Decision on merits; Subjects: CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, UZBEKISTAN; [CCPR: UNO-Pakt II, Internationaler Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte; Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques; Patto II]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.25-00929 (E)
Human Rights Committee
Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4)
of the Optional Protocol, concerning communications
No. 3155/2018, No. 3156/2018 and No. 3158/2018**, ***, ****
Communications submitted by:
Ulyana Tsoy (communication No. 3155/2018),
Aleksey Chernysh, Ramil Gareev, Ruslan
Fakhritdinov, Yulduz Ganieva and Gulnara
Anokhina (communication No. 3156/2018),
Vladislav Ushakov and Olga Ushakova
(communication No. 3158/2018) (all
represented by counsel, Shane Brady and
Haykaz Zoryan)
Alleged victims:
The authors
State party:
Uzbekistan
Dates of communications:
8 December 2017 (initial submission)
(communication No. 3155/2018) and
14 December 2017 (initial submission)
(communications No. 3155/2018 and
No. 3158/2018)
Document references:
Decisions taken pursuant to rule 92 of the
Committee’s rules of procedure, transmitted to
the State party on 25 June 2018 (not issued in
document form)
Date of adoption of Views:
24 October 2024
Subject matter:
Administrative conviction of Jehovah’s
Witnesses for unlawful possession of religious
materials
Procedural issue:
Exhaustion of domestic remedies;
substantiation of claims
* Reissued for technical reasons on 17 March 2025.
** Adopted by the Committee at its 142nd session (14 October–7 November 2024).
*** The following members of the Committee participated in the examination of the communication:
Tania María Abdo Rocholl, Wafaa Ashraf Moharram Bassim, Rodrigo A. Carazo, Mahjoub El
Haiba, Carlos Gómez Martínez, Laurence R. Helfer, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, Hernán Quezada
Cabrera, José Manuel Santos Pais, Tijana Šurlan, Kobauyah Tchamdja Kpatcha, Teraya Koji,
Hélène Tigroudja and Imeru Tamerat Yigezu.
**** A joint opinion by Committee members Carlos Gómez Martínez, Hernán Quezada Cabrera and
Imeru Tamerat Yigezu (concurring) and an individual opinion by Rodrigo A. Carazo (partially
dissenting) are annexed to the present Views.
United Nations
CCPR/C/142/D/3155/2018, CCPR/C/142/D/3156/2018
CCPR/C/142/D/3158/2018*
International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights
Distr.: General
27 February 2025
Original: English
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Substantive issues:
Interference with privacy and home; freedom
of thought, conscience and religion; freedom
of expression; freedom of assembly; freedom
of association
Articles of the Covenant:
17 (1) and (2), 18 (1) and (3), 19 (2) and (3),
21 and 22 (1) and (2)
Articles of the Optional Protocol:
2 and 5 (2) (b)
1.1
The authors of the communications are nationals of Uzbekistan: Ulyana Tsoy, born
in 1968, Aleksey Chernysh, born in 1990, Ramil Gareev, born in 1967, Ruslan
Fakhritdinov, born in 1991, Yulduz Ganieva, born in 1995, Gulnara Anokhina, born in
1967, Vladislav Ushakov, born in 1976, and Olga Ushakova, born in 1976. The authors of
the communications claim violation of their rights under articles 17 (1) and (2), 18 (1) and
(3), 19 (2) and (3), 21 and 22 (1) and (2) of the Covenant. The Optional Protocol entered
into force for Uzbekistan on 28 December 1995. The authors are represented by counsel.
1.2
On 24 October 2024, pursuant to rule 97 (3) of the Committee’s rules of procedure,
the Committee decided to consider the present communications jointly, in view of the
substantial factual and legal similarity.
Facts as submitted by the authors
2.1
The authors are Jehovah’s Witnesses. They were subjected to administrative fines
for the unlawful possession of religious publications because Jehovah’s Witnesses were
not registered as a religious organization in their places of residence. Their respective
appeals, lodged before the domestic courts, were rejected and the authors claim that they
have exhausted all available domestic remedies.
2.2
The facts relevant to each individual communication are summarized below.
Tsoy v. Uzbekistan, communication No. 3155/2018
2.3
On 15 February 2015, the author’s home was searched by the police without a valid
search warrant. The police found and seized the author’s religious books. On 10 March
2015, the Angren City Court found the author guilty under article 184 (2) of the
Administrative Liability Code for possession of two copies of the Bible, which was
declared unlawful because Jehovah’s Witnesses were not registered as a religious
organization in Angren.1 The author was fined to 7,104,000 sum (€2,583). The author’s
cassation appeal was rejected on 30 March 2015 by the Tashkent Regional Court. The
appeal court reduced her fine to 1,184,000 sum (€430). On 15 January 2016, the author
submitted a supervisory review request to the Office of the Prosecutor General. No reply
had been provided to her at the time of submission of the present communication to the
Committee.
Chernysh et al. v. Uzbekistan, communication No. 3156/2018
2.4
On 9 March 2015, the authors were stopped at the Karshi train station by the police,
who inspected their hand luggage and seized some of their personal belongings, including
a Bible, paper notebooks and mobile phones. On 1 April 2015, the Karshi City Court found
the authors guilty under article 184 (2) of the Administrative Liability Code for unlawful
possession of religious publications, because Jehovah’s Witnesses were not registered as
a religious organization in Karshi. Each of the authors was fined to 2,368,000 sum (€872).
The authors’ cassation appeal was rejected on 19 May 2015 by the Kashkadarya Regional
1 Article 184 of the Administrative Liability Code covers the unlawful production, storage, import or
distribution of religious materials. Under article 184 (2), the unlawful production, storage or import
into the territory of Uzbekistan of religious materials for the purposes of distribution, or the
distribution of religious materials, incurs a fine of between 20 and 100 times the minimum wage
for citizens or between 50 and 150 times the minimum wage for officials, with confiscation of the
materials and of the means for producing or distributing them.
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Court. On 15 January 2016, the authors submitted a supervisory review request to the
Office of the Prosecutor General. No reply had been provided to them at the time of
submission of the present communication to the Committee.
Ushakov and Ushakova v. Uzbekistan, communication No. 3158/2018
2.5
The authors are a married couple. On 2 March 2015, their home was searched by
the police without a valid search warrant. The police found and seized the authors’
religious publications and their computer and printer. On 9 March 2015, the Yunusabad
District Court in Tashkent found the authors guilty under article 184 (2) of the
Administrative Liability Code for unlawful possession of religious materials on the
grounds that Jehovah’s Witnesses were not registered as a religious organization in the city
of Tashkent. Mr. Ushakov was fined 592,000 sum (€212). Ms. Ushakova was fined
355,200 sum (€127). The authors’ cassation appeal was rejected on 27 March 2015 by the
Tashkent City Court. Their supervisory review request was rejected by the Office of the
Prosecutor General on 26 February 2016.
Complaint
3.1
The authors of the communications allege that their rights under article 17 (1) and
(2) of the Covenant were violated by an unlawful search of their homes and belongings by
the police.
3.2
The authors submit that Jehovah’s Witnesses were allowed to register their
organization in Uzbekistan only in a small town called Chirchiq in the Tashkent Region.
They argue that the police raids and administrative convictions were based solely on the
faulty premise that, because Jehovah’s Witnesses were not registered in their respective
regions, its members did not have the right to possess copies of religious literature
published by the Jehovah’s Witnesses. The authors note the Committee’s jurisprudence,
according to which legal registration is not a prerequisite to the exercise of fundamental
human rights.2 Accordingly, the authors claim that the police search, the seizure of their
personal belongings, and the subsequent administrative fines have interfered with their
rights as guaranteed by article 18 (1) and (3) of the Covenant.
3.3
The authors allege a violation of their rights under article 19 (2) and (3) of the
Covenant because their right to freely seek, receive and impart information in the form of
religious literature was subjected to a requirement of registration of the religious
organization. The authors argue that they had a right to keep and use religious literature
privately and to share it with others, if they so wished.
3.4
The authors argue that their rights under articles 21 and 22 (1) and (2) of the
Covenant were violated because the State differentiates between registered religious
organizations and religious associations that are not registered, restricting the religious
activities of believers who are not members of the former. The authors were subjected to
administrative sanctions because they were not members of a registered religious
organization.
State party’s observations on admissibility and the merits
4.1
On 19 December 2018 (communications No. 3155/2018 and No. 3156/2018) and
on 26 April 2021 (communication No. 3158/2018), the State party submitted its
observations on admissibility and the merits of the communications. Regarding the
admissibility of communications No. 3155/2018 and No. 3156/2018, the State party
submits that the decisions of the cassation courts could have been appealed to the Supreme
Court under the supervisory review proceedings.
4.2
Regarding the merits of all the communications, the State party submits that the
sanctions were imposed on the authors for the violation of the procedure for the production,
storage, import and distribution of religious literature and materials and not because of the
exercise of their right to peacefully practise their religious beliefs and hold an opinion. The
2 Reference is made to Leven v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/112/D/2131/2012), para. 9.4.
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State party submits that registration is a necessary precondition for exercising religious
activities in Uzbekistan. The Ministry of Justice is responsible for the registration of
religious organizations. The requirements for registration are transparent and set out in the
Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations. In Uzbekistan, Jehovah’s
Witnesses are officially registered in the town of Chirchik in the Tashkent region. Several
other religions are also lawfully registered. According to the conditions of registration,
organizations are allowed to conduct their activities only at their registered address. The
State party further submits that the authors did not present any argument that the
restrictions on the activities of Jehovah’s Witnesses were discriminatory in nature
compared to the conditions imposed on other religions.
4.3
The State party submits that the sanctions were imposed in accordance with the law.
The authors were sanctioned under article 184 (2) of the Administrative Liability Code,
which is in no way connected to the authors’ beliefs or their belonging to the Jehovah’s
Witnesses. The author of communication No. 3155/2018 was fined for the illegal import
and storage of religious literature. The authors of communications No. 3156/2018 and
No. 3158/2018 were sanctioned for the unlawful production of religious materials with the
intent to distribute them, contrary to the argument that the materials were intended for their
private use. The police found 16 copies of religious publications, four memory sticks and
three mobile phones containing religious propaganda materials among the belongings of
the authors of communication No. 3156/2018. The police found 60 copies of leaflets and
62 CD-ROMs and digital videodiscs in the apartment of the authors of communication
No. 3158/2018.
4.4
The State party further submits that the limitations set out in the legislation pursue
the legitimate aim of protecting public order and safety. It argues that such limitations are
necessary in a democratic society and in the specific context of the local mentality,
traditions and religion and the political and geographical specificities.3 The State party
underlines that the legal requirements are clear and accessible and that they apply to all
religions without distinction, therefore precluding any possibility of discrimination.
4.5
The State party asserts that the search and seizure of the authors’ homes and
personal belongings and the sanctions imposed on the authors were in accordance with the
domestic legislation, in particular article 17 of the Law on Police4 and articles 14 and 15
3 The State party submits that Uzbekistan is a secular State where the majority of the population are
Sunni Muslims, but that many other religions are represented, including Christianity, Judaism and
Buddhism. After the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the country experienced a
sudden surge of Islamic fundamentalism, which brought it to the brink of civil war. The State party
submits that those factors, coupled with the unrest in the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan
and Tajikistan, forced it to introduce limitations to counter extremism and fundamentalism and to
help to maintain public order and safety. The State party further submits that, with the presence of
a growing number of religious missionaries since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics representing various neo-Christian religious organizations similar to Jehovah’s
Witnesses, there has been an increase in the break-up of families due to one family member
converting to a different religion. There has been a spike in public discontent and cases of lynching
and suicide relating to religious conversion. Taking into account the tense situation in society due
to conversions and in order to protect public order and safety, the State party submits that it
decided to introduce the limitations on religious activities.
4 According to that provision, the police may enter residential and other premises, plots of land and
vehicles belonging to organizations and citizens without hindrance at any time of day or night to
suppress crimes in progress and to prosecute and detain the perpetrators, if delay could endanger
the life and health of citizens, the security of society and the State. The police may be present in the
dwellings and other premises belonging to citizens, and on plots of land belonging to them, with
their consent, in order to ensure the personal safety of citizens and public security, to prevent crime
and to detect and apprehend persons who have committed crimes or are being sought for having
committed crimes. The police may also enter the homes and other premises of citizens, with their
consent, between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. to monitor compliance with passport regulations and other
rules.
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of the Law on Operative and Investigative activities,5 which correspond to the principles
set out in the Covenant.
4.6
The State party concludes that there was no violation of the authors’ rights under
articles 17, 18 and 19. It rejects as unsubstantiated the claims under articles 21 and 22 of
the Covenant.
Authors’ comments on the State party’s observations on admissibility and the
merits
5.1
The authors submitted their comments on the State party’s observations on 17 May
2019 (communications No. 3155/2018 and No. 3156/2018) and 19 August 2021
(communication No. 3158/2018). The authors of communications No. 3155/2018 and
No. 3156/2018 submit that the supervisory review to the Supreme Court was not available
in 2016. The Administrative Liability Code was amended on 29 January 2018 by law N
LRU-463.
Those
amendments
introduced
chapter
XXIV,
which
includes
articles 324 (1)–(35), which permit the filing of an appeal to the Supreme Court.
5.2
Regarding the merits, the authors reiterate the claims raised in their respective
communications. They emphasize that the State party failed to assess the necessity and
proportionality of the restrictions placed on them. According to the logic of the State party,
any violation of the Convention is permitted if it is in accordance with the domestic laws.
State party’s additional observations
6.
In its rejoinder, submitted on 3 August 2019 in communication No. 3155/2018, the
State party, in essence, reiterated its original arguments to justify that there was no
violation of the author’s rights and that her claims were unsubstantiated.
Issues and proceedings before the Committee
Consideration of admissibility
7.1
Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must
decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is
admissible under the Optional Protocol.
7.2
The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional
Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of
international investigation or settlement.
7.3
The Committee notes the argument of the State party that the authors of
communications No. 3155/2018 and No. 3156/2018 have not exhausted the domestic
remedies since they failed to appeal the decisions of the cassation courts to the Supreme
Court under the supervisory review procedure. The Committee notes the authors’ argument
that, at the time of the submission of their complaints to the Committee, that type of appeal
was not available to them. In the absence of the State party’s argument to the contrary, the
Committee considers that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol
from examining the present communications.
7.4
The Committee finds the rest of the authors’ claims under articles 17, 18, 19, 21
and 22 sufficiently substantiated and proceeds to the considerations of the merits.
5 Article 14 allows the police to conduct an inspection of dwellings and other premises and to
visually inspect them in order to identify persons, facts and circumstances relevant for solving
tasks of operational and investigative activities. Article 15 provides several grounds for such
inspections, including when there is information that has become known regarding signs of the
preparation or commission of an offence and about persons involved in their preparation or
commission, if there are no sufficient grounds for the initiation of criminal proceedings, and when
information is available about persons, events or actions that pose a threat to the security of
individuals, society or the State.
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Considerations of the merits
8.1
The Committee has considered the communications in the light of all the
information submitted to it by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional
Protocol.
8.2
The Committee notes the authors’ claims that the State party violated their right to
privacy and the security of their homes under article 17 (1) and (2) of the Covenant when
the police entered their homes without presenting valid search warrants (communications
No. 3155/2018 and No. 3158/2018), searched their homes (communications
No. 3155/2018 and No. 3158/2018) or belongings (communication No. 3156/2018) and
confiscated religious literature and electronic equipment (communications No. 3156/2018
and No. 3158/2018). The Committee also notes the State party’s argument that the police
entered the authors’ homes or searched their belongings in accordance with domestic law
(Law on Operative and Investigative activities and the Law on Police).
8.3
Regarding the State party’s argument that the searches of the authors’ homes
conducted by the police were lawful and performed in accordance with domestic
legislation, the Committee recalls that, under article 17 of the Covenant, it is necessary for
any interference with the home to be both lawful and not arbitrary.6 The Committee recalls
that, in accordance with paragraph 1 of its general comment No. 16 (1988), the concept of
arbitrariness in article 17 is intended to guarantee that even interference provided for by
law is in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should,
in any event, be reasonable in the particular circumstances. The Committee notes that the
State party has not provided any details about any threat to public safety that prompted the
police actions. The State party has not explained why the police considered the
circumstances to be so urgent as to justify entering the authors’ homes or searching their
belongings at the train station. The Committee, therefore, considers that the police’s search
of the authors’ homes was disproportionate to the threat of harm allegedly associated with
the possession of religious literature. Consequently, the Committee concludes that the State
party has violated the authors’ rights under article 17 (1) insofar as the police arbitrarily
interfered with their homes and their privacy.
8.4
In relation to the authors’ claims under article 18 of the Covenant, the Committee,
recalling paragraph 8 of its general comment No. 22 (1993), must address the issue of
whether the said limitations on the authors’ freedom to manifest their religious beliefs were
prescribed by law and necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others, within the meaning of article 18 (3) of the
Covenant. The Committee recalls that article 18 (3) is to be interpreted strictly and that
limitations on the freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be applied only for
those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related and
proportionate to the specific needs on which they are predicated.
8.5
The Committee notes the State party’s arguments that the authors were sanctioned
under domestic law for possession of religious materials with the aim of distributing them,
which was unlawful because those actions were reserved for the members of registered
religious organizations at the place of registration. The Committee notes the State party’s
argument that the limitations placed on the authors’ rights as protected under article 18 (1)
of the Covenant pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public order and safety because
of a sudden surge of Islamic fundamentalism, unrest in neighbouring countries and the
State party’s aim of protecting the institution of the family. The Committee considers,
however, that the justifications provided by the State party are of an abstract nature, have
no direct relation to the authors’ cases and do not demonstrate how the requirement to be
legally registered in a particular city or region, prior to owning or possessing a religious
book or leaflet, are proportionate measures necessary to serve a legitimate purpose within
the meaning of article 18 (3) of the Covenant. The Committee, therefore, concludes that
such limitation does not meet the requirements of article 18 (3) and that the authors’ rights
under article 18 (1) of the Covenant have been violated.
6 Rojas Garcia v. Colombia (CCPR/C/71/D/687/1996), para. 10.3; and Nasirova et al. v. Uzbekistan
(CCPR/C/139/D/3089/2017, 3092/2018 and 3093/2018), para. 10.3.
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8.6
In the light of its finding that there has been a violation of article 18 of the Covenant,
the Committee does not deem it necessary to examine whether the same facts constitute a
violation of articles 19, 21 and 22 of the Covenant.7
9.
The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view
that the facts before it disclose a violation by the State party of the authors’ rights under
articles 17 and 18 of the Covenant.
10.
Pursuant to article 2 (3) (a) of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation
to provide the authors with an effective remedy. This requires it to make full reparation to
individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. Accordingly, the State party is
obligated, inter alia, to provide the authors with adequate compensation, including the
reimbursement of any legal costs that they have incurred and of the fines paid. The State
party is also under the obligation to take all steps necessary to prevent similar violations
from occurring in the future.
11.
Bearing in mind that, by becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party
has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a
violation of the Covenant and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State party
has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective and enforceable remedy
when it has been determined that a violation has occurred, the Committee wishes to receive
from the State party, within 180 days, information about the measures taken to give effect
to the Committee’s Views. The State party is also requested to publish the present Views
and to have them widely disseminated in the official languages of the State party.
7 Nasirova et al. v. Uzbekistan, para. 10.7.
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Annex I
[Original: Spanish]
Joint opinion of Committee members Carlos Gómez Martínez, Hernán
Quezada Cabrera and Imeru Tamerat Yigezu (concurring)
1.
We fully agree with the Committee’s conclusion that the facts of which it has been
apprised constitute violations by the State party of the authors’ rights under articles 17 and
18 of the Covenant, as the police arbitrarily interfered with the authors’ homes and their
privacy and as they were sanctioned for possession of religious materials that they intended
to distribute despite not being members of a duly registered religious organization.
2.
As some members of the Committee pointed out during the consideration of the
communication, however, the Committee should have provided adequate reasoning for its
decision, set forth in paragraph 8.6 of its Views, to the effect that, having found that there
has been a violation of article 18 of the Covenant, it is not necessary to examine whether the
same facts constitute a violation of articles 19, 21 and 22.
3.
In our view, it could thus be understood that article 18 of the Covenant, which the
Committee found to have been violated, constitutes lex specialis in respect of the violation
of article 19 – that is, that the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief is a particular or
specific form of freedom of expression. That is our personal interpretation, however, and it
cannot take the place of the reasoning that the Committee should have provided in order to
decide not to consider separately the authors’ claims under article 19 of the Covenant.1
4.
With regard to possible violations of articles 21 or 22 of the Covenant, which the
Committee also decided not to consider, we are of the view that the information submitted in
the individual complaint on a possible violation of the rights of peaceful assembly and
freedom of association is insufficient for admissibility purposes under article 2 of the
Optional Protocol and that it should therefore have been declared inadmissible.
1 For examples of such reasoning in decisions, in which, as in the present Views, it is deemed
unnecessary to consider separately possible violations of a given provision, see, inter alia, Benhadj v.
Algeria (CCPR/C/90/D/1173/2003), para. 8.5, and the following judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights: Ezelin v. France, 26 April 1991, para. 35, Kudła v. Poland, 26 October 2000,
para. 146, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania, 17 July 2014,
para. 156, and Mehmet Hatip Dicle v. Turkey, 15 October 2013, para. 41.
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Annex II
[Original: Spanish]
Individual opinion of Committee member Rodrigo A. Carazo (partially
dissenting)
1.
I endorse paragraphs 1–3 of the joint opinion (concurring) of Committee members
Carlos Gómez Martínez, Hernán Quezada Cabrera and Imeru Tamerat Yigezu.
2.
I disagree with paragraph 4 of the opinion and write separately on the subject. Not
only do the facts of the case constitute violations of collective rights (articles 21 and 22 of
the Covenant) but in this case and the hundreds of similar cases that the Committee has
considered (and many others pending before it) it is also clear that a specific minority in
Uzbekistan (dozens of cases) and other countries in the region faces persecution. The
Committee should have considered whether there was a violation of article 27 in relation to
a specific religious minority.
3.
It is undeniable that the Committee has a pedagogical obligation that it must fulfil in
its decisions. It is also consistent with its mandate for it to ascertain, in all circumstances,
whether there are persons deprived of such human rights in any of the States Parties to the
Covenant. Communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any of
the rights set forth in the Covenant are, pursuant to the Optional Protocol, an appropriate
means of understanding rights holders’ views of whether or not their rights are being upheld.
4.
The consideration of communications makes it possible to identify trends in and
patterns of human rights violations by States Parties. Such is the case with the measures taken
by Uzbekistan in relation to people known and regarded as Jehovah’s Witnesses. Since 2017
and 2018, the Committee has registered a large number of cases against Uzbekistan for
violations of the rights of persons identified as Jehovah’s Witnesses, cases that, like the
present case, were resolved in view of the existence of violations of the rights enshrined in
article 18 of the Covenant (freedom of religion). The violations are constant, similar and
constitute disturbing and undeniable patterns, and the State Party attempts to justify them in
its replies to the Committee. Unreasonable restrictions are repeatedly placed on the exercise
of freedom of religion, as the Committee has learned, to the detriment of persons identified
as members of this religious minority in the country. It must be mentioned that, during the
same period, claims of similar patterns of restrictions involving other States Parties in the
geographic region have been made before the Committee.
5.
I am of the view that it is urgent to define these violations – considered and ruled on
one by one by the Human Rights Committee and for which a number of States Parties in the
region have been sanctioned – as an unequivocal manifestation of the prevailing denial to
(all) persons belonging to a religious minority of their right, clearly set forth in article 27 of
the Covenant, to profess and practise their own religion in community with the other
members of their group. This collective right is made invisible in the consideration of this
communication. The damage to some of the trees is noted, but that they are part of a forest in
which the basic rights not only of individuals but also of a religious minority are violated is
overlooked. Article 27 of the Covenant was drafted to be respected by States Parties, and the
Human Rights Committee was established and made competent to address such serious
violations as those highlighted in this dissenting opinion. The Committee, in making a
determination in connection with this complaint and all those that are similar despite being
specific to different States Parties, should strongly urge the State Party concerned to put an
end to the disproportionate persecution of minority groups, including Jehovah’s Witnesses,
for exercising, in community with the other members of their group, their rights to profess
and practise their religion.