Decision; Subjects: CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, LIBYA, TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL TREATMENT; [CCPR: UNO-Pakt II, Internationaler Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte; Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques; Patto II]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
GE.12-43220
Human Rights Committee
Communication No. 1755/2008
Views adopted by the Committee at its 104th session,
12–30 March 2012
Submitted by:
Ashraf Ahmad El Hagog Jumaa (represented by
counsel, Liesbeth Zegveld)
Alleged victim:
The author
State party:
Libya
Date of communication:
7 January 2008 (initial submission)
Document references:
Special
Rapporteur’s
rule
97
decision,
transmitted to the State party on 25 January 2008
(not issued in document form)
Date of adoption of Views:
19 March 2012
Subject matter:
Alleged torture of author and death penalty
imposed after an unfair trial
Substantive issue:
Torture, unfair
trial, arbitrary arrest and
detention; death penalty imposed following
unfair trial
Procedural issue:
Non-substantiation of allegations
Articles of the Covenant:
6; 7; 9; 10; 14
Article of the Optional Protocol:
2
United Nations
CCPR/C/104/D/1755/2008
International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights
Distr.: General
4 June 2012
Original: English
CCPR/C/104/D/1755/2008
2
Annex
Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5,
paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political rights (104th session)
concerning
Communication No. 1755/2008* **
Submitted by:
Ashraf Ahmad El Hagog Jumaa (represented by
counsel, Liesbeth Zegveld)
Alleged victim:
The author
State party:
Libya
Date of communication:
7 January 2008 (initial submission)
The Human Rights Committee, established under article 28 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Meeting on 19 March 2012,
Having concluded its consideration of communication No. 1755/2008, submitted to
the Human Rights Committee by Ashraf Ahmad El Hagog Jumaa, under the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Having taken into account all written information made available to it by the author
of the communication and the State party,
Adopts the following:
Views under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol
1.1
The author of the communication is Ashraf Ahmad El Hagog Jumaa, a Bulgarian
national of Palestinian origin, born on 25 October 1969 in Alexandria, Egypt. He claims to
be a victim of violation by Libya of articles 6, 7, 9, 10 and 14 of the Covenant. He is
represented by Liesbeth Zegveld. The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State
Party on 16 May 1989.
* The following members of the Committee participated in the examination of the present
communication: Mr. Lazhari Bouzid, Mr. Ahmad Amin Fathalla, Mr. Cornelis Flinterman, Mr. Yuji
Iwasawa, Mr. Walter Kaelin, Mr. Rajsoomer Lallah, Ms. Zonke Zanele Majodina, Ms. Iulia
Antoanella Motoc, Mr. Gerald L. Neuman, Mr. Michael O’Flaherty, Mr. Rafael Rivas Posada,
Sir Nigel Rodley, Mr. Fabian Omar Salvioli, Mr. Marat Sarsembayev, Mr. Krister Thelin and
Ms. Margo Waterval.
** The text of one individual opinion (partially dissenting), signed by Committee member Fabían Omar
Salvioli, is appended to the present Views.
CCPR/C/104/D/1755/2008
3
1.2
On 17 April 2008, the Committee, acting through its Special Rapporteur on New
Communications and Interim Measures, decided to examine the admissibility of the
communication separately from the merits.
The facts as presented by the author
2.1
The author was, until his arrival in Bulgaria on 24 July 2007, a stateless person of
Palestinian origin. He and his family had been living in Libya since 4 September 1972. At
the beginning of the events at the basis of the case, the author was a graduate medical
student at Benghazi University, Libya. Since 1998, he had worked as an intern in El-Fatah
paediatric hospital in Benghazi.
2.2
On 29 January 1999, the author was arrested. He was accused of premeditated
murder and causing an epidemic by injecting 393 children in Al-Fatah paediatric hospital
with HIV.
2.3
During the interrogations, the author was allegedly compelled to confess guilt under
torture. Methods of torture allegedly included extensive use of electric shocks on legs, feet,
hands and chest while stretched naked on a steel bed; beatings on the soles of the feet;
being hung by the hands; creation of a sensation of suffocation and strangulation; being
suspended from a height by the arms; being threatened of attack by dogs while blindfolded;
beatings on the body; injection of drugs; sleep deprivation; sensory isolation; very hot or
ice-cold showers; being held in overcrowded cells; being blinded by bright lights. The
author was allegedly subjected to anal rape. His confession triggered a wave of arrests of, in
particular, Bulgarian medical personnel in Libya.
2.4
On 9 February 1999, 23 Bulgarian nationals, working in different hospitals in
Benghazi, including the Al-Fatah paediatric hospital, were arrested by Libyan police
without being informed of the grounds for their arrest. Seventeen of them were released on
16 February 1999. The author and five co-accused Bulgarian nurses1 were allegedly
tortured repeatedly for approximately two months. After they confessed, torture became
less frequent, but still continued. One of the five nurses arrested on 9 February 1999,
Kristyana Valcheva, had never worked at Al-Fatah paediatric hospital.
2.5
On 15 May 1999, the case was referred to the Public Prosecution Office, which
brought the following charges against the author and the five co-accused: commission of
acts against the Libyan sovereignty, leading to the indiscriminate killing of people for the
purpose of subversion of State security (capital offence); involvement in a conspiracy and
collusion for the commission of the above premeditated crimes; deliberately causing an
epidemic by injecting 393 children at Al-Fatah hospital with the AIDS virus (capital
offence); premeditated murder through the use of substances which cause death, by
injecting children with the AIDS virus (capital offence); and commission of acts contrary to
Libyan law and traditions (such as illegal production of alcohol, drinking alcohol in public
places, illegal transaction in foreign currency, illicit sexual relationships). On 16 May 1999,
the author and the five co-accused were, for the first time, brought before the Public
Prosecution Office, approximately four months after their arrest. They were subsequently
brought before the Prosecutor every 30 to 45 days.
First trial
2.6
The trial before the People’s Court (the Extraordinary Court for crimes against the
State) began on 7 February 2000. The first time the author was granted access to a lawyer
1 Kristyana Venelinova Valcheva, Nasya Stoycheva Nenova, Valentina Manolova Siropulo, Valya
Georgieva Chervenyashka and Snezhanka Ivanova Dimitrova.
CCPR/C/104/D/1755/2008
4
was on 17 February 2000, 10 days after the start of the trial. At that time, he raised the
torture allegations in court. He was never given an opportunity to speak to his lawyer freely
as State representatives were always present during their meetings. On 20 March 2001, the
author was taken to the hospital due to his worsening state of health. He remained in
hospital for 25 days. In June 2001, two of his co-defendants2 retracted their confessions,
stating they had been extracted under torture. Subsequently, the author and his co-
defendants pleaded “not guilty.” The confession and the contention of the Head of State
that the accused worked as CIA and Mossad agents were considered to be the basis of the
case.
2.7
The criminal case against the author and the co-defendants was initially suspended,
as the Court had not gathered enough evidence to maintain the accusation of conspiracy
against the State. On 17 February 2002, the People’s Court dismissed the case and
remanded it to the Criminal Prosecution Office, which forms part of the ordinary criminal
justice system. The Prosecutor withdrew the charges of conspiracy and presented new
charges of illegal drug experiments, as well as contamination with HIV/AIDS of 426
children.3 Throughout this time, the author and the co-defendants remained in detention.
Second trial
2.8
In August 2002, the Benghazi Criminal Court Arraignment Chamber maintained the
charges as presented by the Criminal Prosecution Office and referred the case to an
ordinary criminal court, the Benghazi Appeals Court. The prosecution relied on the
confessions of the author and one of the co-defendants,4 and the result of the search of the
residence of another co-defendant,5 where police had discovered five contaminated bottles
of blood plasma. In July 2003, the second trial started. Professors Luc Montagnier and
Vittorio Colizzi were appointed as experts. In September 2003, they testified that the
infection of blood samples at Al-Fatah hospital had occurred in 1997, two years before the
incriminating facts, and one year before the author became an intern in the hospital. Their
expertise concluded that the cause of the infection was unknown and was not deliberate.
Such nosocomial infections6 were caused by a very specific and highly infectious virus
strain, owing to poor standards of hygiene and neglect.7 In December 2003, the Court
appointed a second team of experts, which included five Libyan doctors. On 28 December
2003, the team rejected the findings made by the two renowned professors and stated that
the AIDS epidemic was not attributable to nosocomial infections or to the re-use of infected
medical equipment but to a deliberate act. The defendants called for another counter-
expertise, but the court dismissed their request.
2.9
On 6 May 2004, the Benghazi Appeals Court sentenced the author and the co-
defendant to death for having caused the death of 46 children and contaminating 380 others.
Nine Libyans working at Al-Fatah hospital, had also been charged with the same offence
2 Kristiyana Valcheva and Nasya Nenova.
3 In the charges read to the author, the number of children cited as being contaminated rose from 393 to
426 between the first and the second trial.
4 Nasya Nenova
5 Kristiyana Valcheva
6 The author specifies that nosocomial infections are infections resulting from treatment in a hospital or
hospital-like setting, but which are secondary to the patient’s original condition.
7 See “Final report of Professors Luc Montagnier and Vittorio Colizzi to Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on
the nosocomial HIV infection at the Al-Fateh Hospital, Benghazi, Libya,” (Paris, 7 April 2003),,
which concludes that “no evidence has been found for a deliberated injection of HIV contaminated
material (bioterrorism). Epidemiological stratification, according to admission time, of the data on
seropositivity and results of molecular analysis are strongly against this possibility.” (page 21).
CCPR/C/104/D/1755/2008
5
but appeared free at the trial, having been released on bail at the start of the proceedings.
They were acquitted. As for the eight Libyan security officers who were accused of torture
by the author and the co-defendants, the Court relinquished jurisdiction and referred their
case back to the Prosecutor’s office. On 5 July 2004, the author and the co-defendants
appealed on points of law to the Libyan Supreme Court. The Prosecutor requested the Court
to revoke the death sentences and refer the case to the Benghazi Appeals Court for retrial,
as “irregularities” had occurred during the arrest and the interrogation of the author and his
co-defendants. After postponing its sessions repeatedly, the Supreme Court quashed the
judgement of the Benghazi Appeals Court and referred the case for retrial to the Tripoli
Criminal Court on 25 December 2005. The Court refused to release the author and co-
defendants on bail as there were insufficient guarantees that they would reappear for trial.
Retrial and release
2.10
The Tripoli Appeals Court reopened the trial on 11 May 2006. The Prosecutor
reiterated his request for the death penalty for the author and his co-defendants. The author
again pleaded not guilty and reiterated that he had been tortured to make him confess. On
19 December 2006, he was found guilty and sentenced to death. The Court stated it could
not reconsider the torture allegations, as another Court had already dismissed the torture
claims.
2.11
The author appealed to the Supreme Court on 19 December 2006. The session
before the Court took place on 11 July 2007, although it was supposed to take place within
three months after the submission of the appeal. According to the information provided by
the author, the Supreme Court only had one session lasting one day. The result was the
confirmation of the death sentence for the author and the co-defendants. On 17 July 2007,
the High Judicial Council announced that the sentence would be commuted to life
imprisonment, after a compensation agreement had been reached with the families of the
victims. Subsequently, as a result of negotiations between Libya and Governments of other
countries, the author was transferred to Bulgaria on 24 July 2007 to serve his sentence,
where he was immediately pardoned and released.
2.12
The torture claims submitted by the author as early as 2000 were not investigated as
expeditiously and thoroughly as they should have been. In June 2001, two of the co-
defendants8 retracted their confessions as they had been obtained under duress, and
identified the persons responsible for the torture. Only in May 2002, did the Criminal
Prosecution Office decide to investigate the matter and order a medical report.
Consequently, the Prosecution brought charges against eight security officers who were in
charge of the investigation, a doctor and an interpreter. In June 2002, a Libyan doctor
appointed by the Prosecutor examined the author and the co-defendants and found marks on
their bodies which he argued resulted from “physical coercion” and “beatings.” In its
judgement dated 6 May 2004, the Benghazi Appeals Court determined that it did not have
the competence to rule on the matter since the offence had not been committed under its
jurisdiction, but within the jurisdiction of the Tripoli Appeals Court.
2.13
On 7 May 2004, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment sent a joint urgent appeal to the State party regarding the author’s
and co-defendants’ case, and requested information about the allegations of torture and of
unfair trial. They enquired about the lack of prosecution of officials responsible for the
alleged torture.9 In response, the State party stated that the Department of Public
8 Kristiyana Valcheva and Nasya Nenova.
9 See E/CN.4/2005/7/Add.1, paras. 396-398.
CCPR/C/104/D/1755/2008
6
Prosecutions had referred the case of the police officers to the Tripoli Appeals Court, since
that court was the only one competent to hear the case. The trial against the police officers,
one doctor and an interpreter started before the Tripoli Court. During the hearings, some of
the police officers admitted that they had tortured the author and some of his co-defendants
to obtain confessions.10 The Court rejected the expert medical opinion produced by the
defence, which was performed three years after the incriminating facts, on the grounds that
a Libyan doctor officially appointed as expert considered that the examination had not been
conducted in accordance with the protocols, that marks of torture were undetectable and
that in all events, the alleged torture left no mark after two or three weeks. The Tripoli
Court acquitted the suspects for lack of evidence on 7 June 2005. The author and the co-
defendants appealed the Court’s judgement, but the appeal was rejected by the Libyan
Supreme Court on 29 June 2006. On 10 August 2007, international newspapers reported
that the son of President Muammar Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam, had admitted in an interview
with Al-Jazeera TV that the author and the co-defendants had indeed been tortured.11
The complaint
3.1
The author claims that the State party violated articles 6, paragraph 2; 7; 9; 10 and
14 of the Covenant.
3.2
He claims that the death sentence was imposed after an unfair and arbitrary trial in
violation of article 6, paragraph 2. He considers that both the verdict of 19 December 2006
10 Extract of statement from Major Salim Jum’a Salim, Chief of the police station for training dogs, 30
June 2002:
“At the orders of brigade General Harb Derbal, the suspects Ashraf, Kristiyana, Nasya,
Snezhana and Valya were taken to the department of criminal investigation for interrogation.
[…] When the interrogation started he [Harb Derbal, Director General of Criminal
Investigation] brought a telephone machine along which works with cushions. He wanted to
use it during the interrogation. It gives an electric shock. During the interrogation everyone
was taken in separately. Brigade General Harb requested to attach the wire to the fingers. He
requested to activate the machine in order to interrogate the suspect. He asked me a couple of
times to switch on the machine. Since it was an order, I carried it out. The suspects were also
put blindfolded on the square. The person named Ashraf was put in a cage where there were
no dogs. As concerns the use of dogs at the interrogation, this did not occur. […] An
anaesthetist was called in. His name was Abduljalil Wafaa. All suspects were sedated. […]
When I switched on the machine, I did it because I am a military. When I get the order to
switch it on, I switch it on.”
Extract of statement from Izzudin Mukhtar Saleh Al Baraki, Sergeant-Major at the Directorate
General for Criminal Investigation, guard of the author, 29 July 2002:
“Q: Did you notice any traces of force on the body of the aforementioned suspect?
A: Yes, I saw traces of force between the fingers. One time Lieutenant Nwar Abu Za’ainin
came to him when he was praying. He pushed him, while he was praying. He did not stop
with it. I prevented him from further hitting. Always when he [Ashraf] came out after
examination, I saw fear on his face. Sometimes he cried and I saw tears in his eyes.”
Extract of statement from Salim Jum’a Salim, Chief of the police station for training dogs, guard of
the author and his co-defendants, also present during the interrogations, 29 July 2002:
“Q: Can you tell us what sort of pressure and physical force was exerted on the suspects?
A: As regards Ashraf Ahmad Jum’a, Kristiyana and Nasya, electrical equipment was used.
The suspects were further placed in dog cages. They also were made to run on the square. I
know that Jum’a Al Mashari has exerted physical force with electrical equipment. Also,
Abdulmajid Al Shawal and Brigade General Harb Derbal. Usama Uwaidat was also often
present at the interrogation sessions. ”
11 According to the interview record, Saif al-Islam stated: “Yes, they were tortured by electricity and
they were threatened that their family members would be targeted. But a lot of what the Palestinian
doctor has claimed are merely lies.”
CCPR/C/104/D/1755/2008
7
and the upholding of the judgement by the Supreme Court on 11 July 2007 were the result
of a flagrantly unfair and arbitrary trial. Referring to the jurisprudence of the Committee
and its general comment No. 6, he contends that the imposition of an unfair trial with
numerous violations of article 14 of the Covenant violates article 6, paragraph 2, of the
Covenant.12 Although the death sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment, this
should not relieve the State party from its obligation under this provision. The author
emphasizes that the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment only after a large
sum of money had been offered to the families of the infected children, and heavy pressure
had been brought to bear by the European Union, Bulgaria and other States.
3.3
The author claims that he was subjected to torture and drugged. The facts as
described, according to him, are clear-cut evidence, confirmed by medical records and
witnesses’ statements that the Libyan authorities are responsible for the torture of the author
at the hands of the investigators; and the fact that some of the perpetrators omit or refuse to
mention the more severe ill-treatment is contradicted by the medical findings concerning
the author and his co-defendants. While the doctor could not establish the exact time of the
torture by rape and use of electrical equipment, there is no indication that the author went
into detention in bad health. He emphasizes that the burden of proof cannot solely rest on
him.13 The complaints were made at the earliest possible stage, when he was finally brought
before a judge, eight months after being held incommunicado. At that time, he showed clear
signs of torture, but no action was taken by the public prosecutor or by the court.14 The
author contends that the severity of his ill-treatment was such as to be necessarily
characterized as torture, since it was used to extract a confession. Cruel methods were
applied for a lengthy period of time and a number of practices described above constitute
torture per se.15 These practices as well as the lack of a timely and thorough investigation
into his torture claims constitute a violation of article 7 of the Covenant. The author finally
contends that his treatment throughout his detention also amounts to a violation of article 7.
3.4
The author considers that his arrest and detention were arbitrary. Under Libyan law,
the author should have been brought before the Prosecutor within 48 hours after his arrest.
This was however not done until four months later, on 16 May 1999. Even then, the
authorities kept him incommunicado until 30 November 1999, when his family was finally
allowed to see him. In this respect, the State party violated article 9, paragraph 1, of the
Covenant. Moreover, the author was allegedly not informed promptly of charges against
him. It was not until he was brought before the Prosecutor that he was finally properly
informed of the charges against him, still without legal counsel. This constitutes a violation
of article 9, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. Finally, he was not brought promptly before a
“judicial authority;” in fact, his first appearance in court was on 7 February 2000. Before
this date, he only saw the Prosecutor, which constitutes a violation of article 9, paragraph 3
of the Covenant.
12 See Communications No. 250/1987, Carlton Reid v. Jamaica, Views adopted on 20 July 1990; No
730/1996, Marshall v. Jamaica, Views adopted on 3 November 1998; No 16/1977 Daniel Mbenge v.
Zaire, Views adopted on 25 March 1983; No 349/1989, Clifton Wright v. Jamaica, Views adopted on
27 July 1992; Nos. 464/1991 and 482/1991, Peart and Peart v. Jamaica, Views adopted on 19 July
1995; and No. 719/1996, Levy v. Jamaica, Views adopted on 3 November 1998.
13 The author refers to the jurisprudence of the Committee, particularly communications No. 1096/2002,
Kurbanova v. Tajikistan, Views adopted on 6 November 2003; and No 992/2001, Louisa Bousroual v.
Algeria, Views adopted on 30 March 2006.
14 The author cites the jurisprudence of the Committee on this issue, inter alia, communications No
612/1995, José Vicente et al. v. Colombia, Views adopted on 19 August 1997; No 563/1993, Bautista
de Arellana v. Colombia, Views adopted on 27 October 1995; and No. 04/1977, William Torres
Ramirez v. Uruguay, Views adopted on 23 July 1980.
15 The author refers here to the use of electric shocks on genitals and anal rape.
CCPR/C/104/D/1755/2008
8
3.5
The author contends that the treatment to which he was subjected following his
arrest also violated his rights under article 10 of the Covenant. He adds that he did not
receive any medical care commensurate with his state of health during his detention, which
is also in violation of article 10, paragraph 1. It was only after the abrupt deterioration of his
state of health that he was hospitalized on 20 March 2001.
3.6
The author considers that the State party violated his right to a fair trial, as he was
not informed of charges against him for the first four months of his detention; nor was he
assigned a lawyer until 17 February 2000 – 10 days after the start of the trial and a full year
after his arrest. He was forced to testify against himself through torture; he was not assisted
by a lawyer when he made his confession before the Prosecutor; the court, without
providing sufficient reasons, dismissed the expert report of Professors Montagnier and
Collizi, despite every indication that their report exonerated the author and his co-
defendants; the second search of Ms. Valcheva’s home, during which the police
“providentially”16 discovered five bottles of contaminated blood plasma, was conducted
without the presence of the accused or a defence lawyer; the inconsistencies in this
“discovery,”17 the fact that the prosecution never produced the records of the searches, and
finally that the court itself mistook the findings of one search for the findings of another
prove that it was fabricated. The author concludes that the trial also suffered unreasonable
delays.18 These elements constitute, according to the author, a violation of article 14 of the
Covenant.
State Party’s observations on admissibility
4.1
On 24 March 2008, the State party challenged the admissibility of the
communication on grounds of non-substantiation. It notes that the case was the subject of
lengthy legal and judicial proceedings aimed at establishing the truth in a case concerning
more than 450 children, and relating to violation of their fundamental right to life.
According to the State party, the author was afforded full legal guarantees ensuring his right
to a fair trial in conformity with international standards. Civil society organizations in
Libya, international human rights organizations and foreign diplomatic missions in Libya
followed the proceedings throughout.
4.2
The State party recalls that on 30 September 1998, a Libyan citizen, Mohammed
Bashir Ben Ghazi, lodged a complaint with the Department of Public Prosecutions
affirming that his son, then 14 months old, had been infected with the AIDS virus after a
stay at Al-Fatah paediatric hospital in Benghazi. He discovered that his son was infected
after he had been transferred to Egypt for treatment. On 12 October 1998, the Department
of Public Prosecutions opened an investigation as it had received more complaints. It took
233 statements from parents of infected children and took measures, such as issuing an
injunction to prevent foreign workers at the hospital from travelling abroad.
4.3
The Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Justice and Public Security
issued Decision No 28/1209 to investigate the spread of the AIDS virus among children
treated at Al-Fatah paediatric hospital. The investigating committee consisted of the
director of the General Department of Criminal Investigations, senior investigating officers
from the same department and doctors. It began work on 9 December 1998 and eventually
identified the author, a Palestinian doctor, and five Bulgarian nurses as suspects. The State
16 In quotation marks in the author’s initial submission.
17 The analysis of the bottles was carried out in March 1999, whereas the search of Ms. Valcheva’s
home took place a month after.
18 More than eight years from the date of arrest on 29 January 1999 until the final judgement of the
Supreme Court dated 11 July 2007.
CCPR/C/104/D/1755/2008
9
party explains that the committee concluded its work on 15 May 1999 and sent a report
with the evidence and names of the suspects to the General Prosecution Office, which
conducted an interview with the author and the co-defendants. The author confessed to
committing the crime, in association with the five nurses.
4.4
The State party explains that as a consequence of the author’s torture claim before
the Benghazi Criminal Court on 3 June 2002, the judge of the indictment chamber issued a
decision entrusting a representative of the Department of Public Prosecutions with the
investigation of the author’s allegations. From 13 June 2002, the Department of Public
Prosecutions took statements from the defendants about their claims of torture. It also took
statements from the committee tasked with investigating the spread of the AIDS virus
among the children. Once the investigations were completed, the findings were transmitted
to the indictment chamber which referred the case to the Benghazi Criminal Court on 4 July
2003. That court heard the case in more than 20 sittings. It sentenced the author to death on
6 May 2004, and ruled that it did not have territorial jurisdiction to hear the charges of
torture against members of the investigation committee.
4.5
The State Party explains that the case on the charges of torture was referred to the
Tripoli Criminal Court. This court delivered its verdict on 7 June 2005, acquitting the
members of the committee. The author and the co-defendants appealed the death sentence
pronounced by the Benghazi Criminal Court on 6 May 2004 to the Supreme Court, which
delivered its verdict on 25 December 2006. The Court quashed the death sentence and sent
the case back to the Benghazi Criminal Court for a hearing by a different panel of judges.
From 11 May 2006, a new panel of judges heard the case over a total of 13 sittings. On 19
December 2006, the Court again sentenced the author and the co-defendants to death. On
12 February 2007, the defendants decided to appeal to the Supreme Court, which delivered
its judgement on 11 July 2007.
4.6
The State party considers that the author confessed to participating in the
commission of the crime at every stage of the investigation, beginning with his appearance
before the investigation committee, then before the Office of the Prosecutor-General, which
is the highest judicial investigation body in Libya,19 and again before the Public
Prosecution Office and during numerous sessions of the court which decided on the
extension of his preventive detention.
4.7
The lengthy judicial proceedings in the case were aimed at uncovering the truth and
identifying the perpetrators in a serious case. They were to afford full guarantees to the
convicted persons, so that they could receive a fair trial in which all due process standards
were met. According to the State party, the convicted persons could exercise their right to
defence through a team of lawyers. The trial was held in open court and was attended by
many representatives of civil society and human rights organizations and foreign diplomatic
missions in Libya. The convicted persons, through their lawyers, appealed to the Supreme
Court. The Court quashed the verdict the first time and sent the case back to the Benghazi
Criminal Court to be heard by a new panel of judges. The new panel handed down a guilty
verdict and the defendants again appealed to the Supreme Court. This time, the Supreme
Court upheld the verdict.
4.8
With regard to the allegations of torture, the State Party notes that the author
appeared before the committee formed to investigate this case on 11 April 1999. He
confessed to participating in the commission of the crime. He was subsequently referred to
the Office of the Prosecutor-General, where he was questioned on 15 May 1999 by a
member of the Department of Public Prosecutions employed at the Office of the
19 The State Party provided a copy of the author’s detailed confessions.
CCPR/C/104/D/1755/2008
10
Prosecutor-General. He gave a detailed confession about his participation in the
commission of the crime, in association with the Bulgarian nurses. He said nothing about
being tortured by the above-mentioned investigation committee. He consistently confessed
to his participation in the commission of this crime before all the different judicial
authorities to which he was referred. It was only after the People’s Court issued a decision
about lack of jurisdiction to try the case, and the case was referred to the indictment
chamber of the South Benghazi court of first instance on 3 June 2002, that the author told
the judge of the indictment chamber that he had been tortured. The judge immediately
entrusted the Department of Public Prosecutions with the investigation of the author’s
torture allegations. The latter launched an investigation and took statements from the
author, the Bulgarian nurses and the members of the investigation committee. Even though
the Department of Public Prosecutions was convinced that the allegations of torture were
groundless, it framed charges against the members of the investigation committee. The
court heard the case and delivered its verdict on 7 June 2005, acquitting the members of the
investigation committee.
4.9
The State Party recalls that a total of 115 visits were paid to the convicted persons in
prison by members of foreign organizations and diplomatic missions. The Secretary for
Justice issued instructions to allow members of the author’s family to visit him every
Thursday, throughout his time in prison. A group of lawyers from Bulgaria was given
permission to participate in the defence of the accused.
4.10
Commenting on the author’s defence note submitted to the Supreme Court of Libya
at the appeal against the verdict delivered by the Benghazi Criminal Court on 19 December
2006, the State party points out that the Supreme Court replied to all the objections raised
by the author against the verdict of the Criminal Court.20
Author’s comments on the State party’s observations
5.1
On 2 July 2008, the author reaffirms that the communication is admissible. He adds
that, as explained in his initial submission, all available domestic remedies were exhausted,
both in relation to the torture claims and allegations of unfair trial. He points out that the
State party did not argue that he had failed to exhaust these remedies. Moreover, upon his
transfer to Bulgaria, the State party made the author sign a document that he would not
initiate proceedings against the State Party.
5.2
As for the State Party’s contention of non-substantiation of claims, the author
considers he has substantiated and extensively pleaded the violation of his rights under the
Covenant. On the other hand, the author considers that the State party’s observations on the
admissibility of the communication as mere refutation, and lacking legal precision about the
conditions of his arrest and detention. The author recalls that he was held in an isolation cell
normally reserved for detainees sentenced to death for 11 months. The size of the room was
10 square metres; it had no electricity or running water.
5.3
The author refutes the State Party’s argument that he only complained about torture
four years after he had allegedly been tortured. Immediately after his incommunicado
detention, which lasted 10 months in 1999, he continuously stated that he had been tortured.
When his family was allowed to visit him on 31 December 1999, he revealed that he had
been tortured. At that moment, his family hired a lawyer, who continuously reiterated the
allegations. When the author repeatedly fainted during court sessions, the judge finally
20 In its judgment dated 11 July 2007, the Supreme Court of Libya confirmed, point by point, the ruling
of the Benghazi Criminal Court of 19 December 2006. The Court particularly focused on the
contradiction in the author and the co-defendant’s testimonies throughout the procedure, sometimes
confirming the confessions made during the interrogation phase, sometimes refuting them.
CCPR/C/104/D/1755/2008
11
granted a request made by the author’s lawyer to transfer him to a hospital, where he stayed
for 25 days. Throughout the court sessions, the judge refused to research the torture
allegations made by the author and the five nurses. In several reports, it has been
determined that he and the five nurses were tortured. Some members of the criminal
investigation team themselves admitted to having tortured the author and the nurses, or
stated that they had seen them being tortured. The deputy head of the security police stated
that the torture had a direct effect on the confessions of the author and the nurses; 10 of the
25 officers who committed the torture were prosecuted.
5.4
The author explains that during his detention from 1999 until 2007, he was mostly
kept in isolation. From the time the death sentence was imposed on 6 May 2004 until his
release, his defence lawyers were not allowed to visit him. He also explains that a high-
level official told him to give a full confession on the alleged crimes, as this would lead to
his release.
Committee’s decision on admissibility
6.1
The Committee considered the admissibility of the communication at its ninety-
seventh session on 5 October 2009.
6.2
The Committee ascertained, as required under article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the
Optional Protocol, that the same matter was not being examined under any other procedure
of international investigation or settlement.
6.3
The Committee noted that the State party challenged the admissibility of the author's
claim on grounds of non-substantiation, stating that the author was accorded adequate
guarantees ensuring his right to a fair trial, in conformity with international standards. It
also noted that, according to the State party, the author confessed to participating in the
commission of the crime at every stage of the investigation and that, despite doubts as to
the reliability of the author’s allegations of having been tortured, the Libyan authorities
carried out an investigation. In the State party’s opinion, these two elements should lead the
Committee to consider the communication inadmissible for non-substantiation of claims.
On the other hand, the author considered that his claims were extensively substantiated for
purposes of admissibility, and that, on the contrary, the State party confined itself to merely
refuting the facts as presented. Considering the amount of information provided by the
author, both in terms of testimonies and medical and expertise reports, the Committee
considered that the author had sufficiently substantiated, for purposes of admissibility, that
the treatment he was subjected to in detention, and the trial that he had faced raised issues
under articles 7, 9, 10 and 14 of the Covenant, which should be examined by the Committee
on the merits.
6.4
As for the author’s claim that the death sentence was imposed after an unfair and
arbitrary trial, in violation of article 6, the Committee noted that the death sentence was not
maintained. In view of the commutation of the author’s death sentence, there was no longer
any factual basis for the author's claim under article 6 of the Covenant. Accordingly, the
Committee found that this part of the claim had not been substantiated and was therefore
inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.21
21 See communications No. 971/2001, Arutyuniantz v. Uzbekistan, Views adopted on 30 March 2005;
No. 609/1995, Williams v. Jamaica, Views adopted on 4 November 1997; No. 1161/2003, Kharkhal
v. Belarus, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 31 October 2007; No 1141/2002, Gougnina v.
Uzbekistan, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 1 April 2008.
CCPR/C/104/D/1755/2008
12
Absence of State party’s observations on the merits
7.
In notes verbales dated 5 November 2009, 6 August 2010, 7 October 2010 and 2
March 2011, the Committee requested the State party to convey information to it on the
merits of the communication. The Committee notes that it did not receive the requested
information. It recalls that, under the Optional Protocol, the State concerned is required to
submit to the Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and
indicating what remedies, if any, may have been taken. In the absence of further
observations from the State party, the Committee will examine the merits of the case on the
basis of the information contained in the file. It will also give due weight to the author's
allegations insofar as they have been sufficiently substantiated.
Issues and proceedings before the Committee
Consideration of the merits
8.1
The Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the
written information made available to it by the parties, as provided for in article 5,
paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol.
8.2
The Committee notes the author’s allegation that he was tortured and drugged
during interrogation, and that the allegations were corroborated in court by medical records
and witnesses’ statements. The Committee takes note of the author’s argument that the
burden of proof cannot rest solely on him and that to this effect, there is no indication that
the traces of rape and use of electrical equipment noted on his body could be attributed to a
period prior to his detention, which therefore suggests that they were the result of torture at
the hands of the interrogators. The Committee notes the author’s contention that no
immediate action was taken by the judge, who he saw for the first time in February 2000,
although torture marks were still visible on his body. The Committee also notes that
according to the author the investigation was not carried out thoroughly, but in an
expeditious manner.
8.3
The Committee takes note of the State party’s argument that the author consistently
confessed to his participation in the commission of the crime of which he was accused
before all the different judicial authorities to whom he was referred; that it is only on 3 June
2002 that the author told the judge of the indictment chamber that he had been tortured; that
the judge immediately entrusted the investigation of those allegations to the Department of
Public Prosecutions; and that even though it was convinced that the allegations of torture
were groundless, the Public Prosecution Office framed charges against the members of the
investigation committee. The Committee also takes note of the State party’s observation
that the Tripoli Criminal Court, which was competent to deal with the author’s claims of
torture, delivered its verdict acquitting the alleged perpetrators on 7 June 2005. The
Committee notes that the author refutes the State party’s argument in relation to the first
time he reported having been tortured and reiterates that this occurred for the first time
when he was presented before the judge in 2000 and at each appearance before a judicial
authority.
8.4
The Committee notes the author’s further allegation that he was detained
incommunicado from the moment of his arrest on 29 January 1999 until he was brought for
the first time before the Public Prosecution Office on 16 May 1999; and that during those
four months, he was prevented from communicating with his family and the outside world.
The Committee also notes the author’s contention that after he was sentenced, he was held
in an isolation cell normally reserved for detainees sentenced to death, with no access to his
lawyer for 11 months; that the size of the room was 10 square metres; that it had no
electricity or running water; and that prior to that date, he was held in isolation almost
CCPR/C/104/D/1755/2008
13
throughout his detention. The Committee notes that the State party did not refute these
allegations.
8.5
The Committee reaffirms its jurisprudence22 that the burden of proof cannot rest
solely on the author of the communication, especially considering that the author and the
State party do not always have equal access to the evidence, and frequently the State party
alone has the relevant information. Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Optional Protocol implies
that it is the State party’s duty to investigate, in good faith, all allegations of violations of
the Covenant made against it and its representatives, and to furnish to the Committee the
information available to it. In cases where the author made all reasonable attempts to collect
evidence in support of his claims, and where further clarification depends on information
exclusively in the hands of the State party, the Committee may consider the author's
allegations substantiated in the absence of satisfactory evidence or explanations to the
contrary presented by the State party. The Committee further recalls its jurisprudence that
the State party has the duty not only to carry out thorough investigations of alleged
violations of human rights, particularly violations of the prohibition of torture, but also to
prosecute, try and punish anyone held to be responsible for such violations. As for
incommunicado detention, the Committee recognizes the degree of suffering involved in
being held indefinitely without contact with the outside world. It recalls its general
comment No. 20 on article 7, which recommends that States parties make provision against
incommunicado detention.23
8.6
In the light of the above, the Committee concludes that the treatment inflicted on the
author constitutes torture and that the explanations provided by the State party, including
the reference to the verdict of the Tripoli Appeals Court of 7 June 2005, do not enable the
conclusion that a prompt, thorough and impartial investigation was carried out, despite the
presentation of clear evidence of torture, as contained in the medical reports and
testimonies of the alleged perpetrators. On the basis of the information available to it, the
Committee concludes that the torture inflicted on the author, his incommunicado detention,
his prolonged isolation before and after his conviction, and the absence of a prompt,
thorough and impartial investigation of the facts constitute a violation of article 7 of the
Covenant, both alone and read in conjunction with article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant.
8.7
Having come to this conclusion, the Committee decides not to address the author’s
allegations under article 10 of the Covenant.24
8.8
With regard to the alleged violation of article 9 of the Covenant, the Committee
notes that the author was arrested on 29 January 1999 and that he was brought for the first
time before the Public Prosecution Office on 16 May 1999, although under Libyan law, he
should have been brought before the Prosecutor within 48 hours after arrest. The
Committee further notes the author’s allegation that even after that date, he was prevented
from seeing his family, who was allowed to see him for the first time on 30 November
1999; that he was not informed of the charges against him until he was brought before the
Prosecutor; that he was not provided with legal counsel; and that he was brought before a
judge for the first time on 7 February 2000 when the trial started. The Committee notes that
the State party has not provided any information to refute these claims. In the absence of
22 Communication No. 1412/2005, Butovenko v. Ukraine, Views adopted on 19 July 2011, para. 7.3.
23 Committee’s general comment No. 20 (1992) on the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, para. 11, Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh
Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/47/40), annex VI, sect. A.
24 Communication No. 1297/2004, Medjnoune v. Algeria, Views adopted on 14 July 2006, para. 8.8.
CCPR/C/104/D/1755/2008
14
any pertinent explanations from the State party, the Committee finds a violation of article 9
of the Covenant.25
8.9
The author also invokes a violation by the State party of article 14 of the Covenant.
In this regard, the Committee notes the author’s allegation that he was granted access to a
lawyer for the first time on 17 February 2000, ten days after the beginning of the trial and
more than one year after his arrest; and that he was never given the opportunity to speak to
the lawyer freely. The Committee also notes the author’s contention that he was forced to
testify against himself through torture and that he was not assisted by a lawyer during
interrogation nor in preparation for the trial. The Committee also notes the author’s
allegations that the expert report of Professors Montagnier and Collizi was dismissed
without sufficient reasons, despite every indication that it exonerated the author; that
searches of the house of one of the co-defendants were carried out without the presence of
the accused or a defence lawyer; and that the prosecution never produced the records of the
searches. The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the author was afforded full
legal guarantees ensuring his right to fair trial; that his trial was held under international
scrutiny; that the lengthy judicial proceedings were aimed at uncovering the truth and
identifying the perpetrators in a serious case; and that the author was defended by a team of
lawyers.
8.10
The Committee recalls its general comment No. 32 on article 14, in which it
emphasizes that the right to equality before courts and tribunals, in general terms,
guarantees, in addition to the principles mentioned in the second sentence of article 14,
paragraph 1, those of equal access and equality of arms, and ensures that the parties to the
proceedings in question are treated without any discrimination.26 In the present case, taking
into account the information provided by the State party, the Committee considers that an
accumulation of violations of the right to fair trial took place, including the violation of the
right not to testify against oneself; the violation of the principle of equality of arms –
through unequal access to pieces of evidence and counter-expertise; and violation of the
right to prepare one’s own defense through the lack of access to a lawyer prior to the
beginning of the trial and the inability to speak to said lawyer freely. The Committee
therefore concludes that the trial and sentence of the author disclose a violation of article 14
of the Covenant.
9.
The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is of the view that the
facts before it disclose a violation of article 7, both alone and read in conjunction with
article 2, paragraph 3, and of articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant.
10.
Pursuant to article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the Committee considers that
the State party is under the obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy,
including conducting a new full and thorough investigation into allegations of torture and
ill-treatment and initiating proper criminal proceedings against those responsible for the
treatment to which the author was subjected; and providing the author with appropriate
reparation, including compensation. The State party is also under the obligation to take
steps to prevent similar violations occurring in the future.
11.
In becoming a State party to the Optional Protocol, the State party recognized the
competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a violation of the
Covenant or not. Pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State party has undertaken to
25 Communication No. 1761/2008, Giri v. Nepal, Views adopted on 24 March 2011, para. 7.8.
26 The Committee’s general comment 32 (2007) on the right to equality before courts and tribunals and
to a fair trial, para. 8, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-second Session, Supplement
No. 40, vol. I (A/62/40 (Vol. I)), annex VI.
CCPR/C/104/D/1755/2008
15
ensure to all individuals within its territory or subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective and enforceable remedy in case a
violation has been established. The Committee wishes to receive from the State Party,
within 180 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to the Committee's
Views. The State party is also requested to publish the present Views and to have them
widely disseminated in the official language of the State party.
[Adopted in English, French and Spanish, the English text being the original version.
Subsequently to be issued also in Arabic, Chinese and Russian as part of the Committee’s
annual report to the General Assembly.]
CCPR/C/104/D/1755/2008
16
Appendix
Individual opinion of Committee member, Mr. Fabían Omar Salvioli
(partly dissenting)
1.
In general I concur with the introductory part and conclusions of the Views reached
by the Human Rights Committee on communication No. 1755/2008, El Hagog Jumaa v.
Libya, but I regret that I am unable to agree with the statement in paragraph 6.4, as follows:
“As for the author’s claim that the death sentence was imposed after an unfair and arbitrary
trial, in violation of article 6, the Committee noted that the death sentence was not
maintained. In view of the commutation of the author’s death sentence, there was no longer
any factual basis for the author’s claim under article 6 of the Covenant. Accordingly, the
Committee found that this part of the claim had not been substantiated, and was therefore
inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.”
2.
I thought that it might be decided to reopen discussion on the admissibility of the
possible violation of article 6 of the Covenant when the Committee considered the merits of
the case, but unfortunately it maintained the position which gives rise to my partly
dissenting opinion.
3.
The Committee concludes its Views by stating that “an accumulation of violations
of the right to fair trial took place, including the violation of the right not to testify against
oneself, the violation of the principle of equality of arms through unequal access to pieces
of evidence and counter-expertise; and of the right to prepare one’s own defense through
the lack of access to a lawyer prior to the beginning of the trial and the inability to speak to
him freely. The Committee, therefore, concludes that the trial and sentence of the author
disclosed a violation of article 14.” (para. 8.10, emphasis added).
4.
It is correctly indicated in the above paragraph that the death sentence handed down
against Mr. El Hagog Jumaa resulted from an unfair and arbitrary trial. In the interests of
consistency, the Committee should have concluded that the imposition of the death
sentence following judicial proceedings in which the requirements of the Covenant were
not fulfilled is a violation of article 6.
5.
A violation of article 6, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights can occur without the death sentence necessarily having to be carried out;
as the Committee pointed out on a previous occasion, “the imposition of a sentence of death
upon conclusion of a trial in which the provisions of the Covenant have not been respected
constitutes a violation of article 6 of the Covenant” (communication No. 1096/2002,
Safarmo Kurbanova v. Tajikistan (CCPR/C/79/D/1096/2002), 12 November 2003, para.
7.7). This jurisprudence was based on earlier decisions of the Committee stating that a
preliminary hearing that did not respect the safeguards laid down in article 14 violates
article 6, paragraph 2, of the Covenant (Conroy Levy v. Jamaica, communication No.
719/1996, para. 7.3; Clarence Marshall v. Jamaica, communication No. 730/1996, para.
6.6). This being so, I cannot understand how the Committee can fail to find a violation of
article 6 in the present case, El Hagog Jumaa v. Libya, when it has established that
violations of articles 7 and 14 of the Covenant occurred in the course of the proceedings
against Mr. Ashraf Ahmad El Hagog Jumaa.
6.
The commutation of the death sentence cannot erase the violation committed; the
violation in question was committed precisely at the moment when the death sentence was
upheld by decision of the Libyan Supreme Court, dated 11 July 2007.
CCPR/C/104/D/1755/2008
17
7.
The effect of the commutation of the death sentence in the present case is to avoid
the commission of arbitrary deprivation of the right to life and resultant responsibility for
the State for violation of article 6, paragraph 1, but it cannot extend to treating a violation
that was indeed committed, in this case of article 6, paragraph 2, as not having occurred.
8.
As I have previously argued, in both individual and joint opinions, the Committee
must duly pronounce on all violations committed in a case, because this has practical
consequences – for instance, in regard to due compensation.1
9.
The Committee should reaffirm its jurisprudence which offers the greatest
guarantees in this respect; the principles of progressiveness and non-regressiveness require
that a victim of a violation of the Covenant deserves, as a minimum, a measure of
protection and resolution equal to that accorded in previous cases decided by the same
body, in the most protective interpretation.2
10.
Accordingly, while acknowledging the commutation of the death sentence in the
present instance, I consider that the Committee ought to have indicated that there was also a
violation of article 6, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights in the El Hagog Jumaa case.
[Done in English, French and Spanish, the Spanish text being the original version.
Subsequently to be issued also in Arabic, Chinese and Russian as part of the Committee’s
annual report to the General Assembly.]
1 See communication No. 1378/2005, Kasimov v. Uzbekistan, Views adopted on 30 July 2009, partly
dissenting opinion of Committee member Mr. Fabián Salvioli, paras. 4, 7 and 8; and communication
No. 1284/2004, Kodirov v. Uzbekistan, Views of 20 October 2009, partly dissenting opinion of
Committee members Ms. Christine Chanet, Ms. Zonke Zanele Majodina and Mr. Fabián Salvioli,
paras. 3, 6 and 7.
2 Ibid.