Decision on merits; Subjects: CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, IRELAND; [CCPR: UNO-Pakt II, Internationaler Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte; Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques; Patto II]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.25-13548 (E)
Human Rights Committee
Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the
Optional Protocol, concerning communication
No. 3622/2019**, ***, ****
Communication submitted by:
E.B. (represented by counsel, Joseph Burke)
Alleged victim:
The author
State Party:
Ireland
Date of communication:
6 March 2018 (initial submission)
Document references:
Decision taken pursuant to rule 92 of the
Committee’s rules of procedure, transmitted to the
State Party on 19 June 2019 (not issued in
document form)
Date of adoption of Views:
9 July 2025
Subject matter:
Termination of pregnancy in a foreign country
Procedural issues:
Admissibility – abuse of the right of submission;
lack of substantiation
Substantive issues:
Freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment; interference
with family life; gender discrimination
Articles of the Covenant:
7, 17 and 26
Articles of the Optional Protocol:
2 and 5 (2)
1.
The author of the communication is E.B.,1 a national of Ireland born on 7 May 1980.
The author claims that the State Party has violated her rights under articles 7, 17 and 26 of
the Covenant. The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State Party on 8 March 1990.
The author is represented by counsel.
* Reissued for technical reasons on 10 November 2025.
** Adopted by the Committee at its 144th session (23 June–17 July 2025).
*** The following members of the Committee participated in the examination of the communication:
Wafaa Ashraf Moharram Bassim, Rodrigo A. Carazo, Yvonne Donders, Carlos Ramón Fernández
Liesa, Laurence R. Helfer, Konstantin Korkelia, Dalia Leinarte, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, Hernán Quezada
Cabrera, Akmal Saidov, Ivan Šimonović, Soh Changrok, Teraya Koji, Hélène Tigroudja and Imeru
Tamerat Yigezu.
**** An individual opinion by Committee member Rodrigo A. Carazo (partly concurring) is annexed to
the present Views.
1 In her additional submission of 10 February 2020, the author requested anonymity.
United Nations
CCPR/C/144/D/3622/2019*
International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights
Distr.: General
14 October 2025
Original: English
CCPR/C/144/D/3622/2019
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GE.25-13548
Facts as submitted by the author
2.1
The author is a schoolteacher2 who is married with two children, aged 6 and 3. On
29 January 2013, when she was 12 weeks pregnant, she was informed that the fetus was small
and that she should undergo further tests. On 25 February 2013, the fetus was diagnosed with
trisomy 18, a fetal anomaly consistent with Edwards’ syndrome, which is fatal. On
26 February 2013, the diagnosis of trisomy 18 was confirmed. The author was told by
medical staff that she would risk miscarriage by continuing the pregnancy. However, given
the law applicable at the time, it became evident that the requisite healthcare intervention
would not be offered to the author in the State Party.
2.2
The Rotunda Hospital in Dublin suggested a medical termination of the pregnancy
abroad and recommended the Liverpool Women’s Hospital (United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland), to which all the medical records of the author were forwarded.
On 5 March 2013, the author travelled to the Liverpool Women’s Hospital. On 6 March 2013,
the author underwent the abortion procedure, which cost approximately 2,200 pounds
sterling, at a time when Ireland was facing an economic crisis. The author and her husband
were facing wage cuts and the family was struggling financially. Furthermore, they received
no assistance from the State Party nor from their medical insurance company for the
recommended intervention.
2.3
The abortion process was emotionally stressful as the author and her husband had to
arrange childcare for their young children, take weeks off work and conceal the truth of her
problematic pregnancy from others due to fear of feeling guilty, given the Catholic
background of her family and her position as a teacher in a Catholic primary school. The
author faced delays in the abortion process in a foreign country without support from the
family and friends, further aggravating her emotional stress.3 The abortion procedure was to
be completed on 5 March 2013. However, it had to be delayed to the following day, as a
second round of medication had to be administered to induce labour. In addition, the couple
was unable to attend the cremation of the fetus of their son because of financial limitations.
On 20 March 2013, the author’s son, Michael, was cremated at Liverpool Women’s Hospital
and a prayer service was held for him, in the absence of the parents. In April 2013, the author
and her husband received a delivery from a courier company, which contained their son’s
remains.
2.4
The author received no counselling in the State Party, making it difficult for her to
express herself and her grief. She also had to change jobs, leaving the Catholic primary school
owing to the stigma attached to the fact that she had had to travel abroad for an abortion.
2.5
At the time, abortion was a criminal offence in the State Party.4 The author could not
raise constitutional provisions in favour of her personal rights as the same could have been
invoked on behalf of the fetus.5 Further, the Regulation of Information (Services Outside the
2 She was 37 years old at the time of submission of the initial communication.
3 The author has presented a detailed description of her medical conditions, supported by medical
evidence.
4 At the time of the facts, section 58 of the Offences against the Person Act (1861) criminalized
abortion for both women and abortion providers, even in cases where it was necessary to save the
woman’s life. It provided for life imprisonment for any woman who tried to terminate her pregnancy
and any doctor who tried to help her. In addition, section 22 of the Protection of Life During
Pregnancy Act (2013) provided that: “(1) It shall be an offence to intentionally destroy unborn human
life; (2) A person who is guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable on indictment to a fine
or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years, or both.”
5 Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution, introduced in 1983, reads: “The State acknowledges the right to life
of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.” In Attorney General
v. X and others, decided in 1992, the Supreme Court of Ireland held that article 40.3.3 permitted
abortion only when “it is established as a matter of probability that there is a real and substantial risk
to the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother, which can only be avoided by the termination of
her pregnancy”. In 2009, the Supreme Court further clarified the meaning of the constitutional
protection of the “unborn”. In Roche v. Roche, the Court established that, once an embryo has been
implanted in a woman’s womb, its relevant attachment with the pregnant woman has been created and
it enters a state of “unborn”.
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State For Termination of Pregnancies) Act, 1995, was upheld as constitutional, and the author
had no reasonable prospect of challenging the Act.6 Therefore, the author did not take steps
to exhaust domestic remedies as there was no prospect of success and the remedies available
would have been neither effective nor adequate.7 The complaint in the same matter has not
been presented to any other mechanism of international investigation or settlement.
2.6
The author submitted the communication to the Committee more than five years after
the alleged violations occurred because she suffered from undiagnosed post-traumatic stress
disorder caused by the actions and omissions of the State Party. According to the author, the
delay in submitting her complaint was reasonable.8 The author provided evidence to support
her assertions in that regard, including a psychiatric report detailing the impact of the
necessity of her travel to the United Kingdom to undergo the termination of her pregnancy,
the stigma associated with abortion, the lack of support in the State Party and the need to hide
the abortion procedure from her friends and colleagues.
2.7
The author provided her own affidavit, describing the psychological effects that the
alleged violations had had on her, including post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and sleep
disruption. Lastly, the author states that there is no prejudice to the State in its defence against
the author’s claims on account of a delay in submitting the complaint to the Committee.
Complaint
3.1
The author claims that the State Party violated its obligations under article 7 of the
Covenant by denying her access to necessary healthcare and abortion services in the State
Party. The near-total ban on abortion by the State Party forced the author to carry her
non-viable fetus longer than she would have otherwise had to and forced her to travel abroad
without the financial possibility of attending the funeral of the fetus of her son. This situation
caused her severe mental suffering and emotional distress that have affected her physical and
mental integrity and dignity, which amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
3.2
The author also claims that the State Party violated article 17 of the Covenant by
denying her access to healthcare in the State Party and by interfering with her decision not to
continue her non-viable pregnancy.
3.3
In addition, the author claims that the State Party’s restrictive abortion law, in
particular criminalization of abortion on the grounds of fatal fetal anomaly, discriminates
against women on the grounds of sex, thereby violating the author’s rights under article 26
of the Covenant, read alone and in conjunction with articles 7 and 17. She argues that the
abortion law bans necessary medical procedures that only women need, fails to respect
distinct women’s needs related to reproduction and reproductive decision-making,
perpetuates negative gender-based stereotypes and enforces traditional attitudes towards
women’s role in society and family. The author felt that she was reduced to her reproductive
capacity by prioritizing the protection of the “unborn” over her health needs and decision to
terminate her non-viable pregnancy. Lastly, the author claims that the State Party’s abortion
regime discriminated against her in relation to her right to access sexual and reproductive
health information as protected by article 19 of the Covenant.
3.4
On 10 February 2020, the author requested the following remedies should the
Committee decide in favor of her claims: (a) a guarantee of non-repetition; (b) a public
6 There have been a number of political developments in respect of the ban on abortion contained in
article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution. This included the setting up of a Citizens Assembly to consider
the issue, among others, and the establishment of a cross-party parliamentary committee to consider
article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution and to make recommendations as appropriate. None of these
developments have altered the legal position and the author would be in the same position (as many
Irish women were) at the time of submission of the initial communication, were the same
circumstances to be replicated. Therefore, those developments have not had an impact on the issue of
ineffectiveness of domestic remedies, which could not hence be exhausted.
7 The Committee has examined similar cases against the State Party, finding violations of the Covenant
(Mellet v. Ireland (CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013) and Whelan v. Ireland (CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014)).
8 In January 2014, the author gave birth to her third child. Throughout the pregnancy, she experienced
further psychological distress and hypervigilance in respect of that pregnancy.
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apology and appropriate compensation;9 and (c) a counselling service offered and paid by the
State.
State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits
4.1
On 28 September 2020, the State Party submitted its observations, arguing that the
author’s allegations should be considered inadmissible, or without merit.
4.2
The State Party notes that the author’s communication, submitted on 8 March 2018,
and the subsequent supporting documents of November and December 2018, contained the
claims of a violation of the author’s rights under articles 7, 17 and 26 of the Covenant.
4.3
Recalling the facts, the State Party observes that the author became pregnant in
November 2012. The author had a scan on 21 February 2013 and an amniocentesis was
performed at 16 and a half weeks. A report dated 25 February 2013 confirmed trisomy 18,
consistent with the Edwards’ syndrome. The author travelled on 4 March 2013, when she
was 18 weeks pregnant, to the United Kingdom, going to the Liverpool Women’s Hospital
on 5 March 2013 to commence the induction of labour. The induction of her pregnancy took
place on 6 March 2013, more than five years prior to the date of her communication, which
was submitted on 8 March 2018.
4.4
The State Party argues that the author’s communication, whether the submission date
is 8 March 2018 or November or December 2018, should be found inadmissible as
constituting an abuse of the right of submission due to a delay in submission, pursuant to
article 3 of the Optional Protocol. The Committee, given its latest jurisprudence, must reflect
upon the five-year limit specified in its rules of procedure.10 The reasons provided by the
author for the lapse of time do not justify the delay in submitting the communication more
than five years after the events, taking into account all the circumstances.
4.5
Furthermore, the State Party states that the alleged violations have not been
established. It emphasizes that the law on abortion has changed since 2013, following the
thirty-sixth amendment to the Constitution,11 and that the law applicable at the time struck a
reasonable and proportionate balance between the rights concerned.12 The State Party notes
that the author has relied heavily on the decisions of the Committee in the cases of
Mellet v. Ireland and Whelan v. Ireland. While there is some similarity in circumstances
between those cases and this communication, there is a clear difference between the facts of
the present communication and the facts presented in those two cases, which the Committee
should take into account.
4.6
The State Party disputes the author’s contention that she is in the same position as the
authors in the cases of Mellet v. Ireland and Whelan v. Ireland. The author cannot be said to
have been “abandoned by the Irish State” as alleged, and was not refused necessary and
appropriate post-abortion and bereavement care.
4.7
As a result of the factual differences, while the State Party recognizes that the author
has evidently experienced significant trauma from finding out that her fetus was non-viable,
the response of the State Party to this diagnosis did not violate her rights under article 7.
9 The apology (either public, private or both) should reflect the author’s request for anonymity.
10 Rule 99 (c) provides that a communication may constitute an abuse of the right of submission when it
is submitted five years after the exhaustion of domestic remedies by the author of the communication,
or, where applicable, three years from the conclusion of another procedure of international
investigation or settlement, unless there are reasons justifying the delay, taking into account all the
circumstances of the communication.
11 The 2018 amendment made abortion permissible in certain circumstances, such as a risk to the health
of a woman, following assessment by two doctors, without a distinction between physical and mental
health; a medical emergency, following assessment by one doctor; or a fetal condition.
12 The State Party submits that: “Although article 40.3.3 at that time restricted access to termination of
pregnancy in Ireland, the Irish Constitution acknowledged the entitlement to travel to other
jurisdictions for the purposes of obtaining terminations of pregnancy available in those jurisdictions.
The legislative framework guaranteed the entitlement to information in relation to abortion services
provided outside the State. Thus, the constitutional and legislative framework reflected a nuanced and
proportionate approach to the considered views of the Irish electorate on the extent to which the right
to life of the unborn should be protected and balanced against the rights of the mother.…”
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These differences should be factored into the Committee’s assessment of the author’s
allegations in relation to article 7. The State Party holds that the author did not avail herself
of the free post-abortion counselling that was available to her and does not appear to have
accepted her consultant obstetrician and gynaecologist’s offer of support. The State Party
notes that, even today, the author can still access bereavement support, should she wish to
avail herself of it.
4.8
The State Party argues that the author did not face obstacles in receiving the
information she needed about appropriate medical options from known and trusted medical
providers. Given the circumstances of this case, taking into account the nature, purpose and
necessity of the treatment of the author and applying the Committee’s existing jurisprudence,
the author’s cumulative experiences in the present case did not reach the high threshold
required for a finding of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, in violation of article 7 of
the Covenant.
4.9
There was no arbitrary or unlawful interference with the right to privacy of the author
in violation of article 17 of the Covenant. Any interference with her right to privacy was
neither arbitrary nor unlawful. Rather, it was an attempt to achieve a proportionate endeavour
to reconcile conflicting rights and interests within the framework of the Covenant, taking into
account a balance between the right to life of the unborn and that of the mother, by virtue of
article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution, applicable at the time. The advice provided to the
author by the hospital was properly, openly and lawfully given. The circumstances of the
present case do not support a finding that article 17 of the Covenant was violated. An
interference with the author’s decision as to how best to cope with her pregnancy, following
the diagnosis of a fatal fetal impairment, was reasonable, as within the Irish law applicable
at the time.
4.10
The State Party argues that the author has failed to substantiate her allegation of a
violation of her rights under article 26 of the Covenant by the State Party. The author has not
demonstrated that she was subjected to impermissible differentiation based on a ground that
is prohibited under article 26. While the author has quoted paragraphs 7.10 to 7.12 of the
Committee’s Views in Mellet v. Ireland and argued that she has been discriminated against
on the ground of sex, she does not explain why the Committee should reach a different
conclusion in this case than in the cases of Mellet v. Ireland and Whelan v. Ireland. The State
Party submits that the author does not assert or articulate a violation of article 26 on the basis
of the findings that were made in those two cases by the Committee, namely, discrimination
between women in similar situations. Moreover, the State Party recalls that, in both of those
cases, the Committee did not find a violation of article 26 on the grounds of sex and gender.
The State Party submits that the Committee should find that there has been no violation of
article 26 on the grounds of sex and gender in this case. Lastly, the State Party argues that no
separate violation of article 19 has specifically been pleaded by the author, as the allegations
were not based on the facts.
4.11
Should the Committee find that communication admissible, the State Party submits
that there has been no violation of articles 7, 17 or 26 of the Covenant, taking into account
the facts of this case.
Author’s comments on the State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits
5.1
On 15 September 2021, the author submitted her comments on the State Party’s
observations, rejecting the State Party’s assertion that her communication should be deemed
inadmissible.
5.2
The initial communication was submitted on 8 March 2018, a mere two days after the
five-year period set out in the rule 99 (c) of the Committee’s rules of procedure. The delay is
not such as to warrant exercising the Committee’s discretion to find the complaint
inadmissible due to an abuse of the right of submission given the delay. When amending the
rules, the Committee chose not to set a strict time limit.13 In the circumstances where there
13 This is reflected in the permissive wording of rule 99 (c), which states that a communication may
constitute an abuse of the right of submission when it is submitted five years after the exhaustion of
domestic remedies, unless there are reasons justifying the delay.
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was no domestic remedy available to the author, she agrees with the State Party’s submission
that the relevant date from which the time period should run is 6 March 2013, when her
pregnancy was terminated in the United Kingdom.
5.3
Rule 99 (c) of the Committee’s rules of procedure provides that the time limit applies
unless there are reasons justifying the delay. In this case, a very substantial reason, supported
by medical evidence, has been put forward to explain the delay.14 The author suffered from
post-traumatic stress disorder, which prevented her from engaging in any process relating to
the events concerned by the complaint for several years after the termination of her pregnancy
and continues to present challenges for the author’s engagement with these issues. The
jurisprudence of the Committee, since the 2012 amendment of its rules of procedure,
confirms that the question of delay should be considered on a case-by-case basis, and that the
five-year time frame is not a strict time limit.15 Based on its jurisprudence, the Committee
considers both the length of the delay and any reasons offered for it in determining whether
the delay constitutes an abuse of the right of submission.16 Any reference to the minimal
length of the delay in this case (two days) is notably absent from the State Party’s
observations. Such a short delay should not be considered by the Committee as an abuse of
the right of submission. The medical evidence therefore supports the author’s submission that
her diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder – caused by her need for a termination of her
pregnancy due to fatal fetal abnormality in circumstances under which this treatment was not
available in the State Party – prevented her from engaging in instructing legal representatives
and instituting a complaint earlier than she did. Strong reasons justifying the delay have been
set out in the initial communication, the additional comments of November 2018 and the
present comments, which are supported by the two medical reports of the treating psychiatrist.
5.4
The author notes the State Party’s reliance on legal developments since the events
complained of in this case, in March 2013. While the State Party has emphasized the fact that
Irish law on abortion has changed since 2013, following the thirty-sixth amendment to the
Constitution, the author submits that subsequent legal developments are irrelevant to her
treatment and the violation of her rights at the time of the events. The subsequent legislative
reform only highlights the inadequacy of the law in 2013 and the need for the referred reforms.
The author objects to the assertion of the State Party that the law applicable at the time struck
a reasonable and proportionate balance between the rights concerned. The author was unable
to access the healthcare she required in the State Party and had to travel to the United
Kingdom to terminate her pregnancy. In her view, the State Party’s arguments are
untenable.17
14 The State Party has disputed the author’s submission that her post-traumatic stress disorder prevented
her from engaging a legal team and commencing proceedings in relation to the events complained of
and claimed that “this assessment is not made in the findings of the consultant psychiatrist”. To
exclude any doubt, the author sought an addendum report from the treating psychiatrist. The enclosed
report of the treating psychiatrist, dated 5 September 2021, confirms that the author’s post-traumatic
stress disorder caused avoidance and prevented her from engaging in proceedings concerning the
events at issue at an earlier stage.
15 In A.N. v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/127/D/2518/2014), the Committee noted that “there are no
fixed time limits for submission of communications under the Optional Protocol and that mere delay
in submission does not of itself involve abuse of the right of communication” (para. 8.3). In Kaliyev v.
Russian Federation (CCPR/C/127/D/2977/2017), the Committee reiterated its approach that, in
determining what constituted an excessive delay in the submission of the communication, each case
must be decided on its own facts and concluded, that “in light of the above considerations and in the
particular circumstances of the present communication, the Committee considers that the delay in the
submission of the present communication does not constitute an abuse of the right of submission
pursuant to rule 99 (c) of the Committee’s rules of procedure” (para. 8.7).
16 M.I. v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/128/D/2534/2015), para. 6.6; and Jahelka and Jahelka v. Czech
Republic (CCPR/C/100/D/1583/2007), para. 6.4.
17 The legal position in 2013 that the State Party seeks to justify was precisely the same legal position as
that in 2010, when the author in Whelan v. Ireland travelled to the United Kingdom for the
termination of her pregnancy and in 2011, when the author in Mellet v. Ireland travelled to the United
Kingdom for the termination of her pregnancy.
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5.5
The author reiterates that the State Party’s legal position in respect of abortion in the
State Party in March 2013, resulting in the treatment described by the author in her complaint,
constituted a violation of her rights under articles 7, 17 and 26.
5.6
The author disputes the State Party’s claim that her circumstances are distinguishable
from the facts in Mellet v. Ireland and Whelan v. Ireland to the extent that the reasoning of
the Committee in those decisions is not applicable to the present case. While there are some
factual differences between the cases, the majority of the factors that led the Committee in
those cases to find breaches of articles 7, 17 and 26 are equally applicable to the author’s
communication, and her treatment a fortiori constitutes a violation of those articles of the
Covenant.
5.7
The author rejects the State Party’s assertion that her cumulative experiences in this
case did not reach the high level required for a finding of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment in breach of article 7. The author was denied the medical treatment she required in
the State Party in accordance with the constitutional and legislative framework in place at the
time. This forced the author to carry her fetus longer than she otherwise would have, knowing
that it had no prospect of survival, and forced her to travel to a foreign country for this
treatment, with all of the attendant physical and mental suffering and stigma that the journey
caused. Her experience, taken in its entirety, caused her severe mental anguish and her pain
and suffering reached the threshold required to find a violation of article 7.
5.8
The author also rejects the State Party’s attempts to distinguish her treatment from
that found to constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to article 7 in the
decisions in Mellet v. Ireland and Whelan v. Ireland. The State Party’s quotes from Mellet v.
Ireland emphasize its refusal to provide the author with post-abortion and bereavement care,
and the obstacles she faced in receiving information. The author accepts that the lack of
information provision and aftercare in her case was not as stark as in that case, although the
absence of any offer of counselling and the limitations on information imposed by the
Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State For Termination of Pregnancies) Act
were still significant and contributed to her suffering.
5.9
The author’s medical procedure cost 1,634 pounds sterling. The flights and
accommodation for her and her husband cost approximately 600 euros. The couple funded
those expenses from personal savings.18 The author’s distress was compounded by having to
undergo the procedure abroad, without her friends and family around her. The author also
had to travel home from the hospital on the same day as her pregnancy was terminated. She
was still bleeding as she travelled home to the State Party. The author struggled significantly
with the shame and stigma associated with having to travel abroad for a procedure of abortion
of a fatally ill fetus that was criminalized in the State Party. The restrictive laws in place in
the State Party made the author feel like a criminal.
5.10
The author’s suffering was exacerbated by being unable to grieve with her son’s
remains for more than a few hours. It was extremely difficult to leave her son’s remains in
the hospital within a couple of hours of his birth in order to catch the flight home. The author
and her husband were unable to remain in the United Kingdom to attend their son’s cremation
and the prayer service held in the hospital for him. They felt a deep sense of guilt at leaving
their baby’s body behind. The author’s anguish was exacerbated by receiving the ashes of
her son by courier. There was significant indignity in the way that this occurred while the
family was away.
5.11
In addition, the State Party did not offer the author the necessary and appropriate
post-abortion or bereavement counselling. While the State Party emphasized that various
types of support were available to the author, she was not offered or referred to any
counselling service. On 27 March 2013, for example, the author attended the Rotunda
Hospital and, in April 2013, she attended a six-week check-up with her consultant. These
hospital appointments were a regular part of maternity care. They did not amount to an offer
18 The expenses were difficult for the couple to meet in the circumstances following the economic crash
in the State Party, subsequent wage cuts and the need to make mortgage repayments on the family
home.
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GE.25-13548
of counselling or any specific post-abortion or bereavement care.19 The only information that
the author received about specific support services for people in her situation was leaflets
that she received in Liverpool for support services provided in the United Kingdom. As she
was not able to travel to the United Kingdom for support services, these services were not
available to her.
5.12
The author disputes the State Party’s submission that she did not face obstacles in
receiving the information she needed about her appropriate medical options from known and
trusted medical providers. Other than directly identifying the hospital, rather than directing
her to an intermediate organization, the author was not given any additional information
about the procedure she required. The Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State
For Termination of Pregnancies) Act prevented the hospital from making an appointment for
the author for the procedure required, so she had to make the appointment herself. The State
Party relies on the fact that the author’s relevant medical records were faxed to Liverpool
Women’s Hospital as an alleged distinguishing feature. In fact, in Mellet v. Ireland, the
author’s medical records had also been sent by fax to Liverpool Women’s Hospital by the
Irish Family Planning Association. That did not preclude a finding of a violation of article 7.
5.13 As regards article 17, the State Party submitted that any interference with the author’s
right to privacy was “neither arbitrary nor unlawful”. This submission was rejected by the
Committee in both Mellet v. Ireland and Whelan v. Ireland. In the light of those decisions, it
cannot reasonably be argued that the legal position rendering the necessary medical care
unavailable to the author in her circumstances was reasonable or proportionate. The
Committee’s reasoning in finding the interference with the right to privacy in Mellet v.
Ireland to be arbitrary and unlawful is equally applicable to the present case.
5.14
As regards article 26, the author refutes that her claims would not be substantiated.
The criminalization of the medical procedure that the author required discriminates against
women on the grounds of sex because it bans necessary medical procedures that only women
need, fails to respect distinct women’s needs related to reproduction and reproductive
decision-making, perpetuates negative gender-based stereotypes and enforces traditional
attitudes towards women’s role in society. The provisions of the Constitution and the
Offences against the Person Act (1861), which criminalized abortion in 2013, were not
“gender neutral”, as argued by the State Party. Such argumentation is untenable. As only a
woman can become pregnant and only a woman can therefore require and be refused access
19 The consultant indicated that she would facilitate an early scan if the author became pregnant again:
the focus on future treatment related to the event of future pregnancies and did not constitute an offer
of post-abortion or bereavement counselling. At the Rotunda Hospital, the author was provided with a
leaflet for a support group called Termination for Medical Reasons, a meeting of which the author
attended. The group was attended by mothers who had experienced a similar lack of care by the State,
specifically as there was no State support for women in this situation. Far from remedying the State
Party’s failure to provide appropriate post-termination support, the need for this group only
underscores the absence of necessary State support. In addition, the author was contacted by her
consultant, who was generally supportive, by text message upon her return from the United Kingdom.
However, it did not constitute an offer of support or aftercare. While the State Party submits that the
State-funded Health Services Executive Crisis Pregnancy Programme’s definition of “crisis
pregnancy” “incorporates the experiences of those women for whom a planned or desired pregnancy
develops into a crisis over time in circumstances which include a diagnosis of foetal abnormality”, the
author argues that she would never have associated crisis pregnancy services with her pregnancy,
which was very much planned and desired. While the State Party seeks to assert, after the fact, that
these services were available to the author, it was never explained to her at the time that the services
funded by the Crisis Pregnancy Programme extended to women who had suffered terminations for
medical reasons. She was never referred to any such service and was not encouraged by her medical
team to engage with any such services. Therefore, the availability of counselling through the Crisis
Pregnancy Programme, which was not offered, explained, recommended or referred to the author as
appropriate, does not negate or excuse the State Party’s failure to provide the author with necessary
and appropriate post-abortion and bereavement care.
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to an abortion, the criminalization and refusal of this healthcare to women constitutes
discrimination against women. This principle has been recognized in other forums.20
5.15
The State Party notes that the Committee did not find violations of article 26 on the
grounds of gender and that the Committee should similarly find that there has been no
violation of article 26 on the ground of sex and gender in this case. In fact, the Committee
did not specifically address in its decisions in Mellet v. Ireland and Whelan v. Ireland the
question of whether the authors’ treatment constituted discrimination on the grounds of
gender. It did not explicitly reject the authors’ arguments in this regard but instead found a
violation of article 26 on the basis of differential treatment between women that failed to
adequately take into account the authors’ medical needs and socioeconomic circumstances.
It therefore remains open to the Committee to find that the author’s treatment constitutes
discrimination on the ground of gender in addition to the form of discrimination identified in
those previous cases.
5.16
While the question of restriction of abortion as gender discrimination was not
specifically addressed by the Committee in Mellet v. Ireland and Whelan v. Ireland, the
Committee can find precedents in the jurisprudence of the other United Nations treaty
bodies.21 Similarly in this case, the refusal to provide the author with a termination of her
non-viable pregnancy was informed by the belief that the protection of the fetus should
prevail over the mental and physical health of the author, a belief that only affects women,
and constitutes discrimination on the basis of gender.
5.17
Even if the author had not asserted a violation of article 26 on grounds other than sex,
the author rejects the State Party’s contention that this precludes the Committee from finding
a violation of article 26 on grounds other than sex.22 The Committee is similarly unrestricted
in this case.
State Party’s additional observations
6.1
On 4 April 2022, the State Party submitted its additional observations as a rejoinder
to the author’s comments of 15 September 2021.
6.2
As to the merits, the State Party refers to the Committee’s views in Mellet v. Ireland
and Whelan v. Ireland, noting that, unlike in the context of those cases, the State Party has
provided detailed information in relation to the factual background of the present case.
6.3
The State Party respectfully disagrees with the author’s assertion that there are no true
distinguishing features between her and the authors in Mellet v. Ireland and Whelan v. Ireland.
Without repeating its arguments, the State Party requests the Committee to consider the State
Party’s submissions on the factual distinctions as outlined in the identified parts of its
previous observations, in the light of the author’s allegations. The State Party reiterates its
position in this regard and requests the Committee to consider its observations in their entirety.
Issues and proceedings before the Committee
Consideration of admissibility
7.1
Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must
decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is
admissible under the Optional Protocol.
20 In Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen (case No. C–77/88, Judgment, 8
November 1990], the European Court of Justice held that “only women can be refused employment
on grounds of pregnancy and such a refusal therefore constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of
sex” (para. 12). While that decision relates to employment equality, it applies a fortiori to other
circumstances, such as the regulation of abortion, where laws or measures negatively affect pregnant
women.
21 L.C. v. Peru (CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009), para. 8.5.
22 It is recalled that the violation of article 26 asserted by the authors in both Mellet v. Ireland and
Whelan v. Ireland was discrimination on the grounds of sex (Mellet v. Ireland, paras. 3.15–3.20 and
Whelan v. Ireland, paras. 3.9–3.11); however, the Committee was not impeded from finding a
violation on the grounds of difference in medical needs and socioeconomic circumstances.
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7.2
The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional
Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international
investigation or settlement. The Committee therefore finds that it is not precluded from
considering the author’s claims by article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol.
7.3
The Committee notes the author’s argument that she did not take steps to exhaust
domestic remedies since there was no prospect of success, and that the remedies available
would have been neither effective nor adequate. In the absence of any objection by the State
Party in this connection, the Committee considers that the requirements of article 5 (2) (b) of
the Optional Protocol have been met.
7.4
The Committee notes the State Party’s argument that the author’s communication was
submitted by the author five years and two days after the date of the abortion (6 March 2013)
and that it therefore amounts to an abuse of the right of submission. The Committee also
notes the author’s objection that her communication was submitted only two days after the
discretionary period of five years, as set out in the Committee’s rules of procedure, after the
alleged violations, that the delay in submission was a result of her psychological condition
related to post-traumatic stress disorder, as evidenced by medical certificates, and that the
Committee is entitled to reflect on the reasons for such a delay, which can be considered as
justified in the given circumstances.23 In the light of the above, the Committee considers that
the reasons for the delay in the submission of her communication have been convincingly
explained by the author, observing that the complaint was submitted as early as possible
given her medical condition, caused by her treatment leading to abortion, which is the subject
matter of her complaint. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the submission of her
communication by the author after five years and two days, in the particular circumstances
of the present case, has not amounted to an abuse of the right of submission and finds that it
is not precluded from considering the author’s claims by the requirements of article 3 of the
Optional Protocol.
7.5
The author’s claims before the Committee concern the alleged violations of articles 7,
17 and 26 of the Covenant by denying the author necessary healthcare and abortion services
in the State Party, interfering with the author’s decision not to continue her non-viable
pregnancy and discriminating against her on grounds of sex and gender and between her and
women in similar situations. The Committee notes the State Party’s objection that the author
has not sufficiently substantiated her claims and that her allegations under article 19 do not
arise to a claim as they are not based on the facts. In particular, the Committee observes that
the author was obliged to travel to the United Kingdom at her own expense to undergo the
procedure of abortion, which was criminalized in the State Party at the time (March 2013),
and terminate a non-viable pregnancy, of which she had been informed by the medical
authorities. The Committee considers that the author’s claims under articles 7, 17 and 26 of
the Covenant have been sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility. As
regards the author’s allegations under article 19, the Committee has considered them
insufficiently substantiated since the allegations have focused on article 26, without
elaborating upon the asserted violations of article 19 as such. Accordingly, the Committee
finds the claims under articles 7, 17 and 26 of the Covenant admissible and proceeds with its
consideration of the merits.
Consideration of the merits
8.1
The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information
made available to it by the parties, as provided under article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol.
8.2
The Committee notes the author’s allegation that she was informed by public medical
professionals at the Rotunda Hospital in Dublin, in the sixteenth week of her pregnancy, on
25 February 2013, that the fetus had been diagnosed with a fatal malformation – trisomy 18
– which could lead to miscarriage or would have life-threatening consequences for the baby
23 A.N. v. the Russian Federation (CCPR/C/127/D/2518/2014), para. 8.3. See also rule 99 (c) of the
rules of procedure, which states that a communication may constitute an abuse of the right of
submission when it is submitted five years after the exhaustion of domestic remedies, unless there are
reasons justifying the delay. See also H.R. v. Uzbekistan (CCPR/C/131/D/2479/2014), para. 6.3; and
Murne et al. v. Sweden (CCPR/C/137/D/2813/2016), para. 9.2.
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at the time of birth or after birth. As a result of the prohibition of abortion in Irish law at the
time, she was confronted with two options: carrying to term, knowing that the fetus would
most likely die inside her, or having a voluntary termination of pregnancy in a foreign country.
The Committee also notes the State Party’s indication that article 40.3.3 of the Constitution,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, provided at the time that it was lawful to terminate a
pregnancy in the State Party only if it was established as a matter of probability that there
was a real and substantial risk to the life of the woman (as distinct from her health), which
could only be avoided by a termination of the pregnancy.
8.3
The author claims to have been subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
as a result of the legal prohibition of abortion as she was, inter alia, provided with only partial
information about post-abortion counselling and was denied the healthcare and bereavement
support she needed in the State Party, compelled to choose between continuing to carry a
dying fetus and terminating her pregnancy abroad and subjected to intense distress and stigma,
as a result of which she was also obliged to change her job. The Committee notes the State
Party’s opposing argument that, inter alia, the prohibition seeks to balance the competing
rights between the fetus and the woman, that in the present case the author’s life was not at
risk and that there were no arbitrary decision-making processes or acts of “infliction” by any
person or State agent that caused or contributed to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of
the author. The State Party also argues that the legislative framework guarantees citizens’
right to information in relation to abortion services provided abroad.
8.4
Recalling its jurisprudence, the Committee considers that the fact that a particular
conduct or action is legal under domestic law does not mean that it cannot infringe article 7
of the Covenant.24 By virtue of the existing legislative framework, the State Party subjected
the author to conditions of intense physical and mental suffering. The author, as a pregnant
woman in a highly vulnerable position after learning that her wanted pregnancy was not
viable and, as documented, inter alia, in the psychological reports submitted to the Committee,
had her physical and mental anguish exacerbated by not being able to continue receiving
medical care and health insurance coverage for her treatment from the healthcare system of
the State Party, the need to choose between continuing her non-viable pregnancy or travelling
to another country while carrying a dying fetus, at her personal expense, separated from the
support of her family and returning while not fully recovered, the shame and stigma
associated with the criminalization of abortion of a fatally ill fetus, the fact of having to leave
her son’s remains behind and later having them unexpectedly delivered to her by courier and
the prevailing obstacles to her timely access to necessary and appropriate post-abortion
counselling and bereavement care, although she received partial information to that effect.
Many of the negative experiences that she went through could have been avoided if the author
had not been prohibited from terminating her pregnancy in the familiar environment of her
own country and under the care of the health professionals whom she knew and trusted, and
if she had been afforded the health benefits she needed that were available in the State Party,
and could have been enjoyed by her, had she continued her non-viable pregnancy to deliver
a stillborn child in the State Party.
8.5
In addition, the Committee considers that the author’s suffering was further
aggravated by the obstacles that she faced in receiving the information she needed about her
appropriate medical options from known and trusted medical providers, as the Rotunda
Hospital only identified the Liverpool Women’s Hospital as a suitable facility, leaving the
practical arrangements to the author. The Committee notes that the Regulation of Information
(Services Outside the State For Termination of Pregnancies) Act legally restricted the
circumstances in which any individual could provide information about lawfully available
abortion services in the State Party or overseas and criminalized advocating or promoting the
termination of pregnancy.25 The Committee also notes the author’s unrefuted statement that
she did not receive key medical information about the applicable restrictions on overseas
abortions.
24 Mellet v. Ireland, para. 7.4.
25 The Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act was adopted in 2018 and defines limited
circumstances for the voluntary termination of pregnancy.
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8.6
The Committee observes, as stated in paragraph 3 of its general comment No. 20
(1992), that the text of article 7 allows of no limitation and that no justification or extenuating
circumstances may be invoked to excuse a violation of article 7 for any reason. The
Committee observes that the above facts have exacerbated the author’s mental anguish. She
had to travel to the United Kingdom for the termination of her pregnancy, which subjected
her to intense physical and mental suffering. She was not offered or referred to appropriate
post-abortion and bereavement care and the State Party limited the information that her
medical team could give her about the procedure she needed abroad, including by prohibiting
her medical team from making a referral or appointment for her with Liverpool Women’s
Hospital (see paras. 3.3 and 5.12 above). Accordingly, the Committee considers that, taken
together, the above-mentioned facts amounted to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, in
violation of article 7 of the Covenant.
8.7
The author claims that, by denying her the only option that would have respected her
physical and psychological integrity and reproductive autonomy under the circumstances of
the case, namely to terminate her pregnancy in the State Party, the State Party interfered
arbitrarily in her right to privacy under article 17 of the Covenant. The Committee recalls its
jurisprudence to the effect that a woman’s decision to request termination of pregnancy is an
issue that falls under the scope of this provision. 26 In the present case, the State Party
interfered with the author’s decision not to continue her non-viable pregnancy. The
interference in this case was provided for under article 40.3.3 of the Constitution and
therefore was not unlawful under the State Party’s domestic law. However, the question
before the Committee is whether such interference was unlawful or arbitrary under the
Covenant. The State Party argues that there was no arbitrariness, since the interference was
proportionate to the legitimate aims of the Covenant, taking into account a carefully
considered balance between protection of the fetus and protection of the rights of the woman.
8.8
The Committee considers that the balance that the State Party chose to strike between
protection of the fetus and protection of the rights of the woman in the present case cannot
be justified.27 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 16 (1988) on the right to
privacy, in which it stated that the concept of arbitrariness was intended to guarantee that
even interference provided for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and
objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the particular
circumstances. The Committee notes that the author’s wanted pregnancy was not viable, that
the options open to her were inevitably a source of intense suffering and that her travel abroad
to terminate her pregnancy had significant negative consequences for her, as described above,
that could have been avoided if she had been allowed to terminate her pregnancy in the State
Party. As a result, she suffered harm contrary to article 7. The Committee observes that the
provision to the author of slightly more information about the available options by the
hospital rather than by an intermediary, notably the name of a hospital in the United Kingdom
that could provide an appropriate procedure, does not lessen the fundamental interference by
the State Party in the author’s decision as to how best to cope with her non-viable pregnancy.
The criminalization of the termination of her pregnancy in the State Party unreasonably and
arbitrarily caused her to have to carry her non-viable fetus for nine days more than she
otherwise would have and to travel to a foreign country for the medical treatment she required,
causing all the attendant suffering. On that basis, the Committee considers that the
interference in the author’s decision as to how best cope with her non-viable pregnancy was
unreasonable and arbitrary and in violation of article 17 of the Covenant.
8.9
The author claims that criminalization of abortion on the grounds of fatal fetal
impairment violated her rights to equality and non-discrimination on the grounds of sex and
gender and on the grounds of differences in medical needs between women in similar
26 Llantoy Huamán v. Peru (CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003), para. 6.4; L.M.R. v. Argentina, para. 9.3; Mellet
v. Ireland, para. 7.7; Whelan v. Ireland, para. 7.8; Susana v. Nicaragua (CCPR/C/142/D/3626/2019),
paras. 8.13 and 8.14; Lucía v. Nicaragua (CCPR/C/142/D/3627/2019), paras. 8.13 and 8.14; Norma v.
Ecuador (CCPR/C/142/D/3628/2019), para. 11.16; and Fátima v. Guatemala
(CCPR/C/143/D/3629/2019), paras. 15.13 and 15.14. See also the Committee’s general comment
No. 28 (2000), para. 10.
27 Mellet v. Ireland, para. 7.8; and Whelan v. Ireland, para. 7.9.
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situations, under article 26 of the Covenant. The State Party rejects this claim and contends
that its legal regime regarding termination of pregnancy is not discriminatory.
8.10
The Committee notes that under the legal regime in the State Party, women pregnant
with a fetus with a fatal impairment who nevertheless decide to carry the foetus to term
continue to receive the full protection of the public healthcare system. Their medical needs
continue to be covered by health insurance and they continue to benefit from the care and
advice of their public medical professionals throughout the pregnancy. After miscarriage or
delivery of a stillborn child, they receive any post-natal medical attention and bereavement
care they need. By contrast, women who choose to terminate a non-viable pregnancy must
rely on their own financial resources to do so entirely outside the public healthcare system.
They are denied health insurance coverage for that purpose, they must travel abroad at their
own expense to secure an abortion and incur the financial, psychological and physical
burdens that such travel imposes and they are denied post-termination medical care and
bereavement counselling. The Committee notes the author’s uncontested allegations that, in
order to secure a termination of her non-viable pregnancy, she was required to travel abroad,
incurring financial costs that were difficult for her to bear. She also had to travel back to the
State Party shortly after the delivery, as she and her husband could not afford to stay any
longer in the United Kingdom.
8.11
In paragraph 13 of its general comment No. 28 (2000) on the equality of rights
between men and women, the Committee states that “not every differentiation of treatment
will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and
objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant”. The
Committee notes the author’s claim that the State Party’s criminalization of abortion
subjected her to a gender-based stereotype of the reproductive role of women primarily as
mothers, and that stereotyping her as a reproductive instrument subjected her to
discrimination.28 The Committee considers that the refusal to provide the author with a
termination of her non-viable pregnancy was informed by the belief that the protection of the
fetus should prevail over the mental and physical health of the author, a belief that only affects
women and thereby constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex and gender. The Committee
also considers that the differential treatment to which the author was subjected in relation to
women in similar circumstances failed to adequately take into account her medical needs and
socioeconomic circumstances and did not meet the requirements of reasonableness,
objectivity and legitimacy of purpose. In this context, the Committee underlines that the
refusal of the State Party to allow for terminations in the case of fatal fetal abnormality cannot
even be justified as being for the protection of the potential life of the fetus. Accordingly, the
Committee concludes that the failure of the State Party to provide the author with the services
that she required constituted discrimination on grounds of sex and gender and on grounds of
difference in medical needs between women in similar situations, and violated her rights
under article 26 of the Covenant.
9.
The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view that
the facts before it disclose a violation by the State Party of articles 7, 17 and 26 of the
Covenant.
10.
In accordance with article 2 (3) (a) of the Covenant, the State Party is under an
obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy. This requires it to make full
reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. Accordingly, the State
Party is obligated to provide the author with adequate compensation and to make available
to her any psychological treatment and counselling she needs, paid by the State Party. The
State Party is also under an obligation to take steps to prevent similar violations in the future.
To that end, the State Party should further amend its law on the voluntary termination of
pregnancy, including, if necessary, its Constitution, to ensure compliance with the Covenant,
ensuring effective, timely and accessible procedures for pregnancy termination in the State
Party, and take measures to ensure that healthcare providers are in a position to supply full
28 Norma v. Ecuador, paras. 11.21 and 11.22.
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information on safe abortion services without fearing that they will be subjected to criminal
sanctions.29
11.
Bearing in mind that, by becoming a Party to the Optional Protocol, the State Party
has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a
violation of the Covenant and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State Party has
undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective remedy when it has been
determined that a violation has occurred, the Committee wishes to receive from the State
Party, within 180 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to the
Committee’s Views. The State Party is also requested to publish the present Views and to
have them widely disseminated in the languages of the State Party.
29 See also CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4, para. 9; and CCPR/C/IRL/CO/5, paras. 25 and 26.
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Annex
[Original: Spanish]
Individual opinion of Committee member Rodrigo A. Carazo
(partially concurring)
1.
I concur with the Committee’s finding that the State party violated the rights enshrined
in articles 7, 17 and 26 of the Covenant. However, I believe that one point raised in the
complaint, namely the request that the State party be required to make a public apology (to
the author) as part of the full reparation to which she is entitled (see paragraph 3.4 in
connection with paragraph 10), has been neither accepted nor rejected.
2.
By failing to consider, whether in a positive or negative light, and without justification,
one of the elements of the communication, the Committee has disregarded the author’s will
and right to submit communications and weakens its position as a defender of the rights of
individuals.