Inadmissibility decision; Substantive issues: extradition; Articles: 8 (1) 9 (1); Procedural issues: exhaustion of domestic remedies ratione materiae ratione personae victim status; [CAT: UNO-Antifolterkonvention, Übereinkommen gegen Folter; Convention contre la torture; Convenzione contro la tortura]
Volltext (verifizierbarer Originaltext)
Marcos Roitman Rosenmann v. Spain, Communication No. 176/2000,
U.N. Doc. A/57/44 at 210 (2002).
Decisions of the Committee Against Torture under article 22 of the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
- Twenty-eighth session -
Complaint No. 176/2000
Complainant: Marcos Roitman Rosenmann
Represented by: Juan A. Garcés
State party concerned: Spain
Date of complaint: 25 October 2000
The Committee against Torture, established under article 17 of the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Meeting on 30 April 2002,
Having concluded its consideration of complaint No. 176/2000, submitted to the
Committee against Torture under article 22 of the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Having taken into account all information made available to it by the complainant,
his counsel and the State party,
Adopts its Decision under article 22, paragraph 7, of the Convention.
Decision
1. The complainant is Mr. Marcos Roitman Rosenmann, a Spanish citizen of
Chilean origin and professor of Sociology, at present residing in Madrid. He is
represented by counsel. He alleges violations by Spain of articles 8, paragraph 4, 9,
paragraphs 1 and 2, 13 and 14 of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Spain is a party to the
Convention, and gave the declaration under article 22 on 21 October 1987.
The facts as submitted by the complainant
2.1 The complainant claims that he was subjected to torture in Chile following the
coup d'état of September 1973. On 4 July 1996, a group of alleged torture victims
filed a complaint pursuant to the applicable provisions on actio popularis (arts.
19.1 and 20.3 of the LO del Poder Judicial, arts. 101 and 270 of the Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Criminal, acción popular, art. 125 of the Spanish Constitution)
with the Juzgado Central de Instrucción de Guardia de la Audiencia Nacional,
requesting that criminal proceedings be opened against the former Chilean Chief of
State, General Augusto Pinochet, for violations of human rights allegedly
committed in Chile between September 1973 and March 1990, including violations
of articles 1, 2, 4 and 16 of the Convention. On 7 May 1997 the complainant
appeared before the Audiencia Nacional and gave testimony as a witness of torture
in Chile.
2.2 On 16 October 1998 General Pinochet, who had travelled from Chile to the
United Kingdom for medical treatment and was convalescing in London, was
placed under detention by United Kingdom police authorities pursuant to a warrant
issued on the basis of the criminal proceedings opened in Spain. After more than
16 months of legal, political and diplomatic actions, the United Kingdom Home
Secretary allowed General Pinochet to return to Chile on 2 March 2000.
2.3 The complainant states that Spain has extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes
committed against Spanish citizens anywhere in the world, and that, accordingly, it
had the right and the obligation to request the extradition of General Pinochet from
the United Kingdom, in order to try him before the Spanish courts because of
crimes
committed
against
Spanish
citizens
in
Chile.
2.4 On 8 October 1999 the Bow Street Magistrates Court in the United Kingdom
decided that General Augusto Pinochet could be extradited to Spain. General
Pinochet filed a writ of habeas corpus with the High Court, which was scheduled
for a hearing on 20 March 2000. In the meantime, the Home Office, on its own
initiative, ordered a medical examination of General Pinochet, which took place on
5 January 2000. On the basis of the results of this examination, the Home Secretary
informed the parties on 11 January 2000 that he was considering the possibility of
discontinuing the extradition process for medical reasons and invited comments by
18 January. The Spanish Audiencia Nacional, through the Spanish Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, informed the British Home Office on 13 January that it maintained
its request for extradition. However, by note verbale of 17 January 2000, the
Spanish Embassy in London indicated that Spain would not appeal a decision by
the
Home
Secretary
to
discontinue
the
extradition
process.
2.5 On 19 January 2000 the Audiencia Nacional prepared a document addressed to
the (British) Crown Prosecution Service, counterpart of the Spanish judicial
authorities in the extradition process, to file an appeal in case of a negative
decision by the Home Secretary. However, the Spanish Ministry for Foreign
Affairs did not forward this document to the Crown Prosecution Service.
2.6 In a report dated 20 January 2000, the Crown Prosecution Service requested
instructions in order to prepare an appeal before 23 January. The Spanish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs did not forward this report to the Audiencia Nacional until 10
February 2000. Other requests of the Crown Prosecution Service of 24 and 25
January never reached the Audiencia Nacional, as a result of which the Crown
Prosecution Service was unable to intervene in the judicial hearings held on 26 and
27 January in connection with a claim filed by Belgium and others against the
decision of the Home Secretary to keep the medical reports secret.
2.7 On 24 January the Audiencia Nacional informed the Spanish Ministry for
Foreign Affairs of its intention to appeal in case the extradition was not granted.
However, it was reported that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had made public
statements indicating that he would not transmit such an appeal to the British
authorities.
2.8 In a decision dated 15 February 2000, the High Court accepted the claim filed
by Belgium in connection with the medical reports and asked the Home Office to
send copy of them to the Audiencia Nacional in order to allow it to make a
submission, if it so wished. On the same date the Home Office sent the reports to
the Audiencia Nacional through the Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The
Audiencia Nacional made its submission to the Home Office on 22 February 2000,
including a medical report in which Spanish doctors questioned the conclusions
reached by the British physicians who had examined General Pinochet on 5
January 2000.
2.9 On 1 March 2000 at 4 p.m. the Home Secretary informed the Spanish
Ambassador in London through the Crown Prosecution Service, as well as the
authorities of Belgium, France and Switzerland, that he would make public his
decision concerning the extradition process on the following day at 8 a.m. The
Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, however, did not inform the Audiencia
Nacional. At the same time the Home Office also sent a letter to the Crown
Prosecution Service asking it to inform the Home Office in advance in case it
decided to file an appeal before the Courts on the following day. Copy of this letter
was sent to the Audiencia Nacional by the Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs
only on 2 March at 11:18 hours, after the Spanish press had reported on it. Without
waiting to receive the letter, the Audiencia Nacional, on 2 March, issued an order
instructing the Crown Prosecution Service to file an appeal against the decision to
release General Pinochet. The order was faxed at 10 a.m. to the Spanish Foreign
Minister, who decided not to forward it to the Crown Prosecution Service and
informed the press accordingly. In view of the fact that an appeal had not been
filed, the Home Secretary, at 2 p.m., authorized the departure of General Pinochet's
flight for Chile.
2.10 With respect to the exhaustion of domestic remedies in Spain, the
complainant states that he filed a complaint against D. Abel Matutes Juan, the then
Minister for Foreign Affairs, before the Spanish Supreme Court for refusing to
cooperate with the Judiciary. In a resolution dated 1 February 2000, the Spanish
Supreme Court refused to examine the complaint. The complainant then filed an
appeal against the Resolution, which was also rejected on 22 February 2000. On 24
February 2000, the complainant filed a new complaint against the Minister for
Foreign Affairs for concealing documents relevant to the extradition process. The
Supreme Court refused to examine this complaint in Resolutions dated 6 March
and 13 April 2000. On 16 March 2000, the complainant filed a third complaint
against the Minister for failing to transmit submissions of the Audiencia Nacional
to the Crown Prosecution Service. This complaint was dismissed by Resolutions
dated 28 April and 3 May 2000.
2.11 The complainant states that the same matter has not been submitted to any
other
international
procedure
of
investigation
or
settlement.
The complaint
3.1 The complainant argues that under Spanish law the judicial authorities are in
control of the extradition process and that the Executive has the obligation to
comply with the judicial authorities. He claims that in the case at hand, by failing
to follow the instructions of the judicial authorities and promptly forward the
relevant documents to the British counterpart, the Spanish Minister for Foreign
Affairs obstructed the extradition process and did not act in an impartial manner, in
contravention
of
articles
8,
9,
13
and
14
of
the
Convention.
3.2 The complainant claims, inter alia, that Spain violated its obligations under the
Convention by not pressing with all due diligence its extradition request. In this
context the complainant invokes article 13 of the Convention, which stipulates in
part that "Each State party shall ensure that any individual who alleges he has been
subjected to torture in any territory under its jurisdiction has the right to complain
to, and to have his case promptly and impartially examined by, its competent
authorities." It is argued that the deliberate obstruction of the extradition process
violated the complainant's rights under article 13 of the Convention to have his
case examined by competent authorities and to obtain compensation under article
14 of the Convention.
3.3 The complainant also invokes article 9, paragraph 1, of the Convention, which
stipulates that "States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of
assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of any of the
offences referred to in article 4 ". It is argued that Spain's handling of the
extradition process failed to meet this requirement.
Observations by the State party
4.1 By note verbale of 6 February 2001, the State party submitted its observations,
challenging
admissibility
on
several
grounds.
4.2 The State party considers the communication inadmissible because the
complainant lacks the quality of "victim" and explains that in the Spanish judicial
proceedings that led to the request by Spain for the extradition of General
Pinochet, the complainant was involved not as a victim or as a civil party to the
proceedings, but rather in his capacity as a witness. In this connection the State
party quotes the original complaint which stated that "the witness can be
interrogated about the general practice of torture against Spanish citizens and
citizens of other countries".
4.3 The State party further argues that the communication is inadmissible because
of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, since at the time of submission the
complainant was in the process of appealing certain Resolutions. Moreover, it is
stated that the complainant failed to appeal to the Constitutional Court (Tribunal
Constitucional) by way of amparo. It is submitted that appeals inamparo are
effective remedies in Spain, and have been successful in many other cases of
Resolutions dismissing complaints.
4.4 By note verbale of 5 June 2001 the State party reiterates the arguments
contained in its earlier submission and submits that the complaint should be
declared inadmissible because it falls outside the scope of the Convention, bearing
in mind that (1) the complainant does not claim to be a victim of torture
perpetrated by the Spanish authorities, (2) the complainant did not claim to be a
victim of torture in the Spanish proceedings against General Pinochet. In this
sense, the State party adds that the complaint is in the nature of a laboratory case in
order to test the scope of the Convention. The State party submits that the
communication is manifestly ill-founded, as the articles of the Convention do not
impose such far-reaching obligations on State parties, and certainly not on State
parties in whose territory the person accused of torture is not found. Moreover,
with regard to a right to compensation under article 14 of the Convention, the State
party explains that since the complainant was not one of the civil parties in the
Spanish criminal proceeding against General Pinochet, he would not have had any
right
to
compensation
under
the
Spanish
proceedings.
4.5 As to the claim that the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs disobeyed a
judicial order (mandato judicial), the State party indicates that this claim was
brought by the complainant before the Tribunal Supremo, which dismissed the
claim on the grounds that under Spanish law, as interpreted by the Tribunal
Supremo, there was no such judicial order that the Minister was bound to obey.
Moreover, in the Spanish democratic order, certain domains are properly within the
political discretion of the Executive. The State party emphasizes that it was not the
Spanish Government, but the British Government, which, in the exercise of its
political discretion, decided not to extradite General Pinochet to Spain, Belgium or
Switzerland,
and
decided
instead
to
permit
his
return
to
Chile.
4.6 The State party further argues that the Convention against Torture does not
impose upon any one State the exclusive or even preferential competence to try a
person accused of torture, in theinstant case, an exclusive or preferential
competence of Spain to try a Chilean citizen for crimes committed in Chile. Spain
acted correctly in requesting extradition from the United Kingdom, but this
extradition was not granted because of the exercise of political discretion by the
United Kingdom.
Further comments by the complainant
5. In submissions dated 6 March 2001 and 18 October 2001, the complainant
reiterates his prior statements of fact and arguments. He refers to his appearance as
a witness in the case before the Audiencia Nacional on 7 May 1997, in which he
declared that in 1973, when he was 17 years old, he and other engineering students
had been arrested and taken to a football stadium converted into a detention centre,
where they were subjected to various kinds of physical and mental abuse. The
complainant appeared as a witness, but could have joined the criminal action
against General Pinochet pursuant to articles 108, 111 and 112 of the Spanish Ley
de Enjuiciamiento Criminal. He further claims that the Committee should consider
that domestic remedies have been exhausted, since in the circumstances of the
case, an appeal on amparo to the Constitutional Court would not be an effective
remedy, bearing in mind that the Resolution of 30 May 2000 rejecting the
complainant's appeal was not a summary dismissal but a reasoned judgement, and
that the Constitutional Court recognizes the competence of the lower criminal
courts
to
interpret
the
Spanish
penal
law.
Issues and proceedings before the Committee
6.1 Before examining the merits of a communication, the Committee Against
Torture must determine whether the communication is admissible under article 22
of the Convention.
6.2 The Committee notes the complainant's allegations that the violation of the
Convention lies in the refusal of the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs to
transmit Resolutions adopted by the Audiencia Nacional to the relevant British
authorities. The Committee has also noted the State party's response that the matter
was raised by the complainant before the competent Spanish courts, which
determined that there was no violation of Spanish law. The Committee considers
that the interpretation of national laws is within the competence of the tribunals of
States parties and that, accordingly, it is not in a position to make a finding with
respect to the application or interpretation of Spanish law in matters of extradition.
The Committee limits itself to examining the admissibility of the communication
in the light of the criteria established by the Convention against Torture and other
Cruel,
Inhuman
or
Degrading
Treatment
or
Punishment.
6.3 The Committee notes that the State party's objections to the admissibility of the
communication are essentially fourfold: (a) lack of standing on the part of the
complainant, who does not claim to have been tortured by Spanish authorities nor
became a party to the Spanish criminal proceedings against General Pinochet; (b)
failure to exhaust domestic remedies, including an appeal in amparo to the
Constitutional Court; (c) ratione personae, since the alleged torture was not
committed by Spanish authorities, but by agents of the Chilean State, and because
General Pinochet was not on Spanish soil; and (d) lack of competence ratione
materiae, since no article of the Convention imposes an obligation on a State party
to
demand
extradition
of
a
person
suspected
of
torture.
6.4 With respect to the State party's argument that the complainant lacks standing
to bring the communication, the Committee notes that the complainant claims that
he was arrested by members of the Chilean police and subjected to beatings and
other ill-treatment. While those acts occurred outside of Spain, and before the entry
into force of the Convention, the complainant does not claim a breach by Spain of
his right not to be subjected to torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. Rather, the complainant contends that Spain is in breach
of a current obligation under the Convention to investigate fully and prosecute
alleged acts of torture falling within its jurisdiction, and, in furtherance of that
obligation, to pursue the extradition proceedings to the furthest extent possible. For
the complainant to be a victim of the alleged violation, however, he must be
personally and directly affected by the alleged breach in question. The Committee
observes that, in the present case, the complainant was not a civil party to the
criminal proceedings in Spain against the alleged offender, General Pinochet, nor
did his case form part of the Spanish extradition request. Accordingly, even if
General Pinochet had been extradited to Spain, the complainant's situation would
not have been materially altered (at least without further legal action on the
complainant's part). The Committee considers, as a consequence, that the
complainant has failed to demonstrate that, at the time of the communication, he
was a victim of the alleged failure of the State party to abide by the contended
obligation under the Convention to exhaust the full measure of avenues open to it
in
the
attempt
to
procure
the
alleged
offender's
extradition.
6.5 Moreover, with respect to (b), the Committee notes that the complainant did
not engage domestic remedies in Spain by becoming a civil party to the
proceedings to obtain the extradition of General Pinochet. Further, with regard to
his complaints against the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Committee
notes that the complainant did not make use of the remedy of amparo, which the
State party contends is an available and effective remedy, citing a number of cases
before the Constitutional Court in support of this proposition, whereas the
complainant claims thatamparo would not have resulted in any relief, citing
relevant case-law. In the circumstances, the Committee is not in a position to
decide that recourse to such remedies would have been a priori futile and thus not
required for purposes of article 22, paragraph 5 (b) of the Convention.
6.6 With respect to (c), the Committee notes that the complainant's claims with
regard to torture committed by Chilean authorities are ratione personae justiciable
in Chile and in other States in whose territory General Pinochet may be found.
However, to the extent that General Pinochet was not in Spain at the time of the
submission of the communication, the Committee would consider that articles 13
and 14 of the Convention invoked by the complainant do not apply ratione
personae to Spain. In particular, his "right to complain to, and to have his case
promptly and impartially examined by, [the] competent authorities", and his
claim to compensation would be justiciable vis-à-vis the State responsible for the
acts
of
torture,
i.e.
Chile,
not
Spain.
6.7 With respect to (d), the Committee observes that the State party possesses
extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of torture committed against its nationals. The
Committee recalls that one of the objects of the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment is to avoid any
impunity to persons having committed such acts. The Committee observes that,
based upon the State party's law, and in conformity with articles 5, paragraph 1 (c),
and 8, paragraph 4, of the Convention, the State party sought the extradition of
General Pinochet for trial in Spain. There is every indication that Spain would have
brought General Pinochet to trial, once he were to be found on its territory, further
to the indictment of 4 July 1996 of the Juez Central de la Audiencia Nacional de
España. The Committee observes, however, that while the Convention imposes an
obligation to bring to trial a person, alleged to have committed torture, who is
found in its territory, articles 8 and 9 of the Convention do not impose any
obligation to seek an extradition, or to insist on its procurement in the event of a
refusal. In this connection, the Committee refers to article 5, paragraph 1 (c), of the
Convention, pursuant to which a State party shall take the necessary measures to
establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 "when the victim
is a national of that State if that State considers it appropriate". The Committee
considers this provision to establish a discretionary faculty rather than a mandatory
obligation to make, and insist upon, an extradition request. Accordingly, the
complaint falls ratione materiae outside the scope of the articles of the Convention
invoked by the complainant.
7. The Committee against Torture consequently decides:
(a) That the communication is inadmissible;
(b) That this decision shall be communicated to the State party and to the
complainant.
____________________
* The following members of the Committee participated in the examination of the
present complaint: Peter Burns, Guibril Camara, Sayed El-Masry, Alejandro
Gonzalez Poblete, Andreas Mavrommatis, Ole Rasmussen, Alexander Yakovlev
and Yu Mengjia. Pursuant to Rule 103, paragraph (1) (c), of the Committee's Rules
of Procedure, Mr. Fernando Mariño Menendez did not participate in the
consideration of this case.
** Pursuant to Rule 113 of the Committee's Rules of Procedure, an individual
opinion signed by one Committee member is appended.
[Done in English, French, Russian and Spanish, the English, French and Spanish
texts being the original versions.]
Individual
opinion
of
Committee
member
Mr.
Guibril
Camara,
dissenting in part
I share the ultimate conclusion of the Committee that this case is inadmissible, but
only on the basis of some of the reasons advanced by the majority of the
Committee. I fully subscribe to the majority's reasoning as set out in paragraphs 6.4
and 6.5 to the effect that the author is neither a "victim" in the present case in the
sense of article 22, in that he was not a party to the proceedings against Pinochet in
Spain, nor that it has been demonstrated that the exhaustion of domestic remedies
in the form of an appeal of amparo to the Constitutional Court would be a
priori futile. It would have been consistent with the Committee's practice, once the
inadmissibility of this case became clear on either or both of these formal grounds,
to conclude its consideration at that point. Instead, for reasons that are not clear
from the text of the majority's decision, the majority has elected to engage in a
complex discussion on the scope of the jurisdictional articles of the Convention
which would have been more appropriately considered under the merits of the case
had it been admissible. In procedural law, the first action of a judicial or quasi-
judicial body, such as the Committee, is to satisfy itself that it is appropriately
seized of a matter; this has always been the Committee's previous practice. And
should it not be appropriately seized thereof, notably in the case of inadmissibility,
the sole decision to be taken, after having indicated the reasons therefor, should be
to conclude with declaring the case inadmissible without delving into its merits.
In my view, the majority has come to a premature interpretation of articles 5, 8, 9,
13 and 14. The majority considers that, as article 5 provides for jurisdiction to be
exercised by a State party in cases where the victim is a national of that State "if
that State considers it appropriate", a State possesses a discretion at all points of an
investigation and prosecution as to whether it should pursue proceedings in such a
case. This view neglects a variety of issues:
(a) It would appear to follow from the scheme of the Convention, including the
placement of article 5 and its surrounding articles, as well as the entirety of the text
of article 5, that the option in article 5, paragraph 1 (c), is to leave to States the
ability to elect, when implementing the Convention into domestic law, whether or
not they will confer, in principle, jurisdiction over nationals who are extraterritorial
victims of torture upon their investigative and prosecutory bodies. The travaux
préparatoires and State practice look to confirm that the option contained in article
5, paragraph 1 (c), is aimed at the adoption of generally applicable norms of
criminal law by which a State party confers upon its authorities of the ability to
investigate and prosecute any and all such cases. Spain, among other States, has
elected to exercise that option and confer such extraterritorial jurisdiction upon its
investigative and prosecutory authorities. It was pursuant to this jurisdiction, which
was confirmed by proceedings in the Audiencia Nacional at an early stage, that the
Spanish authorities were able to initiate their investigation of General Pinochet. It
is therefore difficult to understand why the discretion in article 5, paragraph 1 (c),
should, for States parties that have made the election to assume such jurisdiction,
thereupon further extend to each individual case investigated and prosecuted
pursuant to this jurisdiction. In this light, it seems that the majority has confused,
on the one hand, the possibility to assume a (usually legislative) norm of general
application concerning investigation and prosecution of acts of falling within
article 5, paragraph 1 (c), with, on the other hand, the pursuit of each individual
case.
(b) The majority's reasoning that the discretion contained in article 5 has further
meaning beyond that outlined and that the Convention does not require an
extradition request to be made is difficult to square both with the majority's own
emphasis on the object of the Convention to deny impunity and to the consistent
theme running through the Convention that States parties with jurisdiction over an
alleged act of torture should exercise such means at their disposal to bring the
alleged offender to justice. The majority's view of the "discretion" in article 5
significantly weakens the likelihood that alleged offenders in cases of torture of
extraterritorial nationals will be brought to justice, certainly as compared to the
cases in article 5, paragraph 1 (a) and (b), where no such discretion applies.
Even if the Committee is correct that the Convention does not operate to require a
State to lodge an extradition request in a case where it has jurisdiction under its
law, the Committee fails to explain why it should also be concluded that
extradition proceedings should be able to be discontinued at any point. There are
strong policy reasons, again derived from the scheme and object of the
Convention, that an extradition request, once made, should be prosecuted through
to its conclusion. It does not follow that to allow a discretion on whether to initiate
an extradition request also requires a discretion effectively to discontinue the
request at any time to be afforded.
Even if it is correct that the Convention allows a discretion to discontinue requests
for extradition, the majority wholly fails to address the central point in this case as
to which body should be exercising such a discretion. The Committee's consistent
preference has been, in numerous contexts, for judicial resolution of allegations of
torture arising within a State party. In this case, the State party's legal order confers
upon its judiciary the ability to investigate cases of extraterritorial nature, to
prosecute such cases, to seek extradition requests and to assess the legal
implications of decisions in extradition requests and to draw the necessary
conclusions. Accordingly, the State party's judiciary in this case determined that
there were grounds for a legal challenge to the Home Secretary's decision to
terminate the extradition proceedings. Another branch of the State party's
government, having theretofore acted in an essentially administrative capacity,
frustrated the judicial decision to appeal the Home Secretary's decision by failing
to transmit it to the English authorities. It is more than questionable whether such
an exercise of "discretion" by the executive is consistent with the principles
underlying the Convention, and with the expressed will of the international
community to end impunity for the authors of crimes against humanity. The
majority's decision in effect deprives the author of the ability to exhaust domestic
remedies in respect of the issues raised, being avenues which the State party itself
recognises have not been exhausted, and of thereafter returning before the
Committee.
For these reasons, I consider the majority's view expressed in paragraphs 6.6 and
6.7 to be premature and, in any event, unnecessary to the Committee's final
decision.
(Signed) Guibril Camara
[Done in English, French, Russian and Spanish, the English and French texts being
the original versions.]