Decision on merits; Subjects: CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, KAZAKHSTAN; [CCPR: UNO-Pakt II, Internationaler Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte; Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques; Patto II]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.25-07933 (E) 201025 211025
Human Rights Committee
Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the
Optional Protocol, concerning communication
No. 3098/2018*, **, ***
Communication submitted by:
Teymur Akhmedov (represented by counsels
Shane Brady and Konstantyn Chernichenko)
Alleged victim:
The author
State Party:
Kazakhstan
Date of communication:
3 January 2018 (initial submission)
Document references:
Decision taken pursuant to rule 92 of the
Committee’s rules of procedure, transmitted to
the State Party on 9 January 2018 (not issued in
document form)
Date of adoption of Views:
14 March 2025
Subject matter:
Criminal sentence imposed on a Jehovah’s
Witness for expressing his beliefs and opinion in
private
Procedural issue:
None
Substantive issues:
Fair trial; unlawful detention; police entrapment;
non-discrimination; freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; freedom of expression;
protection of minorities
Articles of the Covenant:
9, 14 (1), 18, 19, 26 and 27
Article of the Optional Protocol:
2
1.1
The author of the communication is Teymur Akhmedov, a national of Kazakhstan
born in 1956. He claims that the State Party has violated his rights under articles 9, 14 (1),
18, 19, 26 and 27 of the Covenant. The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State
Party on 30 September 2009. The author is represented by counsel.
* Adopted by the Committee at its 143rd session (3–28 March 2025).
** The following members of the Committee participated in the examination of the communication:
Tania María Abdo Rocholl, Wafaa Ashraf Moharram Bassim, Rodrigo A. Carazo, Yvonne Donders,
Mahjoub El Haiba, Laurence R. Helfer, Konstantin Korkelia, Dalia Leinarte, Bacre Waly Ndiaye,
Hernán Quezada Cabrera, Akmal Saidov, Ivan Šimonović, Soh Changrok, Teraya Koji, Hélène
Tigroudja and Imeru Tamerat Yigezu.
*** Individual opinions by Committee members Rodrigo A. Carazo (partially concurring), Hernán
Quezada Cabrera (concurring) and Teraya Koji (concurring) are annexed to the present Views.
United Nations
CCPR/C/143/D/3098/2018
International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights
Distr.: General
29 September 2025
Original: English
CCPR/C/143/D/3098/2018
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1.2
On 9 January 2018, pursuant to rule 94 of its rules of procedure, the Committee, acting
through its Special Rapporteur on new communications and interim measures, decided to
grant the author’s request for interim measures. It requested the State Party to ensure that the
author received adequate medical treatment in prison and that his prison conditions were fully
compatible with the Covenant and international standards. It also requested the State Party to
consider releasing the author or placing him under house arrest owing to his health condition.
Factual background
2.1
From May to November 2016, the author, a Jehovah’s Witness, had some 20 peaceful
religious discussions with seven university students. The meetings were initiated by the
students and took place either in the author’s apartment or the students’ rented apartment.
The author shared his opinion about different religions and about Jehovah’s Witnesses,
answering the students’ questions. Unbeknown to the author, the State National Security
Committee had initiated a covert investigation against him in April 2016, using the students
to record his religious discussions. The recording was authorized by the prosecutor’s office.
On 18 January 2017, the National Security Committee searched the author’s home and
detained him on suspicion of violating article 174 (2) of the Criminal Code for committing
acts aimed at inciting religious discord and promoting the exclusivity and superiority of
citizens based on their religious affiliation, using literature and other media that promote
religious discord. During the search of the author’s apartment, various items of religious
literature were discovered and seized.
2.2
Despite his reported health problems, on 20 January 2017, the Saryarkinsky District
Court No. 2 in Astana authorized the author’s pretrial detention on the basis of the gravity of
the criminal charges. On 30 January 2017, the Astana City Court rejected his appeal against
the pretrial detention.
2.3
On 2 May 2017, the Saryarkinsky District Court No. 2 found the author guilty under
article 174 (2) of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to five years in prison. It concluded
that the author had publicly, in a group of persons, committed deliberate acts aimed at inciting
religious discord, promoting exclusivity and superiority based on individuals’ attitudes
toward religious affiliation, using literature and other media that promoted religious discord.
The court noted that the author was not authorized to disseminate religious teachings and had
no religious education, and that the meetings had been held outside an official place of
worship, in violation of domestic law.
2.4
The author appealed on 16 May 2017 to the Astana City Court. He claimed, among
other things, that the prosecutor had failed to prove that he had incited religious discord,
promoted superiority based on religious affiliation, committed that act publicly and
distributed literature. He also claimed that the court expert did not have the appropriate
certification to examine the recordings of his discussions with the students. On 20 June 2017,
the Astana City Court rejected his appeal. The author submitted a complaint to the Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention which, on 25 August 2017, found his detention to be arbitrary.1
The author then appealed to the Supreme Court, referring to the opinion of the Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention. On 4 December 2017, the Supreme Court rejected his appeal.
Complaint
3.1
The author claims that his arrest, detention and imprisonment were arbitrary, in
violation of article 9 of the Covenant, as the peaceful religious discussions he had with others
did not pose a threat to public order or national security.
3.2
The author also alleges that the State party has violated article 14 (1) of the Covenant,
claiming that he was a victim of entrapment by the National Security Committee. The
students who worked for the National Security Committee asked him provocative questions
and he would not have expressed his opinion on various religious matters if they had not
asked him to do so.
1 A/HRC/WGAD/2017/62.
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3.3
The author claims that his arrest, detention and conviction for peacefully practising
his religion constitute interference with his rights to freedom of religion and of expression.
He argues that, owing to the vagueness of the wording of article 174 of the Criminal Code, it
is being used to suppress religious debate and target minority religious groups. He claims a
violation of articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant.
3.4
The author highlights the discriminatory treatment of Jehovah’s Witnesses in
Kazakhstan, claiming that on the day of his arrest, the National Security Committee raided
the regional premises of the Jehovah’s Witnesses organization. The author argues that
articles 26 and 27 of the Covenant were violated.
State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits
4.1
On 28 March 2018, the State party informed the Committee that the author had been
pardoned and his criminal record expunged by Presidential Decree of 2 April 2018. He was
released from prison on 4 April 2018.
4.2
The State Party notes that there is a civil procedure for compensation for wrongly
convicted persons. However, the expungement of a criminal record does not mean that the
person was convicted wrongfully. The author has not been found to have been wrongfully
convicted, therefore there are no grounds to investigate a violation of his rights.
Author’s comments on the State Party’s observations on admissibility
5.1
On 11 July 2019, the author submitted his response to the State Party’s observations.
The author reiterates his claim that he was wrongfully sentenced to five years in prison when
he was merely exercising his rights to freedom of religion and of expression as a Jehovah’s
Witness. He repeats that he is entirely innocent of the charges.
5.2
The author trusts that he was pardoned and released as a result of the interim measures
requested by the Committee on 9 January 2018. He spent a total of 14 months and 18 days in
detention. He author argues that, although he was released and his criminal record was
expunged, he was not acquitted of the charges made against him. The Supreme Court rejected
his supervisory appeal on 9 April 2018, depriving him of the possibility of being awarded
compensation for his wrongful arrest, detention and imprisonment.
Issues and proceedings before the Committee
Consideration of admissibility
6.1
Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must
decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is
admissible under the Optional Protocol.
6.2
The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional
Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international
investigation or settlement.
6.3
The Committee notes the author’s claim that he has exhausted all available domestic
remedies. In the absence of any objection from the State Party in that connection, the
Committee considers that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from
examining the communication.
6.4
The Committee notes the State Party’s argument that the author has been released
from prison, that his criminal record has been expunged, that he was not found to have been
wrongly sentenced and hence there was no need to address the allegation of a violation of his
rights. The Committee also notes the author’s claim that, despite having been released from
prison and having had his criminal record cleared, he has not been acquitted of the charges
against him and cannot claim damages for the violation of his rights at the domestic level.
The Committee considers that the author’s release and the expunged criminal record did not
address any of the substance of his claims under the Covenant. The Committee will thus
proceed to consider the author’s allegations.
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6.5
The Committee notes the author’s claim under article 14 (1) of the Covenant that he
was a victim of entrapment by the National Security Committee. The meetings in question
were arranged at the initiative of the students hired by the National Security Committee and
the students asked him provocative questions and recorded the discussions. The Committee
notes that the author, when answering questions posed to him by the students, was merely
sharing his opinion. However controversial his answers might have been, the opinions he
shared are part of his beliefs and could have been expressed in any other circumstances, with
or without instigation by or on behalf of State agents. The Committee notes that the author’s
claim under article 14 (1) concerns the interpretation of the evidence and the application of
the law (art. 174 (2) of the Criminal Code) by the National Security Committee and by the
courts rather than entrapment. The Committee thus finds the author’s claims under
article 14 (1) of the Covenant to have been insufficiently substantiated and therefore
inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.
6.6
The Committee notes that the author is a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, a
religious minority within the State Party. Nonetheless, with respect to the author’s claims
under articles 26 and 27 of the Covenant, the Committee notes that the arguments provided
by the author are insufficient to substantiate his claims that he has been discriminated against
as a Jehovah’s Witness. The Committee therefore considers that those claims have been
insufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility under article 2 of the Optional
Protocol.
6.7
The Committee considers that the author has sufficiently substantiated the claims
under articles 9, 18 and 19 of the Covenant for the purpose of admissibility. It therefore
declares them admissible and proceeds with their consideration on the merits.
Considerations of the merits
7.1
The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information
submitted to it by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol.
7.2
The Committee will first consider the author’s claim that his arrest, detention and
conviction for peacefully expressing his religious views violated his rights under article 18
of the Covenant. The Committee recalls its general comment No. 22 (1993) on the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, in which it held that article 18 does not permit
any limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought and conscience or on the freedom to
have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice (para. 3).2 By contrast, the freedom to
manifest one’s religion or belief may be subject to certain limitations, but only those
prescribed by law and necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others (para. 8).
7.3
In the present case, the Committee notes that the author was monitored by the National
Security Committee, that the evidence against him was collected secretly through staged
meetings with students, who were recording the discussions for the National Security
Committee, that the author was charged with and found guilty of publicly inciting religious
discord and that he was sentenced to five years in prison for holding peaceful private religious
discussions without authorization, outside an official place of worship. Applying its general
comment No. 22 (1993), in which it stated that the freedom to manifest religion or belief may
be exercised either individually or in community with others and in public or private (para. 4),
the Committee considers that the author’s claims relate to his right to manifest his religious
beliefs and that his arrest, detention and conviction constitute limitations of that right.3
7.4
The Committee must address the issue of whether those limitations on the author’s
freedom to manifest his religious beliefs were prescribed by law and necessary to protect
public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others,
within the meaning of article 18 (3) of the Covenant. The Committee recalls that article 18 (3)
is to be interpreted strictly and that limitations on the freedom to manifest one’s religion or
2 Bekmanov and Egemberdiev v. Kyrgyzstan (CCPR/C/125/D/2312/2013), para. 7.2, and Niftaliyev et
al. v. Azerbaijan (CCPR/C/134/D/3094/2018), para. 9.4.
3 Niftaliyev et al. v. Azerbaijan, para. 9.4.
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beliefs may be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be
directly related and proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated.4
7.5
The Committee notes that the author was charged and sentenced to five years in prison
under article 174 (2) of the Criminal Code for inciting religious discord and promoting the
exclusivity and superiority of his religious beliefs. Based on the documents before it, the
Committee observes that the domestic courts did not clarify how the author incited religious
discord by engaging in an open discussion with several adult individuals in a private
apartment. No harmful effects of his efforts to promote his religion have been established by
the domestic courts. The State Party has not explained what considerations of public safety,
order, health, morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others under article 18 (3)
necessitated the imposition on the author of such restrictive sanctions. In the Committee’s
view, the author was punished merely for sharing his religious views and expressing his
personal opinion. The excessively broad application of article 174 (2) of the Criminal Code
by the domestic courts not only penalized the author for exercising his basic freedoms, but
could also have a chilling effect on him and others, deterring any discussion of religious
matters, even in private.5 The Committee finds that the facts of the present case reveal a
violation of the author’s rights under article 18 of the Covenant.
7.6
The Committee notes the author’s claim that his arrest, detention and imprisonment
violated article 9 of the Covenant. In this regard, the Committee recalls its general comment
No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person, according to which arrest or detention as
punishment for the legitimate exercise of the rights as guaranteed by the Covenant, including
freedom of religion under article 18, is arbitrary (para. 17). In the light of the finding that
there has been a violation of the author’s rights under article 18 of the Covenant, and that the
arrest, detention and imprisonment were imposed on him as a sanction for exercising peaceful
religious activities, the Committee finds that the facts before it disclose a violation by the
State Party of article 9 (1) of the Covenant.
7.7
In the light of its finding that there has been a violation of article 18, the Committee
does not deem it necessary to examine whether the same facts constitute a violation of
article 19 of the Covenant.
8.
The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view that
the facts before it disclose a violation by the State Party of articles 9 (1) and 18 of the
Covenant.
9.
Pursuant to article 2 (3) (a) of the Covenant, the State Party is under an obligation to
provide the author with an effective remedy. This requires it to make full reparation to
individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. Accordingly, the State Party is
obligated to provide the author with adequate compensation, including reimbursement of any
legal costs he has incurred, and to offer an effective remedy that allows for the review of his
sentence. The remedy should provide the author with the opportunity to seek compensation
for damages resulting from the unlawful conviction. The State Party is also under an
obligation to take all steps necessary to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future.
10.
Bearing in mind that, by becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State Party
has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a
violation of the Covenant and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State Party has
undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective and enforceable remedy when
it has been determined that a violation has occurred, the Committee wishes to receive from
the State Party, within 180 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to the
Committee’s Views. The State Party is also requested to publish the present Views and to
have them widely disseminated in the official languages of the State Party.
4 General comment No. 22 (1993), para. 8.
5 CCPR/C/KAZ/CO/2, para. 47, and A/HRC/28/66/Add.1, paras. 45–47.
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Annex I
[Original: Spanish]
Individual opinion of Committee member Rodrigo A. Carazo
(partially concurring)
1.
I fully endorse the arguments set out by Committee member Hernán Quezada Cabrera
in paragraphs 1–3 of his concurring opinion (see annex II).
2.
Accepting the author’s claim that a violation of articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant
should also be considered would have allowed the Committee to examine more closely the
factors distinguishing the rights protected under article 18 (freedom of thought) and article 19
(freedom of expression), in particular with regard to the protection of the information
received and the content of such information, and this was specifically established by the
author. The phrase repeatedly used by the Committee in all sorts of communications to the
effect that because a violation of one article has been found, it is not necessary to examine
the potential violation of another article (see para. 7.7) constitutes a breach of the
Committee’s obligations.
3.
I radically disagree with what is now customary with regard to a large number of
communications concerning violations by persons identified as Jehovah’s Witnesses (see
para. 6.6). The violations have occurred and are noted in the complaint. In this case, the lack
of a finding of a violation of articles 26 (non-discrimination) and 27 (respect for the collective
practices of minorities) means once again ignoring the repetitive nature of the violations
suffered by individuals who identify as Jehovah’s Witnesses and who are therefore
discriminated against, individually and as a community, through the non-respect of their
religious practices and the persecution of even those who carry a small amount of
informational material. In this case – and in the very large number of similar cases received
and dealt with by the Committee (with many others still pending) – the persecution of a
specific minority in Kazakhstan and other countries in the region is evident. The Committee
should, therefore, have considered a violation of article 27.
3.
The Committee has a clear pedagogical obligation when adopting its decisions. It is
also within its mandate to determine, in any circumstances, whether there are persons
deprived of human rights in any of the States Parties to the Covenant. Communications
submitted by individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any of the rights set forth in
the Covenant, as set out in the first Optional Protocol, are meaningful tools for other rights
holders in assessing whether their rights are being upheld or violated.
4.
The consideration of communications makes it possible to identify trends and patterns
of human rights violations by States Parties. Such is the case with the measures taken by
Kazakhstan in relation to people known and regarded as Jehovah’s Witnesses. In previous
cases, as in the present case, a decision was reached regarding the existence of violations of
the rights enshrined in article 18 of the Covenant (freedom of religion). The violations are
similar and occur regularly, following disturbing and undeniable patterns, and the State Party
consistently attempts to justify them in its replies to the Committee. Unreasonable restrictions
are repeatedly placed on the exercise of freedom of religion, as the Committee has learned,
to the detriment of persons identified as members of this religious minority in the country. It
must be noted that, during the same period, claims of similar patterns of restrictions involving
other States Parties in the same geographic region have been made before the Committee.
5.
I am of the view that these violations – considered and decided upon one by one by
the Human Rights Committee and for which a number of States Parties in the region have
been sanctioned – are an unequivocal manifestation of the prevailing denial to (all) persons
belonging to a religious minority of their right, clearly set forth in article 27 of the Covenant,
to profess and practise their own religion in community with the other members of their group.
This collective right has been completely ignored in the consideration of this communication.
The damage to some of the trees is noted, but the fact that they are part of a forest in which
the basic rights not only of individuals but also of a religious minority are violated is
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overlooked. Article 27 of the Covenant was drafted to be respected by States Parties, and the
Human Rights Committee was established and made competent to address such serious
violations as those highlighted in this individual opinion.
6.
The Committee, in making a determination in connection with this complaint and all
those that are similar despite involving different States Parties, should strongly urge the State
Party concerned to put an end to the disproportionate persecution of minority groups,
including Jehovah’s Witnesses, for exercising, in community with the other members of their
group, their right to profess and practise their religion.
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Annex II
[Original: Spanish]
Individual opinion of Committee member Hernán Quezada
Cabrera (concurring)
1.
I fully endorse the Committee’s finding that the facts of the present case show that the
State Party has violated the author’s rights under articles 9 (1) and 18 of the Covenant on the
basis of his arrest and detention as a punishment for the practice of activities proper to his
religion, as well as for peacefully expressing his religious views.
2.
As some members of the Committee pointed out during the consideration of the
communication, however, the Committee should have provided adequate reasoning for the
decision, set out in paragraph 7.7 of its Views, in which it deemed it unnecessary, in the light
of its finding that there had been a violation of article 18 of the Covenant, to examine whether
the same facts constituted a violation of article 19.
3.
In my view, it could thus be understood that article 18 of the Covenant, which the
Committee found to have been violated, constitutes lex specialis in respect of the violation
of article 19 – that is, that the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief is a particular or
specific form of freedom of expression. That is my personal interpretation, however, and it
cannot take the place of the reasoning that the Committee should have provided when
deciding not to consider separately the authors’ claims under article 19 of the Covenant.
4.
My intention in drafting this opinion is not to question the Committee’s decision in
paragraph 7.7 above, but rather to point out that the decision should have been properly
reasoned, however succinctly.1
1 For examples of decisions similar to the one discussed in this individual opinion, in which it is
considered that it is not necessary to examine separately possible violations of a given provision, see,
inter alia, Benhadj v. Algeria (CCPR/C/90/D/1173/2003), para. 8.5, as well as the following
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: Ezelin v. France, 26 April 1991, para. 35; Kudła
v. Poland, 26 October 2000, para. 146; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu
v. Romania, 17 July 2014, para. 156; and Mehmet Hatip Dicle v. Turkey, 15 October 2013, para. 41.
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Annex III
Individual opinion of Committee member Teraya Koji
(concurring)
1.
This separate opinion does not fundamentally dissent from the Committee’s findings,
but is intended to complement them by addressing an issue of legal and practical significance
that was not fully elaborated in the Committee’s Views.
2.
In paragraph 7.7 of its Views, the Committee states that, “in the light of its finding
that there has been a violation of article 18, the Committee does not deem it necessary to
examine whether the same facts constitute a violation of article 19 of the Covenant”. While
it is not uncommon for the Committee to refrain from examining additional claims once a
violation has been found under a specific article, this practice has repeatedly been observed
to be less than desirable.
3.
In the present case, the same factual circumstances that led to the finding of a violation
of article 18 equally support a finding of a violation of article 19. The reasoning set out in
paragraphs 7.1 to 7.5 of the Committee’s Views readily extends to the domain of the
freedoms of opinion and expression. This conclusion ought to have been explicitly
acknowledged. Doing so is not merely a matter of procedural completeness in responding to
the author’s submissions, but also carries particular normative and jurisprudential weight for
the reasons set out below.
4.
First, it is essential to expressly affirm the protection of the right to hold opinions and
the right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed under article 19 of the Covenant. As noted
in the Committee’s general comment No. 34 (2011), these rights are “the foundation stone
for every free and democratic society” (para. 2). Although freedom of expression and
freedom of religion may intersect, they serve distinct normative purposes and protect
different dimensions of individual and collective autonomy. It is well established that
freedom of expression includes religious discourse (see general comment No. 34, para. 11).
Accordingly, a violation of article 19 may be inferred from the facts of the present case almost
as a matter of course. However, not all religious expression automatically falls within the
scope of article 19, and this distinction must be carefully maintained. Moreover, as a result
of the Committee’s choice not to assess the article 19 claim, that provision is omitted from
the list of violated articles in paragraph 8 of the Views. As a matter of formal interpretation,
this could misleadingly suggest that the State Party did not violate the author’s rights under
article 19 – an implication that is both substantively and analytically unsound.
5.
Second, explicitly recognizing a violation of article 19 is particularly important for
the effective protection of the rights of religious minorities. Restricting the Committee’s
findings to article 18 alone risks conveying the impression – especially to members of other
faith communities – that the violation at issue concerns only a particular religious group.
Such a message may unintentionally reinforce perceptions of separateness or exclusivity.
This risk is especially pronounced in the present case, where “the author was charged and
sentenced to five years in prison under article 174 (2) of the Criminal Code for inciting
religious discord and promoting the exclusivity and superiority of his religious beliefs” (para.
7.5 of the Views). The realization of the rights of religious minorities critically depends on
the understanding and solidarity of broader society, including of those who do not share the
same beliefs. By affirming a violation of article 19, the Committee would reinforce the
principle that the rights at stake here are not unique to any one group but are foundational to
the fabric of a pluralistic society governed by the rule of law.