CCPR/C/130/D/2845/2016

GE.21-00662(E)

Human Rights Committee

Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the

Optional Protocol, concerning communication

No. 2845/2016*, **

Communication submitted by:

Rahima Huseynova, (represented by counsels,

Daniel Gordon Pole and Petr Muzny)

Alleged victim:

The author

State party:

Azerbaijan

Date of communication:

23 September 2016 (initial submission)

Document references:

Decision taken pursuant to rule 92 of the

Committee’s rules of procedure, transmitted to

the State party on 14 November 2016 (not issued

in document form)

Date of adoption of views:

14 October 2020

Subject matter:

Arrest and fine imposed on Jehovah’s Witness

for religious activities

Procedural issues:

Exhaustion of domestic remedies; admissibility –

manifestly ill-founded

Substantive issues:

Freedom of religion; unlawful interference;

discrimination; freedom of thought, conscience

or religion; freedom of expression; freedom of

opinion

Articles of the Covenant:

18 (1), 19 (1) and (2), 26 and 27

Articles of the Optional Protocol:

2 and 5 (2) (b)

1.

The author of the communication, dated 23 September 2016, is Rahima Huseynova,

a citizen of Azerbaijan, born in 1963. The author claims to be a victim of violations by

Azerbaijan of her rights under articles 18 (1), 19 (1) and (2), 26 and 27 of the Covenant. The

author is represented by counsels, Daniel Gordon Pole and Petr Muzny.

* Adopted by the Committee at its 130th session (12 October–6 November 2020).

** The following members of the Committee participated in the examination of the communication:

Yadh Ben Achour, Arif Bulkan, Ahmed Amin Fathalla, Furuya Shuichi, Christof Heyns, Bamariam

Koita, Marcia V.J. Kran, Duncan Laki Muhumuza, David H. Moore, Photini Pazartzis, Hernán

Quezada Cabrera, Vasilka Sancin, José Manuel Santos Pais, Yuval Shany, Hélène Tigroudja, Andreas

Zimmermann and Gentian Zyberi.

United Nations

CCPR/C/130/D/2845/2016

International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights

Distr.: General

19 January 2021

Original: English

CCPR/C/130/D/2845/2016

2

Facts as submitted by the author

2.1

The author became a Jehovah’s Witness in 2005, a Christian minority religion in

Azerbaijan, which is a predominantly Muslim State. The author is however not a member of

the legal entity entitled the Religious Community of Jehovah’s Witnesses which is registered

as required under the Law on Freedom of Religious Beliefs.1

2.2

On 8 December 2014, the author was walking on a street near her home, engaged two

men in friendly conversation about her religious beliefs and referred them to a publicly

accessible website of Jehovah’s Witnesses that she thought they would find interesting. As

she walked away, a uniformed police officer stopped her and asked what she was doing. He

called another police officer and ordered her to accompany them to the police station. While

in police custody, she was subjected to intimidation aimed at persuading her to abandon her

personal convictions and adopt the Islamic faith. She was charged with the offence of

carrying out religious activities not from a registered address under article 299.0.4 of the

Code of Administrative Offences. 2 The same day, she was brought before a judge and

requested more time to familiarize herself with the case. The judge adjourned the hearing and

rescheduled it for 22 December 2014.

2.3

On 22 December 2014, the author filed a motion to dismiss the charge, asking the

court to compel Azerbaijan to respect domestic and international law protecting her freedoms

of religion and expression. She specifically pleaded that the charge violated her rights under

the Covenant and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights). On 26 December 2014, the Baku district

court found her guilty of committing the offence of carrying out a religious activity not at a

registered address under article 299.0.4 of the Code of Administrative Offences. She was

ordered to pay a fine of 1,500 manats.3

2.4

On 29 January 2015, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal lodged by the author

on 26 December 2014 with no further domestic remedy being available.

2.5

The author explains that article 12 of the Law on Freedom of Religious Beliefs which

formed the basis of the charge against her, bars a religious association from engaging in

religious activities unless it is from its legal address. The author further explains that

intolerance in Azerbaijan for the religious activity of Jehovah’s Witnesses has extended to

censoring the importation of religious publications and prohibiting even informal religious

meetings outside of the city of Baku. In her case, the evidence accepted by both courts was

that she had merely spoken to two people about her beliefs and suggested a website they

might look at. Both courts found this act illegal because she had “carried out propaganda, by

distributing papers preaching the activity of the Religious Community of Jehovah’s

Witnesses outside the registered legal address of the Religious Community, that is to say

outside of their place of worship”. The author states that there was no evidence that she had

distributed any “papers”, and that even if she had done so, neither that nor any of the other

actions described are against the law.

Complaint

3.1

The author submits that Azerbaijan violated her rights under article 18 (1) of the

Covenant because she was denied her right to manifest her individual freedom of religious

1 The author provides a copy of an attestation from the Religious Community of Jehovah’s Witnesses

stating that she is not a member. The document was also presented to the domestic courts.

2 According to a translation provided by the author, article 299.0.4 of the Code of Administrative

Offences states that “carrying out of activities by religious associations in places outside the

registered legal address” entails a penalty in the amount of 1,500–2,000 manats for natural persons

and 7,000–8,000 manats for officials. The court found that according to article 12 of the Law on

Freedom of Religious Beliefs, any religious association may operate only after being registered with

the relevant executive authority and entered in the State register of religious associations. Religious

associations may operate at places of worship specified in the information presented for State

registration at their legal address and after a religious minister has been appointed to the association

by the religious centre or office. According to the court, the violation committed by the author under

article 299.0.4 of the Code of Administrative Offences is fully proven by the evidence.

3 This amount corresponds to approximately 1,436 euros at the time of the conviction.

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belief by discussing her beliefs. She argues that the police initiated an unlawful investigation

and that she was then prosecuted and convicted simply because she had publicly expressed

her religious beliefs. She further argues that the police and the courts used the Law on

Freedom of Religious Beliefs and the Code of Administrative Offences to create an offence

and that the Law was applied to restrict her right to speak about religion in a location other

than the registered address of a religious group. She stresses that in any case, as she is not a

member of the legal entity Religious Community of Jehovah’s Witnesses, her conduct was

an individual exercise of her personal right to freedom of religious belief and not a collective

religious activity. According to the author, the domestic courts failed to recognize and uphold

her right to freedom of religious belief, her right to “freedom of thought and speech” and the

right “to legally seek, receive, pass, prepare and spread information” as set out in the

Constitution of Azerbaijan.4 The author argues that the court also ignored the fact that the

police action contravened the Covenant and other international human rights instruments that

Azerbaijan is obliged to uphold.

3.2

The author refers to the Committee’s general comment No. 22 (1993) and maintains

that her personal beliefs pose no threat to anyone and constitute an exercise of her

fundamental freedom of religious belief, and that discussing a publicly accessible website is

in no way offensive. She refers to the jurisprudence of the Committee in which it recognized

that “the right to freedom to manifest one’s beliefs in worship, observance, practice and

teaching encompasses a broad range of acts”,5 which squarely includes the right to talk to

others about a belief or refer others to a website. She argues that the interference with her

freedom of religious belief cannot be justified, is not prescribed by law and does not pursue

a legitimate aim and therefore does not meet the criteria of article 18 (3) of the Covenant.

The Code of Administrative Offences does not apply to individuals exercising their right to

practise their religion, but rather to religious associations. She has a constitutional right to

profess religion alone or together with others and to freely gather with others6 and the Law

on Freedom of Religious Beliefs guarantees the right either on their own, or together with

others to practise any religion and express or spread his or her belief regarding his or her

attitude towards religion.7 She recalls that, according to the Committee, restricting the right

to manifest one’s religious beliefs to the approved legal address of a religious association

only “must be assessed in the light of the consequences which arise for the authors and their

religious association”.8 Such a limitation must be proven by the State to be “necessary for the

purposes of article 18, paragraph 3”,9 which was not proven by the State party in the present

case. In addition, there was no evidence before the domestic courts that the author

manifesting her religion “was either threatening, unduly disruptive or otherwise likely to

jeopardise public order”.10

3.3

The author further submits that Azerbaijan violated its obligations under article 19 (1)

and (2) of the Covenant by prohibiting the right to freedom of expression without any

legitimate legal justification and without justifying its actions. She claims that the State party

assumed a power under the Code of Administrative Offences, in conjunction with the Law

on Freedom of Religious Beliefs, to attempt to limit the freedom of expression of the author

to the geographic location of the legal address of a religious association, ignoring the fact

that the author was not even a member of the legal entity of that religious association. The

author argues that the expression of her religious beliefs constitutes an important aspect of

her freedom of religion. The author notes that the requirements that a religious association

have a legal address may on the face of it be legitimate but cannot be used to restrict freedom

of expression. In addition, according to the jurisprudence of the Committee, “such a system

4 The author refers to articles 47, 48 and 50 of the Constitution.

5 Malakhovsky and Pikul v. Belarus (CCPR/C/84/D/1207/2003), para. 7.2.

6 Articles 48 (2) and 49 (1) of the Constitution.

7 In her motion filed on 22 December 2014, the author adds that the same article states that freedom of

religion can be limited only in cases provided for by law and important in a democratic society for the

benefit of public security, namely guaranteeing public order, the protection of health or morals, or the

rights and freedoms of other individuals.

8 Malakhovsky and Pikul v. Belarus, para. 7.4.

9 Ibid., para. 7.6.

10 Coleman v. Australia (CCPR/C/87/D/1157/2003), para. 7.3.

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must not operate in a way that is incompatible with article 19 of the Covenant”.11 As argued

under the provisions of article 18 (1) of the Covenant, the author also submits that

interference with her freedom of expression cannot be justified, is not prescribed by law and

does not pursue a legitimate aim and therefore does not meet “the strict tests of necessity and

proportionality”.12

3.4

The author submits that Azerbaijan failed to protect her from discrimination and

unequal treatment, given that she is part of a minority in her country, in violation of articles

26 and 27 of the Covenant. She argues that the domestic courts differentiated between her

rights to be exercised at the registered address of a religious association compared to her

rights being exercised away from such an address. The Court of Appeal determined that her

rights depended on the registration of the religion with which she was associated and was

limited to a specific geographic location. Consequently, if the author had no religious

affiliation, there would be no requirement to register. She was therefore penalized for her

association by a consequential limitation of her rights. She concludes that she was treated in

an unequal and discriminatory way owing to her affiliation with a specific religious minority.

3.5

The author requests the Committee to provide an effective remedy in full recognition

of her rights under the Covenant, as required by article 2 (3), by (a) providing her with

suitable monetary compensation for the moral damages suffered; (b) reversing any monetary

penalty imposed and returning the amount with interest on the amount paid; and (c)

reimbursing her legal costs and fees.

State party’s observations on admissibility and the merits

4.1

On 4 July 2017, the State party submitted its observations on the admissibility and the

merits of the communication and reiterated the facts. The State party explains that the author

was taken to the police station and then sent to court, accused of conducting illegal

propaganda and agitation in front of a secondary school in the Sabunchu district of Baku,

where she was distributing leaflets about the activities of Jehovah’s Witnesses, away from

the registered place of worship.

4.2

On 26 December 2014, the Sabunchu district court ruled that the author was guilty of

an offence under article 299.0.4 of the Code of Administrative Offences for conducting

religious activities in a location other than at the registered legal address of a religious

association, for which she should pay a fine of 1,500 manats.

4.3

On 29 January 2015, the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the author’s appeal and

upheld the decision of the Sabunchu district court.

4.4

The State party submits that pursuant to article 12 of the Law on Freedom of Religious

Beliefs, all religious institutions can operate only after they have been registered by the State

and they can only function at the place of worship that is indicated as their legal address in

the State registration.

Author’s comments on the State party’s submission

5.1

On 16 August 2017, the author submitted that in its observations the State party did

not dispute the facts set out in the her communication. She therefore argues that those facts

should be accepted as established. She also notes that the State party has not made any

objection to the admissibility of the communication.

5.2

The author notes that the State party incorrectly described her conduct as “illegal

propaganda and agitation in front of a secondary school”. She argues that this is inconsistent

with the findings of the domestic courts.13 In addition, the police did not adduce any evidence

regarding the distribution of illegal material or causing agitation.

11 Levinov v. Belarus, (CCPR/C/105/D/1867/2009, 1936, 1975, 1977-1981, 2010/2010), para. 10.3.

12 Turchenyak v. Belarus (CCPR/C/108/D/1948/2010 and Corr.1), para. 7.7.

13 The Sabunchu district court found on 26 December 2014 that the author was carrying out propaganda

by distributing papers preaching the activity of the Religious Community of Jehovah’s Witnesses

away from the registered legal address of the Religious Community, namely in a location other than

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5.3

The author notes that the State party failed to explain the legal basis for its objection

since it only referred to article 12 of the Law on Freedom of Religious Beliefs, which limits

religious institutions to operating in places of worship only. The State party failed to explain

how the author violated the law by not operating at a registered place of worship since she

was not a member of any religious association.

5.4

The author refers to the jurisprudence of the Committee to remind the Committee that

the State party may not defend a violation of international human rights by merely asserting

that it was following domestic law.14

5.5

The author submits that the State party admitted the arrest, detention and conviction

of the author were based on her religious beliefs. In addition, the State party’s claims of

illegal activity or agitation had not been relied upon as a fact in either the trial or the decision

of the Court of Appeal.

5.6

The author asserts that the claims of the State party before the Committee regarding

the situation of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Azerbaijan and that they are allowed to operate freely

and are registered in Azerbaijan, are not true (CCPR/C/AZE/Q4/Add.1, para. 159).

5.7

The author recalls the concern recently expressed by the Committee about the reported

interference in religious activities, the harassment of members of religious groups, including

Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the increase in arrests, detentions and administrative or criminal

sanctions against them and that the Committee has called on the State party to “guarantee the

effective exercise of freedom of religion and belief in practice and refrain from any action

that may restrict that freedom beyond the narrowly construed restrictions permitted under

article 18 of the Covenant” (CCPR/C/AZE/CO/4, paras. 32–33).

5.8

The author argues that the fine imposed was severe and that international standards

require that punishment should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the

circumstances of the offender. In the present case, the author is a single unemployed woman

for whom the amount of the fine was insurmountable.15

5.9

The author reiterates her request to the Committee that the communication should be

considered admissible, with findings of violations of articles 18 (1), 19 (1) and (2), 26 and

27 of the Covenant.

State party’s further observations

6.1

On 5 April 2018, the State party submitted its additional observations and reiterated

the information included in its previous observations.

6.2

The State party submits that its national legislation and relevant articles of the

European Convention on Human Rights allow human rights and freedoms to be limited.

6.3

The State party reiterates that article 48 of the Constitution gives everyone the right

to freedom of conscience and to profess and participate in the religion of his or her choice,

or to profess no religion. According to article 1 of the Law on Freedom of Religious Beliefs,

that freedom may be subject only to limitations prescribed by law and necessary in a

democratic society to protect public safety, order, health, morals, or the fundamental right

and freedoms of others. Therefore, and as with some other human rights, the right to express

one’s belief and views and to practise religion is not an absolute right.

6.4

The State party submits that article 18 (3) of the Covenant and article 9 of the

European Convention on Human Rights state that freedom to manifest one’s religion or

beliefs may be subject to some limitations if they are prescribed by law and are necessary to

protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedom of others.

It also submits that the Committee states the same in its general comment No. 22.

its place of worship. The district court did not provide any evidence that the author was distributing

papers.

14 The author refers to Leven v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/112/D/2131/2012), para. 9.4.

15 The author stresses that the maximum fine the judge could impose was 2,000 manats. According to

the table of nominal real incomes of the population issued by the State Statistical Committee of

Azerbaijan, the average monthly wage in 2015 for the entire country was 466.9 manats.

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6.5

The State party submits that the European Court of Human Rights has demonstrated

that, when necessary, the State has the right to set certain restrictions and the discretion to

evaluate the right to freedom in article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.16

The European Court of Human Rights has also noted that restrictions might be necessary in

a democratic society where a number of religions exist among the same population for the

purpose of ensuring respect for people’s beliefs and coordinating the interests of various

groups.17

6.6

The State party recalls that article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights

has established three standards for determining whether a restriction is justifiable and whether

there has been a violation. These are (a) the existence of a legal purpose for the restriction,

(b) the lawfulness of the measure and (c) its necessity in a democratic society. The State party

argues that this means that any restriction must meet two requirements: to be accurate and

concise. The State party further argues that as envisaged by the Convention, limitations to

religious freedom, regardless of its form, may be “prescribed by law”.

Issues and proceedings before the Committee

Consideration of admissibility

7.1

Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must

decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is

admissible under the Optional Protocol.

7.2

The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional

Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international

investigation or settlement.

7.3

The Committee observes that the State party has not contested the author’s argument

that she exhausted all available domestic remedies, as required by article 5 (2) (b) of the

Optional Protocol. The Committee notes that the author lodged an appeal against the decision

of the Sabunchu district court before the Baku Court of Appeal and that she raised the

substance of her allegations under articles 18, 19, 26 and 27 of the Covenant. Accordingly,

the Committee considers that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol

from examining those claims.

7.4

With respect to the author’s claims under articles 26 and 27 of the Covenant, the

Committee notes that the author has not provided details about the ways in which she has

been discriminated against as belonging to a religious minority in Azerbaijan. 18 The

Committee considers that these claims are therefore insufficiently substantiated for purposes

of admissibility and are inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.

7.5

The Committee considers that the author has sufficiently substantiated her claims

under articles 18 (1) and 19 (1) and (2) of the Covenant for the purposes of admissibility. It

therefore declares the communication admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the

merits.

16 The State party refers to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of

Vallianatos and others v. Greece, applications Nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09 (November 2013).

17 The State party refers to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of

Kokkinakis v. Greece, application No. 14307/88 (May 1993).

18 With regard to the author’s claim that the State party violated her rights under articles 26 and 27 of

the Covenant, the author only mentioned that she was discriminated against owing to her religious

affiliation. Although she mentioned in the documents that she provided to the domestic courts that she

was told by the police that she should preach the Qur’an and that she was discriminated against by the

police because she was a Jehovah’s Witness, she did not make any reference to these allegations in

her communication to the Committee, nor did she give any details as to why the conduct of the police

and of the State party amounted to discrimination because of her faith.

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Consideration of the merits

8.1

The Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the

information made available to it by the parties, as required under article 5 (1), of the Optional

Protocol.

8.2

The Committee notes the author’s claims that the State party violated her rights under

article 18 (1) of the Covenant because she was apprehended, detained and convicted of an

administrative offence for which she was fined 1,500 manats (approximately 1,400 euros)

for merely discussing her religious beliefs with two men on the street away from a place of

worship. The Committee also notes the argument of the author that she was acting

individually and not within the context of a religious association and could not in that regard

discuss any matter within a place of worship as she is not a member of the legal entity the

Religious Community of Jehovah’s Witnesses. The Committee further notes the argument of

the author that the fact that she is only permitted to express her religious beliefs within a

place of worship falls outside the permissible limitations set out in article 18 (3) of the

Covenant. The Committee notes the argument of the State party that according to its domestic

law, the author cannot carry out religious activities in a location other than a registered place

of worship and that the freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject to some

limitations, as set out in article 18 (3) of the Covenant.

8.3

The Committee recalls its general comment No. 22, according to which article 18 of

the Covenant does not permit any limitation whatsoever on freedom of thought and

conscience or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice. Freedom

to manifest religion or belief may be exercised either individually or in community with

others and in public or in private. As such, the Committee considers that the author’s claims

relate to her right to manifest her religious beliefs and that her arrest, detention, conviction

and fine constitute limitations of that right. 19 The Committee must address the issue of

whether the said limitations on the author’s right to manifest her religious beliefs were

“necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the fundamental rights and

freedoms of others” within the meaning of article 18 (3) of the Covenant.

8.4

In the present case, the limitations placed on the author’s right to manifest her

religious beliefs stem from the requirement under article 299.0.4 of the Code of

Administrative Offences that activities are not carried out by religious associations in places

other than at their registered legal address, as well as under article 12 of the Law on Freedom

of Religious Beliefs, which states that any religious association may operate only after being

registered with the relevant executing authority and that religious associations may worship

at their legal address only. The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the author

was causing agitation by conducting propaganda and distributing papers in front of a

secondary school. While the State party has noted that article 18 (3) of the Covenant permits

certain restrictions on the right to manifest one’s religion or beliefs in order to protect the

fundamental rights and freedoms of others, the Committee observes that such protection

requires that the specific fundamental rights and persons that are affected be identified.20 The

Committee recalls that according to its general comment No. 22, article 18 (3) is to be

interpreted strictly and limitations on the freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may

only be applied for those purposes for which they are prescribed and must be directly related

and proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated. In the present case, the

Committee notes that the documents of the domestic courts do not provide any indication

that the author’s behaviour was conducive of agitation and that the State party has not

provided any details, explanations or arguments as to why she should be punished for such

activity. The Committee also notes that the State party has not provided any evidence

indicating that the peaceful discussion of or the distribution of papers relating to the author’s

religious beliefs threatened public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights

and freedoms of others. The Committee considers that the State party has neither identified

any specific fundamental rights or freedoms of others that were affected by the author’s

behaviour in discussing her religious beliefs or distributing papers in front of a secondary

school. The Committee recalls that in its general comment No. 22, it found that “the practice

19 General comment No. 22, para. 4.

20 Ibid., para. 8; see also Malakhovsky and Pikul v. Belarus, para. 7.3.

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and teaching of religion or belief includes acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of

their basic affairs … and the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts or publications”

(para. 4). The Committee also notes that although the State party mentions that the author

was distributing papers in front of a secondary school, which she denies, it has not argued or

established that the author was trying to convert any individual who was not an adult (see,

for example, A/60/399, paras. 63–67). Accordingly, the Committee considers that the State

party has not provided a sufficient basis to demonstrate that the restrictions imposed were

permissible under article 18 (3) of the Covenant.

8.5

The Committee also notes that the State party has not argued how the domestic law

cited above applies to the author as an individual. The Committee further observes that the

State party has not described any context, or provided any example, in which there was a

specific and significant threat to public order and safety that would justify the blanket ban on

religious activities in a location other than that of a registered religious organization, nor how

this would apply to individuals. Even if the State party could demonstrate the existence of a

specific and significant threat to public safety and order, the Committee considers that the

State party has failed to demonstrate that the prohibition of religious activities in a location

other than a place of worship under article 299.0.4 of the Code of Administrative Offences

was proportionate to that objective, in view of its considerable limitation on the freedom to

manifest one’s religion. The Committee further considers that the State party has not

attempted to demonstrate that the prohibition of religious activities in a location other than a

place of worship is the least restrictive measure necessary to ensure protection of the freedom

of religion or belief.

8.6

The Committee observes that during domestic proceedings, the Sabunchu district

court upheld the author’s convictions and fines on the grounds that carrying out propaganda

by distributing papers preaching the activity of the Religious Community of Jehovah’s

Witnesses in a location other than the registered legal address of the Community violated

article 12 of the Law on Freedom of Religious Beliefs, as religious associations may only

operate at their legally registered places of worship. The Committee recalls that article 18 (1)

of the Covenant protects the right of all members of a religious congregation to manifest their

religion in community with others, in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 21 The

Committee considers that the justifications provided by the district court do not demonstrate

how the general prohibition against carrying out religious propaganda on the street or the

distribution of papers by an individual were proportionate measures necessary to serve a

legitimate purpose within the meaning of article 18 (3) of the Covenant. The Committee notes

that the district court did not advance any arguments or details as to why the author’s religious

activities violated the rights pertaining to the beliefs of other individuals. The Committee

therefore concludes that the punishment imposed on the author amounted to a limitation of

her right to manifest her religion under article 18 (1) of the Covenant and that neither the

domestic authorities nor the State party have demonstrated that the limitation represented a

proportionate measure necessary to serve a legitimate purpose, as identified in article 18 (3)

of the Covenant. Accordingly, the Committee concludes that by taking her into custody,

convicting and fining the author for carrying out religious activities away from a registered

place of worship, the State party violated her rights under article 18 (1) of the Covenant.

8.7

In the light of these findings, the Committee does not deem it necessary to examine

whether the same facts also constitute a violation of article 19 (1) and (2) of the Covenant.

9.

The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view that

the facts before it disclose a violation of the author’s rights under article 18 (1) of the

Covenant.

10.

Pursuant to article 2 (3) (a) of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to

provide the author with an effective remedy. This requires it to make full reparation to

individuals whose rights under the Covenant have been violated. Accordingly, the State party

is obligated to, inter alia, provide the author with adequate compensation, including by

reimbursing her for the fine imposed and for court fees related to the case in question. The

State party is also under an obligation to take all steps necessary to prevent similar violations

21 See, inter alia, Leven v. Kazakhstan, para. 9.4.

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from occurring in the future, including by reviewing its domestic legislation, regulations

and/or practices with a view to ensuring that the rights under article 18 of the Covenant may

be fully enjoyed in the State party.

11.

Bearing in mind that, by becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party

has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a

violation of the Covenant or not and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State party

has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction

the rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective remedy when it has been

determined that a violation has occurred, the Committee wishes to receive from the State

party, within 180 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to the

Committee’s Views. The State party is also requested to publish the present Views and

disseminate them widely in the official languages of the State party.