 authorizing the search of their homes. In

the absence of any clarification from the authors in that regard, the Committee finds the

claims under article 17 of the Covenant submitted by Alyona Vilitkevich, Syuzanna Ilyasova

and Nadezhda Yakimova inadmissible under article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol.

8.4

The Committee also notes the State Party’s claim that the rest of the authors have

failed to exhaust all available domestic remedies because they have not submitted appeals

under the cassation review procedure. The Committee further notes the authors’ argument

that cassation appeals would be ineffective and unlikely to bring any relief. The Committee

recalls that, for the purposes of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol, domestic remedies

must be both effective and available, and must not be unduly prolonged. The Committee also

recalls its jurisprudence in which it has found that criminal cassation appeals in the Russian

Federation do not constitute effective remedies for the purposes of article 5 (2) (b) of the

Optional Protocol, and it is therefore for the State Party to demonstrate that such a procedure

offers a reasonable prospect of redress in the circumstances of the present case. 4 In the

absence of any clarification from the State Party as to the effectiveness of cassation review

in cases of searches of the homes of Jehovah’s Witnesses, in particular after the Supreme

Court decision of 20 April 2017 banning the Jehovah’s Witnesses religious organization, the

Committee finds that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from

considering the merits.

8.5

The Committee notes Mr. Vilitkevich’s claim under article 9 (3) of the Covenant.

However, it notes that the author’s detention was authorized by the Leninsky District Court

on 12 April 2018 and that the author’s arguments support his claims under article 9 (1) rather

than article 9 (3) of the Covenant. The Committee thus finds this claim insufficiently

substantiated and inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.

8.6

The Committee considers that the remaining authors have sufficiently substantiated,

for the purposes of admissibility, their claims under articles 9 (1), 17 (1), 18 (1–3), 26 and 27

of the Covenant. The Committee thus declares these claims admissible and proceeds with the

consideration of the merits.

Consideration of the merits

9.1

The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all information made

available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol.

9.2

In relation to the authors’ claim under article 18 (1) and (3) of the Covenant, the

Committee recalls its general comment No. 22 (1993) on the right to freedom of thought,

conscience and religion, in which it stated that article 18 does not permit any limitations

whatsoever on the freedom of thought and conscience or on the freedom to have or adopt a

religion or belief of one’s choice (para. 3). By contrast, the right to freedom to manifest one’s

religion or beliefs may be subject to certain limitations, but only those prescribed by law and

3 European Court of Human Rights, Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, Applications Nos. 32401/10

and 19 others, Judgment, 7 June 2022.

4 Krikkerik v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/137/D/2992/2017), paras. 8.3 and 8.4.

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necessary to protect public safety, public order, health or morals or the fundamental rights

and freedoms of others.

9.3

The Committee notes the authors’ contention that their homes were searched,

religious materials seized and that they were arrested and detained for practising their religion

in community with others. The Committee also notes from the criminal investigation

documents on file that the unlawful activities of which the authors were accused included

preaching, attending and conducting meetings of the banned Jehovah’s Witnesses religious

organization. In line with its general comment No. 22 (1993), the Committee considers that

these activities form part of the authors’ right to manifest their beliefs.

9.4

The Committee must now determine whether the limitations imposed on the authors’

right to manifest their religion were prescribed by law and necessary within the meaning of

article 18 (3) of the Covenant. The Committee notes the State Party’s argument that the

limitation was prescribed by law, namely by article 282 (2) of the Criminal Code applied

following the Supreme Court decision of 20 April 2017 by which the entire Jehovah’s

Witnesses religious organization was pronounced extremist.

9.5

In this regard, the Committee notes that the Supreme Court decision of 20 April 2017,

available on file, banned the Administrative Centre of Jehovah’s Witnesses and its 395 local

organizations as extremist, which entailed prohibition of their activities and confiscation of

their property. Nevertheless, the Committee observes that that decision did not prohibit

Jehovah’s Witnesses from conducting individual or joint peaceful religious activities. The

domestic decisions on file describe the authors as participating in the activities of a “banned

organization of Jehovah’s Witnesses” because they were meeting to peacefully practise their

religion. There is no differentiation between private practice by individual believers and

membership of a formal administrative entity or between peaceful religious worship and

extremist activities. Based on these observations, the Committee concludes that the State

Party has not demonstrated sufficient legal basis or reasons to impose restrictions on the

authors’ peaceful religious activities. The Committee finds that the State Party has violated

the authors’ rights under article 18 (1) of the Covenant. The Committee will not separately

examine the same claims under article 18 (2).

9.6

With regard to the authors’ allegations of discrimination under article 26 of the

Covenant, the Committee recalls its general comment No. 18 (1989), in which defined

“discrimination” as any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any

ground, including religion, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the

recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and

freedoms (para. 7). Differentiated treatment could be allowed if the criteria for such

differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is

legitimate under the Covenant (para. 13).

9.7

In the present case, the Committee notes the State Party’s argument that the restriction

of the authors’ rights was based on their promotion of the activities of a banned religious

organization and that it was necessary to protect public order, security and the rights of others

(para. 4.6 above). The Committee observes, from the information before it, that although the

Supreme Court decision of 20 April 2017 concerned the dissolution of an administrative

organization of Jehovah’s Witnesses and did not outlaw the entire religion, it was interpreted

by the domestic courts and authorities as summarily banning any practice of the Jehovah’s

Witnesses religion. The information on file and the State Party’s submissions indicate that

mere participation in the religious meetings of Jehovah’s Witnesses was regarded as an

extremist activity based on the 2017 Supreme Court decision. That interpretation led to the

investigation of the authors and the prosecution of Mr. Vilitkevich, without any indication of

extremism in their own actions. In the absence of any information indicating that the authors

were engaged in any conduct other than the peaceful exercise of their religion, the Committee

cannot accept the State Party’s argument that they were targeted based on reasonable and

objective grounds.5 In the light of this, the Committee concludes that the authors’ religious

allegiance was the sole basis for their prosecution and finds their treatment discriminatory on

religious grounds in violation of article 26 of the Covenant.

5 See, mutatis mutandis, Waldman v. Canada (CCPR/C/67/D/694/1996), paras. 10.4–10.6.

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9.8

The Committee notes the authors’ claims under article 27 that, as members of a

religious minority, they have been subjected to prosecutions aimed at extinguishing their

religious identity and practice. The Committee recalls that under article 27, persons belonging

to minorities, inter alia religious minorities, shall not be denied the right, in community with

the other members of their group, to profess and practise their own religion. The Committee

recalls its general comment No. 23 (1994), in which it stated that these rights depend on the

ability of the minority group to maintain its religion (para. 6.2) and that article 27 relates to

rights whose protection imposes specific obligations on States Parties. The protection of

those rights is directed towards ensuring the survival of the religious identity of the minorities

concerned (para. 9).

9.9

The facts in the present communication indicate that the authors were subjected to

investigation, and Mr. Vilitkevich was charged under article 282 (2) of the Criminal Code,

based on their peaceful group religious practices, which were monitored by the Ufa

Investigative Department from 19 October to 19 November 2017 (para. 2.2 above). As

indicated (para. 9.5 above), rather than pointing to any extremist activities perpetrated by the

authors, the authorities effectively banned their religious practice in its entirety by subjecting

any manifestation thereof to criminal prosecution under article 282 of the Criminal Code,

relying on the Supreme Court decision of 20 April 2017. The Committee finds that such

excessive interpretation and application of the Supreme Court decision resulted in denial of

the authors’ right to profess and practise their own religion in community with the other

members of their religious group and threatened the continued existence of their religious

community, albeit a religious minority. The Committee considers that in the present case, the

State Party undermined the authors’ ability to maintain their religious identity as Jehovah’s

Witnesses, in violation of article 27 of the Covenant.

9.10

The Committee notes the authors’ claim under article 9 (1) of the Covenant that, on

10 April 2018, they were compelled to accompany the police to the Investigative Department

Office and were kept there for many hours, during which they were interrogated,

photographed and fingerprinted. Noting the State Party’s position that there was no formal

arrest, the Committee must first ascertain whether the authors were deprived of their liberty

within the meaning of article 9 (1) of the Covenant. The Committee recalls that, as it stated

in its general comment No. 35 (2014), deprivation of personal liberty is without free consent;

individuals who go voluntarily to a police station and who know that they are free to leave at

any time are not being deprived of their liberty (para. 6). Moreover, arrest within the meaning

of article 9 need not involve a formal arrest as defined under domestic law (para. 13). The

Committee notes the authors’ assertion that they were not free to leave during the relevant

period. In the absence of information from the State Party indicating that the authors could

have declined to accompany the police or, once present, could have left without adverse

consequences, the Committee concludes that they were coerced into accompanying the police

to the Investigative Department Office and remaining there until released, and were therefore

deprived of their liberty. The Committee, therefore, finds that the authors were arrested, for

the purposes of article 9 (1) of the Covenant.

9.11

The Committee recalls, as it stated in its general comment No. 35 (2014), that: (a) an

arrest or detention must not only be lawful but also include elements of reasonableness and

necessity in all circumstances (para. 12); (b) unlawful deprivation of liberty is deprivation of

liberty that is not imposed on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are

established by law (para. 11); (c) the notion of arbitrariness extends beyond unlawfulness and

includes elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of

law, as well as reasonableness, necessity and proportionality (para. 12);6 and (d) detention

imposed as punishment for the legitimate exercise of the rights guaranteed by the Covenant,

including freedom of religion, is arbitrary (para. 17).7 The Committee recalls the authors’

submission that they were detained and that Mr. Vilitkevich was placed in pretrial detention

solely for the peaceful exercise of their religion. In line with its findings above that there was

no legal basis or any acceptable justification for restricting the authors’ rights (para. 9.5), the

6 For example, Bratsylo et al. v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/140/D/3022/2017), para. 8.4, and

Cayzer v. Australia (CCPR/C/135/D/2981/2017), para. 8.10.

7 Akhmedov v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/143/D/3098/2018), para. 7.6.

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Committee considers that the authors’ arrest was unlawful and arbitrary within the meaning

of article 9 (1) of the Covenant. Similarly, the Committee finds that Mr. Vilitkevich’s pretrial

detention was lacking legal grounds and finds it similarly unlawful and arbitrary in violation

of article 9 (1) of the Covenant.

9.12

Having concluded that, in the present case, there has been a violation of articles 9 (1)

and 18 (1) of the Covenant, the Committee decides not to examine separately whether the

same facts constitute a violation of article 17.

10.

The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view that

the facts before it disclose a violation by the State Party of articles 9 (1), 18 (1), 26 and 27 of

the Covenant.

11.

Pursuant to article 2 (3) (a) of the Covenant, the State Party is under an obligation to

provide the authors with an effective remedy. This requires it to make full reparation to

individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. Accordingly, the State Party is

obligated to provide the authors with adequate compensation, including reimbursement of

the court fees and legal expenses that they have incurred in relation to the domestic

proceedings and to provide Mr. Vilitkevich with adequate compensation for the time he spent

in detention ordered in violation of the Covenant. The State Party is also under an obligation

to take all steps necessary to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future.

12.

Bearing in mind that, by becoming a Party to the Optional Protocol, the State Party

has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a

violation of the Covenant and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State Party has

undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the

rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective and enforceable remedy when

it has been determined that a violation has occurred, the Committee wishes to receive from

the State Party, within 180 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to the

Committee’s Views. The State Party is also requested to publish the present Views and to

have them widely disseminated in the official language of the State Party.

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Annex I

[Original: Spanish]

Individual opinion of Committee member Hernán Quezada

Cabrera (partially concurring)

1.

I fully agree with the Committee’s conclusion that the facts presented in this case

disclose a violation by the State Party of the authors’ rights under articles 9 (1), 18 (1), 26

and 27 of the Covenant, on account of the unlawful and arbitrary deprivation of liberty to

which they were subjected, including the pretrial detention of one of them, as well as the

unfounded prohibition of their religious activities, which was discriminatory and undermined

their freedom to maintain their religious identity.

2.

However, it seems to me that inadequate justification has been provided for the

decision contained in paragraph 9.12 of the Views, as the paragraph simply states that, having

concluded that there has been a violation of articles 9 (1) and 18 (1) of the Covenant, the

Committee decides not to examine separately whether the same facts constitute a violation

of article 17 of the Covenant.

3.

From this decision, according to one possible interpretation, it could be understood

that the facts amounting to a violation of article 17 of the Covenant are subsumed under the

aforementioned violation of articles 9 (1) and 18 (1), or that the two provisions of which the

Committee has found a violation are lex specialis compared to the provision whose possible

violation is not being examined.1 That is mere speculation, however, and it cannot take the

place of the reasoning that the Committee should have provided when deciding not to

consider separately the authors’ claims under article 17 of the Covenant.

1 In this regard, it is worth noting the Committee’s Views in the case of Benhadj v. Algeria

(CCPR/C/90/D/1173/2003), para. 8.5. Although those Views concern provisions of the Covenant

other than those examined in the present case, it is worth noting the way in which the Committee

explicitly justified its decision not to examine separately the possible violation of a specific article of

the Covenant, thereby implicitly applying the principle of lex specialis.

CCPR/C/145/D/3192/2018

10

GE.26-05329

Annex II

[Original: English]

Individual opinion of Committee member Hélène Tigroudja

(partially dissenting)

1.

I concur with the bold step taken by the Committee in the present Views with regard

to the violation of the authors’ right to freedom to peacefully practise their religion (art. 18

(1) of the Covenant) but also, the violation of their right to equality before the law (art. 26)

and protection of religious minorities’ rights (art. 27). However, I regret that the Committee

has not better explained its shift of approach to these provisions compared to the dozens of

cases revealing similar patterns (home searches, confiscation of so-called extremist religious

literature, prohibition of private gatherings, etc.) suffered by Jehovah Witnesses in the

Russian Federation, as well as in other States Parties. For instance, in its Views in Yurlov et

al. v. Russian Federation, dealing with the dissolution of a local organization of Jehovah

Witnesses for distributing “extremist” literature,1 the Committee concluded that there had

been a violation of the right to freedom of religion (art. 18) and the right to freedom of

association (art. 22), but decided not to decide on articles 26 and 27 of the Covenant.2

2.

In the present case, the shift of approach regarding article 27 seems to be implicitly

based on the fact that the domestic interpretation and application of the Supreme Court

decision of 20 April 2017 “resulted in denial of the authors’ right to profess and practise their

own religion in community with the other members of their religious minority group and

threatened the continued existence of their religious community, albeit a religious minority”

(para. 9.9 of the Committee’s Views). However, the threshold and standards applied by the

Committee to draw the distinction with previous cases where Jehovah Witnesses were also

arrested, harassed, deprived of liberty or fined for their religious private activities is unclear

and should have been clarified.

3.

The same remark applies to the conclusion of a violation of article 26. In paragraph 9.7

of its Views, the Committee “concludes that the authors’ religious allegiance was the sole

basis for their prosecution and finds their treatment discriminatory on religious grounds”.

More legal or factual explanation of the Committee’s reasoning would be needed for legal

predictability and certainty to better understand why the Committee has, for so long, either

rejected as inadmissible or decided not to decide on the discriminatory treatment of Jehovah

Witnesses in the Russian Federation, as well as in many other States Parties, and why in the

present case, it departs from its precedents.

4.

Nevertheless, I agree with the conclusion of a violation of these two provisions. My

disagreement with the Committee is related to the decision not to examine the violation of

article 17 of the Covenant (protection from interference with family and private life and

home). In paragraph 9.12 of its Views, and following its long-standing but inconsistent

practice, the Committee indicates that it “decides not to examine separately whether the same

facts constitute a violation of article 17”. In this regard, I fully concur with the partially

concurring opinion of my colleague Hernán Quezada Cabrera in the present case (annex I

above) and I would like to go a little further. To me, the claim under article 17 is not only

admissible but should also lead to a conclusion of violation.

5.

Indeed, as detailed in paragraph 2.3 of the Views, “the police carried out simultaneous

raids on the authors’ homes. The raids lasted several hours. The police seized property,

including religious literature and personal belongings such as telephones and computers.” In

its response (para. 4.5), the State stresses that these searches and seizures were authorized by

and grounded in domestic law. In this regard, the Committee should have applied the same

1 CCPR/C/139/D/2925/2017.

2 See, in this regard, the partially dissenting opinion of Committee member Carlos Gómez Martínez on

the decision not to decide on articles 26 and 27 of the Covenant (CCPR/C/139/D/2925/2017,

annex II).

CCPR/C/145/D/3192/2018

GE.26-05329

11

standards as those implemented in two similar recent cases, Tsoy et al. v. Uzbekistan3 and

Maksutova et al. v. Uzbekistan.4 In these precedents, where the State Party used the same

defence’s argument, the Committee recalled its general comment No. 16 (1988) on the right

to privacy and stressed that “under article 17 of the Covenant, it is necessary for any

interference with the home to be both lawful and not arbitrary”, adding that ”the police’s

search of the authors’ homes was disproportionate to the threat of harm allegedly associated

with the possession of religious literature”.5

6.

Based on the factual background of the present case, the very same conclusion should

have been reached, and it is hardly understandable and is illogical to me that the Committee

adopted a stance of self-restraint on such an important intrusion on the right to privacy,

obviously based on religious discrimination. Therefore, in addition to the violation of articles

9, 18, 26 and 27 of the Covenant, the Committee should also have concluded that there was

a violation of article 17 and accordingly, it should have requested reparation and guarantees

of non-repetition.

3 CCPR/C/142/D/3155/2018, CCPR/C/142/D/3156/2018, CCPR/C/142/D/3158/2018, para. 8.3.

4 CCPR/C/142/D/3157/2018, CCPR/C/142/D/3159/2018, CCPR/C/142/D/3166/2018,

CCPR/C/142/D/3185/2018, para. 7.3.

5 Ibid.