opencaselaw.ch

CAT/C/83/D/1078/2021

Z v. Sweden

UNO-Ausschuss gegen Folter (CAT) · 2025-11-14 · en UN

Decision; Subjects: SWEDEN, TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL TREATMENT; [CAT: UNO-Antifolterkonvention, Übereinkommen gegen Folter; Convention contre la torture; Convenzione contro la tortura]

Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)

GE.25-20934 (E) 230126 260126

Committee against Torture

Decision adopted by the Committee under article 22 of the

Convention, concerning communication No. 1078/2021*, **, ***

Communication submitted by:

Z (represented by counsel, Rebecca Ahlstrand)

Alleged victim:

The complainant

State Party:

Sweden

Date of complaint:

17 June 2021 (initial submission)

Document references:

Decision taken pursuant to rules 114 and 115 of

the Committee’s rules of procedure, transmitted

to the State Party on 22 June 2021 (not issued in

document form)

Date of adoption of decision:

14 November 2025

Subject matter:

Deportation of the complainant to the Islamic

Republic of Iran

Procedural issue:

Level of substantiation of claims

Substantive issue:

Risk to life or risk of torture or other cruel,

inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,

if deported to country of origin

(non-refoulement)

Article of the Convention:

3

1.1

The complainant is Z, a national of the Islamic Republic of Iran born in 1985. At the

time of the initial submission, his request for asylum in the State Party had been rejected and

he was facing deportation to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The complainant claims that, if the

State Party were to proceed with his deportation, it would be in violation of its obligations

under article 3 of the Convention. The State Party has made the declaration pursuant to

article 22 (1) of the Convention, effective from 26 June 1987. The complainant is represented

by counsel.

1.2

On 22 June 2021, pursuant to rule 114 (1) of its rules of procedure, the Committee,

acting through its Rapporteur on new complaints and interim measures, requested the State

Party not to deport the complainant to the Islamic Republic of Iran while the complaint was

being considered by the Committee.

* Adopted by the Committee at its eighty-third session (10–28 November 2025).

** The following members of the Committee participated in the examination of the communication:

Todd Buchwald, Jorge Contesse, Claude Heller, Erdogan Iscan, Peter Vedel Kessing, Liu Huawen,

Maeda Naoko, Ana Racu, Abderrazak Rouwane and Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov.

*** A joint opinion by Committee members Todd Buchwald and Ana Racu (dissenting) is annexed to the

present decision.

United Nations

CAT/C/83/D/1078/2021

Convention against Torture

and Other Cruel, Inhuman

or Degrading Treatment

or Punishment

Distr.: General

26 January 2026

Original: English

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Factual background

2.1

The complainant is a Sunni Muslim belonging to the Baluchi ethnic group. In April

2015, he joined the Balochistan People’s Party in the Islamic Republic of Iran and published

material critical of the regime.1 After his cousin was arrested for similar activities,2 the

complainant fled the country illegally3 and applied for asylum in Sweden on 15 October

2015, claiming that he was at risk of being subjected to torture and ill-treatment in the Islamic

Republic of Iran owing to his ethnicity and political activities.

2.2

On 2 August 2018, the Swedish Migration Agency rejected the application, finding

that Z’s claims of his political activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran were not credible.

The reasoning given by the Agency was that the complainant was not able to say anything

about the party’s members or message, the information regarding his cousin’s arrest by the

police was based solely on his own assumptions and the allegations of police searching for

him in his home were largely vague and based on second-hand information. The Agency then

held that the complainant had not demonstrated that he had been noticed by the Iranian regime

following his activities for the Balochistan People’s Party in Sweden. It considered the

complainant’s statement that the Iranian authorities would be interested in his Facebook

activities to be mere speculation, given that he had never been noticed by them before. The

Agency noted that, although the situation for the Baluchi in the Islamic Republic of Iran was

difficult, the fact of belonging to a vulnerable minority group was not sufficient on its own

to be considered as being in need of protection. It also noted that the complainant had declared

that he had not personally been victimized for belonging to an ethnic group.

2.3

On 10 October 2019, Luleå Administrative Court dismissed the complainant’s appeal.

After hearing the complainant, the court considered that his account of the events in the

Islamic Republic of Iran was vague and lacked detail. The court indicated that the

complainant had been unable to elaborate as to how he went about placing material critical

of the regime in his home locality, despite several questions about it, or as to his cousin’s

political activities. He also provided conflicting information as to how he became aware that

his cousin had been detained. The court therefore concluded that the complainant had not

plausibly demonstrated that he had been noticed by the Iranian authorities before fleeing the

country. While not disputing the complainant’s political activities in Sweden, the court

subsequently held that the complainant had not plausibly demonstrated that he would be

threatened in the Islamic Republic of Iran on account of his political activities in Sweden.

Against that background, there was also no reason to fear that the complainant risked being

subjected to treatment constituting grounds for protection because he had left his country

without a valid exit permit and because he had applied for asylum in Sweden. On

20 November 2019, the Migration Court of Appeal refused him leave to appeal.

2.4

The complainant continued his political activities while in Sweden. He participated in

several demonstrations organized by the Balochistan People’s Party and attended meetings.

He published material on Baluchi independence under his own name and was active for that

cause, also under his own name, on Facebook and Instagram. He also travelled outside

Sweden to protest against the regime in front of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran

to a third country. The police were called, and the complainant was detained and sentenced

to a fine for trespassing on the embassy’s property, then subsequently taken into custody for

transfer to Sweden.

2.5

On an unknown date, the complainant applied for suspension of enforcement of the

deportation decision, owing to new circumstances. He claimed that he had an ongoing and

active engagement within the Balochistan People’s Party and mentioned his participation in

the demonstration at the embassy in a third country. He considered that he would therefore

be known to the Iranian authorities. After that demonstration, his father had been arrested by

the police in the Islamic Republic of Iran and, after a few days, was taken to the hospital and

declared dead, although he had been healthy before the detention. The complainant’s family

1 The complainant provided no further details.

2 The complainant provided no further details.

3 The complainant provided no further details.

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suspected that his father had been subjected to torture. The complainant produced a video

showing that he was at the demonstration at the embassy.

2.6

On 11 September 2020, the Swedish Migration Agency rejected the complainant’s

request for suspension of the deportation order. It found that, in a decision issued by the

administrative authorities of the third country, it was mentioned that the complainant had

entered that country the day after the complainant claimed that he had demonstrated at the

embassy. The third country’s authorities did not specify which day the complainant had

demonstrated at the embassy or that he had been detained by the police and convicted of

trespassing on the embassy property. The Agency therefore concluded that the complainant

had not submitted any documents that supported the assertion that the complainant had

demonstrated at the embassy, had been detained by the police in that country and had been

sentenced to a fine, or that embassy staff and/or the Iranian regime had become aware of the

complainant. The complainant had not submitted any documents to support his allegation

that his father had died or that his death was linked to the complainant’s political activities.

2.7

On 13 October 2020, Luleå Administrative Court dismissed the complainant’s appeal,

considering that he had not shown it to be probable that the Iranian authorities had become

aware of him in connection with the incident at the embassy in the third country or had

subsequently acquired a special interest in him. On 19 November 2020, the Migration Court

of Appeal refused him leave to appeal.

2.8

On 20 November 2023, the complainant’s deportation order expired. On 27 November

2023, he submitted a new application for asylum and produced photos and videos from

several demonstrations that he had attended and interviews that he had given. He also

contended that he managed one of the social media accounts of the Balochistan People’s

Party.

2.9

On 20 September 2024, the Swedish Migration Agency rejected the application.

While it conceded that the Iranian authorities’ intelligence activities in Sweden did target

asylum-seekers belonging to minority groups considered by the regime to pose a threat, it

remained unclear how thoroughly the Iranian authorities could monitor the content of

messages on foreign social media platforms. It also accepted that the fact that the complainant

belonged to the Baluchi minority group entailed an elevated risk of persecution. However,

the vulnerability of the group was not such that mere membership was in itself sufficient for

a person to be considered to have a well-founded fear of persecution in the Islamic Republic

of Iran. In that regard, the Agency observed that no information had emerged to suggest that

the complainant had previously been subjected to persecution in the Islamic Republic of Iran

on the grounds of his ethnicity.

2.10

The Swedish Migration Agency did not question the complainant’s allegation that he

had carried out an act of protest outside the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran to a third

country, but it noted that there was nothing to specifically indicate that the Iranian authorities

had taken notice of the complainant because of it. The complainant did not submit any

documents to support the claim that embassy staff in that country had filed a police report

against him or that he had subsequently been detained and fined. The Agency did not question

the assertions that the complainant was a member of the Balochistan People’s Party in

Sweden, that he had taken part in the party’s activities in the way that he had described or

that the activities that he had undertaken typically displeased the Iranian authorities.

However, no specific details had emerged to support the claim that the complainant’s

engagement had drawn the attention of the Iranian authorities.

2.11

The Swedish Migration Agency noted that there was no evidence that the

complainant’s role as an administrator of the party’s social media accounts was public or that

his personal data had appeared in any of the party’s public channels. With regard to the

complainant’s participation in demonstrations, it had not emerged that he had any distinct

public role apart from having given a speech at one of them to around 10 people. There was

no evidence that the speech was published or otherwise disseminated. With regard to the

scale of the complainant’s engagement, the Agency pointed to a supplementary submission

of 11 September 2024, wherein the complainant had stated that he regularly took part in party

meetings, but that he had not taken part in any demonstrations in the preceding six months.

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The Agency therefore assessed that his political activity in Sweden was still at a low level

and, in addition, that it had diminished in scale.

2.12

The Swedish Migration Agency did not question the submission that the complainant

had published material on social media that was critical of the Iranian regime. However, there

was no evidence to show or suggest that the Iranian authorities had noticed or monitored the

complainant’s social media accounts. The Agency noted that the engagement with Z’s posts

appeared to be low relative to the large number of followers. The screenshots from his

Facebook and Instagram accounts produced on 11 September 2024 showed that four of his

Facebook posts had received two, two, five and five likes, respectively. One of those posts

received one comment and had been shared once, and one of the posts had been shared twice.

The other screenshots did not show the number of likes or potential dissemination. The four

screenshots that displayed Instagram posts showed that the complainant had received 12, 18,

15 and 4 likes, respectively, and no comments. The Agency concluded that the evidence

regarding the number of followers and interactions on the complainant’s social media

accounts was not sufficient for his posts to be considered to have had such a reach that they

might have attracted the interest of the Iranian authorities.

2.13

The Agency noted that an interview with the complainant on 17 October 2023 had

been published on Instagram by two accounts with relatively large numbers of followers and

accepted that the Instagram accounts had published posts that typically displeased the Iranian

authorities. However, it held that the post on which the complainant had appeared only had

2,912 likes, which the Agency considered to be a relatively low number. The number of

views was not shown. Apart from the interview published on 17 October 2023, the

complainant’s participation in demonstrations was published on platforms with relatively

limited reach and exposure. In the light of the foregoing, the Agency concluded that the

complainant had not plausibly demonstrated that his political activity in Sweden had come

to the attention of the Iranian authorities.

2.14

As to the complainant’s allegation of the harassment of his family members because

of his political activity in Sweden, the Swedish Migration Agency did not question the

assertion that his father had passed away, but found that the death certificate could not serve

as support for the claims that his father had been detained because of the complainant’s

political activities in Sweden or that his death could in any way be linked to the complainant.

2.15

On 5 February 2025, the Stockholm Administrative Court dismissed the

complainant’s appeal. On 20 March 2025, the Migration Court of Appeal refused him leave

to appeal.

Complaint

3.1

The complainant submits that, if he is returned to the Islamic Republic of Iran, he

would face a real risk of persecution and ill-treatment because of his ethnicity and political

activities, as well as his illegal departure from the country. He notes that Baluchi activists are

persecuted in the Islamic Republic of Iran, with reports of their disappearance, detention,

torture and ill-treatment.

3.2

The fact that the complainant is politically active for the Balochistan People’s Party

in Sweden, has published widespread material on the activities of the party under his own

name and has participated in several demonstrations against the Iranian regime4 constitutes

an immediate risk of persecution in the Islamic Republic of Iran, given the regime’s

intelligence activities.5 While it is impossible to prove that the Iranian authorities know about

the complainant’s activities, the surveillance, in combination with the visibility of the

complainant’s activities and the widespread information concerning them, makes it highly

likely that the Iranian authorities have such knowledge.

4 The complainant provided to the Committee screen captures from www.youtube.com.

5 In an article published on 16 June 2018 in Dagens Nyheter, the head of the Security Service of

Sweden indicated that the Islamic Republic of Iran was one of the countries in the world that were the

most active with intelligence surveillance in Sweden, see www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/sapochefen-

ryssland-kina-iran-mest-aktiva-har/.

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3.3

The complainant contests the denial of his application for suspension of enforcement

of the deportation order. He asserts that, given the presence of CCTV cameras at the Embassy

of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the third country, the embassy would have recordings of

him. He claims that, although his application for a new examination based on his presence at

the embassy was denied, he has not been provided with an assessment of the merits regarding

those claims.

3.4

The complainant notes that the Committee has confirmed that even opposition on a

lower level is closely watched by the Iranian regime.6 The European Court of Human Rights

also found that not only high-profile activists are detained, but anyone who demonstrates

against the regime may be at risk of being detained and ill-treated or tortured. 7 The

complainant therefore considers that the Swedish asylum authorities failed to make an overall

assessment of the cumulated risks that he would face if returned to the Islamic Republic of

Iran.

3.5

The complainant invokes a risk for having left his country illegally. He notes that the

Committee has already found that there are risks related to leaving the Islamic Republic of

Iran illegally and unsuccessfully applying for asylum abroad, especially in combination with

belonging to a vulnerable ethnic group.8

State Party’s observations on admissibility and the merits

4.1

In its observations of 21 February 2022, the State Party challenged the admissibility

of the complaint, arguing that it was manifestly unfounded because it failed to rise to the

minimum level of substantiation required for the purposes of admissibility.

4.2

On the merits, while not wishing to underestimate the concerns that may legitimately

be expressed regarding the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the State

Party recalls that the situation in the country does not in itself suffice to establish that the

complainant’s deportation would be contrary to article 3 of the Convention. It emphasizes

that the Swedish Migration Agency made an assessment of all the new circumstances in the

complainant’s submission for impediments to the enforcement of the deportation order. The

refusal to grant a new examination was thereafter appealed and reviewed by the Migration

Court of Appeal. During those proceedings, the migration authorities assessed the new

evidence provided by the complainant.

4.3

As to the complainant’s allegation that the Swedish migration authorities failed to

make a cumulative assessment of his individual risk of facing persecution in the Islamic

Republic of Iran based on his belonging to the Baluchi ethnic group and the Sunni Muslim

minority, it is clear from the decision of the Swedish Migration Agency of 2 August 2018

that an assessment was made taking into account the complainant’s belonging to the Baluchi

ethnic group. The State Party notes that the complainant has no official or leading position

within the Iranian opposition. His political activity online is limited to his own social media

accounts, and there is nothing to suggest that the material has been distributed to a wider

circle or that it has come to the attention of the Iranian authorities. Accordingly, the

complainant cannot be considered to have been involved in extensive political and human

rights activities such that they would expose him to persecution or serious harm amounting

to a breach of the Convention, if he is returned to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

4.4

In its observations of 7 July 2025 with respect to the second asylum application, the

State Party noted that all the evidence submitted by the complainant had been duly considered

in the migration authorities’ assessment and examined in the light of relevant and up-to-date

country of origin information. It holds that there is no reason to conclude that the domestic

rulings were inadequate or that the outcome of the domestic proceedings was in any way

arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice.

6 Azizi v. Switzerland (CAT/C/53/D/492/2012), para. 8.6.

7 European Court of Human Rights, S.F. and others v. Sweden, Application No. 52077/10, Judgment,

15 May 2012, para. 63.

8 X v. Switzerland (CAT/C/53/D/470/2011), paras. 7.7 and 7.8.

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Complainant’s comments on the State Party’s observations on admissibility and

the merits

5.1

On 20 December 2022, the complainant submitted comments on the State Party’s

observations, arguing that the migration authorities had failed to make a cumulative

assessment of his multiple risk factors. While they considered that solely belonging to a

vulnerable minority group in the Islamic Republic of Iran was not by itself sufficient grounds

for protection, they had not considered his belonging to the Baluchi ethnic group jointly with

all circumstances in an overall risk assessment. He refers to reports of the treatment of

Baluchi protesters by the security forces in the Islamic Republic of Iran.9

5.2

While the complainant accepts that the reported impediments to enforcement were

examined, he submits that it was not an examination of the merits, which would have required

a new examination. He insists that, given the Iranian regime’s monitoring of the Internet

activities of persons critical of the regime, including members of the diaspora, there is a

considerable likelihood that the regime has knowledge of his activities and opinions.

5.3

In a submission dated 2 May 2025, the complainant insisted that his political activities

for increased rights, freedoms and independence for the Baluchi people and his activities on

social media had very likely come or would come to the attention of the Iranian authorities if

he was returned to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Issues and proceedings before the Committee

Consideration of admissibility

6.1

Before considering any complaint submitted in a communication, the Committee must

decide whether it is admissible under article 22 of the Convention. The Committee has

ascertained, as it is required to do under article 22 (5) (a) of the Convention, that the same

matter has not been and is not being examined under another procedure of international

investigation or settlement.

6.2

In accordance with article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention, the Committee shall not

consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that the individual

has exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Committee notes that, in the present case,

the State Party has not challenged the admissibility of the complaint on those grounds.

Accordingly, the Committee considers that it is not precluded by article 22 (5) (b) from

examining the communication.

6.3

The Committee notes that the State Party challenges the admissibility of the

complainant’s claims under article 3 as being manifestly unfounded, given that the

complainant has not substantiated the existence of substantial grounds for believing that he

would face a foreseeable, personal, present and real risk of torture if returned to the Islamic

Republic of Iran. The Committee considers, however, that the complainant has sufficiently

substantiated his claims for the purposes of admissibility, on the basis of article 3 of the

Convention, regarding his risk of being subjected to torture and ill-treatment if he is returned

to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Accordingly, it declares the communication admissible and

proceeds with its consideration of the merits.

Consideration of the merits

7.1

The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information

made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention.

7.2

In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the return of the

complainant to the Islamic Republic of Iran would constitute a violation of the State Party’s

obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return a person to another State

where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being

subjected to torture.

9 Amnesty International, “Iran: urgent international action needed to stop mass killings of Baluchi

protesters”, 10 November 2022.

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7.3

The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that

the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to

the Islamic Republic of Iran. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all

relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence

of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the

Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the complainant

would be at a foreseeable, personal, present and real risk of being subjected to torture in the

country to which he would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross,

flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient

reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to

torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the

individual concerned would be at a foreseeable, present, personal and real risk. Conversely,

the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that

a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. Moreover, the

Committee notes that, given that the Islamic Republic of Iran is not a party to the Convention,

in the event of a violation of the complainant’s rights under the Convention in that country,

he would be deprived of the legal option of recourse to the Committee for protection of any

kind.

7.4

The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of

article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, according to which the risk of torture

must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. Although the risk does

not have to be shown to be highly probable, the burden of proof generally falls on the

complainant, who must present an arguable case establishing that he or she faces a

foreseeable, present, personal and real risk.10 The Committee also recalls that, in accordance

with the same general comment, it gives considerable weight to findings of fact made by

organs of the State Party concerned, but it is not bound by such findings and instead has the

power, under article 22 (4) of the Convention, to make a free assessment of the information

available to it, taking into account all the circumstances relevant to each case.11

7.5

In the present case, the Committee notes that the complainant maintains that he fears

persecution and ill-treatment, should he be returned to the Islamic Republic of Iran, because

of his ethnicity and political activities, as well as his illegal departure from the country. In

particular, he assumes that his political activity for the Balochistan People’s Party in Sweden,

which is reflected on social media, has very likely attracted the attention of the Iranian

authorities.

7.6

The Committee notes that the State Party’s authorities have not called into question

the submission that the complainant is an active member of the Balochistan People’s Party

in Sweden, that the Iranian intelligence authorities target, in Sweden, asylum-seekers who

belong to minority groups considered by the regime to pose a threat, such as the Baluchi

minority to which the complainant belongs, and that the complainant has published material

on social media that is critical of the Iranian regime. They have however concluded that the

complainant did not produce evidence to demonstrate that his political activities had attracted

the attention of the Iranian authorities. They also assessed the mere fact of being Baluchi not

to post automatically a personal risk.

7.7

The Committee observes that the complainant has provided no evidence to challenge

those specific arguments given by the Swedish authorities. The complainant has thus

submitted no evidence to demonstrate, beyond a simple hypothesis, that he has indeed

attracted the attention of the Iranian authorities for his political activities. The Committee

considers that the complainant has not demonstrated a personal risk to him by virtue of being

Baluchi that would put him in a special situation of risk and in a situation significantly

different to many other Baluchi Iranians.

10 See, for example, A.R. v. Netherlands (CAT/C/31/D/203/2002), para. 7.3; and Dadar v. Canada

(CAT/C/35/D/258/2004), para. 8.4. See also general comment No. 4 (2017), para. 38.

11 General comment No. 4 (2017), para. 50.

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7.8

The Committee notes that the State Party recognizes that legitimate concern can be

expressed regarding the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nevertheless,

the Committee recalls that the occurrence of human rights violations in the complainant’s

country of origin is not, in itself, sufficient for it to conclude that a complainant is personally

at risk of being tortured.12 The Committee notes that the complainant had ample opportunity

to provide supporting evidence and more details about his claims to the Swedish authorities,

orally and in writing, over the course of two sets of asylum proceedings. However, the

evidence provided by the complainant fails to sufficiently substantiate his claim and does not

make it possible to conclude that his involvement in political activities in Sweden or his

belonging to the Baluchi minority could put him at risk of being subjected to torture or

inhuman or degrading treatment upon his return to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

7.9

In the light of the above considerations, and on the basis of all the information

submitted to it by the complainant and the State Party, including on the general situation of

human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Committee considers that, in the present

case, the information on file does not allow it to conclude that the complainant’s return to the

Islamic Republic of Iran would expose him to a foreseeable, personal, present and real risk

of being subjected to torture.

8.

The Committee, acting under article 22 (7) of the Convention, concludes that the

deportation of the complainant to the Islamic Republic of Iran would not constitute a violation

by the State Party of article 3 of the Convention.

12 See, for example, H.R.E.S. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/64/D/783/2016), para. 8.14.

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Annex

Joint opinion of Committee members Todd Buchwald and

Ana Racu (dissenting)

1.

We respectfully dissent from the Committee’s decision. The case raises two points. The

first concerns the burden of proof that the State Party expected the complainant to meet in order

to establish that the Iranian authorities were aware of his political activities. As explained below,

we believe that the burden of proof was, in the circumstances of the present case, unreasonably

high. On the second point, we are concerned that the State Party’s analysis of the complainant’s

situation was overly backward-looking in that it focused solely on whether the Iranian authorities

had become aware of the complainant’s political activities in the past, to the exclusion of whether

they would find out about those activities if the State Party indeed proceeds to return the

complainant to the Islamic Republic of Iran. We believe that these two points are important in

their own right but that they become critically important in the light of the elevated risk that the

complainant in this case faces because of his ethnicity.

2.

On the first point, the particular facts are key. The State Party does not dispute the

complainant’s description of his history of political activities in Sweden,1 nor does it dispute that

Iranian intelligence authorities affirmatively target asylum-seekers belonging to minority groups

considered by the regime to pose a threat,2 that the complainant’s situation would be precarious

if the Iranian authorities know about such activities3 or that the complainant’s Baluchi ethnicity

significantly elevates his risk profile.4

3.

Notwithstanding those unchallenged facts, the State Party countered that the

complainant failed to demonstrate that the Iranian authorities had previously taken notice of

his activities (see para. 2.3 of the Committee’s decision). While not questioning that the

complainant had published material criticizing the Iranian authorities on social media, the

State Party reasoned that the complainant had not established that the Iranian authorities had

noticed or monitored the complainant’s social media accounts (see para. 2.12). Similarly,

while conceding that an interview with the complainant was published on two Instagram

accounts “with relatively large numbers of followers” that published posts “that typically

displeased the Iranian authorities”, and mentioning that the post on which the complainant

appeared had 2,912 likes (see para. 2.13), the State Party contended that the complainant had

not plausibly demonstrated that his political activities in Sweden “had come to the attention”

of the Iranian authorities (see paras. 2.13 and 4.3).

4.

In considering these contentions, it is necessary to consider the burden of proof that a

complainant must shoulder in a case such as this. It is of course axiomatic that the

complainant must ordinarily bear the burden of establishing that he or she faces a risk that is

sufficient to make removal impermissible under article 3 of the Convention. However, as the

Committee’s jurisprudence makes clear, it is also axiomatic that the burden is reversed “when

complainants are in a situation where they cannot elaborate on their case, such as when they

have demonstrated that they have no possibility of obtaining documentation relating to their

allegation of torture”.5

5.

It is therefore necessary to consider the extent to which we are in such a situation here,

and to ask what burden of proof the complainant can reasonably be expected to bear in order

to establish that the Iranian authorities had noticed his political activities. In our judgment,

the answer to that question must take into account the fact that: (a) it is conceded that the

1 See paras. 2.3, 2.10 and 7.6 of the Committee’s decision.

2 See paras. 2.9 and 7.6 of the Committee’s decision.

3 See para. 2.10 of the Committee’s decision, noting that the Swedish Migration Agency did not question

the assertion that the activities that the complainant had undertaken “typically displeased the Iranian

authorities”.

4 See para. 2.9 of the Committee’s decision.

5 General comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of

article 22, para. 38.

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GE.25-20934

complainant’s activities would “displease” those intelligence authorities; (b) the Iranian

intelligence authorities are understood to actively target and seek out information about such

people, as opposed simply to passively collecting information that might drift their way;

(c) the relevant information about the complainant’s activities would in fact appear to be

readily obtainable (e.g. through simple Internet searches already undertaken or to be

undertaken in connection with the routine processing of his return to the Islamic Republic of

Iran) if the intelligence activities do seek it out; (d) particularly given the clandestine nature

of intelligence activities, there is no reason to believe that the Iranian intelligence authorities

would reveal, or that it would otherwise be apparent, if they had already been able to collect

such information; and (e) there is a high risk that, if the intelligence authorities have collected

or do collect such information, the results for the complainant would be severe. In light of

these considerations, it is hard to know what further evidence the complainant could

reasonably have been expected to produce that the Iranian authorities had found out about

his activities.

6.

On the second point, we are concerned that the State Party’s analysis was overly

backward-looking. In particular, the reasoning was structured as if the ultimate question was

limited to whether the Iranian authorities had already noticed the complainant’s political

activities. The Committee’s jurisprudence is, however, quite clear that, while evidence about

what has happened in the past is probative, the analysis ultimately is based on the prospects

for what will happen in the future. The Committee routinely explains in its decisions that the

fact that a person has been subjected to torture or other abuse in the past is important, but

only insofar as it sheds light on the question ultimately in issue: whether the person is

sufficiently likely to be subjected to torture in the future.6

7.

Similarly, in a case such as this, the relevant question is not limited to whether the

Iranian authorities have previously taken notice of the complainant’s activities, but must

include consideration of the likelihood that they will uncover them if the complainant is

removed to their territory. Where the complainant’s political activities – even if previously

unnoticed – would almost certainly come to light, for example, through a simple Internet

search conducted as part of the process of his return, that question is crucially important.

8.

All of this of course takes place in a context in which the complainant is a member of

an ethnic group that is reported to be exceedingly vulnerable.7 Against that backdrop, we

believe it is incumbent upon the State Party, before proceeding with any return of the

complainant to the Islamic Republic of Iran, to reconsider the conclusion that the Iranian

authorities are unaware of the complainant’s activities in the light of the burden of proof

considerations described in paragraphs 4 and 5 above and to consider the possibility that –

even if the Iranian authorities had not previously uncovered evidence of the complainant’s

political activities – they are sufficiently likely to do so in the process of the complainant’s

removal to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

6 See, for example, M.F. v. Sweden (CAT/C/41/D/326/2007), para. 7.6.

7 See, for example, A/HRC/55/62, paras. 53, 54, 62, 63, 78 and 84.